Authored By: Cheru Yalelet
Bahir Dar university school of law, Ethiopia
Abstract
A fundamental tenet of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the principle of distinction, which requires parties to armed conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants as well as between civilian objects and military objectives. With a focus on the persecution and suffering of children, this article critically analyzes the breach of this principle during the Siege of Mariupol in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child are examined, and systemic violations such as indiscriminate shelling, the use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes, and the obstruction of humanitarian access are revealed. The effectiveness of current legal frameworks and enforcement strategies in preventing and responding to such atrocities is also assessed in the article. Based on doctrinal and case-based analysis, it comes to the conclusion that the siege of Mariupol is indicative of a wider breakdown in adherence to child protection standards during armed conflict. To preserve civilian protection, particularly for children in contemporary urban warfare, the paper calls for enhanced real-time monitoring, more robust accountability procedures, and operational changes within IHL enforcement regimes.
Keywords: Geneva Conventions, urban warfare, civilian targeting, war crimes, accountability, Mariupol, Russia-Ukraine conflict, international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction, and child protection.
Introduction
In modern wars, civilians, especially children, are more likely to be targeted than to be killed by accident. International humanitarian law (IHL) protects people in war, but one of the worst things about modern warfare is that it is still hard to tell the difference between soldiers and civilians. The Siege of Mariupol in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict is the best example of this. The city, which used to have more than 400,000 people living there, turned into a war zone where kids were killed, hurt, forced to leave their homes, and mentally scarred. Many were buried under rubble or denied access to basic needs. The brutal siege of the city not only destroyed buildings and infrastructure, but it also broke international laws that are supposed to protect the most vulnerable people during war. [i]
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols enshrine the principle of distinction in the plainest terms possible. They say, and I quote, “attacks must only be directed at military objectives, and civilians must be protected at all times.” The Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol go on to provide even more protections for minors in wartime. All of this, of course, just establishes the baseline. What happened in Mariupol, as even the most cursory survey of available evidence makes plain, was a systematic, large-scale violation of those very baseline protections. [ii] Now, let’s talk about some of those violations.
The aim of this article is to conduct a critical analysis of the targeting of children in Mariupol from the perspective of international humanitarian law, with a particular focus on the apparent legal failure to distinguish between civilian and military targets. The article evaluates the current legal mechanisms and their adequacy in responding to such violations and explores both the legal and practical challenges in ensuring accountability for attacks in urban warfare that produce a conspicuous number of child casualties. Relying on a rich diet of treaty law, customary law, United Nations reports, NGO findings, and scholarly analysis, this article builds a comprehensive understanding of a very nuanced issue. The central question driving the analysis is this: to what extent did the conduct of hostilities during the Siege of Mariupol constitute a violation of the principle of distinction under international humanitarian law, and particularly with regard to child protection, what are the legal consequences of such violations?
The article advances as follows: Firstly, it supplies the framework of the siege, international legal principles, and the discussion’s pivotal definitions. Secondly, it dissects the principal legal transgressions, comprising indiscriminate bombardments, the human shield phenomenon, and the apparently unquenchable thirst for attacking non-military sites. Thirdly, it ponders the significance of all this in terms of both legal accountability and proposals to reform the currently dysfunctional system of international justice. Finally, the article underscores the significance of these discussions by gesturing toward the implications for Child Soldiers and the urgent new enforcement mechanisms we outline in our concluding section. Having seen armed conflict in my youth, and having later devoted myself to the study and advocacy of law, I approach this issue not merely as an academic exercise, but as a question of fundamental human decency. When children become deliberate targets in war, International Humanitarian Law cannot remain mute. If it is to keep up appearances as a legitimate body of law, IHL must assert itself were doing so might actually save some lives. IHL’s refusal to show up in places like Mariupol makes the appearance of IHL at all a farce.
