JANE KAUSHIK VS. UNION OF INDIA (2025)

CASE NAME: JANE KAUSHIK VS. UNION OF INDIA (2025)

Citation: 2025 INSC 1248

Name of the Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench of Justices: J.B. Pardiwala & R. Mahadevan

Date of judgement: 17 October, 2025

Petitioner: JANE KAUSHIK

Vs. 

Respondent: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

FACTS:

Ms. Jane Kaushik, a transgender teacher with proper qualifications, is at the centre of the case, who suffered from being let go and not being hired in two private unaided schools in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat due to her gender identity. She then filed a lawsuit not only against the private discriminations but also against the State’s implementation and enforcement mechanisms’ failure.

Jane​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌ Kaushik was an adequately qualified transgender female candidate who after completion of her undergraduate and postgraduate education followed by teacher training decided to make her career in teaching. Following her Gender Affirmative Surgery, she was able to get jobs in teaching at two private unaided schools, which for ease may be called the First School (Uttar Pradesh) and the Second School (Gujarat) respectively. In both instances, however, she alleges that she was discriminated with after or along with the disclosure of her transgender status.

Jane Kaushik was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher in English and Social Science at the First School in November 2022. Within eight working days, she was harassed by both colleagues and students with name-calling, body-shaming, and mocking of gender non-conformity. The school’s principal was approached by her with these issues, but the response from the school was still very inadequate. When her identity became known to everyone, she had to resign, it seems, under the threat of withheld wages. The school later issued a notice stating “poor performance” as the formal reason for the termination and later issued a defamation notice after the media coverage.

After a period of unemployment, Kaushik got an offer to return to work at the First School on the condition of passing an assessment, which, due to rescheduling and her mental health, she did not attend. She subsequently attempted to get re-employed; however, the school informed her that there was no vacancy. The school later advertised vacancies for the positions she was qualified for and that her applications were ignored.

In July 2023, after the selection test and interview, Kaushik was considered a candidate for a teaching post at the Second School. However, during the onboarding process, the management of the school requested her to present her ID when they learned about her gender identity. The school then withdrew the appointment letter. She was not allowed to take up her post and the school did not respond to legal notices saying that “the order was of offering a probationary period”. So, it was not considered as an appointment.

The attempts for redress by the National Commission for Women, the National Council for Transgender Persons, and the National Human Rights Commission were equally futile. The NCW-ordered inquiry, which according to the petitioner concentrated more on performance than on potential discrimination, did not find gender discrimination. The refusal to an effective grievance redressal and the absence of internal complaint mechanisms operationalized under the 2019 Act and related Rules became the central legal issue in this Supreme Court petition.

The petitioner took her case to the Supreme Court invoking its original writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution alleging that her fundamental rights were infringed by acts of both State and non-State actors. This petition was also targeting not only the two schools but the Union of India and the respective state governments as well on the ground of legislative and administrative omissions in the implementation of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020.

The decision in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India & Ors. 2025 INSC 1248 made by a bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan is an important order that the Supreme Court of India delivered on October 17, 2025. The case highlights the continued fight of transgender people to realize legal rights in practice, with a particular focus on employment discrimination and the scope and operation of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, as well as constitutional

KEY​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌ ISSUES:

Argument of the parties were consolidated by the Court in four main points:

1. Whether the Union of India and the State Governments had duties under the Constitution and the 2019 Act and Rules to prevent the discrimination of transgender persons. 
2. Whether the local authorities’ inaction and omissions had led the petitioner to suffer such discrimination that could be the subject of a legal complaint. 
3. Whether the conduct and non-performance of the two private schools as non-State actors had amounted to the petitioner’s unlawful discrimination due to her gender identity, both under the constitutional and statutory regimes. 
4. Whether the discrimination by the State and non-State actors had been proven, the petitioner would be entitled to receive compensation and what additional directions or remedies could be given.

ARGUMENTS:

Arguments of the Petitioner (Jane Kaushik):

1. Infringing Fundamental Rights: Kaushik argued that her termination and denial of work were infringements of Articles 14, 15, 17, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. She stated that discrimination based on gender identification was contrary to the core principles of equal treatment and human dignity. To prove the horizontal application of rights, she referred to the case of Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), which changed the writ jurisdiction scope against private actors. She argued that private unaided schools, which perform public educational functions, are subject to the constitution even though they are not considered “State” under Article 12.
2. Failure of Statutory Mechanisms: The petitioner pointed out that the grievance redressal mechanisms provided in the 2019 Act and 2020 Rules were not in operation. She argued that the absence of monitoring bodies and internal complaints committees made the Act flat, which was a result of both legislative and administrative failures of the Union and State governments.
3. Reasonable Accommodation: Kaushik emphasized that work accommodations for transgender people should be reasonable if they are to achieve substantive equality. Her systemic exclusion continued when her employment was refused on the ground of her gender identity.
4. Right to Livelihood and Dignity: She argued that the denial of the teaching opportunity amounted to an infringement of her Article 21 right to livelihood under which teaching is one of the fundamental rights and that harassment was equivalent to social untouchability, which is prohibited by Article 17.

Arguments of the Respondents (Indian Union, State Governments, And Schools):

1. It was contended by the schools that they were out of the ambit of writ jurisdiction as they were private, unaided institutions. They argued that they had the administrative control over the decisions of hiring, including that of the probationary posts, and that they alone were accountable for such decisions.
2. The First School claimed that the reason for Kaushik’s dismissal was not her gender identification but poor performance and issues with classroom management. The school mentioned “concerns” from students and “disruptions” in the classroom.
3. The Second School said that the offer to Kaushik was a conditional one and that the revocation of the offer was merely a consequence of this fact. By “administrative grounds,” they explained the reason for the withdrawal of the offer and denied discrimination.
4. The Union and State administrations assured that the 2019 Act and 2020 Rules were in force, and any enforcement failures were only local and not widespread. Their point was that the petitioner should have brought her case before statutory bodies and that grievance redressal procedures were at their infancy stage.
5. The respondents cautioned against the excessive extension of constitutional obligations to the private sector. They argued that such a step would blur the line between the State and non-State entities.

