Authored By: Anushri Dissanayake
Middlesex University - Dubai
Case Name: R v G and Another
Court: House of Lords
Date: 30 October 2003
Citation: R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50; [2004] 1 AC 1034
Introduction
The case involved two appellants, G (aged 11) and Another (aged 12), who were charged with arson after setting fire to newspapers that resulted in extensive damage to a Co-op store and adjacent properties. Both were tried as minors but held to the adult-standard objective test of recklessness established in R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341.
The respondent was the Crown, representing the prosecution, which sought to uphold their convictions for criminal damage under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
This case concerns the criminal law principle of recklessness, specifically in the context of arson causing criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.1 The legal issue arose from the actions of two boys, aged 11 and 12, whose conduct led to significant property damage. The core dispute centred around whether an individual, particularly a child, should be held liable for reckless conduct when they did not foresee the risk of harm.2 This case provided a critical opportunity to reconsider the objective test for recklessness in R v Caldwell, which established liability even when the defendant did not subjectively perceive a risk.3 Ultimately, the Lords replaced this with a subjective test, marking a significant theoretical change that proritised individual foresight and fairness, especially for minors and those with limited capacity.4 The case now serves as a cornerstone in the modern understanding of mens rea and culpability in English criminal law.
The case originated in the Crown Court, where G and his co-defendants, aged 11 and 12 respectively, were charged with arson causing criminal damage, contrary to section 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.5 The trial judge directed the jury using the then-binding objective test of recklessness established in R v Caldwell , under which a person was reckless if the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person, regardless of the defendant’s subjective awareness.6 The boys were convicted and sentenced accordingly. Their appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was unsuccessful. The court upheld the convictions, reiterating the Caldwell standard as a binding precedent.7 However, the case drew public and academic criticism, particularly because of the moral and legal concerns surrounding the application of an adult-centric recklessness standard to children.8 The appeal was granted leave to proceed to the House of Lords, which chose to revisit and ultimately overrule the Caldwell doctrine. This procedural journey reflects a broader judicial willingness to recalibrate established legal principles considering evolving standards of fairness and proportionality, especially in cases involving vulnerable defendants.9 The House of Lords’ intervention was not only corrective but transformative, addressing long-standing critiques of the objective recklessness doctrine.10
Facts of the Case
The defendants, G and another boy, were engaging in unsupervised camping behind a Co-op store in Newport Pagnell, Buckinghamshire. In the early hours of the morning, they found newspapers and lit them on fire in a secluded alleyway. They placed the burning papers under a plastic wheelie bin adjacent to the shop before leaving the area, believing the fire would burn itself out harmlessly.11 However, the fire spread rapidly, causing extensive damage to the bin, the shop’s exterior, and eventually to the entire building and surrounding structures. The total cost of the damage exceeded £1 million.12 The boys did not anticipate the scale of the destruction, nor did they foresee that their actions posed such a grave risk. Despite their age and lack of intent to cause serious harm, they were charged with arson contrary to section 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, on the basis that they had acted recklessly as to whether property would be destroyed or damaged.13 At trial, the judge directed the jury using the objective test for recklessness established in R v Caldwell.14 The boys were convicted, as the court held that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of such damage.15
The facts occurred in the shadow of the controversial Caldwell doctrine, which had governed the meaning of recklessness in English criminal law for over two decades. Under Caldwell, a person was reckless if they failed to give thought to an obvious risk that would have been apparent to a reasonable person, regardless of whether they personally foresaw it.16 This objective standard, while administratively convenient, disregarded developmental capacity, mental state, and individual foresight, making it particularly problematic when applied to children or mentally impaired defendants.17 Academic criticism of Caldwell was widespread. Scholars argued that criminal liability must be grounded in personal culpability, the idea that moral blameworthiness depends on what the defendant actually thought or knew at the time of the offence.18 n R v G and Another, the defendants’ youth brought the limitations of the Caldwell test into sharp relief. The case came at a time when both academic and judicial discourse were shifting toward a more nuanced, subjective approach to mens rea, recognising that criminal blame must correspond to actual mental awareness of risk.19 The stage was therefore set not just for a reconsideration of two boys’ convictions, but for a doctrinal recalibration of English criminal law’s approach to recklessness.20
Legal Issue
The primary legal issue in R v G and Another was whether the objective test of recklessness established in R v Caldwell should continue to govern criminal liability under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, or whether recklessness should instead be assessed subjectively based on the defendant’s actual state of mind at the time of the offence.21 Specifically, the House of Lords had to determine: “Whether a defendant can be held criminally liable for damage caused by reckless conduct if they did not, in fact, foresee the risk, but the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person.”22 This question raised deep concerns about the moral foundations of criminal liability, particularly whether it is legitimate to impose criminal punishment absent subjective liability.23 The defendants’ ages brought this issue into strong relief, as it highlighted the dangers of applying uniform adult standards of reasoning to immature or cognitively underdeveloped individuals.24
In addressing the central question, the House of Lords was also required to consider several subordinate but doctrinally and ethically significant issues, each contributing to the broader reevaluation of the concept of recklessness in English criminal law.