Background
Starting in February 2022 as part of Russia’s partial invasion of Ukraine, the Siege of Mariupol swiftly became among the most lethal and destructive urban sieges in recent European history. Strategically based on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol Russian troops relentlessly bombed artillery, airstrikes, long-range missiles. Basic infrastructure water, electricity, and health services was methodically damaged over several weeks. were systematically and purposefully attacked in civilian facilities including hospitals, maternity wards, schools, and humanitarian passageways. Many of the victims were children, murdered not in crossfire but in their houses, playgrounds, and shelters, according to the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and other reliable sources. [iii] Core concepts of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are severely offended by this pattern of violence. Under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), parties to a conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants. Attacks should only aim at military targets. Additionally, Article 51(2) of the same Protocol clearly forbids acts or threats of violence aimed mainly at instilling fear among the civilian population. [iv] Customary IHL Rule 1 says that both state and nonstate actors have this responsibility regardless of treaty ratification status. Apart from IHL, International Human Rights Law (IHRL), especially the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000) demands states to take all feasible measures to protect children from the effects of hostilities. [v] States are compelled by Article 38 of the CRC to respect and ensure respect for the rules of IHL relevant to children during armed conflict. Under article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, such attacks are expressly forbidden. Unless those facilities are being used for military purposes, Article 52 of the same Protocol forbids attacks on civilian objects such as schools and hospitals. Under Article 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s Rome Statute, targeting civilians including children is also classified as a war crime. [vi] Under Article 12(3) of the Statute, upon such a declaration, the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Ukraine Russia is not party to The Mariupol case shows a horrible breakdown in both compliance and enforcement given this vast legal structure. These targeting of shelters marked with children signs, the use of heavy explosive weapons in highly populated locations, and the blurring of civilian and military objectives were not accidental. They show a planned approach to terror and collective punishment. Before investigating the particular means of breach of these rules during the siege, knowledge of these legal bases is absolutely vital. This context also highlights the general inability of the international community to stop or properly react to large scale violations, notably those affecting minors. [vii]
Legal Violations and War Crimes Against Children During the Siege of Mariupol
One of the most basic tenets of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the principle of distinction, which compels all parties to a conflict to always separate civilians from combatants. Codified under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), this principle is binding customary law; it is not just aspirational. [viii] Deliberate targeting of civilian areas in Mariupol including kindergartens, residential apartment blocks, maternity hospitals, and even clearly marked shelters with the word children in bold letters constitutes a blatant breach of this principle. Many recorded assaults between February and May 2022, according to the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), showed Russian troops had little regard between military and civilian targets. Among the clearest instances remains the bombing of Mariupol Drama Theater on March 16, 2022, hundreds of people mostly women and children had sought shelter. Large letters outside the building seen even to satellite monitoring read ‘children.’ Still, the structure was blown apart, resulting in great civilian death. [ix]
Indiscriminate and Disproportionate Use of Force:
The assault seemed deliberate, hence rising it beyond a breach of IHL to a war crime. Under Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, the employment of large explosive weapons in heavily populated civilian zone without exact military justification amounts to an indiscriminate assault. By their nature, these weapons cannot be aimed exclusively at military objectives, hence they constitute a great danger to people. [x] Reportedly using thermobaric weapons, cluster munitions, and unguided artillery shells in residential areas, Russian forces during the siege Under Rule 14 of Customary IHL, the principle of proportionality forbids attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life too great in respect to the specific and immediate military benefit expected. Many strikes in Mariupol breached this guideline. For example, the shelling of the maternity and childrens hospital on March 9, 2022, not only resulted in civilian deaths, including children, but served no discernible military necessity. Independent inquiries turned up no proof of military presence either inside or close to the facility. Under Article 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Rome Statute, which punishes purposefully directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, these acts amount to serious breaches of IHL and may be prosecuted as war crimes. [xi]
Specific Legal Protections for Children in Armed Conflict
