Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461)

Introduction 

The Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench of 13 judges) scrutinized the restrictions of Parliament’s constituent power in “Kesavananda Bharati” (24 April 1973).1 Kesavananda Bharati, the head of a religious group, filed a lawsuit under Article 32 to challenge Kerala’s land-reform laws. Later, he also challenged the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments that Parliament implemented to preserve the laws in question.2 In a momentous 7–6 vote, the Court came generated by the “Basic Structure” concept. This implies that numerous fundamental components of the Constitution, such as democracy, secularism, federalism, and the rule of law, are unable to be amended by Parliament. This ruling signifies a historic moment since it renders obvious that the people, not just Parliament, are the ones who have authority throughout India by means of the Constitution.3 

1 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India), http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

2 The Constitution of India, 1950. art. 32 (as amended). 

3 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225.

Facts

In March 1970, Kesavananda Bharati filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.135 of 1970 under Article 32 of the Constitution.4 He claimed that certain provisions of The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (and its 1969 Amendment) violated his fundamental entitlements under Articles 25, 26 (freedom of religion), Article 19(1)(f) (property), and others. A “RULE NISI” was pronounced.5 While the case continued to rage on, Kerala approved another Land Reforms Amendment in 1971, which led the petitioner to submit a request for authorization to oppose it. At the identical duration, Parliament passed the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments (1971–72) to protect these land laws from judicial review.6 The 24th Amendment expanded Article 368 (amending power) and kept constitutional amendments from being reviewed under Article 13.7 The 25th Amendment changed “compensation” to “amount” in Article 31 (2) and added a new Article 31C to protect certain laws. The 29th Amendment included the Kerala Acts in the Ninth Schedule.8 The petitioner changed his writ to challenge these adjustments as well. A strong Constitution Bench was assigned to assess whether the 24th to 29th Amendments were genuine. 

Legal Issue 

• Fundamental Issues 

1) Whether Parliament amend any section of the Constitution under Article 368, or are there inherent constraints on its amending authority? Does Article 13(2), which limits measures that infringe upon fundamental rights, pertain to 

4 Constitution of India art. 32. 

5 The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Act 1 of 1964, § ___ (Ker.), 

https://www.google.com/search?q=About+https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83055377/&gsas=1&tbm=ilp ; Constitution of India art. 19(1)(f), art. 25, art. 26. 

6 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

7 Constitution of India art. 13; art. 368. 

8 Constitution of India art. 31(2); art. 31C.

constitutional amendments under Article 368?9 

2) What is the extent of the authority conferred upon Parliament by Article 368? Does it permit Parliament to amend the Constitution’s fundamental structure, or are some essential principles impervious to amendments? Does the incorporation of laws in the Ninth Schedule via the 29th Amendment exempt them from judicial examination concerning fundamental rights, or can such laws still be contested if they infringe upon the Constitution’s core structure?10 

3) Whether the notion of “basic structure” a valid judicial construct, and if affirmative, what are the distinguishing characteristics of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution that are immutable? Can the inclusion of Article 31C in the 25th Amendment, which safeguards laws pertaining to Directive Principles of State Policy from judicial scrutiny, be defended as congruent with the Constitution’s fundamental framework, or Whether it contravene the notion of judicial review?11 

4) Whether the 24th Amendment, which eliminates the relevance of Article 13(2) to modifications enacted under Article 368, constitute an overextension of legislative authority, or is it an essential modification to guarantee that Parliament possesses the whole capacity to modify the Constitution? How should the Court reconcile the power of judicial review with Parliament’s right to change the Constitution? Is judicial review an integral component of the basic structure, and if affirmative, in what manner does it constrain Parliament’s authority?12 

• Targeted comprehensive questions raised through court 

The primary question was to what extent Parliament’s constituent power stretches under Article 368. Chief Justice Sikri asked, “What is the nature of the 