Applicability of Caldwell to Children
A key issue was whether the Caldwell test could be fairly applied to minors, given their limited capacity for risk assessment and moral reasoning. The court had to determine whether this objective standard unfairly criminalised children by failing to take their developmental stage into account, or whether the law should be reformed to accommodate age-related cognitive differences.25
Relationship Between Recklessness and Culpability
The case raised the deeper theoretical question of whether subjective foresight of risk is a necessary component of moral blameworthiness in criminal law. The Lords had to examine whether imposing liability without such foresight undermined the foundational principle that criminal responsibility should reflect personal culpability.26
Judicial Power to Overturn Precedent
The House of Lords also faced the constitutional question of whether it could depart from established precedent. In Knuller v DPP, the court had warned against reversing prior decisions except in cases of manifest injustice. The Lords in R v G had to justify overriding Caldwell, balancing stare decisis against evolving notions of fairness.27
Compatibility with ECHR Principles
The court implicitly engaged with the question of whether the objective recklessness test conflicted with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and legal certainty. A test that imposed liability without actual foresight arguably failed to provide clear notice of prohibited conduct.28
These sub-issues were not merely technical but had far-reaching implications for the development of English criminal law particularly in shaping the contours of mens rea doctrine, safeguarding the rights of juvenile defendants, and navigating the tension between legal certainty and substantive justice.29
Arguments
The Crown’s case rested on the assertion that the defendants had satisfied the legal criteria for reckless criminal damage under section 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.30 Relying on R v Caldwell, the prosecution advanced the objective test for recklessness, arguing that the court need only establish that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of property damage as a result of the boys’ actions, specifically, setting fire to newspapers and leaving them near buildings.31 The prosecution contended that foreseeability from the perspective of a reasonable adult was sufficient to support criminal liability, irrespective of the defendants’ actual mental state. It was not necessary to prove that G and his co-defendant had personally appreciated the risk, only that they ought to have.32 The objective test, it was argued, served a deterrent purpose and promoted public safety, especially in cases involving dangerous conduct like arson.33 Further, the Crown asserted that departing from Caldwell would undermine legal certainty, create inconsistency in the application of recklessness, and open the door to subjective excuses that could reduce the accountability of young offenders.34 The use of a uniform standard, they claimed, was justified by the need for clarity and predictability in the criminal law, even at the expense of tailored moral culpability.35
In response, the defence argued that the application of the Caldwell test to children constituted a fundamental miscarriage of justice, as it imposed criminal liability in the absence of actual subjective foresight of risk.36 The boys genuinely believed the fire would extinguish harmlessly and had not foreseen the possibility of it spreading. Thus, under the subjective approach to recklessness, their conduct could not be deemed culpable. The defence contended that Caldwell’s objective test failed to account for the developmental limitations of children, who are neurologically and psychologically less capable of foreseeing and evaluating long-term consequences.37 Applying the same standard to children as to adults ignored well-established principles in criminal jurisprudence that require mens rea to reflect the defendant’s actual state of mind and capacities.38 They also highlighted that maintaining an objective test deviated from the traditional principles established in R v Cunningham , where recklessness was based on the defendant’s awareness of risk. The defence argued that Caldwell represented a harsh and anomalous departure from this standard, and its continued application would erode the moral foundations of criminal responsibility.39 Finally, the defence emphasised the broader jurisprudential and ethical implications: that punishing individuals, especially minors, based on hypothetical foresight undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and could breach the principles of fair trial and proportionality, especially as protected under the European Convention on Human Rights.40
Legal Reasoning
