Minority Protection in Pakistan and India: A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional and Legal Frameworks

Abstract 

This article undertakes a comparative and analytical study of minority protection in PakistanandIndia, focusing on how constitutional guarantees are translated into enforceable legal rights. It examines the principal constitutional provisions that secure equality, religious freedom, andculturalautonomy, and evaluates the statutory and institutional mechanisms designed to safeguardminoritycommunities. The article then analyses judicial interpretation in both jurisdictions to assess howcourts have shaped the scope of minority rights and remedial protection. By comparing legal designwith practical enforcement, it identifies recurring gaps,such as inconsistency in implementation, limited institutional powers, and challenges in securing ef ective remedies. The article concludesbyproposing targeted reforms aimed at strengthening accountability, improving implementation, andenhancing the practical protection of minorities within each constitutional order. 

1. Introduction 

The protection of minorities is a persistent question of constitutional governance in SouthAsia. Pakistan and India were founded on commitments to equality and religious freedom, yet theeffectiveness of minority protection remains under sustained legal and public scrutiny, particularlyinlight of judicial interventions, legislative developments, and recurring debates about state responsesto minority-related grievances. 

In the contemporary legal landscape, minority protection cannot be assessed by constitutional text alone. Its practical force depends on how guarantees are implemented through legislation, interpretedby courts, and delivered through institutions. Pakistan’s framework combines fundamental rightswith an express constitutional commitment to safeguard minorities and mechanisms of political inclusion, while India’s constitutional design, shaped by secularism, places particular emphasisoncultural conservation and educational autonomy for religious and linguistic minorities. 

Against this background, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the constitutional andlegalframeworks governing minority protection in Pakistan and India. It examines howconstitutional promises are translated into enforceable protection through statutes, judicial interpretation, andinstitutional practice, and it identifies strengths, limitations, and reform directions within eachsystem.

2. Research Methodology 

This article adopts a comparative, doctrinal approach. It draws primarily on constitutional textsinPakistan and India, key statutes relevant to minority protection, and leading judicial decisions interpreting minority rights. It also uses selected academic scholarship and policy commentarytoevaluate how these legal frameworks function in practice, with particular attention to institutional design, enforcement, and remedies. 

3. Legal Framework 

3.1 Defining “minorities” for legal protection 

In constitutional terms, a “minority” is a legal category that triggers protections aimed at securingequal citizenship and preserving group identity. These protections usually operate along twotracks: religious liberty and communal autonomy, and cultural or linguistic preservation, often througheducation. [1] 

In Pakistan, minority protection is largely organized around religious identity within an Islamicconstitutional framework. Islam is declared the State religion, and the Constitution expresslydistinguishes between “Muslim” and “non-Muslim”, defining “non-Muslim” to include specifiedreligious communities. [2] [3] Within that structure, the Constitution guarantees religious freedom, including the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion, and recognizes the autonomyof religious denominations to manage religious institutions, subject to law, public order, andmorality. [4] 

India’s Constitution protects minority identity primarily through cultural and educational guarantees. It secures the right of communities to conserve their language, script, and culture and grants minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. [5] Statutory mechanisms also use the category of “minority”, includingwhere minority status is linked to communities notified by the Central Government for the purposesof the national minorities commission framework. [6] The Supreme Court has further treatedthe State as the relevant unit for determining minority status when the claim arises in relationtoStatelegislation. [7] 

These definitional choices matter because they determine who can access minority-specific institutions and claims, particularly in education, and they shape how grievances are framed, whetheras individual liberty, group autonomy, or equality-based claims. [5] 

3.2 Pakistan: constitutional protections and state duties 

Pakistan’s Constitution couples general equality protections with religion-specific liberties andanexpress duty on the State to safeguard minorities. Equality before the law and equal protectionareguaranteed, and the constitutional scheme also addresses non-discrimination and equal opportunityinpublic service. [8] [9] 

Religious freedom is protected through the right to profess, practise, and propagate religionandthrough the autonomy of religious denominations to manage religious institutions, subject tolaw, public order, and morality. [4] The Constitution also protects conscience by prohibiting compelledfinancial support for the religious activities of a faith other than one’s own, and it contains safeguards in education against compelled religious instruction and discriminatory exclusion. [10][11] 

