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CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V INALEGWU FRANKLINE OCHIFE & OTHERS

Authored By: MERCY OLUWANIFEMI OLA

ADEKUNLE AJASIN UNIVERSITY

CASE TITLE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V INALEGWU FRANKLINE OCHIFE & OTHERS 

CASE CITATION: (2025) LPELR-80220 (SC)

PRACTICE AREA: GARNISHEE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24 JANUARY, 2025

APPELLANT: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (CBN)

RESPONDENTS: 1. INALEGWU FRANKLINE OCHIFE

  1. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
  2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, FCT
  3. OFFICER IN CHARGE, INTELLIGENCE RESPONSE TEAM, SPECIAL ANTI ROBBERY SQUAD (SARS) NIGERIAN POLICE FORCE

PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 

JOHN INYANG OKORO, JSC

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMI, JSC

ADAMU JAURO, JSC

MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, JSC (LEAD JUDGEMENT)

INTRODUCTION

This case is a landmark judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 2025. It deals with  two fundamental legal questions in garnishee proceedings. First, whether obtaining the Attorney General’s consent under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA)1is a strict legal  requirement or a procedural matter that may be waived. The Second point is whether a garnishee  absolute decision may remain in force if the party requesting it cannot demonstrate that the money  belonging to the judgement debtor is in the custody of the Central Bank of Nigeria, which in this  case is the garnishee.

The ruling is noteworthy because it resolved long-standing ambiguities in Nigerian garnishee  practice. Previously, courts considered the Attorney General’s approval to be a basic jurisdictional  requirement. However, in this case, the Supreme Court provided a fresh interpretation, stating that  failure to obtain consent is procedural and can be waived if not raised early.

The burden of proof in garnishee actions was emphasised by the court. It restated the requirement  that the judgement creditor provide unambiguous, concrete proof that the garnishee is in  possession of funds belonging to the judgement debtor. Regardless of procedural compliance, one  cannot sustain the garnishee order absolute without this evidence.

This case is especially relevant to lawyers, public institutions, and financial entities regularly involved in the enforcement of court judgments.

FACTS OF THE CASE 

The Federal High Court sitting in Abuja awarded a judgment sum in favor of Ochife, the first  Respondent against the Second and Fourth Respondents to the tune of Fifty Million Naira. When  the judgment debt remained unpaid, Ochife claimed that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the  Appellant, held money for the Second to Fourth Respondents (judgement debtors) in accordance  with the Treasury Single Accounts (TSA) policy and initiated garnishee proceedings against the  bank in the same court. Thus, Ochife became a judgement creditor.

The Federal High Court issued a garnishee order nisi against the Appellant, requesting it to pay  the said sum or give reasons why it should not be made to pay. According to the CBN’s explanation,  it didn’t have any accounts in the names of the Second to Fourth Respondents. However, the first  Respondent objected to the Appellant’s deposition because it filed the same out of time and did  not make any material opposition. The trial court made the garnishee order absolute, thereby directing the Appellant to pay the debt. This did not satisfy the Appellant. Consequently, it  appealed the decree absolute to the Court of Appeal.2

APPEALS 

At the Court of Appeal, the issue of the Attorney General’s consent was raised. However, the  appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the absence of the Attorney  General’s consent did not render the proceedings null and void. It viewed the consent requirement  as procedural and ruled that the trial court acted within its powers.3

Furthermore, the appellate court confirmed the garnishee order made by the lower court, agreeing  to the possibility of the Appellant having custody of the Second to Fourth Respondents’. An  additional appeal was filed with the Supreme Court by the Appellant.4

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 

  1. Whether non-compliance with the requirement of obtaining the Attorney General’s consent under Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (SCPA)5renders the garnishee proceedings invalid.
  2. Whether the failure of the CBN to raise this objection promptly amounted to a waiver.
  3. Whether the trial court’s rejection of the Appellant’s denial tof keeeping monies for the Second to Fourth Respondents was solely because the Respondents are Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) based on the Federal Government’s TSA Policy.