9 Constitution of India art. 13(2); art. 368. 

10 Constitution of India art. 368. 

11 Constitution of India art. 31C. 

12 Constitution of India art. 13(2); art. 368.

amendment authority conferred on Parliament through Article 368?” This function was independent from Article 13 (2) .13 The Court had to consider if Parliament could amend any section of the Constitution, alongside the Fundamental Rights and basic structure, or if there were limits that were not written down. The State and Union argued that Parliament’s ability to institute amendments was absolute: an Article 368 amendment might strip away even basic rights like freedom of expression and religion, annihilating India’s democratic republic.14 The petitioners contended that the Constitution enshrines enduring freedoms and the values (a “freedom from tyranny”), so certain fundamental provisions once conferred by the populace cannot be rescinded. They stressed that Article 31C (25th Amendment) would provide Parliament (and State Legislatures) arbitrary power over people’s rights, which would go against the Constitution’s purpose.15 

Applicable Law and Provisions 

Article 368 (before the 24th Amendment) spelled out how to make amendments, but it did not specify which amendments seemed constitutional. Article 13(2) originally stated that “the State shall not pass any law which takes eliminates or diminishes the rights obtained by Part III” Golaknath (1967) stated that the amendment included additions to the Constitution.16 Parliament’s 24th Amendment (1971) shifted Article 368 to clarify that “Parliament might amend by means of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution,” and it added Article 13(4) to stipulate that “nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment under Article 368.” The 24th Amendment effectively eliminated Article 13’s limitation on amendments.17 The 25th Amendment (1972) evolved Article 31(2) (the property clause) and added Article 31C, 

13 Constitution of India art. 13(2); art. 368. 

14 Constitution of India art. 368. 

15 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

16 Constitution of India art. 13(2); art. 368;Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, 

http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

17 Constitution of India art. 13; art. 368

which possessed two parts. The first part protected laws that carried out Directive Principles (Art.39(b),(c)) from being void under Articles 14, 19, or 31.18 The second part was designed to prohibit any court challenges to such laws just because they failed to comply with the Directive Principles. The 29th Amendment (1972) merely placed the Kerala Land Acts in the Ninth Schedule where they wouldn’t be held accountable.19 Therefore, the law whose services the Court was considering at encompasses the original Article 368 and 13, as well as the amended formulations of the 24th and 25th Amendments (particularly Article 13(4) and Article 31C).20 

Contentions of Plaintiff and Defendant 

• Petitioners 

Counsel, particularly Nani Palkhivala, contended that although the expansive language of Article 368, the Constitution’s “basic structure” (its fundamental identity) remained immutable. The people’s constitutive power, as shown in the Preamble and Fundamental Rights, set an implied limit. They claimed that Article 13’s protection of rights should be included in the idea of revision, as Golaknath insisted on inalienable rights.21 If Article 31C’s broad non-obstante clause were maintained, Parliament would have the power for consumption off any right.22 They expressed that this went contrary to the framers’ goal of protecting freedom and dignity for generations to come. The petitioner’s arguments concentrated on the premise that the Constitution was written to avert “future tyranny” while simultaneously making guarantee that essential values including democracy, the rule of law, and judicial scrutiny were protected. They further claimed that implied constraints based on the Preamble’s objective should limit the power to 

18 Constitution of India arts. 14, 19, 31, 31(2), 31C, 39(b), 39(c). 

19 The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Act 1 of 1964, § ___ (Ker.), 

https://www.google.com/search?q=About+https://indiankanoon.org/doc/83055377/&gsas=1&tbm=ilp 20 Constitution of India arts. 13, 13(4), 31C, 368. 