Pakistan further imposes a specific constitutional obligation on the State to safeguard the legitimaterights and interests of minorities, including due representation in federal and provincial services. [12]Political inclusion is supported through reserved seats for non-Muslims in the National Assemblyand provincial assemblies, embedding minority participation within the constitutional structure. [13]

These protections operate within a constitutional identity that declares Islamthe State religionanddirects that laws be brought into conformity with Islamic injunctions, which shapes the interpretativeenvironment and can create structural tensions in the balancing of rights and restrictions. [2] [14]

3.3 Pakistan: statutory protections and institutional architecture 

Pakistan’s statutory approach affecting minorities is dispersed across criminal law, regulatorycontrols, and administrative governance. Criminal law is central, with offences relating toreligionaddressing conduct connected to places of worship, deliberate outraging of religious feelings, desecration of the Holy Qur’an, and derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), alongside public-mischief provisions that address statements likely topromoteenmity or ill-will between groups on grounds including religion. [15] 

Regulation has also extended into the digital sphere. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016criminalizes online dissemination of material that advances or is likely to advance interfaith, sectarian, or racial hatred, reflecting a legislative attempt to address contemporary forms of hatespeech. [16] 

Administrative and property governance mechanisms also affect minorities, particularly inrelationtoreligious endowments and the management of minority-linked properties. The Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 establishes a federal framework for the supervisionand control of evacuee trust property through the Evacuee Trust Property Board. [17] 

Institutionally, minority-related concerns are addressed through a mix of specialized and general bodies. The National Commission for Human Rights is a statutory institution with an inquiryandrecommendations mandate that can encompass minority-rights concerns where they arise as humanrights issues. [18] Across these arrangements, a recurring issue is institutional strength. Manymechanisms operate through administration, coordination, or recommendations rather thandirect enforcement, which can limit immediate remedial impact and make effectiveness dependent onexecutive follow-through. [18] 

3.4 India: constitutional protections and minority-specific rights 

India’s constitutional framework begins with general equality guarantees that apply to all personsand citizens. Equality before the law, non-discrimination on grounds including religion, andequalityof opportunity in public employment provide the baseline for minority protection. [19] 

Freedom of religion is secured through freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise, andpropagate religion, alongside denominational autonomy in matters of religion. These guaranteesarecomplemented by provisions governing the relationship between religion and the State, includingsafeguards relating to religious taxation and religious instruction in educational institutions. [20] 

Minority-specific rights are articulated most clearly through culture and education. The Constitutionprotects the right to conserve language, script, and culture, and it grants minorities the right toestablish and administer educational institutions of their choice, together with a protectionagainst discriminatory denial of State aid on that basis. [5]

Linguistic minorities are also supported through constitutional provisions directing mother-tongueinstruction at the primary stage and through an institutional reporting mechanismunder the Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. [21] 

Limits are built into the framework. Religious freedom is subject to public order, morality, andhealth, and it is also subject to other fundamental rights, with scope for State interventionintheinterests of social welfare and reform. [22] The balance between secular constitutional commitmentsand minority autonomy has therefore been developed through constitutional reasoning that reconcilesliberty, equality, and institutional autonomy within a plural constitutional order. [23] 

3.5 India: statutory protections and institutional mechanisms 

India’s statutory and institutional mechanisms operate alongside constitutional guarantees throughspecialized minority bodies and broader human-rights institutions. The National Commissionfor Minorities is constituted under the National Commission for Minorities Act 1992 and is taskedwithmonitoring safeguards and examining complaints, while operating primarily through inquiryandrecommendations rather than direct coercive enforcement. [24] For the purposes of that framework, “minority” is tied to communities notified by the Central Government. [6] 

A distinct statutory track exists for minority educational rights. The National Commissionfor Minority Educational Institutions Act 2004 establishes a specialized commission that supports minority educational institutions through an adjudicatory and facilitative mandate in matters suchasstatus recognition and affiliation-related disputes. [25] 

