Home » Blog » ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONA: A JURISTIC ANALYSIS OF  RAMESSES II’s MODERN CIVIL IDENTITY

ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONA: A JURISTIC ANALYSIS OF  RAMESSES II’s MODERN CIVIL IDENTITY

Authored By: Chukwudebelu Kosiso Esther

Abstract

This article explores the intriguing legal and jurisprudential questions raised by the  unusual case of Pharaoh Ramesses II being issued a modern Egyptian passport nearly  three millennia after his death. Using this as a springboard, the article examines the scope of post-mortem legal personality, its theoretical foundations, and civil  implications. It traverses ancient precedent and modern legal constructs to challenge the  established doctrine that legal personality extinguishes upon death. Through statutory analysis, case law, and comparative perspectives, it argues for a nuanced view of the  legal identity of the dead in contemporary civil and symbolic contexts.

Introduction

The legal world has long operated on the foundational maxim actio personalis moritur  cum persona—personal actions die with the person. Legal personality, the status of being  recognized by law as a subject capable of bearing rights and duties, typically ends at  death (Salmond, 1966)1. Yet, the 1976 issuance of a valid Egyptian passport to Pharaoh  Ramesses II, deceased since approximately 1213 BCE, unsettles this general belief2.

This article delves into whether the dead can, in limited and symbolic circumstances, be  seen as continuing to hold a form of legal personality. Using Ramesses II as a focal case,  it investigates how modern law interacts with ancient remains, state symbolism, and  international civil norms. The case also opens a gateway to discussing deceased persons’  rights, duties, reputations, estates, and recognition in civil law.

Background

Understanding Legal Personality

Legal personality refers to entities that the law acknowledges as subjects of rights and  duties. Jurists such as Salmond define a person as “any being whom the law regards as  capable of rights and duties” regardless of biological form3. This includes both natural  persons (human beings) and juristic persons (corporations, deities, etc.).

The Ramesses II Passport: Fact or Fiction

In 1974, Ramesses II’s mummified body was deteriorating and required transport to  France for preservation. French law at the time required that all persons—even dead  ones—entering the country be documented. Accordingly, Egyptian authorities issued a  passport listing the Pharaoh’s occupation as “King (deceased)” to comply with French  customs and, more importantly, to assert sovereign dignity4.

Though largely ceremonial, this incident is legally and symbolically potent. It challenges  the rigid doctrine of personality cessation upon death and reveals the state’s ability to  confer a form of posthumous civil identity, however fictionalized.

Theories of Legal Personality

  1. Fiction Theory

Under this classical theory—championed by Savigny and Salmond—legal personality is  a creation of law, a convenient fiction to facilitate legal relations. If so, there is no  intrinsic barrier to extending it beyond death, so long as law finds utility in doing so5.

  1. Realist Theory

Gierke and Maitland argue that personality reflects a real, social phenomenon. Even in  death, individuals can retain a social presence, especially figures like Ramesses II who  function as national symbols. This theory accommodates the continued symbolic  recognition of deceased persons as bearers of legacy, duty, or honor6.

  1. Concession Theory

Here, personality is seen as a grant from the state. The state can withdraw or extend it at  will. Issuing a passport to a dead monarch becomes a form of posthumous concession, a  symbolic act acknowledging continued dignity or relevance7.

Civil Law Implications of Post-Mortem Personality

  1. Estates and Property

One critical legal aspect where the dead retain influence is in estate law. Wills, trusts, and  succession laws ensure that a deceased person’s intent is respected8. In Indian law, for  instance, Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, allows children in the womb at the time of death to inherit property if later born alive.

This suggests that while the dead no longer “own” in the classical sense, legal personality  provides an avenue for the recognition of their posthumous distribution of rights,  benefits, and obligations.

Similarly, Nigeria alludes to this through the Administration of Estates Law (Various  States) which provides for duties and rights relating to the deceased’s estate, suggesting a  lingering civil personality in administration9.

  1. Reputation and Defamation

Another example is post-mortem defamation. While a deceased person cannot sue, many  jurisdictions allow surviving family members to bring actions where reputational harm  affects them. Indian courts have occasionally recognized reputational damage to a  deceased person as actionable if it impacts the social standing of living relatives10. This continuity of reputation implies an enduring personal identity, protected under civil  law.

Symbolic Legal Acts and National Identity

  1. Cultural Diplomacy and Symbolism

The passport issued to Ramesses II was not merely bureaucratic, it was an assertion of  Egypt’s sovereignty, heritage, and cultural dignity. It exemplified how civil law can  intersect with national identity through symbolic legal acts.