The leading judgment, delivered by Lord Bingham of Cornhill, undertook a comprehensive critique of the Caldwell test and set out a clear rationale for its abandonment. His Lordship began by reaffirming the long-standing principle that criminal liability should rest upon fault, typically in the form of intention or recklessness as a subjective mental state.41 He observed that the objective test in Caldwell could result in the conviction of individuals who lacked moral blameworthiness, particularly children or those with mental impairments.42 Lord Bingham noted that while Caldwell had been intended to serve practical purposes by simplifying prosecutions and reinforcing deterrence, these considerations could not justify violating the fundamental tenet of criminal justice: that punishment must be morally proportionate to culpability.43 He stated that a defendant must be shown to have actually foreseen a risk and proceeded unreasonably in the face of that risk in order to be reckless.44 The House of Lords agreed that the subjective approach to recklessness, as established in R v Cunningham, better conformed to this principle. In doing so, the court signaled a return to individualised justice, abandoning the rigid, impersonal framework of Caldwell.45
The central statutory provision in question was section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, which requires that the accused act either intentionally or recklessly with respect to the destruction or damage of property.46 The key question was how the term “reckless” should be understood, whether as a subjective appreciation of risk (Cunningham), or as objective disregard for obvious danger (Caldwell). In support of the subjective standard, the court drew upon both domestic precedent and broader common law traditions, as well as international legal principles advocating for mens rea consistency.47 It also considered the disproportionate impact of objective tests on juvenile defendants, particularly considering evolving standards of youth justice and mental development.48
The Lords interpreted the facts considering the boys’ subjective knowledge and developmental stage. Lord Bingham emphasised that the defendants were 11 and 12 years old and had no actual appreciation of the risk that their actions posed.49 They genuinely believed the fire would burn out harmlessly, and there was no evidence that they foresaw the substantial damage that followed.
Under the Caldwell test, the boys were convicted simply because a reasonable adult would have foreseen the risk. However, the House found that such an approach ignored the reality of the defendants’ understanding, violating the principle that criminal law should reflect what the defendant subjectively knew or intended.50 In light of this, the House of Lords held that the boys’ convictions should be quashed, and that the correct standard of recklessness going forward must be subjective. The ruling reaffirmed the importance of tailoring criminal liability to individual circumstances, particularly in cases involving youth or vulnerability.51
Decision
The House of Lords delivered an uncontested judgment in favour of the appellants. The court held that the objective test of recklessness established in R v Caldwell should no longer apply, particularly in the context of offences under section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.52 Instead, the Lords ruled that recklessness must be assessed subjectively, meaning that the accused must have actually foreseen the relevant risk and unreasonably continued the conduct despite that awareness.53 The decision thus reaffirmed the earlier principle laid down in R v Cunningham, where the court required personal foresight of risk as the basis for establishing recklessness.54 In rejecting Caldwell, Lord Bingham noted that the test had caused “serious anomalies” in the law As a direct consequence of this doctrinal shift, the convictions of G and his co-defendant were quashed.57The House of Lords accepted that the boys had not subjectively foreseen the risk that their actions would cause the level of damage that ensued. As such, they could not be properly convicted under the newly redefined standard of recklessness. The ruling marked not only a victory for the appellants, but also a significant recalibration of the criminal law’s moral compass, particularly in cases involving youth or diminished cognitive capacity.58 It has since served as a binding authority on recklessness in criminal damage cases and has influenced subsequent interpretations of mens rea across other offence categories.59
The judgment was uncontested, with no formal dissenting opinions. However, individual concurring opinions elaborated on the reasoning and the broader implications:
- Lord Steyn concurred with Lord Bingham but added that Caldwell had contributed to a “harsh and unfair system of justice” and that its removal aligned English law with both principled fault-based liability and international human rights norms.60
- Baroness Hale, in her concurring speech, emphasised the importance of recognising children’s cognitive differences and warned against expecting “adult reasoning from immature minds.”61 She supported a system that reflects age-appropriate standards of responsibility, aligning with modern approaches to youth justice.62
Significance
The decision in R v G and Another had a profound doctrinal impact on English criminal law. It overruled the objective recklessness test established in R v Caldwell, marking a return to the subjective standard of recklessness rooted in R v Cunningham.63 The case reasserted that criminal culpability must reflect personal foresight of risk, thereby realigning the law with fundamental principles of individual fault and moral responsibility.64 Lord Bingham’s ruling significantly enhanced the fairness and legitimacy of criminal trials, especially for young and vulnerable defendants. The case is now widely regarded as a milestone in youth justice, reinforcing the need for courts to account for developmental capacity when assessing liability.65 Moreover, the judgment addressed wider concerns about the legitimacy of imposing liability without subjective awareness, particularly in offences requiring mens rea. It clarified that the law must not punish inadvertent negligence under the guise of recklessness.66
