The Three-Year Practice Mandate: Obstacle or Opportunity in Judicial Appointments

Abstract

The Supreme Court of India’s decision to reinstate the three-year practice demand for campaigners seeking entry into the lower bar has revived a long-standing debate. While intended to ensure judicial officers retain practical experience in the legal profession, the rule has been blamed for disproportionately disadvantaging women, first-generation attorneys, and individualities from marginalized backgrounds. This composition critically examines the elaboration of the rule, the bar’s shifting interpretations, and its counteraccusations on inclusivity and capability in judicial reclamation. The paper argues that enhanced post-selection training at Judicial Academies may serve as a further indifferent medium to achieve judicial preparedness without creating systemic walls.

Introduction

The judiciary, as the guardian of constitutional principles, demands a blend of academic expertise, ethical grounding, and practical skills. In May 2025, the Supreme Court of India reinstated the requirement of three years of legal practice at the Bar as a condition for eligibility into the subordinate judiciary[1]. While proponents assert that this rule ensures candidates are equipped with essential courtroom skills, critics highlight its exclusionary effects. The reimposition of this mandate reignites debates on access, diversity, and fairness within India’s judicial services.

Legal Framework

The eligibility criteria for recruitment into the judiciary have undergone multiple transformations. The Second All India Judges’ Association case (1993) introduced the three-year practice requirement for the first time[2]. However, this mandate was reversed in the Third All India Judges’ Association case (2002), with the Court acknowledging that it deterred talented young graduates from joining the judiciary[3]. Despite this reversal, the recent 2025 judgment reinstated the requirement, citing the need for judicial officers to possess exposure to actual courtroom dynamics before assuming responsibility over matters of life and liberty[4]. Comparatively, other constitutional posts, such as members of the legislature or civil servants, face no such restrictions, raising concerns about the consistency of eligibility standards across institutions[5].

Judicial Interpretation

The judiciary’s stance on this issue has been far from static.

1. 1993 (Second All India Judges’ Association case): The Court emphasized that prior practice was essential to standardize judicial entry requirements across states. The underlying assumption was that exposure to litigation would foster practical knowledge and judicial temperament2.
2. 2002 (Third All India Judges’ Association case): The Court reversed its earlier stance, reasoning that the mandate discouraged bright graduates and failed to attract the “best talent” to the judiciary. It also acknowledged the role of structured post-selection training in compensating for the lack of courtroom practice3.
3. 2025 (Reinstatement decision): The Court, overturning its 2002 position, reinstated the mandate. The reasoning was rooted in the perception that judges, unlike bureaucrats, adjudicate matters with profound consequences and must therefore possess a minimum level of professional experience4.

Critical Analysis

Disproportionate Impact on Women: The three-year rule disproportionately affects women, who already face structural obstacles such as lower representation at the Bar and societal expectations regarding marriage and family. With women comprising only about 15% of India’s practicing advocates,[6] the imposition of additional years before entering judicial service risks shrinking the pool of female candidates further.

First-Generation Lawyers and Lack of Networks: The mandate assumes that practice uniformly equips candidates with relevant skills. However, first-generation lawyers often struggle to secure meaningful mentorship or paid opportunities in litigation. Many work on clerical tasks or under exploitative conditions, while candidates with established legal family networks navigate the rules more easily[7].

Marginalised Communities: Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes remain underrepresented in the higher judiciary. Lowering entry barriers in 2002 had widened access for these communities. Reintroducing the three-year mandate risks re-establishing systemic exclusions[8].

Questioning the Assumption of Competence through Practice: Practical experience at the Bar is not uniform. Opportunities in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities are often limited, making the quality of litigation exposure highly inconsistent. As the 1986 Law Commission observed, the assumption that “a few years at the Bar” prepare an individual to be a judge is unsustainable[9].

Recent Developments

The 2025 reinstatement came after petitions contended that academic brilliance alone cannot substitute for courtroom exposure. The Court endorsed the view that judicial officers must demonstrate professional maturity before assuming office. Critics argue that this reasoning overlooks deficiencies in post-selection training at State Judicial Academies, which often lack permanent faculty and standardized curricula[10]. Public discourse has highlighted the mismatch between expectations in the judiciary and opportunities available in practice. While the government has supported the reinstatement, legal scholars and advocacy groups warn that the move could exclude deserving candidates and worsen diversity gaps[11].

Suggestions/Way Forward

1. Strengthen Judicial Academies: Judicial Academies should adopt structured training modules, including case management, evidence evaluation, and judicial ethics, supported by full-time faculty[12].
2. Mentorship and Shadowing Programs: Introducing judicial shadowing programs, similar to the UK’s model, would allow recruits to observe senior judges in practice[13].
3. Alternative Eligibility Models: Instead of a fixed practice requirement, a flexible model allowing candidates to choose between practice or extended post-selection training could balance inclusivity with competence.
4. Policy Support for Women and First-Generation Lawyers: Stipend schemes, mentorship programs, and institutional reforms should support those unable to sustain long periods of unpaid or underpaid practice[14].

Conclusion

The three-year practice mandate reflects a judicial philosophy that values professional experience as a safeguard for judicial competence. However, its blanket imposition risks excluding those who already face systemic barriers, undermining the constitutional commitment to equality. Competence in the judiciary is better ensured through robust training, mentorship, and institutional reforms rather than mandatory years at the Bar. To preserve both inclusivity and quality, the judiciary must reconsider whether the rule is a legitimate benchmark or merely a gatekeeper that reinforces existing hierarchies.

Reference(S):

[1] All India Judges’ Ass’n v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 2493 (India).

[2] All India Judges’ Ass’n v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 (India).

[3] All India Judges’ Ass’n v. Union of India, (2025) 3 SCC (India).

[4] All India Judges’ Ass’n v. Union of India, (2025) 3 SCC (India).

[5] NITI Aayog, Strategy for New India @ 75, 199 (2018).

[6] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Proportion and Strength of Women Judges and Lawyers, Rajya Sabha (2023).

[7] Mathews J. Nedumpara, Writ Petition (Civil) D. No. 35794 of 2022 (Supreme Court of India, 2024).

[8] Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Representation of Judges of Weaker Sections in Supreme Court and High Courts, Lok Sabha (2024).

[9] Law Commission of India, One Hundred Seventeenth Report on Training of Judicial Officers (1986).

[10] Reshma Sekhar & Vagda Galhotra, Schooling the Judges: The Selection and Training of Civil Judges and Judicial Magistrates (Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 2019).

[11] Hindustan Times, Judicial Dynasties in India  (May 16, 2025).

[12] Geeta Oberoi, Limitations of Induction Training Offered to Magistrates by State Judicial Educators in India, 4 Athens J. L. 301 (2018)

[13] Judicial Work Shadowing Scheme, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary (UK).

[14] Bar Council of India, Circular for Minimum Stipend for Junior Advocates, BCID-5383-2024 (2024).