Authored By: Husnain Qamar
University of London
Abstract
For many people in England and Wales, the first step in a civil claim is now more likely tobeamediation appointment than a hearing before a judge. Since May 2024, large numbers of small claims have been routed into mediation as a default stage, reflecting a clear shift fromencouragement to expectation. This development raises a more pressing question than whethersettlement is sensible: if ADR is required before a hearing, at what point does a well intentionedstepbegin to impede ef ective access to justice?This article examined whether mandatory ADR, especially compulsory mediation, interfered with access to a court and an ef ective remedy inEngland and Wales, and what safeguards keep compulsion rights-compatible. It used doctrinal andpolicy analysis, focusing on the post-Churchill legal position, the strengthened procedural roleof ADR, and the practical operation of compulsory small-claims mediation. The article foundthat thereal risk is not formal exclusion from court but indirect pressure: delay, limitation anxiety, costsconsequences and bargaining inequality can steer parties, particularly litigants in person, intosettlements they would not freely choose. It concluded that mandatory ADR can improve accesstojustice only where exemptions are workable, consequences are proportionate and support is built infor weaker parties, so the route back to adjudication remains real rather than allowing mandatoryADR to operate as a quiet barrier that places access to court on pause.
1. Introduction
In England and Wales, the civil courts are sending a clear message: try to settle, and do it early. Since May 2024, many small claims have been channelized into mediation as a default step. Theshift raises a simple but uncomfortable question. If you must go through ADR before a judgewill hear you, is access to court still a right in practice, or has it become conditional on process compliance?
ADR is not new to the civil justice system. Since the Woolf reforms and the creation of the CPR, settlement has been treated as part of responsible litigation, not a sign of weakness. For years, thelaw also carried a cautionary note: courts could encourage ADR and penalize unreasonable refusal, but there was concern that forcing unwilling parties into ADR might sit uneasily with access tojustice. That line has moved. Recent authority and procedural reform now reflect a more confident approach to court directed ADR, including the possibility of requiring parties to engage innoncourtdispute resolution where this is proportionate and does not shut the door to a judicial determination. What remains less settled is the human rights impact at ground level. A rule can preserve a hearingon paper while still shaping outcomes through delay, limitation pressure, cost, and the unevenbargaining power that is common when one party has representation and the other does not.
This article explores whether mandatory ADR, especially compulsory mediation, interferes withaccess to a court and an effective remedy in England and Wales. It focuses on court connectedformsof compulsion rather than private arbitration clauses. The central argument is that mandatoryADRcan be rights compatible where it compels participation but not settlement, preserves a real routeback to adjudication, and is applied through a careful proportionality lens with sensible exemptionsfor cases where ADR is unsuitable.This debate matters because mandatory ADR is no longer confined to commercial disputes with evenly matched lawyers. It affects ordinary people ineverydayclaims, and it affects how courts allocate time, attention, and resources across the system.
The article proceeds in five steps. It first sets out the human rights and procedural frameworkgoverning access to court and court directed ADR. It then explains the legal move fromencouragement to compulsion and the limits that still apply. Next, it evaluates the main ways mandatory ADR can hinder fairness in practice, including delay, pressure, and power imbalance. It then uses compulsory mediation in the small claims process as a concrete illustration of theserisksand safeguards. Finally, it draws the key findings and offers targeted recommendations aimedat keeping ADR effective without making adjudication harder to reach.
2. Legal Framework
This section sets out the legal map for the argument that follows. The focus is on court connectedforms of mandatory ADR in England and Wales, especially compulsory mediation, becausethat iswhere the tension with access to court is most direct. The aim is to show what the lawrequires, howprocedure has shifted towards compulsion, and where the rights limits sit.
2.1 Constitutional and Foundational Provisions
The starting point is the right to a fair hearing, which includes practical access to a court, under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [1] The right is not absolute. Restrictionscanbe legitimate, but only if they pursue a proper aim, are proportionate, and do not damage thevery
essence of access to a judicial determination. [2] This matters for mandatory ADRbecause thequestion is practical rather than rhetorical. If ADR is imposed as a step in the process, does theperson still have a real, timely route to a judge when settlement is not possible.
