Authored By: Winkie K Molefe
University of South Africa
ABSTRACT
The 2025 Johannesburg G20 Presidency marked a turning point: for the first time, the G20 convened on African soil, yet the summit was marred by a high-profile diplomatic rupture between the United States and host South Africa. The United States’ boycott and allegations that South Africa “weaponised” the presidency presented a real-world test of the legal and procedural architecture surrounding political multilateral forums. This article assesses whether, and to what extent, existing international law governs conduct at such summits, evaluates the legal remedies available to states, and proposes practical legal and procedural reforms to safeguard the integrity and inclusivity of future G20 presidencies.
- INTRODUCTION
The G20 has emerged since the late 1990s as the foremost forum for global economic governance and international policy coordination. Originally formed in 1999 as a finance level grouping in response to the Asian financial crisis, the G20 was elevated in 2008 to include heads of state/government meetings, thereby becoming a central mechanism for addressing systemic crises, macroeconomic coordination, climate change, development, and global inequality.1
In 2025, Johannesburg, South Africa’s assumption of the G20 Presidency 2025 was historic: the first G20 leaders’ summit held on African soil and a strategic opportunity to foreground development and climate justice. However, the Summit concluded amid a high profile diplomatic standoff: the United States of America (U.S.) boycotted the leaders’ session, objected to the procedural arrangements (including the handover protocols), and publicly declared its intention to “disinvite” South Africa from the next G20 summit. 2
These events transformed what is nominally a political and economic forum into an arena of legal and normative contestation, challenging assumptions about the G20’s procedural informality and the limits of executive discretion in international diplomacy. This article asks: When diplomacy and procedure collide, what legal constraints, if any, bind states within informal multilateral fora like the G20? Specifically:
- What domestic and international legal frameworks govern state conduct in relation to summit-state presidencies, diplomatic representation, and summit handovers?
- Were the actions of South Africa and the USA in the 2025 Johannesburg context lawful under those frameworks?
- What remedies or institutional reforms could reduce legal and procedural gaps in future G20 presidencies? The central claim is that while the G20’s informal nature means that many decisions remain political, the lack of binding procedural rules creates normative and legal risk.
Given South Africa’s constitutional and statutory obligations, and general norms of diplomatic law and state responsibility, there is strong justification for formalising a soft law framework to regulate presidencies, handovers, and representation, thereby protecting the integrity, inclusivity, and legitimacy of the forum.
- METHODOLOGY
This research employs a doctrinal-normative methodology. It consists of:
Statutory and constitutional analysis, examining relevant South African constitutional provisions and domestic statutes giving effect to diplomatic and conference-meeting law.
Public international law analysis, including treaty law (the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961)3 And customary international law, with reference to the doctrine of state responsibility under the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).
Empirical contextualisation, drawing on summit documents (presidency declarations, official municipal documents), media reports of the 2025 summit, and public statements by governments.
Comparative institutional analysis, reviewing procedures or lack thereof, in other multilateral groupings (African Union, Commonwealth, other informal or semi-formal bodies) to derive lessons for better governance. Normative evaluation, proposing reforms (domestic and multilateral) designed to close legal gaps and strengthen legitimacy.
- Factual Chronology: The 2025 Johannesburg G20 Dispute
The 2025 G20 Leaders’ Summit was held in Johannesburg on 22–23 November 2025. South Africa assumed the G20 presidency and hosted the summit, framing the agenda around climate change mitigation, economic inequality, and inclusive development. The Johannesburg Leaders’ Declaration emphasised multilateral cooperation on these issues, including debt relief for developing countries and climate finance commitments.4
Ahead of the summit, the United States publicly criticised South Africa for allegedly “weaponising” the G20 presidency and announced that no senior U.S. officials would attend. President Donald Trump claimed that South Africa had failed to hand over the G20 presidency to a U.S. representative, citing the ceremonial refusal to accept a junior official from the U.S. embassy during the closing handover.
