R (Leger) v Secretary of State for Education (2025)

1) Case Title & Citation 

The King (on the application of Glawdys Leger) v Secretary of State for Education(2025) EWHC 665 (Admin) (Admin Court, King’s Bench Division). 

2) Court Name & Bench 

Court: High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division – Administrative Court.

Judge: Mrs Justice Lang DBE. 

Bench type: Single-judge bench (Administrative Court). 

3) Date of Judgment 

Hearing: 26 February 2025.

Judgment: 20 March 2025 (handed down remotely).

4) Parties Involved 

Claimant (Petitioner): Glawdys Leger, a teacher (French and Spanish; also taught some RS/PSHE)at Bishop Justus Church of England School (Aquinas Trust). She brought the claimby judicial review challenging the Secretary of State’s decision following professional misconduct proceedings. 

Defendant (Respondent): Secretary of State for Education, the public authority responsibleforthe statutory teacher disciplinary regime, acting on the recommendation of the Teaching RegulationAgency’s Professional Conduct Panel (PCP). 

5) Facts of the Case 

Glawdys Leger was employed at Bishop Justus Church of England School (Aquinas Trust), teaching French and Spanish, and also teaching some Religious Studies (RS) and PSHE. Theschool is a Church of England academy with a stated Christian character. (Judgment, paras 5–6) Leger held conservative Christian beliefs about sex and marriage and said she would not discriminate against those who disagreed. She became uncomfortable with aspects of the school’s Equality, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) approach and with LGBTQ+ resources used in RS/PSHE. She displayed an EDI poster in her classroom but later said she would not continue, and shestoppedusing certain LGBTQ+ materials because she felt they conflicted with her beliefs. She raisedconcerns with senior staff. (Judgment, paras 9–10) In a Year 7 RS lesson, she was expected to teach a “Human Rights” segment that includedaPowerPoint touching on LGBTQ+ topics and protected characteristics. Instead, she explainedherChristian beliefs to the class and why she considered LGBTQ+ ideology contrary to those beliefs; pupils asked questions and a discussion followed. (Judgment, para 12) A pupil (“Pupil A”) and the pupil’s mother complained to the school by email, saying the commentswere distressing. The school began disciplinary proceedings, suspended Leger in March2022anddismissed her in May 2022 (the detailed dismissal process was not before the court). (Judgment, paras 12–13) The matter was referred to the Teaching Regulation Agency (TRA). A Professional Conduct Panel (PCP) later found unacceptable professional conduct proved (but did not find conduct likelyto bring the profession into disrepute), recommended no prohibition order, and recommendedpublication of the misconduct finding. The Secretary of State accepted that recommendationon11December 2023. Leger brought this judicial review challenging the misconduct finding anditspublication. (Judgment, paras 1, 15–16, 25) 

6) Issues Raised (Questions of Law) 

Legal issue 1 (Context): Was the PCP’s misconduct decision unlawful because it failed toconsiderthe proper context of the classroom comments? (Judgment, para 2(i)) 

Legal issue 2 (Procedural fairness / Article 6): Was the PCP process unfair because it madecrucial findings outside the pleaded allegations/evidence and not put to the Claimant? (Judgment, para 2(ii)) 

Legal issue 3 (Curriculum misdirection): Did the PCP misdirect itself by treating the Claimant aspersonally subject to the “broad and balanced curriculum” duty? (Judgment, para 2(iii)) 

Legal issue 4 (Articles 9/10 — legality): If Articles 9/10 were engaged, was any interferencenot“prescribed by law” (Purdy)? (Judgment, para 2(iv)–(v))

Legal issue 5 (Articles 9/10 — proportionality): Was any interference with Articles 9/10not necessary/proportionate (Bank Mellat)? (Judgment, para 2(vi)) 

Legal issue 6 (Publication — Article 8 / data protection): Was publication of the decisionunlawful as a breach of Article 8 and/or data protection rights? (Judgment, para 2(vii)) 

7) Arguments of the Parties 

(A) Claimant’s key contentions 

Context (Ground 1): The PCP and Secretary of State took her words out of context. She saidshewas teaching RS in a Christian school, was known to be Christian, and was responding topupil questions during a single classroom discussion. She argued the PCP wrongly relied on twounrelated“incidents” (EDI poster / not showing an LGBTQ+ video) and placed undue weight on brief notesmade by an 11- year- old pupil, ignoring more positive pupil evidence. (Judgment, paras 43–45) 

Guidance relied on for “context”: She relied on Department for Education guidance (including“The Equality Act 2010 and schools” (May 2014)) to argue teachers may express personal viewsin an appropriate manner and context, and on the RSE statutory guidance (13 Sept 2021) stating that schools may teach faith perspectives and allow balanced debate. (Judgment, paras 46–49)