For minority-related grievances that also engage broader human-rights protections, complainantsmay also pursue remedies through human-rights commissions under the Protection of HumanRightsAct 1993, which provides inquiry and recommendation powers. [26] In practice, the accessibilityofthese mechanisms may be affected by overlapping jurisdictions, variable institutional responsiveness,and procedural complexity, which can dilute the practical value of formal safeguards. [24] 

3.6 Comparative synthesis for the Legal Framework 

Pakistan and India adopt distinct constitutional strategies. Pakistan combines general fundamental rights with an explicit duty to safeguard minorities and with reserved representation, embeddingminority participation within the constitutional structure. [12] [13] India, by contrast, places greater emphasis on group-based protection through culture and education, supported by a developedjurisprudence on minority educational autonomy and the permissible limits of State regulation. [5][7]

This comparison frames the evaluative question that drives the article: which framework is morecapable of producing enforceable protection in practice, and why. The answer depends not onlyonconstitutional text, but also on institutional pathways, remedial design, and implementationconsistency. 

The comparison also explains why courts become central to defining the real scope of minorityprotection in both jurisdictions. Where constitutional provisions are broad and statutory bodiesoperate mainly through monitoring and recommendations, judicial interpretation supplies theoperative standards for balancing rights against restrictions and for shaping workable remedies. [27][28] 

4. Judicial Interpretation 

4.1 Pakistan: constitutional adjudication and minority protection 

Pakistan’s Supreme Court has treated minority protection as a question of constitutional governancewhere implementation failures risk emptying constitutional guarantees of practical content. [29] InSuo Motu Case No 1 of 2014, the Court framed minority protection as an affirmative constitutional responsibility grounded in religious freedom, equality, and the Constitution’s express commitment tosafeguarding minorities. [29] [30] 

The judgment is significant for its remedial posture. Rather than stopping at declarations, theCourt issued structural directions aimed at institutional delivery, including measures linked to protectionofplaces of worship, curbing hate speech, institutional coordination on minority rights, and follow-upoversight to secure implementation. [29] The case illustrates a positive-duty approach in whichconstitutional rights justify requiring the State to act through policing and administrative safeguards, not merely to refrain from interference. [29] [30] 

A persistent limitation, however, is the implementation gap. Structural orders depend on executivecompliance and capacity, so judicial intervention may be strong in principle but uneven indelivery. [29] 

4.2 India: minority rights jurisprudence, especially education and autonomy

In India, minority protection has been shaped most decisively through constitutional adjudicationonminority educational rights under Article 30. [31] The core logic is that minorities must retainmeaningful autonomy to establish and administer institutions that preserve identity, while remainingsubject to regulation that serves legitimate public purposes and does not destroy the essenceof theright. [31]. 

T.M.A. Pai Foundation established the foundational framework. It clarified that minority statusforArticle 30 purposes is ordinarily assessed with reference to the relevant State, and it distinguishedpermissible regulation from impermissible control, emphasising that administrative autonomyisnota licence for maladministration. [31] Islamic Academy of Education and P.A. Inamdar thenrefinedthe autonomy-regulation boundary in the context of admissions and fees in private unaidedprofessional institutions, seeking to reconcile autonomy with standards, fairness, and the preventionof profiteering, while limiting the scope of direct state control in the unaided sector. [32] [33] 

4.3 Comparative evaluation of judicial roles 

Judicial emphases mirror constitutional design. In Pakistan, courts more readily frame minorityprotection as a State duty and respond with implementation-oriented directions when minorityinsecurity is presented as a governance failure. [29] In India, courts have most visibly shapedminority protection through doctrinal refinement of autonomy and regulation, especially ineducation,using balancing frameworks that determine the practical content of minority rights. [31] [33] 

In both systems, judicial protection is not self-executing. Pakistan’s structural remedies dependonfollow-through and capacity, while India’s doctrinal clarity can still be diluted where regulationexpands or implementation is uneven. [29] [33] This leads into the critical analysis that follows: persistent gaps are best explained through enforcement design, institutional capacity, andimplementation dynamics, rather than constitutional text alone. [29] [31] 

5. Critical Analysis 

5.1 The enforcement gap: rights on paper versus protection in practice 

A recurring problem in both jurisdictions is the distance between constitutional promise andinstitutional delivery. Formal rights may be clear in text, but practical protection depends onbodiesthat can investigate, coordinate, and ensure follow-through, and on remedies that can be implemented on the ground.