21 Constitution of India art. 13; art. 368. 

22 Constitution of India art. 13C

change the Constitution.23 

• Respondents 

The Union and State Governments acknowledged that the 24th Amendment clarified explicitly that Parliament had unrestricted constituent power. Article 368 must be fully enforced due to Article 13 being amended to leave out changes. If the people were interested in preventing a provision that had already been amended, they would’ve done so. They stated that there does not currently exist a section in the text that could not be amended, and they highlighted towards the fact that even the Preamble as well as certain federal provisions (Art.368 proviso) may be amended as long as the states agreed.24 From this point of view, the courts’ sole responsibility was simply to make sure that Article 368 was followed, not to judge amendments to the law itself. The replies defended the 24th and 29th Amendments as appropriate uses of Parliament’s authority. They additionally maintained that Article 31C (the 25th Amendment) was a legitimate way to express the requirement for social justice through Directive Principles and should be upheld to the full.25 

Interpretation of Law 

The Court accomplished a thorough analysis of the Constitution. The majority did not agree with the contention (put out by some) that Article 368 was just a procedural matter. Instead, their bodies read it alongside the Preamble and the remaining portions of the document. Sikri C.J. noted that Article 368 now commences with “notwithstanding anything in this Constitution” (after the 24th Amendment), demonstrating that Parliament has full authority.26 Nevertheless he indicated that 

23 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

24 Constitution of India art. 13; art. 368. 

25 Constitution of India art. 31C; art. 368. 

26 Constitution of India art. 368.

every single constituent authority must be utilized in a manner that is in line with the essence of the Constitution. The Preamble was considered to hold the most interpretive authority. Sikri J. asked, “As long as ‘sovereign democratic republic’ are therein, could the Constitution be amended to go contrary to [them]?”.27 He recommended that the Preamble’s concept of justice, freedom, and equality restricts amends. The majority declared that Articles 13(2) and 368 were at odds with each other before the 24th Amendment. The 24th Amendment declared clear that Article 13(2) did not apply to amendments to the Constitution. This entailed that amendments made after the 24th Amendment (under Article 368) weren’t eligible to be considered a “law” under Article 13. Still, the Court ruled that the word “amendment” should be understood in its broader sense: it should be an upward trend inside the Constitution’s framework, not a revolutionary structure.28 The two parts of Article 31C were scrutinized at independently. The first portion (immunity for legislation giving effect to Art.39(b),(c) policies) was seen as a legitimate conserving clause that protected qualifying laws from Articles 14, 19, or 31, even though as they genuinely put those Directive Principles into action. The Court supported this section due to the fact that it only let the Legislature determine objectives for society and provided room for judicial scrutiny of their relevance and purpose. However, the second section of 31C was thrown out due to its provided the Legislature limitless immunity and designated it the final judge of purpose.29 The majority considered this was “beyond the permissible limit” of amendment, giving Parliament “carte blanche” to ignore Articles 14, 19, and 31 and rendering all such laws toward of the scope of the courts. The Constitution’s basic structure was violated by the offending paragraph, resulting in stipulated that any such law “shall not be questioned or called in question in any court.”30 

27 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 

28 Constitution of India arts. 13, 13(2), 368. 

29 Constitution of India arts. 14, 19, 31, 31C, 39(b), 39(c). 

30 Constitution of India arts. 14, 19, 31.

Court (Jurisdiction) 

This was a petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32.The most significant Constitution Bench in Indian history (13 judges led by C.J. Sikri) heard it since the questions were regarding the legality of constitutional amendments and the limits of Parliament’s basic statutory authority.31 

Legal Analysis 

The majority in Kesavananda struck an attentive compromise between textualism and purposivism. subsequently indicated that Parliament possesses an abundance of power in amending the Constitution, declaring the fact that it may amend “by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision” (post-24th). On the reverse side, it uncovered a subliminal limitation that the specified any amendment needed to maintain the Constitution’s vital foundation. Justice H.R. Khanna famously responded, “Every part of the Constitution can be amended within reason so as the basic structure and foundation of the Constitution persists the same.”32 He outlined the primary attributes that are founded on the dignity and freedom of the individual, which “may not by any form of amendment be shredded.” These characteristics include the supremacy of the Constitution, a republican-democratic government, secularism, the separation of powers, and federalism. This line of thought stated that amendments seemed only valid if they sustained the basic constitutional spirit alive.33 Chief Justice Sikri (for the majority) rendered obvious that this criteria was based on the Preamble and the Constitution as in its entirety. Since the Preamble stipulates that India is a democratic republic, amendments which would terminate democracy or the republic form would not be allowed. The majority additionally recommended that an amendment shouldn’t strip eliminate judicial review or fundamental rights, since those constitute significant avenues for the people to express their will.34 The Supreme 

31 Constitution of India arts. 32; Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/ 32 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid.