Children are granted special protection under both IHL and International Human Rights Law. Parties to the conflict must take all reasonable steps to guarantee that children are protected and respected, according to Article 77 of Additional Protocol I. Similarly, Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocol strengthen the obligation to stop children’ direct participation and to guarantee their protection throughout hostilities. The reality in Mariupol shows complete disregard for these safeguards. [ xii] The targeted destruction of infrastructure like schools and childrens hospitals and the deaths of dozens of minors verified by several foreign monitors not only reflect a failure to follow international standards but also a pattern of behavior meant to demoralize the civilian population by means of group punishment. Since these attacks aimed to instill fear rather than fulfill a definite military purpose, this might also point to the ban on terror tactics under Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I. Furthermore, the Rome Statute defines as a war crime conscripting or recruiting youngsters under 15 into military or employing them to take part actively in hostilities. Although this may not specifically pertain to the Russian Federation’s actions in Mariupol, the sheer neglect of child dignity and safety represents a more general infraction of international legal norms and ethical values. [xiii]
Systemic Collapse of the Principle of Distinction and Effects on Child Protection International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Established in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, relies on the distinction principle. It forces parties to a dispute at every moment to differentiate between combatants and civilians, as well as between military goals and civilian items. The targeting of children, who under IHL and international human rights instruments have extra protections, not only constitutes a great violation of the law of armed conflict but also a great humanitarian failure. [ xiv ] Reliable data collected by international groups, humanitarian workers, and reporters during the Mariupol siege indicated indiscriminate shelling causing disproportionate damage to children. Sometimes continuously, bombs or shells targeted residential structures, hospitals, maternity wards, and schools. [xv]Human Rights Watch, Russia’s Siege of Mariupol: War Crimes, Civilian Suffering, and the Need for Accountability, Human Rights Watch (May 2023), Attacking a designated civilian shelter is prima facie contrary to the tenets of distinction and proportionality. Under Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects and launching disproportionate attacks are categorized as war crimes. Several such examples abound in the Mariupol siege. Russian troops allegedly targeted shelters, schools, and hospitals, according opensource investigations and satellite images examined by international monitors in activities that cannot be justified under the laws of war. [xvi] Special protection for youngsters during armed conflict is specifically demanded under Article 77 of Additional Protocol I and the Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC). Denial of humanitarian access, forced displacement, loss of family members, and exposure to psychological damage were violations against children in Mariupol. Not maintaining these commitments has terrible and long-term effects. Many Mariupol children not only died or were hurt but also experienced trauma that would follow them always. Essential infrastructure was severely damaged, hence compromising access to healthcare, education, and psychosocial assistance. [xvii] Moreover, reports from Ukrainian officials and UN systems point that some children were separated from their families and forcibly sent to Russian-controlled regions a possible breach of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which bars individual or mass forcibly transfers of protected persons from occupied territory. Taken together, these behaviors show a pattern of willful disobeying or systematic neglect of the principle of distinction. [xviii] Under IHL, they also emphasize a purposeful or careless disrespect of civilian life and child protection standards. In this frame of reference, the case for war crimes gets even more pressing and calls for thorough evidence, research, and prosecution. The international community’s inability to act forcefully runs the risk of emboldening such violations and eroding IHL’s general credibility. Therefore, the Mariupol siege becomes not only a human catastrophe also a legal test of worldwide accountability systems. Particularly those protecting the most vulnerable like children, if parties to armed conflict continue to disregard basic legal standards with impunity, then the very core of IHL the idea that even war has limits will erode irreparably. [xix]
Misuse of Military Necessity and the Distortion of Proportionality Principles
Especially state actors in armed conflict often cite the doctrine of military necessity as a reason for allowing force against legitimate military targets when such force is necessary to achieve a specific military advantage. This doctrine is not limitless, however, and it does not give unequivocal permission to neglect the laws of distinction, proportionality, or precautions under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). [ xx ] Russia has repeatedly claimed in the Mariupol siege that its strikes aimed at Ukrainian military positions buried inside urban areas, hence passing responsibility for civilian damage on to Ukrainian defense forces. Legally and factually, though, this line of thought falls flat. First, the attacking force is under a moral need to differentiate and avoid, or at least reduce, civilian damage even when military goals are located within populated areas a reality in many urban conflicts. [xxi] All feasible precautions to avoid or at least reduce incidental loss of civilian life are mandated by the Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(a)(ii). Reports from UN agencies and independent groups like Amnesty International and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) show that Russian troops made no significant efforts to follow this standard. The repeated usage of unguided artillery, thermobaric weapons, and cluster munitions in heavily populated civilian areas shows evidence of indiscriminate conflict rather than a showcase of necessity. [xxii] Second, the principle of proportionality codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I prevents assaults expected to inflict excessive incidental civilian damage in relation to the specific and immediate military benefit expected. In operations with no obvious