Modern nations routinely engage in such symbolic assertions of legal personality. For  example:

– Granting posthumous awards or citizenship (e.g., Anne Frank receiving honorary Dutch  citizenship).

– Legally recognizing historical wrongs (e.g., formal pardons of executed figures centuries after their death).

These actions, though often viewed as political, exist within the framework of civil law  and are executed through its mechanisms.

  1. Jurisprudential Significance

The Ramesses II case reveals the flexibility of legal systems to adapt fictionally. It poses  key jurisprudential questions:

– Can symbolic recognition imply residual legal personality?

– Does the state, through its sovereign prerogative, redefine who is a person post mortem?

Such questions remain open but merit deeper legal and philosophical inquiry.

The notion that legal personality ends at death is largely functional—designed to draw  administrative boundaries around life and law11. Yet, cases like Ramesses II show that  under certain civil or symbolic conditions, posthumous personality can persist which has  been proven in various other instances in law such as the provision of the Nigerian  Evidence Act on dying declaration which allows the declaratory statements of a dead  person admissible provided it aligns with the set stipulations12.

One could argue this is an extension of the bracket theory, where law uses personality as  a symbol to manage legal relations, regardless of biological status13. When France  required documentation, and Egypt responded with a passport, this was law recognizing  not just a corpse, but a sovereign—dead yet dignified.

This opens the door for legal systems to explore whether, in cases of national heritage,  war crimes, or genocide, the legal personality of the dead might be invoked to ensure  justice, restitution, or symbolic reparation.

Conclusion

Ramesses II’s passport, while a legal anomaly, is rich in jurisprudential significance. It  disrupts the canonical maxim that legal personality dies with the person and invites a  rethinking of the boundaries between life, law, and symbolism.

This article has argued that civil law, through its doctrines on estates, reputation, and  symbolic acts, already acknowledges a diluted form of posthumous legal personality.  Whether we classify this as personality, residual rights, or symbolic status, the fact  remains that legal recognition of the dead continues in meaningful ways. In a world  increasingly conscious of historical justice and symbolic reparation, it may be time to  refine our understanding of post-mortem personality—not as a ghostly fiction, but as a  civil construct with real implications.

Bibliography

  1. Adaramola F, Jurisprudence (LexisNexis 2008)
  2. Bryant S, ‘Legal Personality’ [1928] 37(3) The Yale Journal

https://www.jstor.org/stable/789740 accessed 10 July 2025

  1. Gardiner K, ‘Mummy mugshots and other strange passport facts’ (Nationalgeographic.com, 26 October 2018)

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/weird-passports-history accessed 7 July 2025

  1. Harlem Solicitors, ‘Harlem Solicitors’ (Harlem Solicitors, 21 January 2024) https://www.harlemsolicitors.com/2024/01/21/an-appraisal-of-administration of-estate-and-probate-in-nigeria/ accessed 10 July 2025
  2. Hindu Succession Act 1956, s 20
  3. The India Code, s 499
  4. Paton GW, Textbook of Jurisprudence (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1972) 8. Salmond JW, Jurisprudence (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966)
  5. The Nigerian Evidence Act, s 40
  6. Townsend K, ‘Raising the Dead: Understanding Post-Mortem Rights of Publicity’ (International Documentary Association, 2 April 2022)

https://www.documentary.org/column/raising-dead-understanding-post-mortem rights-publicity accessed 9 July 2025

1 Salmond JW, Jurisprudence (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1966)

2 Gardiner K, ‘Mummy mugshots and other strange passport facts’ (Nationalgeographic.com, 26 October  2018) <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/weird-passports-history> accessed 7 July  2025

3 Bryant S, ‘Legal Personality’ [1928] 37(3) The Yale 

Journal <https://www.jstor.org/stable/789740> accessed 10 July 2025

4 Gardiner (n. 2).

5 Adaramola F, Jurisprudence (LexisNexis 2008)

6ibid.

7ibid.

8 Townsend K, ‘Raising the Dead: Understanding Post-Mortem Rights of Publicity’ (International  Documentary Association, 2 April, 2022) <https://www.documentary.org/column/raising-dead understanding-post-mortem-rights-publicity> accessed 9 July 2025

9 Harlem solicitors, ‘Harlem Solicitors’ (Harlem Solicitors, 21 January, 

2024) <https://www.harlemsolicitors.com/2024/01/21/an-appraisal-of-administration-of-estate-and probate-in-nigeria/> accessed 10 July 2025

10 The India Code, s 499.

11 Adaramola (n. 5).

12 The Nigerian Evidence Act, s 40

13 Paton, G. W., Textbook of Jurisprudence (4th edn, Oxford University Press 1972)

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