Access to justice constraints deepen this gap. Minority-rights claims can involve urgent protectionneeds, yet litigation and complaint pathways may be slow, costly, and procedurally complex. Delays,limited legal awareness, and fear of retaliation can discourage reporting and reduce the likelihoodthat available remedies will be pursued to completion. 

The quality of remedies also matters. Even where courts articulate strong constitutional standards, protection may remain fragile if orders are not monitored, if compliance is inconsistent, or if implementation requires resources and coordination that are not reliably available. 

5.2 Pakistan: core challenges and doctrinal tensions 

Pakistan’s minority-rights jurisprudence includes ambitious structural directions, but their practical effect often turns on compliance, coordination, and sustained oversight by executive agencies andlaw-enforcement bodies. [34] 

A second challenge arises from the sensitivity of criminal-law provisions connected to religion. Where such provisions are misused, or where procedural safeguards are weak in practice, minoritycommunities may face heightened vulnerability despite formal constitutional guarantees. [35] 

Protective mechanisms in education, policing, and worship-place security illustrate the samedeliveryproblem. Constitutional safeguards and the State’s duty to safeguard minorities can support strongprotection in principle, but day-to-day effectiveness depends on consistent administrative practiceand credible law-enforcement response. [36] 

5.3 India: core challenges and doctrinal tensions 

India’s minority-rights jurisprudence is most developed in education, but maintaining the boundarybetween permissible regulation and effective control remains difficult in practice. Regulatoryexpansion can narrow the space within which minority institutions exercise genuine autonomyinadministration and governance, and state-level variation can produce uneven protection andunevenaccess to remedies. [37] 

5.4 Comparative critique using standards of effectiveness 

On an effectiveness standard, the two systems display different strengths and vulnerabilities. Pakistan’s framework combines general rights with an express duty to safeguard minorities andwith representation mechanisms, supporting a strong constitutional narrative of inclusion, but theimpact of judicially articulated duties can be undermined by compliance deficits and capacity constraints. [34] 

India’s framework offers stronger doctrinal development of group-based autonomy, particularlyineducation, and relatively detailed judicial guidance on regulatory limits, yet practical protectioncanstill be diluted where regulation expands or implementation differs across States. [37] 

This comparative assessment leads into recent developments. Reforms and policy debates inbothjurisdictions increasingly focus on institutional strengthening, clearer enforcement pathways, andmechanisms that make remedies more timely and practically meaningful. 

6. Recent Developments 

6.1 Pakistan: legislative and institutional developments 

A major institutional development is the enactment of legislation establishing a National Commission for Minorities’ Rights. The President assented to the National Commission for Minorities Rights Bill 2025 after it was passed in a joint session of Parliament, and the reportedamendments included the removal of an overriding-effect clause and the withdrawal of proposedsuomotu powers, indicating sensitivity to constitutional and political concerns about the commission’sreach. [38] 

In terms of mandate, the commission is intended to strengthen monitoring of constitutional safeguards and to provide an institutional route for minority-related grievances. Public reportingsuggests that the proposed model combines oversight, inspection, and recommendation functions, including engagement with implementation of court directions, but that its practical impact will depend on independence, resources, and follow-through by executive agencies. [39] 

Recent policy discussion has also focused on institutions connected to minority worship sites andheritage. In 2025, government statements indicated plans for structural reforms in the EvacueeTrustProperty Board, including measures aimed at digitisation and improved performance, while theBoard’s 2024 to 2025 performance reporting highlighted substantial allocations for maintenanceanddevelopment of minority religious sites and projected further allocations for 2025 to 2026. [40] [41]

