Authored By: SOORAJ KR
Government Law College Thrissur
INTRODUCTION
The case of X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi (2022) marks a transformative moment in India’s jurisprudence on reproductive autonomy and gender equality. The Supreme Court’s decision redefined the interpretation of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act, 2021, by affirming that the right to safe and legal abortion extends beyond the boundaries of marital status. The case involved a 25-year-old unmarried woman who sought permission to terminate her 23-week pregnancy, which had arisen from a consensual relationship. Her plea was initially rejected by the Delhi High Court, prompting her to appeal before the Supreme Court.
This case represents a crucial evolution in the judicial understanding of bodily integrity, decisional privacy, and equality under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India. It brings India’s abortion jurisprudence in alignment with international human rights principles that emphasise the reproductive autonomy of all women, regardless of their social or marital identity. The judgment, delivered by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, reiterates that reproductive choice is not merely a statutory right but a core facet of the constitutional right to personal liberty and human dignity.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner, referred to as X to preserve her privacy, was a 25-year-old unmarried woman who conceived through a consensual relationship. Upon discovering that she was 22 weeks pregnant, she sought permission to terminate the pregnancy at a government hospital in Delhi. Her request was denied because she was unmarried and thus not covered under the permissible categories under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003, as amended in 2021.
Rule 3B(c) permits termination of pregnancy up to 24 weeks for certain categories of women, including survivors of sexual assault or rape, minors, women with physical disabilities, and married women whose marital status changes during pregnancy (such as by widowhood or divorce). The petitioner’s case did not fall under these enumerated categories because she was unmarried, although her partner had refused to marry her.
She approached the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the MTP Act and Rules must be interpreted liberally to include unmarried women within the category of those entitled to termination beyond 20 weeks. The High Court, however, dismissed her plea on 15 July 2022, holding that “change in marital status” could not include an unmarried woman who had conceived out of wedlock.
Aggrieved by this restrictive interpretation, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India. The case raised profound constitutional questions about whether reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity are contingent upon marital status, and whether the state can justifiably deny an unmarried woman access to safe abortion within the permissible gestational limit. Recognising the urgency, the Supreme Court granted interim relief, allowing the medical termination of the pregnancy subject to medical board approval, while reserving its detailed reasoning for a later date.
ISSUES RAISED
The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve several interlinked questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional law arising from the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act, 2021 and its corresponding Rules. The principal issues were:
- Interpretation of Rule 3B of the MTP Rules, 2003 – Whether the expression “change in marital status” in Rule 3B(c) is confined only to married women who become widowed or divorced, or whether it should be expansively interpreted to include unmarried women whose relationships have broken down during pregnancy.
- Equality and Non-Discrimination – Whether the denial of safe abortion access to an unmarried woman amounts to discrimination on the grounds of marital status, violating Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution by perpetuating a patriarchal and unequal view of female sexuality.
- Right to Privacy and Reproductive Autonomy – Whether the freedom to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy forms an essential part of the right to personal liberty and privacy protected under Article 21.
- Interpretation Consistent with Constitutional Morality – Whether the MTP Act and Rules must be interpreted in light of constitutional values of dignity, autonomy, and substantive equality, rather than through a restrictive moral lens rooted in marital norms.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
- Arguments on behalf of the Petitioner
- Counsel for the petitioner argued that the restrictive reading adopted by the Delhi High Court undermined both the object and purpose of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act, 2021. The petitioner emphasised that the 2021 amendment was enacted precisely to widen access to safe abortion and eliminate the marital bias embedded in the original 1971 Act. It was contended that the term “woman” under Section 3 of the Act is unqualified, covering all women regardless of marital status, and that limiting Rule 3B(c) only to married women violated the legislative intent.
- The petitioner further contended that the impugned interpretation offended Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution by creating a class-based discrimination between married and unmarried women. The right to reproductive autonomy and decisional privacy, it was argued, had been firmly recognised in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, and Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, The petitioner maintained that forcing an unmarried woman to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term was an infringement of bodily integrity, dignity, and mental health.
- Reliance was placed on international human rights obligations, including Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which mandate non-discriminatory access to reproductive healthcare. The petitioner asserted that the State’s paternalistic distinction between “married” and “unmarried” women perpetuates stereotypes about female sexuality and moral worth.
- Arguments on behalf of the Respondents
- The State and Union Government contended that the rule-making authority had consciously limited Rule 3B(c) to certain enumerated categories of women, which included widowed or divorced women, and that it would be impermissible for the Court to rewrite the provision through judicial interpretation. The respondents argued that legislative classification based on marital status was reasonable and policy-driven, aiming to balance social morality and public health considerations.
- They cautioned that liberal judicial construction could open the floodgates for misuse of abortion provisions and argued that any change in the scope of the MTP Rules must emanate from the legislature, not the judiciary. The respondents urged that the Court respect the separation of powers and refrain from creating new categories not contemplated by Parliament.
