Authored By: Sara Hirji
University of Warwick
Abstract
This article explores the tension between free speech and censorship within higher education, focusing on the UK legal framework, judicial interpretation, and the impact of counterterrorism measures and campus activism restrictions. It argues that censorship on university campuses disproportionately targets marginalized groups, particularly Muslim students and Palestinian activists, thereby stifling academic freedom. By examining statutes such as the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, alongside case law and recent policy developments, the article demonstrates how legal and institutional practices contribute to a climate of self-censorship and fear. Proposing a way forward would be to balance the prevention of harm with the protection of academic freedom, ensuring universities remain spaces of critical inquiry and diverse perspectives.
Introduction
The debate over free speech and censorship on university campuses remains a contentious issue. Free speech advocates argue that universities should allow controversial ideas to be debated without restriction, encouraging academic freedom and pioneering new ideas. However, advocates of censorship argue that certain forms of speech, particularly hateful or controversial, should be regulated to ensure the prevention of harm. This tension raises critical questions about the limits of academic freedom and the potential consequences of restricting speech.
Drawing on different theories regarding the scope of free speech as a framework, this article examines whether censorship within universities stifles academic freedom, focusing on two case studies: the Prevent programme and Palestinian activism on campuses.
Legislative framework and academic opinion
In discussions of free speech on campus, the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 can be examined through a racial lens, particularly in relation to activism for Palestinians, especially when led by Muslim students.1 This establishes a duty on higher education providers to protect free speech in universities,2including for visiting speakers.3 However, the Labour government suspended the commencement of the act in 2024 when they came into government. In 2025, they further sought to implement key elements of the act and repealing/amending others.4 One significant motivation behind this decision resulted from “serious concerns over the Act’s potential impact on the welfare of minority groups” and worries that the act “could lead to increased harassment and discrimination on campus.5”
Despite concerns over the 2023 act resulting in harm, other laws seeking to censor students are already causing disproportionate harm to students from ethnic minority backgrounds, particularly Muslims on campus, defeating the objective of the suspension of the act. This can be demonstrated by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015,6 which imposes key duties on universities: to protect academic freedom and free speech,7to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism,8and to follow accompanying government guidance.9 An issue with this act is that it arguably creates a “vacuum”10 between the statutory provisions themselves and the accompanying state guidance on their implementation. In other words, it opens up a grey area between what is legally binding and what is merely advisory. This gap can be deeply problematic, as universities, staff, and students may struggle to distinguish between what the law actually requires and what government guidance merely encourages. Inevitably, this uncertainty is filled with caution and apprehension: individuals and institutions often treat guidance as though it carries the same weight as law, acting out of fear of potential consequences or accusations of non-compliance. As a result, the line between lawful obligation and state expectation becomes blurred, fostering a climate of self censorship and risk-aversion that undermines the very principle of free expression the Act purports to protect.
The legal academic Scott-Bauman states that the guidance itself contains “strong elements of discrimination and racial stereotyping” and is being implemented “More strongly than it mandates, as if it is law.11” The key issue is that despite written respect given to academic freedom and freedom of speech within the 2015 Act, Muslims are seen to be more at risk of radicalisation on campus, and thus they are disproportionately scrutinised through implementation of Government guidance.12 This presents another contradictory aspect of the law- assumptions that Muslim students are at higher risk of radicalisation creates an environment where critical discussions on issues such as foreign policy, civil rights, or systemic discrimination are discouraged either by the university out of fear of disobeying guidelines and the impact on their reputation,13 or self-censorship.14 Thus, the 2015 Act’s requirement of ensuring academic freedom and freedom of speech is contradicted; through the guidance issued on counterterrorism, diversity of perspectives in academic spaces is arguably suppressed.
The UK’s Prevent Programme
The effects of the Prevent Programme on Muslim students exemplify this position. Shawson in his Independent Review of Prevent stated in his report that ‘Islamists’ are the most lethal terrorist threats to the UK,15 further making comparisons with far-right extremism to Islamic extremism, seeking to justify enhanced scrutinization of Muslims under the Prevent Programme.16 This narrative has previously been criticised. Prior to the 2023 report, the House of Lord and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights recognised that the Counter-Terrorism strategy was “based on an assumption that there is an escalator that starts with religious conservatism and ends with support for jihadism,” recognising the Islamophobic nature of the Prevent programme.17 Additionally, the Higher Education and Research Bill was proposed,18 and suggested disapplying the Prevent Programme to Higher Education institutions, thus supporting a position against censorship on campus.19 Similar to this view, it’s arguable that Counterterrorism measures like Prevent risk creating an “Orwellian society”20 where the state suppresses academic debate and elicits fear and self censorship amongst Muslim students. He argues that tackling islamophobia is most effectively achieved by challenging hateful rhetoric and upholding freedom of speech.21 However, one could argue that harmful speech cannot simply be countered with more speech, as its impact is too severe to be neutralized by dialogue alone.22 Arguably, this is flawed. Newman proposes that if hate speech is “a disease of the body politic,” then public denunciation of such rhetoric serves as “a healthy immune response in a tolerant society.23” Similarly, Joseph Magnet warns that criminalizing hate speech paradoxically discourages individuals from confronting bigotry themselves, instead shifting responsibility to law enforcement and the courts.24 The Prevent programme framed Muslims as potential terrorists, reinforcing public perceptions of them as threats. Discussion, rather than censorship, is arguably the key to dismantling such biases. A study by Benier, Faulkner, and Wickes found that engaging in dialogue temporarily increased cognitive empathy and significantly reduced Islamophobia with lasting effects.25 Thus, the Prevent programme’s censorship not only discriminates against Muslim students and cultivates a culture of fear and silence within universities, but also stifles meaningful discourse, hindering also freedom of thought by obstructing the development of empathy in those with racial bias or subjection to the denunciation of their racist beliefs.