In domestic law, Convention rights are given effect through the Human Rights Act 1998, whichrequires courts and other public authorities to act compatibly with those rights. [3] Alongsidethis, English law also treats access to justice as a constitutional value at common law. The SupremeCourthas stressed that where people cannot practically enforce legal rights, those rights become meaningless and the rule of law is undermined. [4] These foundations provide the benchmarkfor thelater analysis. Mandatory ADR is not automatically unlawful, but it must not become a procedural hurdle that blocks effective adjudication, especially for weaker parties.
2.2 Statutory Law and Procedural Framework
There is no single statute that makes mediation compulsory across civil litigation. In practice, mandatory ADR is driven by procedural rules and court control of process rather than a standalonelegislative code. The system has also been shaped by a wider policy idea, rooted in the post Woolfsettlement culture, that responsible litigation includes serious attempts to resolve disputes without trial where that is realistic. [5]
The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2024 represent a major procedural step inthat direction. They strengthen the place of ADR within the overriding objective and active casemanagement and, most importantly, confirm an express case management power to order partiestoparticipate in ADR. [6] These changes matter because they turn policy into clear procedural authority. They also shift the debate away from whether the court can ever require ADR and towards howthepower should be exercised so that it remains fair.
A practical example of this shift is the automatic referral of many small claims money disputestotheSmall Claims Mediation Service. The pilot is set out in a dedicated practice direction andappliestomany small claims issued on or after 22 May 2024, with the court required to consider whether sanctions are appropriate where parties do not attend. [7] For the purposes of this article, the importance of the pilot is not simply settlement rates. It shows that compulsory mediationis nolonger a theoretical possibility. It is now a lived feature of civil justice for everyday disputes.
2.3 Case Law
The modern position is best understood through three decisions that mark the movement fromcaution to confidence.
Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Steel v Joy and Halliday (2004) is the referencepoint for the earlier approach. The Court of Appeal confirmed that courts may encourage ADRandreflect unreasonable refusal in costs, while also expressing concern that forcing unwillingpartiesintomediation could obstruct access to the court. [8] For a long time, those remarks were treatedas abarrier to court ordered mediation, even though the case itself was about costs consequences ratherthan a direct power to compel ADR.
Lomax v Lomax (2019) reflects the next step. The Court of Appeal held that the court couldorderearly neutral evaluation without the consent of all parties as part of case management. [9] AlthoughENE is not mediation, it is significant because it shows the court treating structured dispute resolution as part of ordinary procedural control rather than purely voluntary bargaining.
Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council (2023) is the turning point. The Court ofAppeal clarified that the court has power to stay proceedings for, or order parties to engage in, noncourt dispute resolution, provided the order is made in a way that remains compatible withArticle6. [10] The legality of mandatory ADR therefore depends on proportionality and practical impact, not onan absolute rule that ADR must always be voluntary.
2.4 Scholarly and Policy Commentary
Policy and scholarship explain why the system moved in this direction and why the rights debateremains alive. The Woolf reforms were driven by a diagnosis that civil litigation was too slow, toocomplex, and too expensive, and that settlement should be treated as a normal and responsibleoutcome rather than a failure to pursue justice. [5] In that environment, ADR is presented as awaytoreduce delay and cost and to give parties more control over outcomes.
At the same time, a consistent concern in the literature is that compulsion can change the characterofADR. The risk is not simply being asked to attend a mediation session. It is that mandatorystepscanproduce pressure that falls unevenly, especially where one party is represented and the other isalitigant in person. The weaker party may feel pushed into settlement by delay, cost, uncertainty, orfear of sanctions, even where a judicial decision would be more appropriate. [5]
2.5 International Materials
Although this is a single jurisdiction article, international material still matters because Article6provides the rights benchmark used in England and Wales, and it is the source of the proportionalityapproach applied when courts regulate access to adjudication through procedure. [1] Europeanlegal materials also help identify what safeguards keep mandatory settlement steps compatible withjudicial protection, such as keeping ADR non binding, avoiding substantial delay, protectinglimitation periods, preventing prohibitive cost, and preserving a real route back to court if settlementfails. [5]
Taken together, the framework shows a clear shift. The law now accepts that courts can direct partiestowards ADR, and the CPR has been amended to support that direction. [6] [10] The remainingquestion is how this power should be controlled so that it remains a tool for access to justiceratherthan a source of pressure, delay, and unfair settlement outcomes. That is the focus of the analysisthatfollows.