At the same time, debate on effectiveness continues. Commentary and legal reporting frequentlyreturn to the persistent implementation gap in relation to the Supreme Court’s 2014 minority-rightsdirections, treating compliance as uneven and stressing the need for institutional mechanisms that translate constitutional commitments into consistent protection on the ground. [42] 

6.2 India: evolving policy environment affecting minority protections 

In India, recent developments have largely arisen through litigation and policy contestationintheeducation sector, where minority autonomy frequently intersects with equality-based regulation. InSeptember 2025, reporting indicated that the Supreme Court expressed serious doubt about its earlierdecision exempting minority educational institutions from the Right to Education Act, andreferredthe issue for consideration by a larger bench, signalling renewed judicial attention to the balancebetween Article 21A and Article 30. [43] 

At the state and regulatory level, minority institutions have also challenged measures perceivedasintruding into institutional autonomy. In January 2026, the Delhi High Court sought responses onpetitions by minority schools challenging the constitutional validity of a school-fee regulationlaw, with the petitions asserting that certain provisions violate constitutional protections enjoyedbyminority institutions. [44] 

State-level legislative movement adds further complexity. In August 2025, Uttarakhand’s cabinet approved the Uttarakhand Minority Educational Institutions Bill 2025, intended to extendminority-status benefits beyond madrassa-focused regulation and to create a dedicated authority tooverseeminority educational institutions in the state. [45] 

Judicial clarification has also continued at the national level. A Constitution Bench referencejudgment delivered in November 2024 examined the National Commission for Minority EducationalInstitutions Act 2004 and its 2010 amendments, including the statutory shift from“establishedormaintained” to “established and administered”, and addressed how such statutory language interactswith the constitutional interpretation of Article 30. [46] 

6.3 Why recent developments matter? 

These developments matter because they test whether legal change strengthens protectioninpracticeor remains largely symbolic. In Pakistan, the creation of a specialised commission could improve oversight and complaint-handling, but its effectiveness will depend on clear powers, credibleindependence, and administrative follow-through. 

In India, the continuing cycle of litigation and state-level policy initiatives shows that minorityprotection is dynamic and contested, particularly in education. The trajectory reinforces the article’scentral point: constitutional protection is shaped not only by rights text, but by institutional design, regulatory practice, and the ability of courts and public bodies to deliver timely and meaningful remedies. 

7. Reforms and the Road Ahead 

7.1 Reform objectives 

Reform in both jurisdictions should be assessed against three connected objectives: closingtheenforcement gap, strengthening remedies and accountability, and preserving constitutional legitimacy in plural societies. The enforcement gap is visible where constitutional guarantees areaffirmed judicially but remain uneven in delivery, particularly when implementation depends onexecutive follow-through and institutional capacity. [47] 

7.2 Pakistan: priority reform directions 

Pakistan’s most immediate reform priority is institutional strengthening. The enactment of legislationestablishing a National Commission for Minorities’ Rights signals movement towards a specialisedoversight body, but its effectiveness will depend on independence, resources, and a clear mandatethat allows credible complaint-handling and follow-through with relevant authorities. [48] Asecondpriority is implementation reform. Structural directions can only protect minorities if there is aconcrete compliance framework, including time-bound reporting, measurable indicators, andaninstitutional focal point responsible for monitoring implementation of court directions anddocumenting action taken. [47] Finally, legal safeguards should be strengthened to reduce vulnerability from misuse of religion-related offences. This requires robust procedural checks, prompt and impartial investigation protocols, and safeguards against abuse, while maintainingpublicorder protections. [49] The same logic applies to online hate speech enforcement, where consistent application and transparent standards are essential to avoid selective enforcement while protectingvulnerable communities. [50] 

7.3 India: priority reform directions

In India, reform priorities are closely tied to the education sector and the autonomy-regulationboundary. Judicial doctrine already offers structured guidance on minority educational autonomyandpermissible regulation, but stronger administrative clarity is needed so that regulation does not become effective control in practice. [51] [52] This can be advanced through transparent regulatorystandards, consistent decision-making on minority status, and clearer procedural safeguards indisputes involving affiliation, recognition, and fee and admissions regulation, areas where thespecialised commission under the 2004 Act can play a more effective role if supported withcapacityand clear coordination with state authorities. [53] [54] A broader priority is strengtheninganti- discrimination and accountability mechanisms, including consistent enforcement across states andimproved complaint-handling capacity in institutions that address minority-related human-rightsviolations. [55] 