Pro-Palestine activism on campus
Another important case study concerns the censorship of Palestinian activism on university campuses, which illustrates how restrictions on political expression can stifle academic freedom and prevent the cultivation of independent thought. Palestinian activism has increasingly been curtailed by reference to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which controversially extends the concept of antisemitism to encompass anti-Zionism and, in some interpretations, criticism of the State of Israel itself. By collapsing the distinction between hostility towards Jewish people and opposition to the political ideology of Zionism or the policies of Israel, this definition risks silencing legitimate critique. It becomes increasingly difficult to scrutinise Israel’s alleged violations of international law, the colonial dimensions of Zionist ideology, or the historical and ongoing struggles for Palestinian liberation without being branded as antisemitic. This conflation has been described as the “Palestine exception to free speech,” because it creates a uniquely circumscribed environment in which Palestinian perspectives and critical scholarship on Israel are subject to exceptional restrictions.
The implications of this for academic freedom are profound. As Tatour observes, the protections of international human rights law are central to safeguarding the autonomy of intellectual inquiry. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) guarantees the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the ability to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Similarly, Article 26 of the UDHR enshrines the right to education, which cannot be meaningfully realised without a parallel guarantee of academic freedom. These protections are reinforced by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which requires states to uphold freedom of expression while recognising only narrow grounds for permissible restrictions. Within the context of higher education, academic freedom can therefore be understood not only as an individual right of scholars and students to pursue inquiry, but also as a collective obligation to preserve universities as protected spaces where controversial or unpopular ideas can be debated without fear of censorship or external interference.
Despite these protections, there remains what some describe as an “emotional need” within universities and public discourse to censor anti-Zionist activism. The reasoning is often that prohibiting or restricting such speech demonstrates a symbolic commitment to combatting antisemitism and protecting vulnerable communities. This rationale resonates with John Stuart Mill’s famous harm principle, which suggests that the only legitimate basis for restricting freedom is to prevent harm to others. In this framework, universities might argue that speech perceived as hostile to Jewish students causes emotional and psychological harm, and therefore warrants suppression.
An alternative view
The counterargument to this is equally powerful. To focus exclusively on the harm caused by controversial or offensive speech is to overlook the equally significant harm produced by the suppression of speech, whether through outright bans or through subtler pressures that encourage self-censorship. As critics such as Steinhoff argue, liberal democracy does not guarantee immunity from all harms, particularly those arising from speech, but rather from serious violations of rights. A commitment to equal liberty requires tolerating the discomfort and conflict inherent in free expression. According to this perspective, minimising overall harm—and ensuring the protection of liberty—requires the robust defence of free speech in its entirety, even when that speech is controversial, unsettling, or unpopular.
This view highlights the paradox at the heart of campus restrictions: efforts to prevent harm by censoring controversial views may themselves produce harm by undermining the very conditions that make academic freedom possible. When universities restrict Palestinian activism or label criticism of Israel as antisemitic under the IHRA definition, they not only silence dissenting voices but also impoverish the intellectual environment by narrowing the scope of permissible debate. Students are discouraged from challenging dominant narratives, developing critical perspectives, and engaging with complex, often uncomfortable realities. In this way, censorship functions less as a shield against harm and more as an instrument of intellectual conformity and closing off avenues of inquiry that are essential for the advancement of knowledge.
The censorship of Palestinian activism on campuses thus demonstrates how the suppression of controversial perspectives undermines the university’s role as a space of free inquiry. By privileging symbolic displays of protection over genuine intellectual engagement, institutions risk transforming themselves into environments where difficult questions cannot be asked and critical perspectives cannot be explored. The consequence is a narrowing of debate and a weakening of the academic mission itself. Far from protecting students, such measures deny them the opportunity to confront and engage with contested issues, which is the very foundation of higher education and democratic society.
