From Military Operation to War Crimes: Civilian Targeting in Ukraine

Abstract 

Russia has consistently framed its attacks on Ukraine as a ‘special military operation’ formally declared by President Vladimir Putin on 24 February 2022. Yet the devastation of apartment buildings, children’s playgrounds, hospitals and most significantly the loss of countless civilian lives reveals the stark reality of Russia’s actions. These attacks create serious legal concerns under international humanitarian law, which guarantees the protection of people and bans indiscriminate attacks. Drawing on the Geneva Conventions, the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, and legal precedent from International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, this article argues that Russia’s actions constitute as war crimes rather than authorised military operations. Recent developments, including UN reports and the Ternopil incident underscore the urgency of accountability. 

Introduction 

On 19 November 2025, Russian missiles struck two residential apartment blocks in the western Ukrainian city of Ternopil. Taras Pastukh, Deputy Chief of the Ternopil Military Administration, informed national television that 33 dead had been identified, including six children, and more than 90 people have been injured. The attack illustrates how civilians, who should be shielded from hostilities have instead become deliberate victims. The significant nature of this issue now stems not only from the scale of civilian injury, but also from the threat it poses to the legitimacy of international law. Recent UN investigations have shown significant breaches, and the International Criminal Court has launched an inquiry into potential war crimes in Ukraine.  Precedents established in ICTY cases like Prosecutor v Tadić (1999)and Prosecutor v Galić (2003), recognising war crimes such as targeting civilians and attacking cities. This article will examine the legal framework, judicial precedents, and current developments that underline the critical need for accountability and stricter implementation for international humanitarian law. This article concludes by calling for stronger enforcement of international law to safeguard civilian populations. 

Legal Framework

International humanitarian law provides the framework for evaluating Russia’s missile assaults on Ukrainian cities. The Geneva Conventions, reinforced by the Rome Statute, define purposeful or indiscriminate attacks on civilians as war crimes. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is central, as it establishes the minimum protections owed to civilians and persons not actively participating in hostilities. Although originally applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character, it has been recognised by both the International Court of Justice and the ICTY as reflecting customary international law, meaning it applies universally. It prohibits violence to life and person, the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentences without a fair trial. Russia’s missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, including the attack on Ternopil, directly contravene these protections, illustrating how its conduct amounts to war crimes under international humanitarian law.

Furthermore, Geneva Convention IV reinforces these baselines rights by codifying civilian immunity and prohibiting their targeting during armed conflict. Additional Protocol I (1977), strengthens the Convention’s prohibitions by establishing the concept of distinction and clearly prohibiting indiscriminate attacks on civilian people, and objects. Russia’s missile strike on a children’s playground in Kryvyi Rih, which killed and injured children distant from any military target, is a clear violation of these principles. The purposeful targeting of places where children assemble highlights the extent to which Russia’s actions breach the safeguards afforded by international humanitarian law. 

This violation is reinforced by Article 8 of the Rome Statute, which defines war crimes as ‘intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities’ and ‘intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives.’ Civilian infrastructure such as residential buildings, hospitals, energy facilities, and children’s playgrounds in Ukraine evidently fall within this category of protected objects. Russia’s deliberate destruction of these sites demonstrates how its assaults not only directly target civilians, but also devastate the critical infrastructure on which civilian life is dependent on, meeting the threshold for war crimes under Article 8 and undermining the claimed justification of a ‘special military operation’. 

Judicial Interpretation

Judicial interpretation has played a crucial role in clarifying the scope and application of international humanitarian law. Decisions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), most notably Prosecutor v Akayesu (1998) have reinforced that deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure constitute war crimes, providing authoritative guidance for evaluating Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. The ICTY tried leaders for deliberate assaults on civilians throughout the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, setting key precedents for the implementation of international humanitarian law. This is best exemplified in Prosecutor v Tadić (1999), the Appeals Chamber determined that targeting people constitutes a war crime under international humanitarian law. The ruling was significant because it established that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to all armed conflicts, whether international or internal, and that breaches of its provisions can result in individual criminal culpability. Recognising the universal applicability of these rights, the Tribunal underlined the concept that civilians must never be the target of attack, a decision that is immediately relevant to assessing Russia’s continuous attacks on Ukrainian cities.  

