Authored By: Teboho Mmako
University of South Africa
Case Title & Citation
Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2025] ZACC 21 (CCT 206/25, Constitutional Court of South Africa, judgment delivered 3 October 2025).
Court Name & Bench
Heard by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, comprising Chief Justice Khampepe and Justices Madlanga, Majiedt, Mhlantla, Tshiqi, Mathopo, Kollapen, Rogers, and Baartman.
Date of Judgment
3 October 2025.
Parties Involved
Applicants: Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma and the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party). Respondents: The President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Police, and the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service.
Procedural History
The applicants approached the Constitutional Court directly, relying on section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution, which grants the Court exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation. They sought direct access, arguing that the matter was of national importance and urgency, and that it would not be effective to pursue ordinary proceedings in lower courts. The respondents opposed direct access, asserting that the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction because the applicants had not pleaded a specific constitutional obligation.
Facts of the Case
On 6 July 2025, Lieutenant-General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi, the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Commissioner of Police, made public statements during a press briefing. He alleged that a criminal syndicate had infiltrated South Africa’s law enforcement, intelligence, and judicial structures, and named senior government officials, including the Minister of Police, as possibly complicit. These claims raised concerns about the integrity of key state institutions.
In response, Zuma and the MK Party brought an urgent application before the Constitutional Court. They argued that the President had failed to act on these serious allegations, thereby violating his constitutional obligations to uphold and defend the Constitution. They maintained that his failure to investigate or take remedial action constituted a failure to fulfil a constitutional obligation in terms of sections 83(b) and 84(2)(e) of the Constitution, which set out the President’s duty to promote unity and perform executive functions in good faith.
Issues Raised
The case presented three primary constitutional issues:
- Whether the Constitutional Court could exercise exclusive jurisdiction under section 167(4)(e) in this matter.
- Whether the President’s alleged inaction amounted to a failure to fulfil a specific constitutional obligation.
- Whether direct access should be granted in the interests of justice given the alleged urgency and constitutional implications.
The Court also considered whether the applicants’ case raised political questions rather than justiciable constitutional issues.
Arguments of the Parties
The applicants argued that the President’s duty to act decisively in defence of the Constitution is not optional. They submitted that the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on the President to respond when credible evidence of institutional corruption arises. They pointed to sections 83(b), 84(2)(e), and 84(3) as sources of this obligation, emphasising that inaction in the face of threats to constitutional integrity undermines the rule of law.
The respondents countered that the application lacked legal substance. They contended that the applicants had not identified a specific and enforceable constitutional duty. Rather, they sought to compel the President to perform his discretionary functions in a particular way a move that would violate the separation of powers principle. They argued that section 84(2) confers broad executive discretion, not a mandatory duty enforceable by courts. The respondents further noted that the applicants had provided no evidence of a constitutional crisis requiring urgent judicial intervention, and that other mechanisms, such as Parliament or investigative agencies, existed for accountability.
Judgment / Final Decision
The Constitutional Court unanimously dismissed the application for direct access. It held that the applicants had not met the jurisdictional requirements under section 167(4)(e). The Court reasoned that for its exclusive jurisdiction to be invoked, the applicant must clearly identify a specific constitutional provision imposing an obligation on the President and demonstrate how it was breached.
The Court found that the applicants’ claim relied on broad and general constitutional principles rather than a clearly defined duty. The Court explained that the President’s powers under sections 83 and 84 are discretionary, and his choice whether to act upon the Commissioner’s allegations cannot be judicially compelled unless a specific legal duty exists. Accordingly, the alleged inaction could not amount to a failure to fulfil a constitutional obligation.
The Court concluded that the matter was more appropriately characterised as a political dispute rather than a constitutional one and therefore fell outside its exclusive jurisdiction. The application for direct access was dismissed.
Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning was grounded in the principle of constitutional clarity and separation of powers. The judges emphasised that section 167(4)(e) grants the Court exclusive jurisdiction only where the alleged failure relates to a defined and enforceable constitutional obligation. The Court explained that it cannot intervene in matters involving presidential discretion unless the Constitution explicitly creates a duty to act in a specific way.
The Court reaffirmed that direct access is an exceptional remedy, available only when the matter is of immediate and national constitutional importance and when there is no adequate alternative remedy. In this case, the applicants failed to show that the matter met these criteria.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that the Constitutional Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under section 167(4)(e) arises only where a specific and justiciable constitutional obligation exists, and it has been clearly demonstrated that the President failed to fulfil it. General or political grievances do not fall within this jurisdiction.
This ratio reinforces judicial restraint and the necessity of respecting the constitutional demarcation between the branches of government.
Obiter Dicta
While dismissing the application, the Court made several observations worth noting. It acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations made by the Provincial Commissioner, observing that claims of corruption within the security and justice sectors are matters of national concern. However, the Court advised that such allegations should be addressed through proper executive and investigative channels, not through the courts unless a specific legal duty is implicated.
The Court further observed that political accountability for executive inaction lies with Parliament and the electorate, not the judiciary. This comment, though not central to the judgment, highlights the Court’s view that the separation of powers must be preserved even when politically sensitive issues arise. These obiter dicta serve as guidance for future cases, illustrating the Court’s cautious but principled approach to disputes involving presidential conduct.
Conclusion / Observations
The judgment underscores several important constitutional lessons. First, it highlights the strict procedural and substantive requirements for invoking the Constitutional Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Applicants must clearly define the constitutional obligation at issue and show direct non-fulfilment. Secondly, the Court reaffirmed that judicial intervention in executive matters is permissible only where the Constitution expressly imposes a duty on the President. Thirdly, it demonstrated that political accountability mechanisms such as parliamentary oversight remain the primary avenues for addressing executive inaction.
The Court’s refusal to grant direct access reflects a careful balance between maintaining judicial authority and respecting executive autonomy. By declining to adjudicate a politically charged issue without a defined constitutional foundation, the Court protected its institutional legitimacy and reinforced the separation of powers.
Significance of the Case
This judgment strengthens the distinction between constitutional and political questions, ensuring that the judiciary remains a guardian of the Constitution rather than an arbiter of political conduct. It clarifies that section 167(4)(e) applies only to well-defined constitutional obligations and cannot be invoked for discretionary or political acts.
The decision complements previous rulings such as Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (“Nkandla II”) [2016] ZACC 11, where the Court enforced explicit constitutional duties. Here, the Court drew a clear contrast: when obligations are vague or political, judicial involvement is limited.
Ultimately, the case demonstrates the Court’s commitment to constitutional discipline, accountability, and institutional balance. It reaffirms that the strength of South Africa’s constitutional democracy lies in each branch of government acting within its proper sphere.
References
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judgment Summary: Zuma and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 206/25, 3 October 2025).
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 83(b), 84(2)(e), 84(3), 167(4)(e).
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (“Nkandla II”) [2016] ZACC 11.