Case example: Ben-Dor v University of Southampton [2016]
The case of R (Ben-Dor and Others) v University of Southampton [2016] serves as a striking example of how censorship, even when framed as a precautionary measure, can inflict significant harm on academic discourse. In this case, the University of Southampton cancelled a scheduled conference that aimed to critically examine the legal foundations of the
State of Israel, citing concerns over safety and security. The conference had been expected to attract both strong support and fierce opposition, and the university argued that it could not guarantee order or prevent potential disruption. The claimants, however, argued that this decision amounted to a restriction on academic freedom, as it suppressed the ability of scholars to engage in rigorous intellectual exploration of a politically and legally contentious subject. They contended that universities, as institutions dedicated to fostering debate, should be particularly resistant to external pressures to silence unpopular or controversial viewpoints.
Despite these arguments, the court upheld the university’s decision to cancel the event, concluding that the university had acted within its discretion in prioritising safety and order. Yet, this outcome highlights a troubling tension: when security concerns are permitted to outweigh academic freedom, universities risk reinforcing what has been described as a “growing popular unwillingness to listen to opposing views.” Instead of providing a protected space for robust intellectual exchange, institutions may increasingly feel obliged to impose restrictions whenever opposition, controversy, or the threat of disorder arises. This tendency not only undermines the role of universities as arenas of free inquiry but also harms the pursuit of knowledge by silencing critical perspectives on deeply contested issues. By preventing scholars from challenging prevailing assumptions or exploring sensitive topics, such restrictions narrow the boundaries of permissible debate, thereby eroding the diversity of thought that lies at the heart of academic freedom.
A way forward?
A proposed solution lies in recalibrating the balance between safeguarding students from harm and protecting academic freedom through proportionate, transparent, and non discriminatory frameworks. This would involve reforming the Prevent duty to remove racialised assumptions, ensuring universities apply security measures only where genuinely necessary, and replacing the IHRA definition of antisemitism with a more precise standard that distinguishes between hate speech and legitimate political critique. Additionally, universities should adopt clear, consistent event policies that prioritise dialogue and mediation over cancellation, while embedding a culture of critical engagement that equips students to challenge, rather than silence, controversial views. Such measures would help create a campus environment that protects vulnerable groups without stifling academic freedom or democratic debate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, censorship on university campuses appears to restrict open debate, discouraging critical inquiry, and disproportionately targeting marginalized groups. The Prevent programme exemplifies how counterterrorism measures can elicit self-censorship amongst Muslim students, whilst the suppression of Palestinian activism elucidates how redefining antisemitism can prevent political discourse. R (Ben-Dor and Others) v University of Southampton further portrays how institutional decisions to limit speech can hinder academic freedom. Whilst proponents of censorship argue that it prevents harm, this article has shown that such restrictions often reinforce bias, and paradoxically create more harm by stifling diverse perspectives and intellectual exploration.
Table of cases
R (Ben-Dor and Others) v University of Southampton [2016] EWHC 953, [2016] ELR 279
Table of Legislation
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)
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1 Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023.
2Ibid pt A1.
3Ibid pt A1(2)(d).
4 HC Deb 15 Jan 2025, vol 760, cols 379-381.
5ibid, col 379.
6 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
7ibid s31.
8ibid s26(1).
9ibid s29.
10 Alison Scott-Baumann, ‘Ideology, Utopia and Islam on Campus: How to Free Speech a Little from Its Own Terrors’ (2017) 12 Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 159, 165.
11 ibid 163.
12 Irene Zempi and Athina Tripli, ‘Listening to Muslim Students’ Voices on the Prevent Duty in British Universities: A Qualitative Study’ (2023) 18 Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 230, 232-233.
13 Scott-Baumann (n 11) 163.
14 ibid 171.
15 William Shawcross, Independent Review of Prevent (Dandy Booksellers Ltd 2023) 2 16 ibid 7.
17 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism: Second Report of Session 2016-2017 (HC 2016-2017, HL 39 HC 105) para 107.
18 Higher Education and Research HL Bill (2016-2017) 76, cl 84.
19 Higher Education and Research Bill (n 20).
20 Tahir Abbas, Imran Awran and Jonathan Marsden, ‘Pushed to the Edge: The Consequences of the “Prevent Duty” in de-Radicalising Pre-Crime Thought among British Muslim University Students’ (2023) 26 Race Ethnicity and Education 719, 732.
21 ibid.
22 Stanley Fish, ‘There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech, and It’s A Good Thing, Too’ (Oxford University Press 1993) 102, 109.
23 Stephen L Newman, ‘Finding the Harm in Hate Speech: An Argument against Censorship’ (2017) 50 Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 679, 687.
24 ibid.
25 Kathryn Benier and others, ‘Reducing Islamophobia through Conversation: A Randomized Control Trial’ (2024) 87 Social Psychology Quarterly 461, 473-474.