LEAD JUDGMENT AND RATIO DECIDENDI

H.A.O. Abiru, JSC, who delivered the lead judgment made critical findings.

On Attorney General’s Consent

The Supreme Court held that Section 84 of the SCPA, which requires consent from the Attorney  General before initiating garnishee proceedings against a public officer or institution, is a condition  precedent, and as a result, it is closer to ‘procedural jurisdiction’ than ‘substantive jurisdiction’.6 Thus, if the garnishee (in this case, the Appellant) does not protest to the Attorney General’s lack  of permission in a timely manner, they will be considered to have lost that privilege.7 This finding  brings an important shift in legal interpretation, as previous cases often treated the absence of  consent as fatal to the case.

On the Burden of Proof

The court also ruled that even if the procedural standards are met, the party requesting a garnishee  order still needs to show that the Appellant has funds for the judgement debtor.

The Judgment Creditor failed to provide any actual and credible indicator that the CBN held funds  on behalf of the Judgment Debtors. The Supreme Court pointed out that garnishee actions are  exceptional procedures, and careful adherence to the law is required.8

“The onus lies heavily on the Judgment Creditor to prove that the Appellant is in  possession of the Judgment Debtors’ funds. This was not discharged in this case.” per  H.A.O. Abiru, JSC

Based on these, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the garnishee order absolute.

DISSENTING JUDGMENT AND OBITER DICTUM

Ogunwumiju, JSC, who happened to be the 1 in the 4/1 majority vote allowing the appeal, stressed  the need for balance in garnishee matters involving public institutions. She emphasised the  challenges encountered when attempting to employ garnishee actions to execute judgements  against government corporations. She said that the statute requires rigorous proof before it may  seize public funds, even if courts ought not to unfairly protect public entities.9

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case combines judicial clarity with stronger doctrine. By  reframing section 84 of the SCPA as procedural rather than substantive, the court, per Abiru, JSC, allowed flexibility but insisted on strict compliance at trial. The omission of the Attorney-General’s  directive does not necessarily nullify garnishee proceedings, provided the objection is not delayed,  according to this judicial ruling.

Nevertheless, substance prevailed over form. The court insisted that garnishee orders cannot  proceed without verifiable proof (bank statements, affidavits or the like) that the Appellant truly  holds the judgment debtors’ funds. As a result, a judgement creditor’s absolute dependence on the  TSA framework was risky and unsustainable.

Thus, while the court waived the procedural misstep, the absence of actual proof dashed the hope of the garnishee order. The Supreme Court upheld the basic principle that credibility, rather than  technicalities, is the foundation for constitutionally permitted enforcement processes by reversing  the decision and nullifying the enforcement.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

  1. Procedural Jurisdiction vs Substantive Jurisdiction

Drawing from the Court of Appeal’s Sterling Bank plc v. Gamau10, emphasis is laid on the fact that procedural issues, such as failure to comply with section 84, SCPA are not unbendable and can  be waived if not objected to early. This encourages judicial efficiency.

  1. Strictness of Proof in Garnishee Proceedings

The ruling confirms that garnishee processes are sui generis and need trustworthy evidence of the  possession of the judgement debtor’s funds. There is a clear deviation from reliance on  organisational or systemic policies (like TSA), requiring documentary evidence to validate  enforcement. This resonates with the high evidentiary standard set in Mobil Producing Nigeria  Unlimited v LASEPA11 where the court noted that speculative claims are insufficient.

  1. Doctrine of Waiver and Timeliness

By emphasizing timeliness in objecting to procedural default, the judgment echoes the principle  in Julius Berger Nigeria Plc v Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd12 that litigation complacency  results in forfeiture. This profoundly improves garnishee practice and procedure.

  1. Judicial Caution Over Public Funds

This case signifies the need for litigants who have confidence in public funds to apply prudence  and extreme caution when dealing with governmental institutions. In another light, the decision in  this case mirrors Katsina Local Government v Makudawa13 which protects public funds from  judicial or private overreach.

