Drone Strikes and the Erosion of International Law: Sovereignty Accountability and Ethics

Introduction

Drone warfare has redefined the contemporary battlefield, enabling states to project lethal force across borders with unprecedented precision and minimal risk to their personnel[1]. Yet, this technological evolution has not been matched by the development of adequate legal controls. Rather than fitting neatly within the existing framework of international law, drone strikes have systematically undermined its core principles[2]. While proponents argue that drones offer a precise and efficient alternative to conventional warfare, the reality is that their deployment frequently violates state sovereignty, circumvents accountability mechanisms[3], and poses grave ethical concerns[4]. This essay contends that the widespread and often unilateral use of drone strikes, particularly outside active battlefields, has contributed to the erosion of international law and threatens its foundational legitimacy.

Sovereignty and the Undermining of Territorial Integrity

The principle of sovereignty remains the cornerstone of the international legal order, embodied in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter[5]. This provision prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Yet, drone strikes conducted without the consent of the target state represent clear and recurrent violations of this rule. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) [1986] ICJ Rep 14[6], the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that unauthorised use of force, including indirect interventions, constitutes a breach of international law. Modern drone strikes, such as those by the U.S. in Pakistan and Yemen, follow the same logic of illegal intervention, often without host-state consent and outside recognised warzones[7].

While some states invoke the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter[8] to justify such operations, this justification is increasingly unconvincing. The expansion of “imminence” to justify pre-emptive strikes against non-state actors, often in states that are merely “unwilling or unable”[9] to act themselves, lacks legal precision and stretches the doctrine of self-defence beyond recognition. Legal scholars such as Dapo Akande[10] has criticised this trend, arguing that such justifications amount to a reassertion of unilateral force, reminiscent of pre-Charter norms. The result is a regression, not evolution, of international law, effectively subordinating sovereignty to perceived security needs of powerful states.

Even when states acquiesce to drone strikes, such consent is frequently opaque or coerced, raising questions about the genuine voluntariness of that consent. The erosion of state sovereignty through the normalisation of drone operations sets a dangerous precedent, weakening the normative force of territorial integrity and fostering a permissive environment for cross-border violence[11].

Accountability Deficits and the Rule of Law in Decline

Equally corrosive is the accountability vacuum surrounding drone warfare. International law demands that uses of force be lawful, necessary, and proportionate[12], and that violations be subject to independent investigation and redress[13]. In practice, however, drone strikes are often cloaked in secrecy, operated through covert programs, and shielded from meaningful scrutiny[14]. This institutional opacity creates a profound accountability gap that undermines the rule of law.

One striking example is the killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011[15]. Carried out without trial or judicial oversight, this strike raised serious questions regarding the extraterritorial application of due process rights[16]. Legal scholars such as Mary Ellen O’Connell[17] argue that such extrajudicial killings constitute clear violations of both international human rights law (IHRL) and domestic constitutional safeguards. Yet, despite global condemnation, no judicial forum has effectively reviewed the legality of the operation, highlighting the impotence of existing enforcement mechanisms.

International humanitarian law (IHL) has also struggled to impose discipline on drone operations. While some drone strikes may occur within recognised armed conflict zones[18] and therefore fall under the remit of IHL, many take place in legally ambiguous situations, outside declared hostilities and against non-state actors[19]. The Tadić decision (Prosecutor v Tadić (1999) ICTY)[20] clarified the criteria for non-international armed conflicts, yet drone use frequently occurs outside these parameters[21]. As a result, the legal regime becomes selective and malleable, applied inconsistently depending on the identity of the actor and the location of the strike.

The failure of both domestic and international systems to demand transparency, conduct robust legal review, or hold perpetrators accountable contributes to a broader erosion of the rule of law[22]. Rather than reinforcing legal norms, drone strikes encourage a culture of impunity under the guise of national security[23].

Ethical Concerns as Indicators of Legal Regression 

Beyond legal doctrine, the ethical dimensions of drone warfare underscore the extent to which it subverts the spirit of international law. While drone technology is often praised for its precision and ability to reduce military casualties, this purported ethical advantage is overstated and, in practice, misleading. Reports by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International[24] and Human Rights Watch[25] have documented significant civilian casualties resulting from drone operations, particularly in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. The drone strike that killed 10 Afghan civilians, including children, during the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul in 2021, exemplifies the tragic human cost and fallibility of these operations[26].

The ethical justification of drone’s rests on the claim that they can meet jus in bello standards of discrimination and proportionality[27]. However, without accurate intelligence, even the most precise weaponry cannot avoid unlawful killings. As philosopher Michael Walzer[28] has argued, ethical warfare must be restrained not just by technology, but by legal and moral accountability, both of which are currently lacking in the drone paradigm[29].

Moreover, the psychological distancing of drone operators from the battlefield raises serious moral hazards. Scholars such as Grégoire Chamayou[30] argue that the dehumanised nature of remote warfare erodes empathy and transforms the conduct of war into a technocratic exercise in target elimination. This trend contradicts the fundamental ethos of IHL, which aims to humanise warfare and protect non-combatants.

