The Need to Balance the Avoidance of Delay in Public Children’s Proceedings

Abstract

This article examines the statutory and policy emphasis on avoiding delay in public  children’s proceedings in England and Wales, critically evaluating whether the current  approach sufficiently safeguards children’s welfare. While the Children Act 1989 s1(2) correctly identifies that delay is likely to be harmful in public children’s proceedings, reforms  such as the 26-week time limit introduced by the Children and Families Act 2014 risk  encouraging an overly target-driven culture that prioritises procedural speed over substantive  justice. Through analysis of case law, including Re B-S, Re W, and empirical research on care  proceedings, the article argues that the pursuit of speed can undermine thorough assessment,  fair parental participation, and the child’s best interests. It highlights systemic biases,  resource constraints, and the risks of defensive legal practice stemming from pressure to meet  timelines. The article concludes that delay should be balanced against the need for careful,  evidence-based decision-making and calls for statutory reform to support genuinely child focused proceedings.

Introduction

Delay is rightly described in the Children’s Act 1989 s1(2) as likely to prejudice a  child’s well-being in the context of family proceedings.¹ S 1(2) therefore places a  responsibility on the family courts to ensure that any proceedings regarding a child’s  upbringing should be carried out as quickly as possible. This presumption against delay is  unsurprising given the statistical context, as Masson’s 2021 study notes that despite the  introduction of the 26-week target²and the restriction of experts³in 2014, average care  proceedings last over 40 weeks, with only around half of proceedings concluding within the  statutory time limit.⁴ However, it is unaccounted for in the Act that the uncritical pursuit of  speed can also cause harm to children, especially when it compromises assessments, parental  participation, or fair outcomes.⁵In line with the concerns put forward in Re W, rather than simply avoiding delay as a presumptive harm principle, courts must ensure that the  procedural and institutional interest in swift proceedings does not override substantive justice in care proceedings.⁶

The Statutory Presumption Against Delay

The introduction of the 26-week time limit for care proceedings in the Children and  Families Act 2014⁷ was motivated by concerns about delay, inconsistency, and costs in care  proceedings.⁸ The average cost for the local authority alone in care proceedings is  approximately £120,000,⁹ with significant variations to costs and delays based on the level of complexity.¹⁰ The multi-agency coordination and procedure for gathering evidence in support  of submissions regarding the welfare checklist¹¹ and threshold findings,¹² and subsequently  the formation of case management and strategy, takes a considerable amount of time and  resources, with one agency’s delay inevitably impacting the ability of other agencies and  legal counsel to progress.¹³ The Public Law Working Group (2021) acknowledged that  interdependencies complicate the timely delivery of justice, particularly as local authority  resources are often limited and staff turnover disrupts assessment continuity.¹⁴

Significant concerns exist regarding the impact of delays in family proceedings on  children, which have influenced both policy and law. Such delays can harm a child by  preventing them from feeling settled in their environment. Family proceedings can be  particularly prolonged and unsettling for young children, who perceive the passing of time  more acutely than adults and whose development relies on secure and stable attachments.¹⁵

Moreover, research demonstrates that the longer a child waits for a final order and the more  placements they experience before that order is made, the less likely it is that any future  placement will succeed.¹⁶ In Re B (2013),¹⁷ it had taken three years to resolve the case, and the Supreme Court highlighted the damaging impact of uncertainty on children’s welfare.¹⁸ These concerns about delay prompted the procedural additions in the Children and Families  Act 2014, and while both the prior Family Justice Review 2011 and the eventual statutory  scheme acknowledged that some cases would require longer than 26 weeks,¹⁹ the review has  been criticised for being overly focused on “cutting costs and standardising court  timescales.”²⁰ The current time limit can only be extended if the court determines it necessary  to resolve proceedings justly,²¹ requiring a “special justification,”²² and such an extension  cannot exceed eight weeks.²³ Bainham and Gilmore go further in their criticism of these  reforms, describing the 2014 Act as “getting children through care proceedings as quickly as  possible … into adoptive families,”²⁴ highlighting a grave concern for parental rights and  children’s welfare. It is therefore essential in this procedure-focused context that family  courts and policymakers resist the temptation to treat speed as an absolute good, recognising  instead that the true harm lies in delay without purpose rather than time taken to explore all  potential decisions which may be in the child’s best interests.²⁵

Delay as a Good 

It is critical to recognise that the avoidance of delay is not an infallible principle that  should override other considerations, and rushed proceedings can also cause harm to children and compromise justice. Ward’s (2009) study found that many care plans were primarily  “resource or practice-led,” reflecting shortages of suitable placements and inadequate  planning rather than child-centred reasoning.²⁶ Such patterns demonstrate that procedural  speed, when pursued without sufficient flexibility and investment in robust assessment, risks  replicating the instability and transience it is intended to avoid. As highlighted in Masson et  al.’s 2019 review, there is a danger of “pendulum swings,”²⁷ where the drive to avoid delay  produces equally damaging consequences through rushed, superficial safeguarding  procedures. This is especially problematic in the context of care proceedings that consider  adoption, as the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires courts to make determinations  about the child’s welfare “throughout his life”²⁸ rather than just at the point of proceedings  and explicitly includes the effect of severing ties with the birth family,²⁹ importing special  considerations beyond the generally applied welfare checklist in the Children Act 1989.

It is time for UK courts to adequately recognise that delay can also contribute to a  positive outcome for families in many situations.³⁰ For example, a parent who previously had  a negative parenting assessment may be later assessed positively and regain or maintain  parental responsibility if the delay affords them the time to address the concerns of the local  authority adequately.³¹ Further, a relative who wishes to seek a Special Guardianship Order³² on behalf of a child at a later stage in the proceedings may do so if delay operates in their  favour, allowing the child to remain within the family³³ in circumstances in which a focus on  swift proceedings may have led to a permanent severance of ties with the family.³⁴ While  there have been concerns regarding possible kinship carers coming forward too late in  proceedings, the frequent late identification of prospective SGO carers is not always the result of poor practice but rather a natural and predictable feature of complex family  dynamics. It is often the case that the alternative carer waits until the last minute to avoid  negatively affecting the chances of the birth family or does not fully grasp the severity of the  proceedings, and therefore only comes forward when those chances of reunification are  realised to be low.³⁵ This late emergence is therefore not always preventable and cannot be  eliminated by mere procedural efficiency. The statutory expectation of concluding within 26  weeks can make it difficult to complete thorough assessments of these carers, even if they  emerge predictably but late in the process. Empirical research has highlighted this concern in  practice: stakeholders reported that the 26-week statutory limit represents a “major obstacle”  to achieving fairer and more thorough assessment processes for SGOs, warning it risks  rushed decisions that fail to secure the best outcome for children.³⁶ Such systemic pressures  were described as contributing to “every case [being] rushed,” creating a “recipe for disaster”  in which the possibility of viable family placements may be prematurely dismissed.³⁷

Assumptions & Systemic Biases

There is an increasingly popular assumption in care proceedings that delay is fruitless  for parents, as they are deemed unlikely to make and sustain meaningful change,³⁸ and  therefore, time granted for further assessment or rehabilitation is predetermined to be a waste  of time and expense. This is a dangerously prejudicial stance, often based on stereotypes  associated with the parents’ disadvantaged socioeconomic status and associated drug misuse  and mental illness, which risks treating all parents as equally incapable of change,  disregarding individual circumstances and the potential for genuine, lasting improvements in  parenting capacity. The Children’s Social Care system disproportionately targets families  with low socioeconomic status, treating poverty-related harms as parenting failures and  failing to account for structural disadvantage.³⁹ Beyond poverty, systemic biases in the child protection system, such as those based on race, ethnicity, or disability, exacerbate the risks of  both delayed and rushed proceedings. Featherstone et al. (2018) highlight that minority ethnic  families face disproportionate scrutiny, often leading to harsher judgments about parenting  capacity or kinship suitability.⁴⁰ Furthermore, research conducted by Bywaters et al. (2016)  demonstrated clear socioeconomic differences in child welfare interventions, with children in  the most deprived neighbourhoods in England over ten times more likely to be subject to  child protection plans or care proceedings than those in the least deprived areas.⁴¹

The tendency for families to experience intergenerational involvement in care  proceedings, where children subject to care proceedings later become parents whose own  children are subject to proceedings,⁴² intensifies this prejudicial stance by fostering low  expectations.⁴³ Research by Farmer and Moyers (2008) highlights that such biases can lead to  overly stringent evaluations compared to foster carers, unfairly dismissing viable family  placements.⁴⁴ This “cycle of recurrent care proceedings” is often driven by systemic  disadvantage and insufficient support rather than inevitable personal failure.⁴⁵ Further,  research demonstrates that children in kinship care, when given adequate time for assessment,  exhibit lower rates of mental health issues and stronger identity development.⁴⁶

The compounded biases parents currently face in the family care and justice systems create a real danger of final orders in care proceedings, whether care orders or placement  orders for adoption, being made on behalf of a child hastily. This is a clear risk to the  presumption in favour of parental involvement and Article 8 rights, which in some cases fail  to be justified by reference to context-specific analysis that delay has or likely will cause harm to the child. This, combined with austerity-based cuts to family support, has led to the  startling result that “comparatively high levels of non-consensual adoption have developed in  the past 20 years compared to other European countries.”⁴⁷ The experience of these parents in  the aftermath of an adoption order being made has been criticised as  “compounding…cumulative social insults,”⁴⁸ highlighting how, in a context of persistent  inequality and swift proceedings, adoption orders may inadvertently reinforce structural  disadvantages. 

Higher Evidential Standards

The Court of Appeal in Re B-S (2013) reinforced the statutory obligation⁴⁹ that adoption and other final orders must be justified by rigorous analysis of “all the possible  options,”⁵⁰ ensuring proportionality with the right to family life under Article 8 of the  European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).⁵¹ This standard accounts for the need for  caution against unduly accelerated proceedings that risk sacrificing fairness, thoroughness,  and the child’s long-term welfare for the sake of procedural speed. The enforcement of Re B S was immediate, as Re C (2013)⁵² was decided mere weeks later, where the Court of Appeal  overturned a decision that had failed to provide evidence as to why rehabilitation to the  parent was unrealistic, demonstrating the Court’s willingness to enforce Re B-S principles  rigorously in practice.