  1. Pragmatic Guidance for Enforcement

According to the ruling, judgement creditors must strike a balance between procedural observance  and the accuracy of the evidence. Early applications for the AG’s consent must now be supported  by specific proof of the debtors’ funds. Future enforcement actions must now adhere to this both criterion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)

Court of Appeal Act, Cap. C36 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004

Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. v Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd (2022) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1804) 201 Katsina Local Government v Makudawa (1971) 7 NSCC 119

Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited v LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt 798) 1 Sterling Bank Plc v Gamau [2019] LPELR-47067 (CA)

United Bank for Africa v France Appro SAS (2015) LPELR 40394 (CA)

Central Bank of Nigeria v. Inalegwu Frankline Ochife & Ors. https://legalpediaonline.com/central bank-of-nigeria-v-inalegwu-frankline-ochife-ors/ (accessed 19th June, 2025)

Position of the Law Regarding the Requirement of Consent of the Attorney General Before  Garnishee Proceedings Can Lie Against Any Government https://lawpavilion.com/blog/position of-the-law-regarding-the-requirement-of-consent-of-the-attorney-general-before-garnishee proceedings-can-lie-against-any-government/ (accessed 19th June, 2025)

Re: Central Bank of Nigeria v. Ochife & Ors (2025): Is the dissenting judgment of the Hon. Justice  Ogunwumiju, jsc a reqiuem for section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 1945?  https://spaajibade.com/re-central-bank-of-nigeria-v-ochife-ors-2025-is-the-dissenting-judgment of-the-hon-justice-ogunwumiju-jsc-a-reqiuem-for-section-84-of-the-sheriffs-and-civil-process act-1945/ (accessed 19th June, 2025)

The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the AG’s Consent in Garnishee Proceedings: Twilight of  the Judgment Creditor’s Albatross? https://www.templars-law.com/knowledge-centre/the supreme-courts-recent-decision-on-the-attorney-generals-consent-in-garnishee-proceedings/ (accessed 19th June, 2025)

1 Cap S6, Laws of Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2004.

2 Central Bank of Nigeria v. Inalegwu Frankline Ochife & Ors. https://legalpediaonline.com/central-bank-of-nigeria v-inalegwu-frankline-ochife-ors/ (accessed 19th June, 2025); Position of the Law Regarding the Requirement of  Consent of the Attorney General Before Garnishee Proceedings Can Lie Against Any Government 

https://lawpavilion.com/blog/position-of-the-law-regarding-the-requirement-of-consent-of-the-attorney-general before-garnishee-proceedings-can-lie-against-any-government/ (accessed 19th June, 2025).

3 Section 15, Court of Appeal Act, Cap. C36 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

4 The Supreme Court’s recent decision on the AG’s Consent in Garnishee Proceedings: Twilight of the Judgment  Creditor’s Albatross? https://www.templars-law.com/knowledge-centre/the-supreme-courts-recent-decision-on-the attorney-generals-consent-in-garnishee-proceedings/ (accessed 19th June, 2025)

5 Cap. S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

6Julius Berger Nigeria Plc. v Almighty Projects Innovative Ltd (2022) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1804) 201; Mobil Prodsucing  Nigeria Unlimited v LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt 798) 1.

7 Katsina Local Government v Makudawa (1971) 7 NSCC 119.

8 United Bank for Africa v France Appro SAS (2015) LPELR 40394 (CA).

9 Re: Central Bank of Nigeria v. Ochife & Ors (2025): Is the dissenting judgment of the Hon. Justice Ogunwumiju,  jsc a reqiuem for section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 1945? https://spaajibade.com/re-central-bank-of nigeria-v-ochife-ors-2025-is-the-dissenting-judgment-of-the-hon-justice-ogunwumiju-jsc-a-reqiuem-for-section-84- of-the-sheriffs-and-civil-process-act-1945/ (accessed 19th June, 2025).

10 (2019) LPELR-48597(CA).

11 (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt 798) 1.

12 (2022) 11 NWLR (Pt 1804) 201.

13 (1971) 7 NSCC 119.

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