7.4 Comparative reform lessons 

Comparative learning is available without importing foreign models. Pakistan can drawfromIndia’sstructured minority-rights jurisprudence, especially the developed analysis of howautonomyispreserved while allowing reasonable regulation, which can help build clearer standards for minorityinstitutions and reduce discretionary inconsistency. [51] India, in turn, can drawfromPakistan’sconstitutional emphasis on an express state duty to safeguard minorities and on representationmechanisms, which underline that minority protection is also a question of participation andinstitutional voice. [56] Across both systems, best practice principles converge: independent oversight with credible powers, measurable implementation plans, timely and effective remedies, andreforms that strengthen protection without diluting constitutional commitments. [47] 

7.5 Future trajectory and concluding bridge 

The likely trajectory in both jurisdictions is continued reliance on courts to clarify the scopeof minority rights, alongside gradual institutional reform aimed at improving implementation. Thecentral thesis is reinforced by recent experience: constitutional promise matters, but the decisivevariable is institutional delivery. The next section therefore translates the above reformdirectionsinto targeted, constructive recommendations for the judiciary, legislature, executive institutions, andcivil society. 

8. Conclusion
   

This article has compared the constitutional and legal frameworks for minority protectioninPakistanand India, and has shown that both systems combine broad rights guarantees with distinct structural choices. Pakistan’s framework is marked by an express constitutional duty to safeguard minoritiesand by reserved political representation, while India’s framework places greater weight oncultural and educational autonomy, supported by an extensive body of constitutional jurisprudence. Acrossboth jurisdictions, however, the central challenge is not the absence of legal promises, but theuneventranslation of those promises into reliable protection through institutions, enforcement, andremedies.

The importance of minority protection lies in what it signals about constitutional legitimacyinpluralsocieties. Where minorities cannot access timely remedies, or where safeguards depend ondiscretionary or inconsistent implementation, equality and religious freedomrisk becomingformal assurances rather than lived rights. Recent reforms and ongoing debates therefore matter most whenthey strengthen accountability, clarify institutional roles, and make protection practically available. 

The comparative lesson is clear. Constitutional text and judicial reasoning can set the standard, but durable protection depends on institutional delivery. The question for both Pakistan and Indiaistherefore not whether minority rights are recognized in principle, but whether their legal systemscanensure that those rights are enforceable, predictable, and meaningful in everyday life. 

Bibliography/References (OSCOLA) 

[1] Constitution of India 1950, arts 29 and 30 

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf 

[2] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 2 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[3] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 260(3)(b) https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[4] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 20 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[5] Constitution of India 1950, art 29(1) and art 30(1) and (2) https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf

[6] National Commission for Minorities Act 1992, s 2(c) https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/view- casepdf?id=AC_CEN_41_69_00001_199219_1517807322944&type=act 

[7] T.M.A. Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/665015/ 

[8] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 25 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[9] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 27 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[10] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 21 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[11] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 22 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[12] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 36 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[13] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, arts 51(4) and 106(1) https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[14] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, art 227(1) https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[15] Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ss 295, 295A, 295B, 295C and 505(2) https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Npa5lo-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[16] Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, s 11 https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Jvbp8%253D-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[17] Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975, ss 3 and 4 https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-bpuUZWNp-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj

[18] National Commission for Human Rights Act 2012 https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Npa5lrbA%3D%3D-sg jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[19] Constitution of India 1950, arts 14, 15 and 16 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf 

[20] Constitution of India 1950, arts 25, 26, 27 and 28 

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf 

[21] Constitution of India 1950, arts 350A and 350B https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf 

[22] Constitution of India 1950, art 25(1) and (2) https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf [23] S R Bommai v Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60799/ 

[24] National Commission for Minorities Act 1992, s 9 https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/view- casepdf?id=AC_CEN_41_69_00001_199219_1517807322944&type=act 