3. Analysis / Discussion
This section tests the legal shift towards mandatory ADR against what access to justice looks likeinreal disputes. The question is not whether mediation is useful. The question is what happens whenitstops feeling optional and becomes a gateway that parties must pass through before they canreachajudge.
3.1 What “Mandatory ADR” Really Means in England and Wales
A lot of the heat in this debate comes from a misunderstanding. Mandatory ADR does not usuallymean a party is forced to settle. It means a party is required to take part in a process designedtoencourage settlement, while the formal right to trial remains available if settlement is not reached. That difference sounds neat in principle, but it matters because the human rights risk oftenarisesnotfrom the existence of the process, but from the way the process changes incentives and pressure.
The legal turning point is that the court’s role is no longer described as simple encouragement. InChurchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council (2023), the Court of Appeal made clear thatcourts can stay proceedings for, or order engagement in, non court dispute resolution, so longastheorder does not effectively block a party from obtaining a judicial determination. [11]
That shift is now reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules themselves. Part 1 places emphasis ondealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost and treats ADR as part of the modern approachto civil justice rather than a side option. [12] Part 3 reinforces this by giving the court an express casemanagement power to order parties to engage in ADR. [13] Once ADR is built into procedureinthisway, the rights question becomes unavoidable. The system must ensure that mandatory ADRdoesnot turn into a filter that only the well advised and well resourced can comfortably pass.
3.2 The Human Rights Line: When Compulsion Becomes a Barrier
The rights line can be stated in simple terms. Article 6 protects a fair hearing, which includes practical access to a court. [14]Regulation of access is not automatically unlawful, but it has limits. The European Court has long accepted that restrictions must pursue a legitimate aim, be proportionate, and must not damage the very essence of the right of access to a court. [15]
In domestic law, these rights standards operate through the Human Rights Act 1998, whichrequirescourts and other public authorities to act compatibly with Convention rights. [16] Alongside that statutory framework, English law also treats access to justice as a constitutional requirement at common law. In R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (2017), the Supreme Court made the point sharply: if people are prevented in practice from enforcing legal rights, the rule of lawis undermined.[17]
This is why mandatory ADR has to be judged by effect, not label. It can serve legitimate aims, including reducing cost and delay and preserving court time for cases that genuinely requireadjudication. But those aims only carry weight if compulsion is designed with safeguards. Arights-compatible model is more likely where ADR remains non binding, does not cause substantial delay, does not impose prohibitive cost, protects limitation positions, and preserves a clear route backtothecourt if settlement fails. [18]
3.3 The Human Rights Cost Part I: Delay, Limitation Pressure, and Procedural Fatigue
Delay is one of the quiet ways access to court can be placed on pause. Even a short compulsorystepcan stretch the timeline and change how a party behaves. The effect is not neutral. Awell resourcedparty can absorb delay and treat it as strategy. A weaker party often cannot. Delay can meanstress, uncertainty, and the temptation to accept a poor settlement simply to end the process.
This is where the human rights argument becomes concrete. A formal right to a hearing does not guarantee fairness if the path to the hearing is shaped so that people are worn down before theyget there. The risk is especially sharp in lower value disputes, where the cost of continuing canquickly feel irrational even when the legal entitlement is strong. If mandatory ADR is intended tohelp, it hasto be deployed in a way that does not quietly transform time pressure into settlement pressure.
Limitation pressure creates the same kind of tilt. If a claimant fears time is running out, or doesnot understand whether the process protects their position, they may settle for less than their legal entitlement to avoid the risk of losing everything. This is not a theoretical problem. It is a predictableoutcome when procedure becomes complex for those without advice.