Court nevertheless failed to attempt to establish a full list of “basic features” (and different judges’ concurring opinions issued different lists), which demonstrates that the notion is simultaneously flexible and objective: any amendment that changes or negatively impacts the Constitution’s identity (its “basic structure”) is ultra vires.35 When the Court gazed at the amending clauses, it read Art.368 in light of Art.13, the Preamble, and the larger historical background, including the need to balance Fundamental Rights with Directive Principles. It thereby safeguarded the essential tenet that the Constitution constitutes a covenant with spanning values.36 

Final Judgment 

In final analysis, the Bench voted 7 to 6 to approve most of the amendments that were currently contested with the basic-structure protection in place. It disclosed the 24th and 29th Amendments (as and to the extent they were actually used) and the first part of Article 31C, but it threw out the second part of Article 31C.37 “The majority’s decision can be summed up as follows”, Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution, but it can’t change the Constitution’s core framework. In this manner, the 24th and 29th Amendments, which just gave greater authority to the process and implemented laws in the Ninth Schedule, were legal.38 The amendments implemented through the 25th Amendment to Article 31(2) (compensation to amount) and the first part of Article 31C (preserving DP-related laws) were found to be lawful. The second component of Article 31C, which clarified that the law was immune to challenge in court, was found to be invalid because it went against the basic-structure limit. The Court stressed that the authority of judicial review is an important part of the system that cannot be changed by an amendment. These rulings referred to that the petitioners’ original challenges to the Kerala Acts were no longer valid (the Acts were 

35 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/. 

36 Constitution of India art. 13; art. 368. 

37 Constitution of India art. 31C. 

38 Kesavananda Bharati, 4 SCC at 225, http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/

nevertheless subject to constitutional limits).39 

Criticism 

Additionally, there has lately been a lot of controversy about the Kesavananda judgment. Certain individuals contend that the judges seized on a plenary constituent authority by producing up along with the vague “basic structure” criteria, which ought to be limited to the people and their representatives. They declare this blurs the lines between the three branches of government since judges who weren’t elected can throw out amendments implemented by parliament for broad reasons of principle. I have pointed out that each majority judge made a different list of inviolable traits, which shows how uncertain the concept is. The ambiguous criteria affords courts considerable latitude (“what is and is not basic”) absent written direction. Some people think that the majority neglected democratic legitimacy. If the voters and Parliament continue to implement popular reforms, the Court’s addition of extra-constitutional ideals may be excessively of an intrusion. Additionally, critics say that assuming any clauses were really not amendable, the framers or Parliament should have made them clear instead of relying on judicial implication. A more text-based approach might have limited the constraints to those that were clearly stated, as the necessity in Article 368’s proviso for federal concerns. Instead, Parliament may have added special unamendability clauses through an amendment (“a political process”) to protect some basic rights or values completely. This would have been better than having the Court do it. In short, critics would be better off if they followed the exact wording of Article 368 and its exceptions, and if they respected democratically legislated entrenchment, which would leave less leeway for subjective judicial theories.40 

39 Constitution of India art. 31C; art. 31(2). 

40 Constitution of India art. 368.

Conclusion 

Kesavananda Bharati established the notion that India’s Constitution is a pensive endowment from the populace, rather than merely a regulation. Its fundamental idea that the “basic structure” of a constitutional republic can’t be altered even by amendment has become a key part of Indian law. While its breadth encourages discussion, the ruling solidified that the Constitution’s enduring identity must take precedence over majoritarian law-making. In this way, the Court demonstrated it clear that it is the guardian of constitutional values by protecting the democratic, secular, and freedom-seeking underpinnings that render the Constitution a living document that stands true to its noble purpose. 

Bibliography: 

Primary Legal Sources 

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India). Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (India). The Constitution of India, 1950. 

The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, Act 1 of 1964, § ___ (Ker)