Building on the principles affirmed in Tadić, subsequent ICTY jurisprudence addressed the practical realities of urban warfare, most notably, in Prosecutor v Galić (2003). In this case, the ICTY addressed the siege of Sarajevo, where the purposeful and indiscriminate shelling of residential areas and targeting of civilians through sniping campaigns were judged unlawful. The tribunal determined that such actions constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity, underlining the importance of never attacking innocent populations. This precedent is directly comparable to Russia’s attack on cities like Ternopil, which attacked residential structures and public places without distinction, exhibiting the same disrespect for civilian immunity that the ICTY deemed illegal in Sarajevo. 

Moreover, the ICTR’s ruling in Akayesu was notable as it acknowledged that attacks on villages, schools, and other locations where civilians gathered were not incidental to military operations but formed part of a systematic campaign against the civilian population. The tribunal highlighted that such behaviour might result in individual criminal culpability and breached the rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. The same disregard for civilian immunity that the ICTR condemned Rwanda is evident in Russia’s missile assaults on Ukrainian cities, underscoring that such conduct engages individual criminal responsibility under international humanitarian law. 

Critical Analysis

Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 poses a significant obstacle to the pursuit of accountability. Consequently, crimes committed on Russian soil or by Russian nationals are not automatically subject to ICC jurisdiction. The Court’s capacity to prosecute Russian officials is still limited notwithstanding Ukraine’s statements under Article 12(3) admitting ICC jurisdiction for crimes committed on its territory, allowing investigations into Russian attacks in places like Kyiv, Ternopil, Mariupol, and Sumy. Direct prosecution is highly constrained in the absence of Russia’s assistance or referral by the UN Security Council, which is unlikely given Russia’s veto power. This enforcement gap highlights the conflict between the strong legal foundation of international humanitarian law and the political circumstances that make it difficult to apply it to strong governments. 

In addition, ambiguity arises in differentiating between military objectives and civilian objects. According to Additional Protocol I’s Article 52(2), military objectives are restricted to those which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage. Until shown differently, civilian objects are assumed to be protected. Russia regularly uses the idea of “dual-use” to defend attacks on communication, transpiration, and energy infrastructure arguing that these systems have both military and civilian use. However, international humanitarian law forbids excessive injury to civilians and mandates that such assaults provide a tangible and direct, military gain. By stretching the definition of military objectives, Russia exploits this ambiguity to legitimise assaults on infrastructure essential to civilian survival, thereby eroding the principle of distinction.

Similar issues have emerged in NATO interventions like Kosovo, where civilian injury estimates were crucial to discussions about legitimacy. These enforcement and interpretation difficulties are not unique to Russia. Operation Allied Force used precise bombings to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, but it was criticised for attacking “dual-use” infrastructure including communications and electricity grids, which were said to cause disproportionate suffering to civilians. By contrast Russia’s missile campaign in Ukraine, shows a radically different strategy, civilian harm is not an unintended consequence but the very object of attack. The utilisation of “dual-use” statutes conceals a tactic intended to undermine civilian resistance exposing these attacks as intentional transgressions of the principle of distinction rather than lawful military actions. 

Recent Developments 

The conclusion that Russia’s missile campaign is aimed against civilians rather than legitimate military objectives has been confirmed by recent UN findings. In October 2025, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine concluded that Russia’s actions amounted to cries against humanity, including systematic targeting of civilians and forcible transfers. These finding s underscore that Russia’s conduct is not a military operation but rather a deliberate campaign against the civilian population. Reports by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission document recurring violation of the principles of distinction and proportionality, particular in attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities and residential areas. 