3.4 The Human Rights Cost Part II: Cost Barriers, Sanctions, and Coercion by Consequence
Mandatory ADR is often defended as a cheaper alternative to trial, and in many cases that is true. Butcost enters the picture in two different ways. There is the cost of participating, including timeoff work, childcare, preparation, and the hidden cost of not having legal advice. There is alsothecost ofrefusing ADR, or being seen as refusing it, through the risk of financial consequences later.
The CPR now makes the link between ADR behaviour and costs explicit. When decidingcosts, thecourt must consider conduct, including whether a party failed to comply with an order for ADRorunreasonably failed to engage in ADR. [19] That is a powerful lever. Used carefully, it discouragestactical refusal and rewards sensible cooperation. Used bluntly, it can create coercion by consequence, especially for litigants in person who may not understand what counts as reasonableengagement or who have genuine reasons for believing ADR is unsuitable.
The line between encouraging settlement and forcing settlement can blur without anyone sayingthewords “you must settle.” If the practical message becomes “settle or risk financial punishment,”thechoice is no longer a free one. Rights-compatible practice therefore depends on clarity andproportionality, and on courts being willing to treat justified refusal as a legitimate positionratherthan misconduct.
3.5 The Human Rights Cost Part III: Power Imbalance, Litigants in Person, and InformationGaps
The most serious human rights cost is inequality. ADR is often described as empowering becauseparties control the outcome. But that assumes the parties enter the process on roughly equal footing. In many disputes, one party has legal advice, experience, and confidence, while the other is alitigantin person with limited ability to value the claim or test the other side’s assertions.
The unfairness shows up in subtle ways. A represented party can frame the dispute, present settlement as the only sensible route, and use delay and risk language to steer the outcome. Alitigantin person may confuse the pressure of the process with the weakness of the case. Outcomes canlookconsensual while being driven by imbalance. Any serious mandatory ADR systemthereforehastotreat information, suitability, and vulnerability as central, not as an afterthought.
3.6 Case Study Anchor: Compulsory Mediation in the Small Claims Process
The small claims compulsory mediation model is a useful test because it makes the abstract debateconcrete. Under the pilot scheme in Practice Direction 51ZE, many small claims are referredautomatically for mediation, and the court is directed to consider whether sanctions shouldbeapplied for non attendance. [20] The policy case is clear. If low value claims can be resolvedquicklythrough a short mediation, court time is saved and parties may get closure faster.
The Ministry of Justice has presented the reform in exactly those terms, including the claimthat embedding mediation into the process will free up court capacity for more complex disputes. [21] Afree, short, accessible scheme has a stronger claim to proportionality than expensive private mediation in complex litigation. In that sense, small claims compulsory mediation may represent thebest version of mandatory ADR.
But rights risks still remain. Not every dispute is suitable for mediation at the same stage, particularlywhere disclosure or expert evidence is needed before meaningful negotiation is possible. Afreeservice can still create pressure if people believe refusal will be punished or if the process feelslikeagate-keeping obstacle and because small claims involve many litigants in person, inequalityandinformation gaps remain the central problem. A scheme can be proportionate at the systemlevel andstill produce unfair outcomes for particular people if safeguards are not actively applied.
3.7 Key Takeaways from the Analysis
Mandatory ADR is not inherently incompatible with access to court, and there are strong policyreasons for embedding ADR into civil justice. But the human rights cost becomes real whencompulsion produces delay, settlement pressure, and unequal outcomes, especially for litigantsinperson. The decisive question is whether the system preserves a realistic route back to adjudicationand whether safeguards are strong enough to prevent mandatory ADR from turning into compulsorycompromise.
4. Comparative Perspective
This section offers a limited comparative perspective to support the central argument. It does not attempt a global survey. Instead, it focuses on how selected jurisdictions have introduced mandatorymediation while seeking to preserve meaningful access to adjudication, and on the practical lessonsthis provides for England and Wales.