FINAL JUDGEMENT:

By​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌ its judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court substantially and quite visibly widened the scope of transgender rights in India. The Court pointed out that the State had displayed a ‘grossly pathetic attitude’ in failing to implement the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the 2020 Rules, and regarded this failure as ‘omissive discrimination’ for the reason that it deprived the transgender persons of the benefits of rights already guaranteed by law. Moreover, the Court embraced the concept of substantive equality which recognized that the word equal does not only imply formal non-discrimination but also the idea of redressing disadvantage, breaking down stigma, facilitating participation, and taking into account difference. Besides, the Court did away with the view that reasonable accommodation – alterations in policies, infrastructure, and workplace culture to include transgender persons – is simply a matter of charity and thus it raised this to a constitutional and statutory obligation that is binding in nature. The Court, inter alia, importantly, held that the 2019 Act directly binds private establishments vis-à-vis granular obligations, including schools, hence making them answerable under Article 32 writs; thereby this act confirmed the horizontal application of fundamental rights. 

Concerning the facts, the Court did not find any decisive evidence pointing to intentional discrimination in Kaushik’s dismissal at the First School but it blamed the lack of complaint officers and redressal mechanisms thereby holding the State responsible for the failure to enforce compliance. However, At the Second School, it identified clear recruitment-stage discrimination as her job offer was withdrawn due to her gender identity only, which is an offence under Section 9 of the Act. Besides, the Court reaffirmed that transgender persons do not require a permission from their employer for a gender-affirming surgery and at the same time pointed out that educational institutions have to make sure that there are inclusive spaces for all. In the end, it instructed the Union and State governments to Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, complaint officers and gender-neutral infrastructure without delay, thus making it explicit that both the State and private actors have to abide by the constitutional promise of equality and dignity for transgender ​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌persons. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The‍‌‍‍‌‍‌‍‍‌ Jane Kaushik judgment, as per ratio decidendi doctrine—ratio decidendi refers to the legal principle forming the basis of the decision, which is binding on future cases—sets the main rules of law as follows:

1. The “equal protection of the laws” under Article 14 entails substantive and not only formal equality. It also covers the positive requirement of providing reasonable accommodation for transgender individuals by both state and private actors in cases where a legal framework exists.
2. When the State fails to establish or implement the mechanisms provided for in a discriminatory law (omissive discrimination), it constitutes a violation of constitutional rights and can be remedied by courts. 
3. The 2019 law has made explicit the horizontal application of fundamental rights with regard to the anti-discrimination provisions, as it states that private entities (e.g. schools and employers) have to comply with statutory and constitutional obligations in the area of discrimination prevention and provision of reasonable accommodation. 
4. Those subjected to discrimination of private entities in the areas covered by the Act and Rules may seek constitutional remedies which include compensation, structural relief, etc. Moreover, these remedies can be used against non-State actors as well. The legal rationale is firmly backed by extensive factual record, thorough doctrinal analysis, and systematic engagement with both Indian and comparative international legal principles of equality and non-discrimination. 

CONCLUSION: 

The​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌ Supreme Court in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India & Ors. (2025) made a landmark decision that significantly moved forward transgender rights in India. The Court stated that the State exhibited a “grossly apathetic attitude” in its failure to implement the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the 2020 Rules, and it referred to this failure as “omissive discrimination” because by doing so it denied the transgender persons the implementation of those rights that were already guaranteed by law. It embraced the concept of substantive equality, pointing out that equality entails not only the formal non-discrimination, but also giving back to the disadvantaged, breaking the stigma, ensuring participation, and taking difference into account.

The Court made reasonable accommodation—modifications in policies, infrastructure, and workplace culture for the inclusion of transgender persons—to be a compulsory constitutional and statutory obligation binding on the Court, thereby rejecting the idea that it is just a matter of charity. Significantly, it decided that effect must be given to the 2019 Act be regarded as having immediate effect, thus private establishments, inter alia schools, are directly liable under Article 32 writs; this was the confirmation of horizontal application of fundamental rights.

On the facts, the Court did not find any definite evidence of deliberate discrimination resulting in the termination of Kaushik’s employment at the First School but it castigated the absence of complaint officers and redressal mechanisms and thus held the State responsible for the non-compliance enforcement. However, at the Second School, the Court discovered unequivocal discrimination at the recruitment stage as her job offer was withdrawn only because of her gender identity, which is a violative act under Section 9 of the Act.

The Court expressed its view that transgender persons are not required to get the employer’s permission if they undergo gender‑affirming surgery. The Court emphasized the need for educational institutions to create a welcoming environment for all genders and also highlighted that educational institutions should create such spaces. Lastly, it urged the Union and State Governments to not delay in setting up Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, complaint officers, and gender‑neutral infrastructure, and it was quite explicit that both State and private actors are under an obligation to abide by the constitutional promise of equality and dignity for transgender ​‍​‌‍​‍‌​‍​‌‍​‍‌persons.

REFERENCE(S):

India Const. art. 14.

India Const. art. 15.

India Const. art. 17.

India Const. art. 19.

India Const. art. 21.

Kaushal Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 S.C.C. 1 (India).

Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1248 (India).

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, No. 40 of 2019, India Code (2019).