Procedural unfairness / Article 6 (Ground 2): She said the PCP’s real reasoning was a newallegation that she failed to provide a balanced RS curriculum and presented her beliefs as “theTruth” which was not in the pleaded allegations and was not put to her in cross- examination, sotheprocess was unfair at common law and under Article 6 ECHR. (Judgment, paras 57–59) 

Curriculum misdirection (Ground 3): She argued the PCP wrongly treated her as personallysubject to the statutory duty to provide a “broad and balanced curriculum”, which lies onschools(Education Act 2002, ss 78–79; Academies Act 2010, s 1A), not individual teachers. (Judgment, paras 65–68) 

Articles 9 & 10 (Grounds 4–6): She argued the PCP misdirected itself on Convention rights, over- emphasized “legitimate aim”, and failed properly to apply “prescribed by law” andproportionality requirements (HRA 1998, s 3(1)). She said the EA 2002 / 2012 Regulations / Teachers’ Standards were not sufficiently precise/foreseeable, and the PCP misapplied BankMellat (including by treating publication as the least intrusive measure and failing to balance competinginterests). (Judgment, paras 75–80) 

Authorities relied on for Articles 9/10: She relied on Ngole v University of Sheffieldandanumber of other Strasbourg/UK authorities (including Lee v Ashers Baking Co and ŞahinvTurkey) in support of her Articles 9/10 arguments. (Judgment, paras 75, 85, 88, 91–92) 

Publication (Ground 7): She argued publication damaged her reputation and job prospects andamounted to disproportionate “shaming”. She also argued the interference with Article 8 was not “prescribed by law” because reg 8(5) did not expressly require publication of her name. (Judgment, paras 113–114) 

(B) Defendant’s key contentions 

Context (answer to Ground 1): The Secretary of State argued the PCP’s assessment expresslyengaged with context and rationally reflected the Claimant’s responsibilities as a teacher inthat setting, including school policies and pupil welfare. (Judgment, para 54) 

Fairness (answer to Ground 2): The Secretary of State argued it was not procedurally unfair forthePCP to rely on matters not pleaded as separate allegations (such as earlier disputes about materials/posters), because they formed part of the Claimant’s own evidence explaining the widercontext, and she was questioned about them. (Judgment, paras 62–63) 

Curriculum (answer to Ground 3): The Secretary of State resisted the “misdirection” point onthebasis that, although the statutory curriculum duty rests on schools, teachers are expected todeliverthe curriculum and the PCP referred to curriculum breadth/balance only in the specific context oftheClaimant declining to teach prescribed segments contrary to school policy. (Judgment, paras 70–72)

Articles 9 & 10 (answers to Grounds 4–6): The Secretary of State maintained that any interferencewas lawful and justified: the statutory teacher- misconduct scheme plus Teachers’ Standards/guidance supplied the necessary legal basis and framework, and the PCP appliedthePurdy legality approach and Bank Mellat proportionality principles in reaching a proportionateoutcome. (Judgment, paras 83–84, 95–98) 

Publication (answer to Ground 7): The Secretary of State argued publication was requiredbyreg8(5) of the 2012 Regulations and was consistent with open justice (PCP hearings are public).

Alternatively, even if not mandatory, publication was justified on policy grounds (public confidence, safeguarding/safer recruitment, transparency), supported by TRA policy and witness evidenceexplaining the public interest in publishing serious misconduct decisions (with removal after twoyears where no prohibition order is made). (Judgment, paras 117–118, 120–124) 

8) Judgment / Final Decision 

The High Court dismissed the claim for judicial review. (Judgment, para 130). The Court heldthat none of the challenge grounds succeeded – Ground 1 (context) (para 56), Ground 2 (procedural fairness/Article 6) (para 64), Ground 3 (curriculum misdirection) (para 74), Grounds 4–6(Articles9/10: legality and proportionality) (para 108), and Ground 7 (publication: Article 8/data protection)(para 129).The PCP’s finding of unacceptable professional conduct and the Secretary of State’sdecision to publish the misconduct outcome remained in force. (Judgment, paras 129–130).Noadditional orders or directions are set out in the judgment beyond dismissal of the claim. (Judgment, para 130) 

9) Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi 

The Court treated the claim as a judicial review challenge to an expert disciplinary decision. It stressed that the Claimant had to show a public law error (or a Human Rights Act breach), andthatthe Court would not re- decide disputed facts. The PCP was the primary fact-finder and the Court would only interfere if findings were perverse. It also emphasised that evaluative judgments onprofessional standards and outcome attract appropriate deference. (Judgment, paras 39–42) 

