The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors.

Case Name: The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision: 1 August 2024

Bench: 7-Judge Constitutional Bench

Citation: The State of Punjab & Others v Davinder Singh & Others, (2024) 9 SCC 1 (SC)

Introduction

Reservation of seats in public employment and education for historically disadvantaged groups is a core feature of India’s social justice architecture. The Constitution of India envisages special measures for advancement of “backward classes” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). Over time, this has been interpreted to cover Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) via the Presidential Lists (Articles 341, 342). The jurisprudence has wrestled with how to balance the twin imperatives of inclusive equality and targeted affirmative action.

For nearly two decades, Indian law held (via Chinnaiah) that SCs and STs, once recognised in the Presidential list, formed a single homogenous class, and thus states could not further subdivide them for reservation purposes. The decision under commentary overturns that understanding: in The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh the Supreme Court holds that sub‑classification within the SC/ST category is constitutionally permissible, provided certain criteria are fulfilled. This decision therefore represents a watershed in reservation jurisprudence and raises multiple questions: when is sub‑classification valid? How does it interact with equality and legislative competence? What safeguards must exist? This commentary explores those questions.

Facts

1. The State of Punjab had long recognised in policy a sub‑quota arrangement within its 25 % SC reservation: approximately 50 % of the SC quota was earmarked for the Balmiki and Mazhabi Sikh communities, and the remaining for “other SCs”.
   
2. The Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006 (“the Act”) included Section 4(5) which provided for “first preference” (or priority) to the Balmiki & Mazhabi Sikhs within the SC quota in public employment.
3. The respondents (Davinder Singh & others) challenged the constitutionality of this provision. The Punjab & Haryana High Court struck down Section 4(5) on the basis of the precedent in E. V. Chinnaiah (2004) which held that SCs cannot be further subclassified.
4. The State of Punjab appealed to the Supreme Court. The 5‑Judge Bench (in earlier hearings) referred the matter to a 7‑Judge Constitution Bench on the question of whether sub‑classification within SC/ST is permissible.
5. On 1 August 2024, the 7‑Judge Bench (CJI D.Y. Chandrachud + six other judges) delivered its judgment: majority 6:1. The Court held that states may validly enact sub‑classifications within SC/ST for reservation, and accordingly upheld the validity of Section 4(5) of the Act. The earlier Chinnaiah decision was overruled to the extent it held SC/ST sub‑classification impermissible.

Issues

The case posed multiple pivotal legal questions:

1. Legislative competence – Whether the State legislature had competence to enact sub‑classification within SCs (whose castes are included in the Presidential List under Article 341) for reservation in services, or whether such sub‑classification was prohibited by Chinnaiah’s doctrine.
2. Constitutional validity – Whether sub‑classification within SC/ST categories infringes the equality guarantee under Article 14, or violates clause (4) of Articles 15/16 by treating “classes of citizens” differently.
3. Scope of affirmative action – Whether Articles 15(4) and 16(4) permit only broad classes  (such as OBCs) to be subclassified, or also SCs/STs; and whether a“creamy‑layer” exclusion or other filtering mechanism is constitutionally required within SC/ST categories.
4. Standards of review – What standard should courts apply when reviewing a state’s decision to sub‑classify: whether the classification must be based on quantifiable data, representation deficiency, backwardness or other criteria?
5. Precedential correction – Whether the earlier Chinnaiah decision remains good law, or must be reconsidered in view of evolving social reality.

Judgment

Majority (6:1):

• The Court held that SCs/STs do not necessarily form a monolithic, homogeneous class for all purposes of reservation. It recognised internal social and educational heterogeneity.
• It affirmed that under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) the State has power to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward class of citizens. That necessarily includes the power to sub‑classify groups within a listed class if necessary to ensure effectiveness of reservation.
• It held that Article 341 (or 342) which deals with inclusion/exclusion of castes in the Presidential List does not itself prevent state legislatures from classifying among the castes already scheduled for the purpose of reservation — the List simply identifies castes for the purpose of Article 341, not the fine‑tuning of the state’s quota policy.
• The Court prescribed certain prerequisites for valid sub‑classification: (i) there must be quantifiable and reliable data showing that some castes/groups in the listed category are inadequately represented in services or education; (ii) there must be a rational nexus between the classification and the objective of reservation; (iii) the classification must not tinker with the “character of the Presidential List” nor exclude any group from the List;(iv) the formula must ensure that the “creamy layer” within SC/ST may be excluded, even if not mandated but at least conceptually acknowledged.
• On the facts, the Court accepted that the Punjab Act met the standard: the State had empirical studies (or found basis) that the Balmiki and Mazhabi Sikh communities had been historically disadvantaged relative to other SC castes, thereby justifying priority; thus Section 4(5) was valid.
• The decision thereby expressly overruled Chinnaiah to the extent that it placed a blanket prohibition on sub‑classification of SC/STs.

Dissent (Justice B.M. Trivedi):

• The dissenting judge held that further subclassification within SC/ST risks intra‑group fragmentation, undermining the protective umbrella of the Scheduled category; and that the Presidential List under Article 341/342 was not meant to be dissected by intra‑group differentiation.

