Authored By: Owais Malik
DES Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune
- Case Title & Citation
- D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India (2003).
- 6 SCC 186 and AIR 2003 SC 2502.¹
- Court Name & Bench
- Supreme Court of India.
- Justice R.C. Lahoti and Justice Ashok Bhan.
- Division Bench
- Date of Judgement
- 25 April, 2003.
- Parties Involved
- Petitioner: D. Saibaba, was a physically handicapped person who had initially been allotted an STD booth under the handicapped quota as a means of livelihood. Subsequently, he enrolled as an advocate and began practice under a senior lawyer.
- Respondent: The Bar Council of India (BCI), a statutory authority established under the Advocates Act, 1961, entrusted with regulating the legal profession and maintaining ethical standards of advocates in India.
- Facts of the Case
The facts of the case began with the petitioner’s livelihood arrangement. Before entering the legal profession, Saibaba was granted an STD booth under a special quota for handicapped persons. After his enrollment as an advocate, he ceased his active involvement with the
booth, which was thereafter run by his parents.
- D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, (2003) 6 SCC 186 : AIR 2003 SC 2502.
Despite this, his wife, Smt. D. Anuradha, filed a complaint before the Bar Council alleging professional misconduct, asserting that he continued to be associated with the booth. The State Bar Council initially dismissed the complaint, but upon a second complaint, the BCI directed Saibaba to surrender the booth and went further to recommend striking his name
from the roll of advocates. Aggrieved by these directions, Saibaba filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging both the directive to surrender the booth and the recommendation for disbarment.
- Issues Raised
The following issues came before the Court for determination:
- Whether, under Section 48-AA of the Advocates Act, the sixty-day limitation period for filing a review runs from the date of the order itself or from the date of its communication to the concerned party.
- Whether Saibaba’s review petition was time-barred even though it was filed promptly after he became aware of the order and after surrendering the booth.
- Whether retaining an STD booth in his name, which was run by his parents, amounted to trade or business inconsistent with the Advocates Act, thereby constituting professional misconduct.
- Whether the BCI had violated the principles of natural justice by relying on inquiry material without affording Saibaba an adequate opportunity to present his case.
- Whether equitable considerations, such as Saibaba’s physical disability, livelihood needs, and his eventual surrender of the booth, should have influenced the BCI to take a corrective rather than punitive approach.²
7.Arguments of the Parties
- Arguments made by the Petitioner: The petitioner argued that the BCI had misinterpreted the Advocates Act, 1961. He contended that the mere pendency of disciplinary proceedings did not amount to proof of guilt, and thus his right to continue as an advocate could not be automatically curtailed. He further claimed that he had not been given a fair opportunity to be heard, in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to him, the Advocates Act requires suspension or removal to follow a proper disciplinary process and cannot operate automatically.
- Advocates Act, 1961 – Sections 30, 35, and 48-AA.
- Arguments made by the Respondent: The respondent, BCI, contended that under the Advocates Act, disqualification in such circumstances was automatic and left no room for discretion. The BCI argued that strict interpretation of the law was necessary to preserve the integrity and discipline of the profession. It further asserted that the continuation of an STD booth in Saibaba’s name was inconsistent with the dignity and independence required of a legal practitioner.³
8.Judgement / Final Decision
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Saibaba and set aside the decision of the Bar Council of India. The Court held that merely holding an STD booth in one’s name did not amount to professional misconduct unless it interfered with the practice of law. It further clarified that under Section 48-AA, the sixty-day period for filing a review begins only from the date the order is communicated to the advocate, not the date on which the order was passed. The Court emphasized that the right to practice law under Section 30 of the Advocates Act cannot be curtailed except through due process of law and upon a conclusive finding of guilt. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the recommendations of the BCI were quashed.
- Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi
The Court reasoned that disciplinary proceedings do not automatically result in disqualification or cessation of an advocate’s membership. Such a consequence can only arise when there is a conclusive finding of guilt or an express order of suspension or removal. In interpreting Section 48-AA, the Court adopted a purposive approach, ruling that limitation cannot begin to run until the order is communicated to the affected party, since otherwise, it would unfairly deprive a person of their right to review.
The judgment reaffirmed the importance of natural justice. The Court held that Saibaba was not given a fair chance to defend himself against the allegations. Citing the well-known dictum of Lord Hewart, C.J., it stressed that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” The Court also referred to principles laid down in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262⁴ on natural justice in administrative law, and Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611 on the requirement of impartiality and fairness, and in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248⁵ on fairness and due process.
- Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611.
- A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262.
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
10.Conclusion / Observations
The decision in D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India is an important precedent clarifying that disciplinary proceedings alone do not strip an advocate of his statutory right to practice. The judgment ensured that the BCI cannot take punitive measures without giving the concerned advocate an opportunity to be heard and without arriving at a conclusive finding of misconduct. It reinforced the principle that natural justice is central to professional disciplinary processes.
The case also has broader significance for the regulation of the legal profession. It balanced the need for professional discipline with equitable considerations, recognizing the unique circumstances of Saibaba’s disability and livelihood. Ultimately, the case strengthens the idea that while the dignity of the Bar must be preserved, advocates’ rights must not be curtailed arbitrarily or unfairly.