On context and fairness, the Court held the PCP had considered the setting (Year 7 RSlesson; Church of England school; Claimant’s beliefs) but was entitled to conclude the discussionwasnot merely neutral “Q&A”: on the Claimant’s own evidence she initiated the topic in a way that framedthe discussion. The Court accepted the PCP could rely on pupil evidence and on the earlier poster/video disputes because the Claimant herself used those matters to explain why she actedasshe did. On procedural fairness/Article 6, the Court rejected the argument that the PCPinventedanew allegation: once the comments were found proved, the PCP was entitled to make an evaluativejudgment whether they amounted to unacceptable professional conduct, taking account of theClaimant’s own explanatory evidence. Grounds 1 and 2 therefore failed. (Judgment, paras 50–56, 60–64)

On the curriculum point, the Court accepted that the statutory duty to secure a broad andbalancedcurriculum rests on schools, but held it was still legitimate for the PCP to refer to curriculumbreadth/balance when evaluating a teacher’s decision to decline to teach prescribed content contrary to school policy. Teachers deliver the curriculum and are expected to act consistentlywithschool ethos and policies; the PCP could treat the refusal to present alternative perspectives as relevant to professional standards in that setting. Ground 3 failed. (Judgment, paras 70–74) 

On Articles 9 and 10, the Court focused on whether the outcome actually breached Conventionrights. It held the PCP correctly treated the rights as qualified and applied the correct frameworks. For legality (“prescribed by law”), the Education Act 2002/2012 Regulations together withTeachers’Standards and published guidance provided an accessible and sufficiently foreseeable professional-regulation framework (the scheme necessarily involves evaluative discretion). For proportionality, the Court accepted the PCP applied Bank Mellat and was entitled to concludetheconduct breached Teachers’ Standards and that the available lesser outcome within the statutoryscheme—no prohibition but publication—was proportionate; the Secretary of State independentlyaccepted that recommendation. Grounds 4–6 failed. (Judgment, paras 83–85, 93–95, 97–98, 104, 106–108) 

On publication (Article 8/data protection), the Court accepted publication can engage Article8where reputation is affected, but held publication fell within the statutory/policy frameworkandserved legitimate public-interest aims (transparency, public confidence, safeguarding/safer recruitment), with time-limited publication under TRA policy where no prohibition is imposed. Publication was proportionate, so Ground 7 failed. (Judgment, paras 116, 120, 123–129) 

Ratio decidendi 

A PCP may lawfully find unacceptable professional conduct where a teacher’s classroomconduct/comments, assessed in context, are incompatible with Teachers’ Standards and school ethos/policies; the High Court will not interfere on judicial review absent perversity or publiclawerror. (Judgment, paras 39–42, 54–56, 97).Interference with Articles 9/10 can be prescribedbylawand proportionate under the teacher- discipline scheme (EA 2002/2012 Regulations +Teachers’Standards), applying Purdy and Bank Mellat. (Judgment, paras 83–85, 95–108).Publicationof amisconduct finding can be a lawful, proportionate regulatory sanction compatible with Article8inpursuit of safeguarding/transparency/public confidence objectives. (Judgment, paras 116, 120–129)

10) Conclusion / Observations 

The case is significant for showing how the teacher disciplinary framework applies where a teacher’sclassroom speech engages freedom of religion and expression. The Administrative Court upheldthe regulator’s approach as a lawful form of professional regulation: teachers may hold religiousconvictions, but classroom delivery of sensitive topics is assessed through Teachers’ Standards, theschool’s ethos and policies, and the need to maintain a respectful learning environment for children. In practice, the judgment signals that tribunals and courts will focus less on the teacher’s privatebeliefs and more on whether the manner and ef ect of what was said in class was compatiblewithprofessional standards and pupil welfare. 

Leger is important because it shows the boundary the courts draw between a teacher’s protectedbeliefs and professional standards in the classroom. The High Court treated the case as oneaboutregulation of conduct in a school setting: the question was not whether the Claimant couldholdherreligious views, but whether the way the topic was handled in a Year 7 lesson was compatiblewithTeachers’ Standards and the school’s policies, including the need for a respectful environment forpupils. 

The decision is also practically significant for how the teacher-misconduct regime uses publication. Even without a prohibition order, a published finding can have real career consequences, andthejudgment accepts publication as part of the statutory scheme aimed at transparency and safeguarding.A useful point for practice is that government guidance now indicates that, where there is a findingof serious misconduct but no prohibition order, published decisions are removed after twoyears, which reflects an attempt to make publication time-limited in “no prohibition” cases. 

The case is a reminder that, where sensitive issues arise, teachers should use internal channels toraise concerns and ensure classroom discussion is delivered in a way that recognizes the teacher’sinfluence and the diversity of pupil’s circumstances.