strategic military purpose, hundreds of civilians including a disproportionately high number of children were killed or injured in Mariupol. For instance, the UN and World Health Organization denounced worldwide the bombing of the maternity hospital on March 9, 2022. First rejecting the strike, Russian officials then mistakenly asserted it was being used as a Ukrainian military base, lacking credible proof. Still, even if that were the case, the sheer scope of civilian deaths and destruction together with the lack of prior alerts (as obligated under Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I) makes the strike unlawful under IHL. [xxiii] Some analysts have tried to claim that the Ukrainian militarys presence in civilian areas, including near schools and hospitals, amounts to the use of human shields and thus undermines civilian protections. This argument intentionally misapplies Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I, which says that the presence of civilians shall not be used to render certain points immune from attack. Still, unlawful use of civilians by an adversary does not excuse the attacking party from its legal obligations. [xxiv] The assailant still has to exercise caution and evaluate proportionality. Not doing so constitutes a war crime. Furthermore, no reliable proof has appeared demonstrating Ukrainian troops in Mariupol deliberately or systematically employed civilians as shields. Some have also argued that the natural anarchy of war particularly in urban sieges results in collateral damage. Often used by military strategists, this phrase has no legal standing if it is used to cover up intentional or careless assaults on civilians. Just because civilian casualties were unintended does not legally or morally justify them; this is especially true when the means and techniques of battle used make such results foreseeable and avoidable. [xxv] Under customary IHL and the Rome Statute (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)), knowingly launching an attack that causes excessive civilian harm is a prosecutable war crime even without direct intent to kill civilians. The Russian Federation’s refusal to allow independent investigators access and its persistent attempts to discredit foreign observation teams further suggest a deliberate effort to impede accountability. Under the law of armed conflict, such obstruction is often seen as indicative of guilt or culpability, especially when paired with overwhelming independent documentation of violations. Under international law, the Russian justification of its actions in Mariupol under the cover of military necessity or proportionality fails upon inspection. Together, the repeated and systematic nature of the attacks, their unequal effect on youngsters and other non-combatants, and the lack of lawful military goals in many of the targeted locations invalidate any valid legal justification. These acts show a deliberate disregard for civilian life and the fundamental principles of humanitarian law constituting war crimes that must be investigated and prosecuted without delay, rather than legal combat operations. [xxvi]
Legal Responsibility and Enforcement Obstacles
Although targeting children during the Siege of Mariupol constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law (IHL), the true tragedy is in the inability to impose legal responsibility for such infractions. Although core instruments like the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as well as Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute clearly prohibit targeting attacks against civilians, including children, current enforcement systems have shown mostly ineffectiveness. [xxvii] The International Criminal Court (ICC) is first among world enforcement efforts. Geopolitical facts, though, greatly limit the ICC& 039; s authority. By officially withdrawing its signature, Russia a non-member state party to the Rome Statute clearly rejects the Courts authority. Unless called by the United Nations Security Council, a body where Russia has veto power, this makes prosecution of Russian military or political leaders practically impossible under present legislation. This institutional stalemate creates great accountability holes, especially when major powers are involved. The lack of functional domestic responsibility inside Russia compounds the issue. The ICC operates only under the idea of complementarity when national jurisdictions would not or could not prosecute. In this instance, Russia has shown neither inclination nor ability to look into or punish those accountable for military offenses in Mariupol. This failure of domestic legal reaction undermines the basic premise of shared responsibility between national and international jurisdictions. [xxviii ] Valuable documentation of breaches is provided by other devices such factfinding missions or commissions of inquiry started by the UN or another worldwide organization. Constant confirmation of assaults on schools, hospitals, and civilian shelters by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have led to the displacement of children and death These organizations are restricted to investigative roles; they cannot pass indictments or carry out decisions. Their influence is therefore dependent on the political will of countries, many of whom may be either complicit or reluctant to oppose stronger countries. [xxix ] The disconnect between legal reality and political reality aggravates the enforcement crisis even further. IHL provides a strong theoretical framework, but in practice, infractions often go unpunished owing to lack of cooperation, political obstruction, or selective application of justice. This impunity sends a risky message that powerful countries may act with little consequence, hence undermining the deterrent value of international law. Finally, institutional inertia, budget constraints, and dispersed enforcement systems impede the capacity of international legal systems to provide justice in a timely and effective way. Without universal jurisdiction, great political support, and a verifiable threat of enforcement, legal safeguards for children in armed conflict stay aspirational rather as functioning ones [xxx].