Reasoning

The majority placed emphasis on both social reality and constitutional text:

• It noted that the “homogeneity” assumption of SC/ST groups was empirically untenable: within a listed caste category, some sub‑castes may have advanced significantly, while others remain deeply disadvantaged. Thus viewing the scheduled category as uniformly backward ignored social fact.
• It held that the power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is not confined to broad “classes” but extends to any “class of citizens” that is socially and educationally backward; treating unrepresented sub‑groups within a listed class may warrant priority to those sub‑groups.
• It interpreted Article 14’s requirement of equality to allow “differential treatment” if there is a rational basis and a legitimate aim (i.e., ensuring the benefits of reservation reach the most deprived). It cited Indra Sawhney’s principle of “adequate representation” as relevant.
• On the legislative competence issue, the majority held that state legislatures may legislate under Entry 41 of State List (Public employment) and Entry 38 (Social welfare) in conjunction with the constitutional provisions; the Presidential List mechanism (Articles 341/342) concerns classification of castes, and does not automatically preclude a state from sub‑classifying for purposes of reservation.
• The Court underscored that while judicial review remains available, the states enjoy “wide margin” in choosing the mode of implementation provided the empirical basis is furnished.

Critique

Strengths:

• The decision is pragmatically attuned to social reality and addresses a long‑standing inequity: within SC/ST lists, dominant sub‑castes often corner benefits of reservation, while deeply disadvantaged sub‑castes remain excluded. This jurisprudential evolution aligns with the principle of substantive equality rather than mere formal equality.
• By permitting sub‑classification, the Court provides states flexible tools to design quota policy more finely tuned to intra‑group disparities.
  
• The decision retains judicial oversight: the majority emphasised data, rationale and reviewability, thereby embedding procedural safeguards.

Weaknesses / Concerns:

• The concept of “creamy layer” or intra‑SC exclusion remains less clearly defined; the judgment leaves states significant discretion but offers fewer specific benchmarks, which may spawn legislative/administrative arbitrariness.
• Sub‑classification may entrench further fragmentation within scheduled categories, and risks undermining solidarity among historically disadvantaged groups. The dissent warned against this.
• The reliance on state empirical data may pose practical challenges: many states lack robust caste‑wise data, and this may delay implementation or invite litigation over methodological adequacy.
• The decision may raise concerns of policy intrusion by judiciary: though the Court tried to preserve legislative primacy, the setting of standards (quantifiable data, rational nexus) may lead to increased judicial supervision of quota policy, potentially slowing administrative action.
• The judgment’s interplay with the “creamy layer” doctrine for SC/ST remains somewhat under‑developed relative to existing OBC jurisprudence (Indra Sawhney etc.). Future litigation may be needed to flesh this out.

Implications

For Reservation Policy & Administration:

• States may now enact laws or sub‑quota formulas within SC/ST communities, provided they document backwardness and representation deficits.
• Several states (e.g., Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, UP) that had sought sub‑classification or sub‑quotas may proceed with legislative measures, perhaps subject to empirical survey requirements.
• Implementation will require robust caste‑wise data collection, possibly prompting new government commissions or socio‑economic surveys.
• Administrative machinery (public service commissions, employment boards) will need to adapt to differentiated reservation categories and internal quotas, monitoring “over‑represented” and “under‑represented” sub‑groups.

For Judicial Review & Constitutional Jurisprudence:

• The judgment signals the Court’s acceptance that reservation jurisprudence must evolve in light of intra‑group inequalities; this may lead to further nuanced judgments on “creamy layer”, on adjunct classes such as Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and on private sector quotas if introduced.
• The judgment also re‑emphasises the importance of empirical data and methodology in quota challenges: litigants may increasingly challenge reservation schemes on record‑deficiencies grounds.
• It may shift the balance in favour of more fine‑grained affirmative action rather than blanket quotas, potentially influencing international comparators.

For Equality Doctrine:

• The case marks a move toward substantive equality in Indian constitutional law: acknowledging that treating all listed castes identically may perpetuate inequalities.
• On the other hand, it raises normative questions: to what extent can the state subdivide already marginalised groups without violating inter‑group solidarity? This remains to be tested.

Conclusion

The State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh is a landmark decision in India’s reservation jurisprudence. By recognising the constitutionality of sub‑classification within SC/ST categories, the Supreme Court has opened a new chapter in affirmative action law—one that recognizes intra‑group disparities and grants states greater leeway in tailoring quotas. At the same time, the Court anchored this flexibility within the constraints of data, rationality and reviewability, thereby preserving doctrinal coherence with equality principles.

While the judgment holds significant promise for more equitable reservation policy, its long‑term impact will depend on how effectively states implement sub‑quotas, collect data, define “backwardness” within scheduled categories, and avoid fragmentation of disadvantaged groups. For scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike, the decision poses both opportunity and challenge: the opportunity to better tailor social justice tools, and the challenge of safeguarding administrability, legality and constitutional identity of reservation schemes.

Bibliography

Cases

1. The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. (2024) 2024 INSC 562.
2. E. V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 394.
3. Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India (1992) Supp 3 SCC 217.
   

Articles & Commentaries

1. Devanshi Singh, ‘Revisiting sub classification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for affirmative action through judicial lens: Insights from State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh’ (2024) 4(2) International Journal of Law, Justice and Jurisprudence 149.
2. ‘Landmark Supreme Court Verdict on SC/ST Quota: Sub‑Categorisation Allowed | State of Punjab vs Davinder Singh (2024)’ LegalBites (online, 2024) https://www.legalbites.in/landmark-supreme-court-verdict-on-scst-quota-sub-categorisation-allo wed-state-of-punjab-vs-davinder-singh-2024-1054507 accessed on 23 October 2025 .
3. ‘Validity of Sub‑Classification Within Reserved Categories – Supreme Court Observer’SCObserver (online, 2024) https://www.scobserver.in/cases/punjab-davinder-singh-validity-of-sub-classification-within-rese rved-categories-case-background/amp/ accessed [date]. Supreme Court Observer
4. ‘Supreme Court Ruling on Sub‑classification of SCs and STs’ Insights on India (online, 3 August 2024)https://www.insightsonindia.com/2024/08/03/supreme-court-ruling-on-sub-classification-of-scs-a nd-sts/ accessed on 23 October 2025.