In a public social media statement, Trump declared: “Therefore, at my direction, South Africa will NOT be receiving an invitation to the 2026 G20, which will be hosted in the Great City of Miami, Florida next year.”5 South African President Cyril Ramaphosa described the boycott and public statements as “regrettable” and emphasised that the summit had proceeded successfully, with instruments of the G20 presidency formally transferred to a U.S. embassy official under domestic protocol at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation.6
Despite the absence of U.S. senior officials, the summit concluded with a joint declaration committing to multilateral cooperation and reaffirming shared priorities.7 Other G20 leaders, including the Presidents of Brazil and Germany, publicly condemned the boycott as counterproductive to multilateralism.8 Trump justified the boycott with claims of “white genocide” and alleged violations of property rights in South Africa, allegations that have been widely discredited by both South African officials and independent observers.9 The dispute escalated beyond ceremonial issues, encompassing threats to U.S. foreign aid and formal measures affecting trade and development assistance.10
- LEGAL ANALYSIS
A boycott of a non-binding summit is fundamentally a political act. Under international law, abstention or non-participation in an informal forum like the G20 is not prima facie unlawful. The G20 lacks a charter or treaty-based legal obligations; its decisions are non-binding.
Public criticism or accusations by a state do not constitute an internationally wrongful act under ARSIWA unless they breach a specific treaty obligation, coerce a state unlawfully, or otherwise violate binding norms. In the case of the U.S., the boycott and statements fall within the political prerogative of the executive, rather than creating actionable legal liability.11
However, should the U.S. impose measures such as visa denials, economic sanctions, or foreign aid suspension in connection with the boycott, legal questions may arise under:
- South African domestic law.
- International trade law, including obligations under the World Trade Organisation or bilateral investment treaties.12 Absent concrete unlawful action beyond diplomatic abstention, the U.S. boycott remains political, not legal.
- Legality of South Africa’s Procedural Decisions
South Africa’s refusal to accept a junior U.S. representative at the ceremonial handover can be assessed under:
- Constitutional law
Executive authority over foreign relations is subject to legality, rationality, and procedural fairness (s 1, 195, 231–233).13
- Diplomatic statutes
Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 mandates recognition and accreditation for diplomats and conference participants, but does not prescribe ceremonial rank.14
- International law
Vienna Convention norms ensure immunity and recognition of accredited diplomats but leave ceremonial discretion to the host. The host state’s refusal was therefore within the bounds of legal discretion, provided accredited envoys were properly recognised, immunities respected, and no arbitrary discrimination occurred.
The practical solution formal handover at DIRCO headquarters complied with statutory and international obligations, maintaining legality while asserting procedural authority.15
5.1 Remedies and State Responsibility
Even if a dispute were to implicate international law, ARSIWA provides that remedies include restitution, compensation, satisfaction, or cessation of the wrongful act.
For the G20 dispute:
- Boycott: falls outside ARSIWA, as political acts without coercive measures do not constitute internationally wrongful acts.
- Handover dispute: also political, not actionable, unless refusal is discriminatory or violates treaty obligations. Consequently, available remedies are political and diplomatic, such as negotiation, mediation, or reputational counters, rather than judicial enforcement.16
- COMPARATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
The G20’s informality contrasts with other multilateral fora:
- The UN General Assembly has a permanent secretariat and codified protocols for participation, credentials, and procedural handovers.
- Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings issues handbooks and procedural guidelines for host countries.
- European Union Council of Ministers relies on codified voting procedures, presidency rotations, and written agendas. Comparative analysis suggests that modest procedural codification reduces the scope for unilateral disruption while preserving flexibility. Formal guidance, even if non-binding, establishes predictable norms and reduces reputational disputes.17
RECOMMENDATIONS: PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL REFORMS Non-binding G20 Code of Practice for Presidencies
- Establish minimum standards for procedural handovers, accreditation, and ceremonial recognition.
- Ensure consistency across presidencies to prevent ad hoc disputes.
Lightweight G20 Secretariat Unit
- Provide advice on procedural transitions.
- Maintain records of presidencies and best practices.
Clear Diplomatic Protocol Annexe
- Define acceptable representatives for summit handovers.
- Include dispute-resolution procedures to avoid public boycotts.
Mediation Mechanism
- Neutral states or a small panel could mediate procedural disagreements before escalation.