4.1 Comparison with Italy and Canada
Italy and Ontario (Canada) are useful comparators because they represent two different legal traditions with a similar policy move. Both have built mandatory mediation into ordinarycivil procedure, but they justify and control it in slightly different ways.
4.2 Italy and Canada: The Legal Position
Italy’s approach is shaped by European requirements of effective judicial protection. In Alassini andOthers (2010), the Court of Justice accepted that making an out of court settlement step a conditionfor bringing proceedings can be compatible with access to the courts where it does not imposeabinding outcome, does not cause substantial delay, allows urgent interim measures, and keeps theroute back to litigation open in practice. [22] In Menini and Rampanelli (2017), the Court tookthesame idea into a mandatory mediation setting and treated “voluntariness” as meaning control of theprocess and the ability to leave it, not an absolute freedom to avoid ADR altogether. The keyisthat the person’s right to go to court must be maintained in a practical sense. [23]
Ontario shows the common law version of mandatory, court connected mediation. Rule 24.1of theOntario Rules of Civil Procedure provides for mandatory mediation in specified civil actions, withthe stated aim of reducing cost and delay and supporting early and fair resolution. It sets tight timelines for when mediation should occur and allows the court to exempt a case where mediationisinappropriate. [24] The programme is presented as a permanent reform tool rather than a one off experiment, with mediation treated as a routine stage of managed litigation. [25]
4.3 Lessons for England and Wales
Two lessons are most relevant. First, mandatory ADR is most defensible when the safeguards areconcrete rather than rhetorical: clear timelines, easy access, non binding outcomes, and reliableexemptions for unsuitable cases. Second, “keeping the court door open” has to mean more than formal availability. It must mean that parties can reach a judge without being worn down bydelay, pressured by consequences, or disadvantaged by lack of information.
5. Findings/Observations
Based on the framework and analysis above, the following findings emerge.In England andWales, mandatory ADR is now best understood as a case management tool rather than a purely voluntarychoice. After Churchill v Merthyr (2023), the key question is no longer whether the court candirectparties towards ADR, but whether the direction is controlled in a way that preserves meaningful access to a judicial determination.
The legal limit is practical, not rhetorical. Article 6 permits regulation of access, but it does not permit measures that impair the very essence of the right. That essence based test, combinedwiththedomestic constitutional emphasis on access to justice, requires the system to look beyondformal availability and focus on real world effects.The main “human rights cost” of compulsory ADRarisesthrough pressure rather than formal exclusion. Delay, cost burdens, and the fear of consequencescanpush parties towards compromise even where adjudication is needed, especially when costs discretion is used to penalize non engagement.
Compulsory mediation in the small claims process shows why proportionality depends ondesign. Alow cost, accessible scheme may be justified, but the risk concentrates where disputes are unsuitablefor early mediation and where litigants in person face information and bargaining disadvantages.Other jurisdictions show that mandatory ADR is more defensible when safeguardsareconcrete and predictable, including clear timelines, meaningful exemptions, and an unchangedrouteback to court. Those safeguards are not optional extras; they are what keeps compulsion compatiblewith access to justice.
This article’s contribution is to turn the abstract rights standard into a practical test for courts andpolicymakers. It pinpoints how mandatory ADR can undermine fairness in real disputes andsetsoutthe safeguards most likely to ensure that “mandatory participation” does not slide into “compulsorycompromise”.
6. Conclusion & Recommendations
This article set out to examine whether mandatory ADR, particularly compulsory mediation, interferes with access to a court and an effective remedy in England and Wales, and to identifythelimits that keep compulsion rights compatible.
The analysis shows that the legal debate has moved on. After Churchill and the recent procedural reforms, the question is not whether courts may direct parties towards ADR, but whether theydosoin a way that preserves meaningful access to a judicial determination. Mandatory ADRcansupport access to justice where it compels participation rather than settlement and where it is appliedproportionately. The human rights risk arises when compulsion operates through pressure.Delay, limitation anxiety, costs consequences, and bargaining inequality can turn a formal right toahearinginto a practical push towards compromise, especially for litigants in person. The small claims schemeillustrates the point: low cost and accessibility strengthen the case for mandatory mediation, but onlyif exemptions and protections are real in practice.