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision delivered by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, allowed the petition, holding that the term “woman” under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, as amended in 2021, must be interpreted broadly to include all women, regardless of marital status. The Court emphasised that reproductive autonomy and the right to make decisions regarding one’s own body are integral to Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassing decisional privacy, bodily integrity, and personal liberty.
The Court observed that restricting access to abortion based on marital status was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 15(1), which guarantee equality before the law and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. It noted that unmarried women face unique societal stigma, and the denial of abortion amplifies psychological distress and perpetuates inequality. The Court held that legislative language should be interpreted in light of constitutional morality, rather than outdated social norms or moral presumptions.
Relying on Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India the Court reaffirmed that personal autonomy and privacy are core constitutional values. The judgment also cited Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, which recognised the right of a pregnant woman to make decisions concerning termination of pregnancy as part of her fundamental right to dignity.
The Court further clarified that the gestational limit of 24 weeks under Rule 3B(c) is procedural, and that the statutory provision does not distinguish between married and unmarried women. It emphasised that any classification creating unequal access to safe abortion services must pass the test of reasonableness, proportionality, and non-arbitrariness, and found that the High Court’s interpretation failed this test.
Finally, the Supreme Court directed that the petitioner could proceed with the abortion at a registered medical facility, subject to medical board approval, and stated that the judgment has far-reaching implications, extending protection to unmarried women, survivors of sexual violence, and marginalised groups. The Court underscored that the State has a constitutional duty to ensure safe, legal, and stigma-free access to reproductive healthcare.
This judgment represents a paradigm shift in Indian reproductive rights jurisprudence, affirming that reproductive autonomy is inseparable from dignity, equality, and liberty, and that restrictive interpretations based on marital norms are constitutionally impermissible.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s decision in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department (2022) marks a progressive and transformative step in the recognition of reproductive rights in India. By interpreting the MTP Act expansively to include unmarried women, the Court emphasised that constitutional protections cannot be undermined by social biases or restrictive statutory interpretations. The judgment reflects a deliberate move toward substantive equality, ensuring that access to abortion is determined by individual autonomy rather than marital status.
One of the most significant aspects of the case is the Court’s integration of constitutional morality into statutory interpretation. Justice Chandrachud observed that the MTP Rules must be construed in harmony with Articles 14, 15, and 21, which protect equality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty. This approach underscores that the judiciary must safeguard fundamental rights against societal prejudices, especially when vulnerable groups such as unmarried women are disproportionately affected. The reasoning aligns with the principles laid down, reinforcing that decisional privacy is inseparable from bodily integrity and human dignity.
The judgment also addresses gendered assumptions embedded in law and society. By rejecting the High Court’s narrow reading of “change in marital status,” the Supreme Court acknowledged the evolving social realities in which women exercise agency outside the traditional marital framework. It confronts patriarchal constructs that historically penalise women for premarital relationships while privileging married women under the law.
From a comparative perspective, the decision resonates with global jurisprudence on reproductive rights. While it mirrors aspects of Roe v. Wade in recognising the centrality of reproductive autonomy, it goes further by embedding equality and non-discrimination as constitutional imperatives, reflecting India’s commitment to international human rights norms, including CEDAW and ICCPR obligations.
Practically, the judgment ensures greater access to safe abortion services for unmarried women, reducing the risk of unsafe procedures and associated health hazards. It also sets a precedent for inclusive interpretation of health legislation, emphasising that statutory silences or restrictive phrases must be read through the lens of fundamental rights rather than societal morality. The ruling reinforces that reproductive choice is not merely a personal or medical matter but a constitutional right intertwined with dignity, equality, and liberty.
However, the judgment also places a significant responsibility on the State to ensure implementation, including adequate healthcare facilities, medical boards, and sensitisation of healthcare providers to prevent discrimination or stigma. Future litigation may explore the practical challenges of operationalising these rights, especially in rural or conservative settings.
In sum, the case represents a landmark affirmation of reproductive justice, expanding constitutional protections to a previously marginalised category of women while reinforcing the judiciary’s role in upholding fundamental rights against legislative or societal constraints.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s judgment in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department (2022) represents a landmark advancement in Indian reproductive rights jurisprudence. By recognising that the right to abortion extends to unmarried women, the Court reaffirmed that bodily autonomy, decisional privacy, and dignity are fundamental constitutional values protected under Articles 14, 15, and 21. The decision dismantles discriminatory barriers rooted in marital status, ensuring that reproductive choice is governed by constitutional morality rather than social prejudice.
The ruling holds profound social and legal significance. It empowers women to exercise agency over their bodies, protects mental and physical health, and aligns domestic law with international human rights standards. Additionally, it sets a guiding precedent for interpreting healthcare and personal liberty statutes in a manner that advances equality and inclusivity.
While the judgment is transformative, it also underscores the State’s responsibility to implement safe, accessible, and non-stigmatising abortion services. Ultimately, X v. Principal Secretary consolidates India’s commitment to gender justice, reproductive freedom, and human dignity, positioning reproductive autonomy as an inalienable constitutional right and a cornerstone of substantive equality for all women, irrespective of marital status.

