JOSEPH SHINE V. UNION OF INDIA (2018)

CASE DETAILS

Case Title: Joseph Shine V. Union of India (2018)

Citation: (2019) 3 SCC 39, AIR 2018 SC 4898

Court Name: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y Chandrachud, Justice Indu Malhotra (Five-Judge Constitution Bench).

Judgement Date: 27th September 2018

Parties Involved:

Petitioner- Joseph Shine, a businessman of Indian origin living in Italy.

Respondent- Union of India.

INTRODUCTION

In India, the concept of patriarchy served as the foundation for adultery. A male faces criminal penalties for having liaison with a female who happens to be another male’s spouse. However, a woman has no rights if her husband commits adultery on her. Judges cited Article 15(3)[1] as the justification for this law, arguing that it is an affirmative action policy in favour of women. In India, adultery views women as victims rather than offenders. Adultery is illegal in up to 60 nations, including the Republic of Korea and others.[2] The petitioner’s, Joseph Shine who is a non-Kerala resident, close friend killed himself after a female coworker maliciously and falsely accused him of rape. This triggered Shine to file the case[3], contesting the lawful nature of 497th Section of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)[4], penalizing liaison and declaring it unconstitutional for violating Articles 14 (equality before the law)[5], 15 (prohibition of discrimination based on sex)[6], and 21 (right to life and personal liberty)[7] of the Constitution. In addition to decriminalizing adultery, this case dismantled centuries-old patriarchal ideas that limited women’s autonomy and dignity and had become embedded in the legal system. It brought the law into line with the changing ideals of privacy, gender equality, consent, and individual liberty.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. An Indian national residing in Italy who goes by the name of Joseph Shine submitted a motion for writ in accordance with 32nd article of Indian Constitution[8] in 2017 challenging Section 198(2) of the CrPC[9] and Section 497 of the IPC.[10]
2. In December 2017, a PIL was filed, arguing that clause 497 read with the second section of clause 198 of the CrPC violates Articles fourteen, fifteen, and twenty-one and that it is arbitrary, discriminatory, and dehumanizing to women.
3. Shine was motivated by the suicide of a close friend after a false rape allegation and challenged these provisions, claiming they treated women like their husbands’ property, were discriminatory, and violated women’s fundamental rights to equality and liberty.
4. The Union of India upheld the law, highlighting the importance of social morals and marriage protection.
5. A three-judge panel led by Chief Justice Dipak Mishra at the time heard this case initially. The case was referred to a five-judge Constitution Bench by the three-judge bench.
6. The Bench reached its decision on September 27, 2018.

ISSUES INVOLVED

1. Whether Section 497 needs to be decriminalized because it is an excessively harsh criminal provision.
2. Whether Section 497’s exemption for married women violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equality.
3. Whether the provision regarding adultery promotes the idea that women are men’s property and discriminates against women on the basis of gender under Article 15, which states that an act is no longer illegal if the husband has approved of it.
4. Whether female dignity is diminished when her sexual autonomy and liberty of choice are ignored.
5. Whether criminalizing adultery constitute a legal intrusion into a person’s private life.
6. Whether Section 497 be made gender neutral by including women in the list as offenders.
7. Whether the wife should be provided with the ability to complain about her husband’s violation of their marriage’s sanctity.
8. Whether section 497 is against the constitutional article number 21.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

1. The petitioner pointed out that Section 497 was passed during the British era and has no relevance whatsoever on contemporary issues.
2. The petitioner claimed that Article 14 of the Constitution, which addressed equality before the law, was violated by Sections 497 and 198(2) of the CrPC.
3. The appellant contended that the section, which has no legitimate link to its objective, charges liaisons based solely upon gender differences. Article 14 of the Constitution is violated because the wife’s consent has been seen as irrelevant.
4. The appellant contended the fact that the section is predicated upon the belief that a female is owned by her husband. The section states that if the spouse agrees, infidelity fails to be performed.
5. It was also argued that since there is no legal provision in this, women whose husbands participated in the act were not granted the ability to complain against him under this section.
6. The petitioner claimed that because the provisions were arbitrary and patriarchal, they disregarded the basic freedoms protected by the constitutional provisions of articles fourteen, fifteen and twenty-one. He also argued neither party should be exempted from liability because sexual activity was a mutual and consensual act.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