Three reforms follow from the analysis.First, courts should apply a clear proportionality checklist before ordering ADR, focusing on suitability, urgency, and inequality between the parties.Second, exemption routes should be simple and predictable, with special attention to vulnerabilityandinformation gaps.Third, consequences for non engagement should remain targeted at genuineunreasonableness, not used as a blunt tool that pressures settlement.
Future research should test mandatory mediation empirically, including how often exemptionsaregranted, how sanctions are used, and whether outcomes differ for represented parties and litigantsinperson.If these safeguards are treated as core features rather than optional add ons, mandatoryADRcan support access to justice. Without them, it risks placing access to court on pause.
7. Bibliography
[1] European Convention on Human Rights (official English text). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG
[2] Ashingdane v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528 (ECtHR), judgment (PDF). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57425
[3] Human Rights Act 1998. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents
[4] R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, judgment (PDF). https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2015_0233_judgment_d0f3da86aa.pdf
[5] ADR Subject Guide, University of London (UGLaws VLE, Topic 2: ADR v litigation, movingtowards compulsory ADR). Course material (no public link).
[6] The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 3) Rules 2024 (SI 2024/839). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/839/contents/made
[7] Practice Direction 51ZE, Small Claims Track, Automatic Referral to Mediation Pilot Scheme. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part51/practice-direction-51ze-small-claims-track-automatic-referral-to-mediation-pilot-scheme
[8] Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust and Steel v Joy and Halliday [2004] EWCACiv576.https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/576.html
[9] Lomax v Lomax [2019] EWCA Civ 1467. https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/1467.html
[10] Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 (judgment pagewith PDF download). https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/james-churchill-v-merthyr-tydfil-county-borough-council/
[11] Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1416 (judgment pagewith PDF download). https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/james-churchill-v-merthyr-tydfil-county-borough-council/
[12] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 1 (Overriding Objective and Court’s Duty to Manage Cases) (asamended). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part01
[13] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 3 (The Court’s Case Management Powers) (rule 3.1(2)(o): orderparties to engage in ADR). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part03
[14] European Convention on Human Rights (official English text). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG
[15] Ashingdane v The United Kingdom (1985) 7 EHRR 528 (ECtHR), judgment. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57425
[16] Human Rights Act 1998. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents
[17] R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, judgment (PDF). https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2015_0233_judgment_d0f3da86aa.pdf
[18] Civil Justice Council, Compulsory ADR (July 2021) (report). https://www.judiciary.uk/wp- content/uploads/2021/07/Civil-Justice-Council-Compulsory-ADR-report.pdf
[19] Civil Procedure Rules, Part 44 (Costs) (rule 44.2(5)(e): ADR non-compliance / unreasonablefailure to engage). https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part-44-general rules-about-costs
[20] Practice Direction 51ZE, Small Claims Track, Automatic Referral to Mediation Pilot Scheme. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part51/practice-direction-51ze-small-claims-track-automatic-referral-to-mediation-pilot-scheme
[21] Ministry of Justice, ‘Faster resolution for small claims as mediation baked into courts process’(22 May 2024). https://www.gov.uk/government/news/faster-resolution-for-small-claims-as- mediation-baked-into-courts-process
[22] Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08, Rosalba Alassini and Others v TelecomItalia SpAandOthers (Judgment of 18 March 2010). ECLI:EU:C:2010:146 (PDF). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=ecli%3AECLI%3AEU%3AC%3A2010%3A146
[23] Case C-75/16, Livio Menini and Maria Antonia Rampanelli v Banco Popolare – SocietàCooperativa (Judgment of 14 June 2017). ECLI:EU:C:2017:457 (PDF). https://eur lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A62016CJ0075
[24] Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24.1 Mandatory Mediation (PDF). https://www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/files/archive/civil-rules/Rule24_1-EN.pdf
[25] Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, Ontario Mandatory Mediation Program(Rules 24.1and75.1).https://cfcj-fcjc.org/inventory-of-reforms/ontario-mandatory-mediation-program-rules-24-1-and-75-1/