By facilitating low-cost, low risk killing, drones lower the political and ethical threshold for using lethal force. Rather than promoting restraint, they incentivise expansionist counterterrorism strategies, untethered from legal or moral checks. This shift signals not just legal degradation, but a fundamental transformation in the character of lawful warfare[31].

Counterarguments and Their Limitations

Proponents of drone warfare often highlight its potential to align with, or even strengthen, international law by offering more discriminate and proportionate uses of force. It is argued that drones, when employed with proper legal oversight, can reduce civilian casualties[32] compared to conventional airstrikes or ground operations. Some scholars suggest that legal frameworks can evolve to incorporate the realities of drone warfare, creating clearer norms and accountability structures.

However, these claims are more aspirational than actual. The potential for precision does not equate to lawful practice. In reality, the intelligence underpinning drone strikes is frequently flawed or incomplete, resulting in wrongful deaths and undermining the principle of distinction[33]. The argument for legal evolution is equally tenuous in the absence of political will. As observed by the UN Special Rapporteur[34], there is a persistent lack of transparency[35], clear state practice, or consensus on the legality of drone strikes outside armed conflict zones[36].

Until a comprehensive legal regime emerges, one that addresses jurisdiction, transparency, independent oversight, morality and victim compensation, the theoretical benefits of drones remain outweighed by their corrosive impact on existing legal norms. Without such reforms, the optimistic framing of drones as ethically superior tools risks masking the ongoing erosion of international law.

Conclusion

Far from fitting comfortably within the legal architecture of modern warfare, drone strikes have actively destabilised its core foundations. Through systematic violations of sovereignty, the circumvention of legal accountability, and the undermining of ethical principles, drone warfare challenges the legitimacy and coherence of international law[37]. While counterarguments regarding precision and potential legal adaptation deserve acknowledgment, they do not offset the pervasive erosion witnessed in practice.

International law must evolve not to accommodate drone strikes uncritically, but to restrain and regulate them rigorously. Without such recalibration, the continued use of drones risks entrenching a two-tier legal system, one where powerful states operate with impunity, and weaker states suffer unchecked incursions and extrajudicial killings[38]. The trajectory of drone warfare thus demands not passive acceptance, but an urgent reaffirmation of the rule of law.
Bibliography –

Case Law

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) ICJ Rep 14
• Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) ICJ Rep 168
• Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999)
• R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs UKHL 60
• R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade EWCA Civ 1020

Treaties and UN Charter

• Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)
• Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171

UN and International Reports

• UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ (A/HRC/31/59, 28 January 2016)
• UN Human Rights Council, ‘Drone Strikes and international human rights law’ (A/HRC/33/CRP.2, 14 September 2016)
• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects’ (2016)

Academic Books and Articles

• Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018)
• Dapo Akande, ‘The Lawfulness of the Use of Force to Recover Occupied Territory’ (2021)

• Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (1st edn, OUP 2016) ch 8

• Humble K, ‘War, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Conflict’ (2024) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 12 July 2024
• Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘When to Target Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 65
• Michael Ramsden, ‘Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al‑Awlaki’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 385
• Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th edn, Basic Books 2006)
• Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (trans. Janet Lloyd, The New Press 2015)

NGO Reports

• Amnesty International, ‘Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ (2013)
• Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’ (2013)

[1] Humble K, ‘War, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Conflict’ (2024) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

[2] Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (1st edn, OUP 2016) ch 8

[3] R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade EWCA Civ 1020

[4] Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’ (2013)

[5] Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI

[6] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) ICJ Rep 14

[7] Amnesty International, ‘Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ (2013)

[8] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)

[9] Dapo Akande, ‘The Lawfulness of the Use of Force to Recover Occupied Territory’ (2021)

[10] Dapo Akande, ‘The Lawfulness of the Use of Force to Recover Occupied Territory’ (2021)

[11] Amnesty International, ‘Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ (2013)

[12] Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (1st edn, OUP 2016)

[13] Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘When to Target Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 65

[14] Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018)

[15] Michael Ramsden, ‘Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al‑Awlaki’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 385

[16] Michael Ramsden, ‘Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al‑Awlaki’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 385

[17] Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘When to Target Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 65

[18] Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) ICJ Rep 168

[19] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects’ (2016)

[20] Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999)

[21] Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) ICJ Rep 168

[22] R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs UKHL 60

[23] Humble K, ‘War, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Conflict’ (2024) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 12 July 2024

[24] Amnesty International, ‘Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ (2013)

[25] Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’ (2013)

[26] Human Rights Watch, ‘Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda’ (2013)

[27] Douglas Guilfoyle, International Criminal Law (1st edn, OUP 2016)

[28] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th edn, Basic Books 2006)

[29] R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for International Trade EWCA Civ 1020

[30] Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (trans. Janet Lloyd, The New Press 2015)

[31] Humble K, ‘War, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of Conflict’ (2024) Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 12 July 2024

[32] Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018)

[33] Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘When to Target Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 65

[34] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’ (A/HRC/31/59, 28 January 2016)

[35] R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs UKHL 60

[36] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Drone Strikes and international human rights law’ (A/HRC/33/CRP.2, 14 September 2016)

[37] Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (4th edn, Basic Books 2006)

[38] Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (trans. Janet Lloyd, The New Press 2015)