Discussion
Dialogue Among the most shocking examples of the violence done against civilians in modern military engagement is the targeting of children during the Siege of Mariupol.
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), the examination of this case shows several, serious violations of established legal standards especially those protecting children as a protected group. According to UN agencies and independent human rights monitoring groups, Russian forces show not only the arbitrary application of force in civilian populated regions but also a pattern of attacks that systematically disregarded the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. [xxxi] Under IHL and international criminal law, these acts constitute war crimes. Still elusive is responsibility given mountains of legal documentation and clarity. A major conclusion is the clear disrespect of the idea of distinction. Under Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, parties to a conflict must always differentiate between civilian populations and combatants. This guideline is directly violated by the reported assault on hospitals, schools, and shelters where youngsters sought refuge. Moreover, the excessive use of force, disproportionate to any expected military benefit, contravenes the Article 51(5)(b) of the same Protocol’s ratified principle of proportionality. With regard to Mariupol, proof suggests that Russian troops used siege methods, which denied food and water, intentionally caused harm to the civilian population, and endangered children’s lives all of which under customary IHL are forbidden. [xxxii] The broader implementation of IHL depends vitally on these results. First, they show how little deterrent capability current legal tools have in dealing with strong countries. Russias capacity to execute operations in obvious breach of humanitarian standards without instant legal retribution highlights the ineffectiveness of the world community during crisis. The incident also highlights how vulnerable youngsters in conflict areas are; their legal defense is supposedly strong but actually fragile. Geopolitical interests often take precedence over their pain, and even well documented crimes rarely lead to definitive prosecutions when a strong player is engaged. An additional consequence is the increasing disconnection between reality and legislation. Although they exist, legal systems are not self-enforced. The ICC, UN commissions, and foreign NGOs are among the tools the world uses to raise awareness of offenses. These actors, however, lack the means to override state sovereignty or binding enforcement power. This legal vacuum allows repeated infractions free of fear of retaliation. This not only emboldens violators but also weakens IHL’s normative power. Moreover, this case exposes in reality the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) theory’s failure. Developed to prevent mass atrocities including war crimes and crimes against humanity, the doctrine has been sidelined because of political willlessness and UN Security Council paralysis. The lack of worldwide coordinated response in the face of civilian targeting in Mariupol, especially against children, calls into question the legitimacy of R2P as a workable tool. Several strategies can help to enhance children’s protection in armed conflict given their circumstances. First, the creation of an independent hybrid tribunal by international consensus by passing the Security Council might provide an alternative to ICC in politically delicate situations. Second, national courts enforcing universal jurisdiction statutes could offer avenues for prosecution—perhaps even in absentia. Greater funding in digital evidence gathering, witness protection, and child-centered reporting systems is also absolutely necessary. Although these policies would not address the systematic enforcement deficit, they could at least slow down the impunity gap. The larger lesson from Mariupol is evident: international law—especially humanitarian law—is only as strong as its implementation. Without binding mechanisms holding offenders responsible irrespective of their power or influence, the promise of child protection during conflict seems empty.