R v G set a binding precedent that applies across all cases involving recklessness under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and has influenced judicial reasoning in other areas of criminal law requiring subjective fault elements.67 Its importance lies not only in redefining recklessness but also in reaffirming the court’s willingness to depart from established but flawed precedent when it compromises justice. This aspect is particularly notable given the court’s general caution in overturning prior rulings, as seen in Knuller v DPP.68 The decision has been consistently cited in subsequent cases to emphasise that objective tests are ill-suited to crimes requiring a personal mental element, and that culpability must be tailored to the individual defendant’s understanding and foresight.69
Following R v G, courts in England and Wales have uniformly applied the subjective recklessness standard. The ruling has been instrumental in shaping the approach to juvenile criminal responsibility, influencing both case law and law reform debates. For instance, the judgment contributed to broader academic and policy discussions that later informed the Sentencing Council’s guidelines on youth offenders, which emphasise age, maturity, and cognitive development in sentencing decisions.70 n Booth v CPS, the court reaffirmed that the test for recklessness must focus on what the defendant actually foresaw, citing R v G as controlling authority.71 Similarly, in R v Parker, the subjective test was reinforced in the context of driving offences.72 The case has also served as a reference point in academic literature calling for the abolition of strict liability in criminal law, on the basis that faultless conviction undermines the criminal law’s normative function.73
R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50 is a landmark case in English criminal law, notable for its rejection of the objective recklessness test established in R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341. The case arose from the convictions of two boys, aged 11 and 12, for arson resulting in extensive property damage. Although they did not subjectively foresee the risk, their conduct was deemed reckless under the objective test then prevailing. The House of Lords, led by Lord Bingham, concluded that recklessness must be assessed subjectively and a defendant must have foreseen the risk and unreasonably taken it. The court reinstated the Cunningham approach, emphasising that personal fault is essential for criminal culpability, particularly for children or those with limited cognitive capacity. This ruling quashed the convictions and reshaped the legal understanding of mens rea. It continues to serve as a binding precedent in all criminal damage cases involving recklessness and has broader implications for youth justice, moral blameworthiness, and fair trial standards under both domestic and international legal frameworks.74
The decision in R v G is not only doctrinally sound but also morally compelling. It corrects the injustice perpetrated under the Caldwell regime, where individuals could be convicted without any actual awareness of the risk they created. Such a standard was inherently unjust, particularly for children, whose psychological development often precludes the capacity for adult-like risk assessment.75 By shifting back to a subjective model of recklessness, the House of Lords reaffirmed that culpability in criminal law must correspond to moral faults. This alignment is essential not just for the integrity of criminal justice, but for its legitimacy in the eyes of society.
The case also exemplifies the law’s ability to evolve and self-correct, especially when faced with empirical evidence and principled academic critique.76
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 1923 (Admin)
Caldwell, R v [1982] AC 341 (HL)
Cunningham, R v [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA)
G and Another, R v [2002] EWCA Crim 1992
G and Another, R v [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034
Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 (HL)
Parker, R v [2013] EWCA Crim 2208
Table of Legislation
Criminal Damage Act 1971, ss 1(1), 1(3)
European Convention on Human Rights, art 6(1)
Books
Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023)
R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007)
Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005)
David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021)
Andrew Simester and Bob Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (6th edn, Hart 2016)
Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004)
Journal Articles
Dennis J Baker, G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252
Nicola Lacey, Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 249
Nicola Lacey, Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility’ (2008) 72(1) Modern Law Review 72
R A Duff, Intention, Recklessness and Negligence: Moral and Legal Differences’ (2003) 22(1) Law and Philosophy 1
1 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1.
2 R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50.
3 R v Caldwell [1982] AC341(HL).
4 Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 254–259.
5 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1),1(3).
6 Caldwell (n3).
7 G and Another (n2).
8 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 191–194; Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252.
9 Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 249, 259–263.
10 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 185–188. 11 G and Another n(n2).
12 Ibid; Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 183.
13 Criminal Damage Act 1971, ss 1(1) and 1(3).
14 Caldwell (n3).
15 G and Another (n2); ibid.
16 Caldwell (n3); Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 190.
17Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) J Polit Philos 249, 259.
18Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 112–116; R A Duff, ‘Intention, Recklessness and Negligence: Moral and Legal Differences’ (2003) 22(1) Law and Philosophy 1, 4–5.
19 Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 258–260.
20 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 187–189.
21G and Another (n2); Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1.
22 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL); see also Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 253.
23 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 189–192; R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 157–160.
24 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 185–187
25 Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 258–260; Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 185–187.
26 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 189–192; R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 157–160. 27 Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 (HL).
28 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021) 143; European Convention on Human Rights, art 6(1).
29 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 215–219; Nicola Lacey, ‘Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility’ (2008) 72(1) Modern Law Review 72.
30 Criminal Damage Act 1971, ss 1(1) and 1(3).
31 Caldwell (n3).
32 Ibid.
33 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021) 145–146.
34 Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 256.
35 Andrew Simester and Bob Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (6th edn, Hart 2016) 142–144.
36 Caldwell (n3).
37 Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 185–187.
38 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 158–160.
39 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA); cf. Ashworth and Horder (n 6) 190–192.
40 European Convention on Human Rights, art 6(1); Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) J Polit Philos 249.
41 G and Another (n2).
42 Horder J, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 185–188.
43 R v G (n 1) [45]; Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 191– 194.
44 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA); Lord Bingham reaffirmed this test in R v G, [2003] UKHL 50 [37].
45 Tadros V, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 218–220; Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252.
46 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1); see also R v G (n 1) [22].
47 Lacey, ‘Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility’ (2008) 72(1) Modern Law Review 72, 75.
48 Lacey, ‘Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility’ (2008) 72(1) Modern Law Review 72, 75.
49 R v G (n 1) [5]– [6], [30].
50 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 157–159.
51 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021) 146–149.
52 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL); R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034 [32]– [35] (Lord Bingham).
53 Ibid [37]; Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1.
54 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA).and that adhering to it would be “contrary to principle.”
55 The Lords concluded that Caldwell represented a “misstep” in English criminal jurisprudence that had produced unjust results by convicting defendants lacking actual fault.56
55 R v G (n 1) [41].
56Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 186–188.
57 R v G (n 1) [44].
58 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 160–162.
59 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021) 147–149.
60 R v G (n 1) [52] (Lord Steyn); Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 249.
61 R v G (n 1) [70] (Baroness Hale).
62 Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (OUP 2004) 124–126.
63 R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034 [35]– [38]; R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA).
64 Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 186–188; Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 190–194.
65 Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’ (2001) 9(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 249; Baroness Hale in R v G, [2003] UKHL 50 [70].
66 Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 258.
67 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (17th edn, OUP 2021) 146–149.
68 Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 (HL); R v G (n 1) [30].
69 Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (OUP 2005) 215–220.
70 Sentencing Council, Sentencing Children and Young People: Definitive Guideline (2017) [1.1]– [1.8].
71 Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 1923 (Admin), [18]– [19].
72 R v Parker [2013] EWCA Crim 2208, [12]– [14].
73 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007) 162–165.
74 R v G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034; Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (9th edn, OUP 2023) 186–188.
75 Baroness Hale in R v G, [2003] UKHL 50 [70]; Nicola Lacey, ‘Psychologising Jekyll, Demonising Hyde: The Strange Case of Criminal Responsibility’ (2008) 72(1) Modern Law Review 72, 75.
76 Dennis J Baker, ‘G Recklessness and the House of Lords: Making Sense of Subjectivity in Criminal Law’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 258; R A Duff, Answering for Crime (Hart 2007) 157–159.