Moreover, in response to referrals from thirty-nine States Parties, Prosecutor Karim Khan launched an inquiry into Russia’s actions in March 2022. The court was able to investigate suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity on Ukraine’s territory, such as missile attacks against civilian infrastructure and the forcible transfer of children, when Ukraine accepted jurisdiction under Article 12(3). Senior Russian officials have already been the subject of arrest warrants, highlighting the seriousness of these accusations. Yet, Russia’s reluctance to comply and its withdrawal from the Rome Statute imply that enforcement is still restricted. This demonstrates the conundrum of international criminal law, although the International Criminal Court (ICC) is technically able to classify Russia’s campaign as illegal civilian targeting, political circumstances make it difficult to prosecute the most culpable individuals. 

Lastly, the Ukrainian government has continuously presented Russia’s missile campaign as an intentional attack on civilians rather than a legitimate military operation. Kyiv has attempted to guarantee responsibility on a global scale by calling for a special tribunal on aggression and making statements under Article 12(3). The Public’s response both at home and abroad, as well as media coverage that details the devastation of homes, hospitals, and energy infrastructure, support this position. Together, these reactions highlight that Russia’s attacks are perceived as unlawful civilian targeting rather than a military necessity. Ukraine’s resilience in the face of blackouts and attacks contrasts with widespread outrage in international media, where Russia’s strikes are portrayed as punitive attacks on civilian life. 

Way Forward

In order to fill the accountability gap going forward, positive measures are required. To minimise abuse, international law should define “dual-use” targets more precisely. Additionally, the ICC and future special courts should have the authority to punish acts of aggression without the need for referrals from the Security Council. Authorities should strengthen victim assistance programs and sanctions, while national courts can exercise universal jurisdiction. Through documentation and humanitarian aid, civil society continues to play a crucial role in making sure that Russia’s intentional targeting of civilians is faced as a breach of the principle of difference rather than normalised. When taken as a whole, these actions offer a path ahead for enhancing the integrity of international humanitarian law. 

Conclusion 

To conclude this discussion, it is clear to say that Russia’s strikes in Ukraine cannot be understood as a legitimate military operation. The deliberate targeting of homes, hospitals and energy systems constitute a systematic assault on civilians, in direct violation of the principle of distinction and the protections afforded by international humanitarian law. Civilian harm is not incidental but the defining feature of this campaign, confirming that is amounts to war crimes rather than lawful military action. 

Bibliography 

Cases 

1. Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (ICTR Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998).
2. Prosecutor v Galić (Judgment) IT-98-29-T (ICTY, 5 December 2003).
3. Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (ICTY Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999).

International Treaties  

1. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287.
2. ICC, Declaration of Ukraine accepting jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court under Article 12(3) (2014).
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90.

Reports, Statements, and Institutional Documents 

1. Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, Report to the United Nations General Assembly (October 2025).
2. NATO, Operation Allied Force: Lessons Learned (1999) <URL> accessed 25 November 2025.
3. UK Delegation to the OSCE, Russia’s deliberate attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure seek to punish Ukrainian civilians (Vienna, 7 November 2024).
4. UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, ‘UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine finds continued war crimes and human rights violations gravely impacting civilians’ (20 October 2023) <URL> accessed 24 November 2025.
5. UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Civilian casualties mount as Russian Armed Forces step up attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter (25 November 2025).
6. UN General Assembly, Resolution on the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine (2023).

ICC Documents 

1. ICC, Statement of Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation (2 March 2022) <URL> accessed 25 November 2025.
2. ICC, Warrants of arrest issued for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova (17 March 2023).

News Articles 

1. BBC News, ‘Russia targets Ukraine’s energy grid in winter strikes’ (November 2025) <URL> accessed 26 November 2025.
2. euters, ‘Ukraine raises death toll in Ternopil missile strike to 34’ (23 November 2025) <URL> accessed 24 November 2025.
3. Reuters, ‘Ukraine accuses Russia of war crimes after missile attacks on residential areas’ (October 2025) <URL> accessed 26 November 2025.