Conclusion
Conclusion Targeting youngsters during the Siege of Mariupol is a serious and unjustifiable violation of internationally recognized moral values, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. This article has looked at the legal structures meant to shield children in armed conflict, the recorded offenses committed during the Russian attack of Mariupol, and the systematic obstacles to achieving responsibility for such offenses. Under the Geneva Conventions, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and several childprotection treaties, enforcement systems have been inadequate when strong states perpetrate or support atrocities regardless of thorough legal provisions. Key to Mariupol’s legal disaster is the neglect of IHL’s fundamental ideas: distinction, proportionality, and caution. The constant bombardment of homes, hospitals, and schools among other civilian infrastructure shows evident breaches of these ideas. Children experienced systematic and, in many cases, absolutely predictable pain, not accidental. The siege circumstances purposely fed their misery, displacement, damage, and death along with hunger. Legally speaking, these acts fit the criteria of war crimes—and perhaps crimes against humanity. The international legal system, however, has mostly responded symbolically rather than punishably. One cannot emphasize the larger consequences of this mistake. The whole framework of IHL is at stake if the international community stays unwilling or unable to shield youngsters—the most often acknowledged victims. Not acting decisively in the face of evidence of crimes sends a bad signal: that violations can go on without significant consequence if the offender is geopolitically powerful. It undermines international justice’s credibility and fuels future breaches. This concern is very human, not only legal or political. Children are people with rights, dignity, and futures; they are not collateral damage. Their misery in Mariupol mirrors our shared inability to live up to the ideals we assert we protect. Advocacy, documentation, and public warning remain essential instruments to maintain accountability and stop historical erasure even if legal systems could be limited. Children especially Mariupol’s victims deserve more than commemoration; they need justice. Having seen personally how war changes justice and damages innocence as a law student and past peacekeeping soldier, I know Mariupol’s suffering echoes the same silence I saw in war zones where children wept not just from fear, but from being forgotten, not far from my own experience. My will to apply the law not as a theory but as a tool of protection and truth stems from this personal connection. Should legally voices like mine sit silent, then the law becomes complicit in its own failure. As a result, I promise to oppose the institutions permitting such horrors to repeat and support those without voice. The law ought to speak for the living, but also preserve the dignity of that mute by war.
Reference(S):
i Human Rights Watch, “Russia’s Siege of Mariupol: War Crimes, Civilian Suffering, and the Need for Accountability,” Human Rights Watch (May 2023),
ii Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (Principle of Distinction)
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
iii Human Rights Watch, “Our City Was Gone”: Russia’s Devastation of Mariupol, Ukraine, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2024),
iv Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Id. art. 51(2).
v Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
vi Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
vii Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12(3), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90;
viii Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
ix United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, February–May 2022, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/51/75 (June 2022),
x Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
xi Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(i)–(ii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90;
xii Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 77, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
xiii Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
xiv Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
xv Human Rights Watch, Russia’s Siege of Mariupol: War Crimes, Civilian Suffering, and the Need for Accountability, Human Rights Watch (May 2023),
xvi Human Rights Watch, “Our City Was Gone”: Russia’s Devastation of Mariupol, Ukraine, Human Rights Watch (May 2023),
xvii Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
xviii Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
xix International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Fundamental Principles of International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians, (2023),
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xxi ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 15: Precautions in Attack, in Customary International Humanitarian Law 55 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005)
xxii Amnesty International, Ukraine: Indiscriminate Attacks on Civilians in Mariupol, Amnesty Int’l (2022),
xxiii UNICEF, Statement by UNICEF Executive Director on Reported Attack Against Maternity Hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine (Mar. 9, 2022),
xxiv Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 211–13 (2d ed. 2010
xxv Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90;
xxvi Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90;
xxvii Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, arts. 3, 27, 50, 51, 54, 147, 149, 156, 157, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168;
xxviii United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC);
xxix United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/51/75 (June 2022),
xxx International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Challenges and Opportunities, (2021),
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xxxii International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rules 1, 14, 55,