- Preserve political discretion while mitigating reputational risk. These reforms respect sovereignty, comply with domestic law, and operate within the G20’s informal, soft-law framework.18
- CONCLUSION
The 2025 Johannesburg G20 dispute demonstrates that political forums depend as much on procedural legitimacy as substantive agreement. U.S. boycott and South Africa’s ceremonial discretion fall largely within political prerogative, but the incident exposes governance gaps that enable major powers to influence host-state agendas. Legally grounded, non-binding reforms, a procedural code, secretariat support, and mediation mechanisms can strengthen the G20’s resilience without undermining political flexibility. Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners should map the boundary between political discretion and enforceable legal obligations, ensuring that informal multilateral fora remain credible, inclusive, and normatively coherent.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Legislation / Domestic Law
- Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 (South Africa).
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
- Treaties and International Conventions
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, 500 UNTS 95.
- Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994, 1867 UNTS 154.
- International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.
- Government / Official Sources
Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ‘2025 G20 Summit Declaration’ (2025)https://dirco.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-G20 Summit-Declaration.pdf accessed 25 November 2025.
White House, ‘Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa’ (Executive Order, February 2025) https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential actions/2025/02/addressing-egregious-actions-of-the-republic-of-south africa/?utm accessed 25 November 2025.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘Trade in Goods and Services: South Africa’ (2024) https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/south-africa accessed 25 November 2025.
- Secondary / Academic Sources
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019).
Commonwealth Secretariat, CHOGM Handbook (2023).
European Council, Council Presidency Manual (2022).
- Media / News Reports
BBC News, ‘South Africa hits back after Trump says US won’t invite it for G20 next year’ (BBC, 27 November 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq8dq47j5y8o.amp accessed 27 November 2025.
BBC News, ‘G20 summit boycotted by US closes in South Africa’ (BBC, 23 November 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg130704zro accessed 25 November 2025.
Al Jazeera, ‘Can Trump ban South Africa from 2026 G20 summit, as he says he will?’ (Al Jazeera, 27 November 2025) https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2025/11/27/can-trump-ban-south-africa from-2026-g20-summit-as-he-says-hewill be accessed 26 November 2025.
AP News, ‘G20 South Africa summit: World leaders react to U.S. boycott’ (AP News, November 2025) https://apnews.com/article/g20-south-africa-summitworld leaders-76e36aa669a8e05ff5ad5495cc1252ed accessed 29 November 2025.
- Official Websites
G20, ‘About the G20’ https://g20.org/?utm_source=chatgpt.com accessed 29 November 2025.
Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa https://www.dirco.gov.za accessed 29 November 2025.
White House, Presidential Actions https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential actions accessed 29 November 2025.
- Other / Reports / Commentaries
Pumza Fihlani, ‘G20 Summit: South Africa Defends Presidency Amid US Boycott’ (BBC, November 2025).
Saeed Abdalla, Commentary on Sudan inclusion in G20 Declaration, Newzroom Afrika, November 2025.
Carlos Lopes, Analysis on US–South Africa G20 Dispute, Al Jazeera Expert Commentary, 2025
1 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ‘2025 G20 Summit Declaration’ (2025) https://dirco.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-G20-Summit-Declaration.pdf?utm accessed 25 November 2025.
2 Ibid.
3 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, arts 3–5.
4 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ‘2025 G20 Summit Declaration’ (2025) https://dirco.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-G20-Summit-Declaration.pdf accessed 25 November 2025.
5 BBC News, ‘G20 summit boycotted by US closes in South Africa’ (BBC,23 November 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg130704zro accessed 25 November 2025.
6 Ibid.
7 BBC News, ‘G20 summit boycotted by US closes in South Africa’ (BBC, 23 November 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg130704zro accessed 25 November 2025.
8 Ibid.
9 Al Jazeera, ‘Can Trump ban South Africa from 2026 G20 summit, as he says he will?’ (Al Jazeera, 27 November 2025) https://www.aljazeera.com/ amp/news/2025/11/27/can-trump-ban-south-africa-from-2026g20- summit-as-he-says-he-will accessed 28 November 2025.
10 Ibid.
11 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) 242.
12 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1994, arts I, III.
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
14 Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001, ss 3, 9.
15 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, arts 3–5.
16 International Law Commission, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.
17 Commonwealth Secretariat, CHOGM Handbook (2023); European Council, Council Presidency Manual (2022).
18 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (n 1); Crawford (n 8) 245.