1. The respondents argued that prevention should be in place to preserve the institution of marriage’s sanctity because adultery is a crime and having sex outside of marriage destroys family ties.
2. The respondent asserts that misconduct affects the partner, their children, and cultural standards in general. This was also added that adultery is a morally unacceptable crime to society and that those who commit it should all face consequences. The sanctity of marriage and family is destroyed by an outsider who commits this crime with full knowledge.
3. The discrimination caused by this clause is protected by subsection (3) of article 15, which gives the government the power to create unique regulations over affected individuals such as females and infants.
4. Additionally, it was argued that Section 497 was legitimate and did not hinder the right to equality because it was a type of affirmative action that favoured women.
5. Since Section 497 is protecting society from such immoral conduct that would disrupt the institution of marriage, it should not be overturned.
6. According to the respondent, there are some reasonable limitations on the right guaranteed by article 21, specifically the right to life and personal liberty.

JUDGEMENT

In Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India issued a unanimous decision. There were no dissenting opinions. In their decision to overturn Section 497 of the IPC, a panel of five judges, forming a constitutional bench, unanimously agreed that this law was unconstitutional.

The court had noted that certain “Social presumptions” form the basis of the law. The Apex Court held within this major case that the 497th section violated the fourteenth and fifteenth and twenty-first articles and was therefore invalid. Additionally, it claimed that Section 198(2) of the CrPC was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to Section 497 of the IPC. Many earlier judgements, that made adultery a crime, have been overturned by this decision.

CJI Deepak Mishra began his ruling by stating that husbands are not their masters and wives are not their property. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud also emphasized that our constitutional order, which upholds the autonomy and dignity that are inherent to every human being, cannot tolerate misogyny or patriarchal views regarding a woman’s sexual control. He also discussed the relevance of gender autonomy as an aspect of personal freedom, bringing up the matter of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.[11]

The Bench went on to say that this Section violated the principles of Article 15 and was biased because it exclusively focused on one gender and because it denied a woman her autonomy, dignity, and privacy, the Apex Court declared that Section 497 had become obsolete and unconstitutional. As a result, this section violated Article 14.

LEGAL REASONING

The court held that while criminal penalties and other wrongs should be considered public, adultery cases are considered private. According to the right to dignity, a person should only be punished when required, and appropriate research and analysis should be done before imposing punishment. Furthermore, a woman should never be treated like an item of property or a commodity.

Therefore, the Honourable Supreme Court correctly pointed out in its decision that such a law is extremely discriminatory and since patriarchal laws are not very important in this day and age, this law, which was made before the Constitution was enacted, needs to be changed or repealed.

Three requirements must be met in order for an act to be considered a criminal offense under the harm principle. These requirements are as follows: Injury or harm, a transgression and an element of public. Following this landmark judgement, having sex with someone other than one’s spouse will not result in punishment, and adultery is now only one of the reasons for filing for divorce.

CONCLUSION

The case’s conclusion is that adultery is no longer punishable. Along with section 198(2) of the CrPC, this section of adultery is no longer in effect because decriminalization removed it as an offense. However, it is important to keep in mind that marriage is a sacrament in India, and any action that has a direct impact on a marriage is influenced by people’s feelings. Judges gave the argument that while many western nations have decriminalized adultery, India shouldn’t follow suit. India is an independent nation, and its moral principles shouldn’t be impacted by events abroad. Even though it is not punishable, it nevertheless has an impact on the lives of many citizens.

Reference(S):

[1] The Constitution of India 1950, art 15(3)

[2] ‘South Korean court decriminalises adultery’ BBC (26 February 2015), accessed 30 September 2025.

[3] Joseph Shine V. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.

[4] The Indian Penal Code 1860, s 497.

[5] The Constitution of India 1950, art 14.

[6] The Constitution of India 1950, art 15.

[7] The Constitution of India 1950, art 21.

[8] The Constitution of India 1950, art 32.

[9] The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 198(2).

[10] The Indian Penal Code 1860, s 497.

[11] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.