[25] National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 2004 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1897/1/A2005-2.pdf 

[26] Protection of Human Rights Act 1993, ss 12 and 18 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13233/1/the_protection_of_human_rights_act_1993.pdf 

[27] Suo Motu Case No 1 of 2014 (2014) PLD SC 699 https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/smc_1_2014.pdf [28] P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1390531/

[29] Suo Motu Case No 1 of 2014 (2014) PLD SC 699 [37] https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/smc_1_2014.pdf

[30] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, arts 20, 25 and 36 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[31] T.M.A. Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/665015/ 

[32] Islamic Academy of Education v State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1978528/ 

[33] P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1390531/

[34] Suo Motu Case No 1 of 2014 (2014) PLD SC 699 [37] https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/smc_1_2014.pdf 

[35] Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ss 295, 295A, 295B and 295C https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Npa5lo-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[36] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, arts 22 and 36 https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf 

[37] T.M.A. Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/665015/; Islamic Academy of Education v State of Karnataka (2003)6SCC 697 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1978528/ ; P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra (2005) 6SCC 537 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1390531/ 

[38] Staff Reporter, ‘President assents to bill for setting up minorities’ commission’ Dawn(Karachi, 17 December 2025) https://www.dawn.com/news/1961642 

[39] Waqas Chaudhry, ‘Parliament clears bill to establish commission for minority rights’ TheExpress Tribune (2 December 2025) https://tribune.com.pk/story/2580150/na-passes-national- commission-for-minority-rights-bill-2025-amid-opposition-uproar 

[40] Khalid Hasnain, ‘Structural reforms to be introduced in ETPB’ Dawn (Karachi, 4 August 2025)https://www.dawn.com/news/1928574

[41] Associated Press of Pakistan, ‘ETPB releases annual performance report, highlights financial, administrative gains’ (12 July 2025) https://www.app.com.pk/domestic/etpb-releases-annual- performance-report-highlights-financial-administrative-gains/ 

[42] Shafique Chaudhry, ‘Delayed justice for minorities’ Pakistan Observer (26 December 2025)https://pakobserver.net/delayed-justice-for-minorities/ 

[43] Amit Anand Choudhary, ‘Why are minority institutions left out of RTE, asks SC’ The TimesofIndia (2 September 2025) https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/why-are-minority-institutions left-out-of-rte-asks-sc/articleshow/123643958.cms 

[44] TNN, ‘HC seeks reply on pleas challenging fee hike law’ The Times of India (Delhi, 10January2026) https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/hc-seeks-reply-on-pleas-challenging-fee-hike law/articleshow/126442643.cms 

[45] Kautilya Singh, ‘Uttarakhand to repeal madrassa Act, new law to cover all minority institutions’The Times of India (18 August 2025) https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/uttarakhand-to repeal-madrassa-act-new-law-to-cover-all-minority-institutions/articleshow/123351540.cms 

[46] 2024 INSC 856, paras 70, 155–157 (Supreme Court of India, 8 November 2024) https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2006/9287/9287_2006_1_1501_57054_Judgement_08-Nov- 2024.pdf 

[47] Suo Motu Case No 1 of 2014 (2014) PLD SC 699 [37] https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/smc_1_2014.pdf 

[48] Staff Reporter, ‘President assents to bill for setting up minorities’ commission’ Dawn(Karachi, 17 December 2025) https://www.dawn.com/news/1961642 

[49] Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ss 295, 295A, 295B and 295C https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Npa5lo-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[50] Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, s 11 

https://pakistancode.gov.pk/english/UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-apaUY2Jvbp8%253D-sg-jjjjjjjjjjjjj 

[51] T.M.A. Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/665015/

[52] P.A. Inamdar v State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1390531/

[53] Constitution of India 1950, art 30(1) and (2) https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/19151/1/constitution_of_india.pdf 

[54] National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 2004 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1897/1/A2005-2.pdf 

[55] Protection of Human Rights Act 1993, ss 12 and 18 https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13233/1/the_protection_of_human_rights_act_1993.pdf 

[56] Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, arts 36, 51(4) and 106(1) https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf