Authored By: Samuel Xavier Oliveira
De Montfort University Dubai
Introduction
R v Blaue is a landmark decision in English criminal law on the doctrine of causation. The case is most significant for its extension of the “thin skull rule” — the principle that a defendant must take their victim as they find them — beyond purely physical vulnerabilities to encompass the victim’s moral, religious, and personal characteristics. In doing so, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) confirmed that a victim’s religiously motivated refusal of life-saving medical treatment does not break the chain of causation between a defendant’s act and the victim’s death. The decision continues to be cited as a foundational authority on causation in English criminal law.
Case Citation
R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411 (CA)
Court and Bench
Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), United Kingdom
Bench: Lord Justice Lawton, Mr Justice Thompson, and Mr Justice Shaw
Date of Judgment: 9 July 1975
Parties Involved
Appellant: Ronald Konrad Blaue — convicted of manslaughter after stabbing 18-year-old Jacolyn Woodhead (spelling to be verified by author)
Respondent: The Crown — representing the State in the manslaughter proceedings
Facts of the Case
The defendant, Blaue, stabbed an 18-year-old woman, Jacolyn Woodhead, multiple times after she refused his sexual advances. The stab wounds penetrated her lung. She was taken to hospital, where doctors advised that a blood transfusion was required to save her life. The victim, a Jehovah’s Witness, refused the transfusion on grounds of her religious beliefs and died the following day. Blaue was convicted of manslaughter. He appealed on the basis that the victim’s refusal to accept the blood transfusion constituted a novus actus interveniens that broke the chain of causation between the stabbing and her death, thereby absolving him of legal responsibility.
Issues Raised
Whether the victim’s refusal to undergo the blood transfusion acted as a novus actus interveniens that broke the chain of causation from the stabbing to her death.
Whether the defendant remained legally responsible for the death of the victim despite the existence of treatment that could have saved her life.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Blaue)
The refusal to undergo the blood transfusion was unreasonable and unforeseeable.
The refusal to accept treatment broke the chain of causation between the stabbing and the death.
By reason of the intervening act of refusing treatment, the stabbing was no longer the legal cause of death, and Blaue should therefore be absolved of liability.
Respondent (The Crown)
A defendant must take his victims as he finds them, including their religious beliefs, as established in R v Holland.(1)
The refusal to accept a blood transfusion did not break the chain of causation.
In criminal law, victims are not required to mitigate injuries inflicted upon them by a defendant.
The stab wound was still an operative and substantial cause of death, applying the principle in R v Smith.(2)
Judgment
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed the appeal and upheld Blaue’s conviction for manslaughter. The Court held that the victim’s refusal to undergo a blood transfusion did not constitute a novus actus interveniens and did not break the chain of causation. Blaue remained legally responsible for her death because the stabbing was still an operative and substantial cause of it.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court extended the thin skull rule, confirming that defendants must take their victims as they find them.(3) Critically, this principle applies not only to the victim’s physical condition but also to their religious and moral beliefs. A defendant cannot escape liability by arguing that the victim could have taken better steps to preserve their own life, as stated by Maule J.(4) Even where a victim’s refusal of treatment might appear unreasonable to an outside observer, that refusal does not diminish the culpability of the defendant.(5)
The victim’s refusal of a blood transfusion did not constitute a novus actus interveniens. Applying the test from R v Cheshire,(6) only an act so independent of, or so potent in relation to, the initial injury can break the chain of causation. The stabbing remained an operative and substantial cause of death; the victim’s decision did not sever that chain. Furthermore, criminal law does not require a victim to mitigate the harm caused to them by a defendant.(7) Accordingly, the defendant remained legally liable for the victim’s death.
Conclusion
R v Blaue has had a significant and lasting impact on English criminal law. The case extended the thin skull rule beyond physical vulnerabilities to encompass a victim’s religious and moral characteristics, treating these as inseparable components of the individual as a whole.
The decision ensures that defendants cannot absolve themselves of criminal responsibility solely by reference to a victim’s personal choices or decisions, unless the victim’s act is so independent and potent as to break the chain of causation altogether.
Furthermore, the case affirms the principle of victims’ autonomy alongside defendants’ accountability: the reasonableness of a victim’s decisions does not, of itself, reduce the culpability of the defendant who inflicted the original harm.(8) This principle reflects a deliberate policy choice — that courts should focus on the defendant’s criminal responsibility rather than scrutinising the victim’s response to being harmed.
It should be noted that the case has attracted academic commentary questioning whether the complete exclusion of reasonableness from the analysis is appropriate in all circumstances. The tension between respecting victims’ autonomy and holding defendants to account for all consequences of their acts, however remote, remains a live area of scholarly debate in English criminal law.
Reference(S):
(1) R v Holland (1841) 2 Mood & R 351
(2) R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35
(3) Nicola Monaghan, Criminal Law Directions (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2025) 43
(4) R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411, 1414
(5) Ian Edwards and Michael Allen, Criminal Law (17th edn, Oxford University Press 2024) 58
(6) R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844 (CA) 850
(7) R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411 (CA) 1412
(8) Ian Edwards and Michael Allen, Criminal Law (17th edn, Oxford University Press 2024) 58