Similarly, Re S (2014)⁵³ warned against target-driven approaches that undermine  proper consideration of family placements. While this progression of precedent demonstrated the need for a nuanced, context-sensitive approach that avoids blanket assumptions about the  futility of delay while remaining vigilant to its potential harms, it offered no clear framework for assessing when speed might become unsafe or undermine fairness.⁵⁴ Therefore, while the  dangers of an inflexible 26-week target have been thoroughly recognised in case law, the  matter is left to judicial discretion without any statutory limit or further guidance on how  quickly proceedings are allowed to progress.

While Re B-S articulated principles of flexibility⁵⁵ and a judicial responsibility to  question “cases where there is any reason to suspect that resource issues may be affecting the  local authority’s thinking,”⁵⁶ the reality is that lower courts often lack the institutional  capacity or resources to deliver genuinely thorough assessments within compressed  timelines.⁵⁷ Judges can feel pressured or inclined to work within this reality and accept  situations where a set timeframe unduly inhibits total exploration of all potential interests of  and possibilities for a child. The series of appeals before Re B-S exposed the problem of local  authorities prematurely ruling out kinship carers to meet statutory deadlines and criticises social workers, local authorities, and judges alike for operating without a “proper balancing  exercise in order to determine whether it was necessary to make a care order with a care plan  of adoption.”⁵⁸

Yet it is essential to recognise that while Re B-S rightly demanded more thorough,  evidence-based analysis before making placement orders only as enforcement of law already  in place,⁵⁹ the way the case was perceived and the eagerness to become compliant with this  assertion of existing law compounded significant system-level challenges in practice.⁶⁰ As  Masson (2017) notes, social workers and local authority lawyers adapted to these heightened  evidential expectations through prioritising defensive strategies designed to satisfy judicial  scrutiny rather than genuinely assessing the child’s best interests. This meant multiple kinship  assessments, even for relatives “who appeared unsuitable at the outset,”⁶¹ over-cautious care  planning, and strategic litigation tactics described as “bargaining in the shadow of the law.”⁶²

At the same time, courts faced rising numbers of contested hearings and markedly increased  refusals of placement orders,⁶³ leading local authorities to submit fewer adoption applications  overall “because of the difficulties posed by satisfying the court.”⁶⁴ The paradox between the  drive to work faster and the drive to be more thorough has also incentivised professionals to  rule out parental care prematurely to construct a defensible case for adoption that will satisfy  the court’s evidential threshold. The rise in special guardianship orders similarly reveals a  complex picture. Although more children found placements within extended family networks,  some orders were “fragile or inadequately assessed,” with courts feeling compelled to  approve them “despite insufficient time for proper scrutiny.”⁶⁵

Practitioners at all levels are confronted with the “philosophical gulf”⁶⁶ between  government policy and the judiciary, which encourages both rushed and defensive practices  that undermine the child’s best interests. The lack of corresponding resource adjustments  following Re B-S to support better analysis within time constraints led to a rise in successful  appeals, such as Re W (2016),⁶⁷ as the family system was not equipped to meet its  enforcement of expectations.⁶⁸ In Re W (2016),⁶⁹ the Court of Appeal emphasised that while  the 26-week time limit is important, it must not become a straitjacket that prevents a fair and  thorough assessment of whether change is realistically possible. Ironically, these necessary corrections often extended proceedings far beyond the timeframe recent reforms seek to  uphold, as the tension between statutorily mandated speed and doctrinally required evidential  depth is not being addressed at the source.⁷⁰ In effect, the policy landscape after Re B-S demonstrates that improving evidential rigour cannot succeed in isolation from reforms that  allow realistic, child-focused timetabling and adequate resourcing of social work practice.⁷¹

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paramount focus on the child’s welfare⁷² and “the principle of  partnership”⁷³ rather than an adversarial mentality when working with parents must not be  outweighed by considerations of timetabling and case management.⁷⁴ This includes the  consideration that delay may ultimately allow the family time to recuperate, mediate, meet  the standard of care necessary to maintain contact and parental responsibility, or find viable  alternative kinship placements. While the presumption against delay is vital in family  proceedings involving children, this should be properly and explicitly balanced statutorily with the need to avoid hasty decisions. This update would more adequately reflect the  possible harm caused to a child if swift proceedings prevent all possibilities for the child to be  explored, or even cause a placement possibility to be irrationally disregarded.⁷⁵ Such a  statutory safeguard would balance the need to avoid harmful delay with ensuring that any  final order, including adoption as a last resort,⁷⁶ is supported by proportionate, evidence based analysis of all realistic options.⁷⁷ While the family courts appear to be attempting to  strategically reassert the level of evidence which must be met for the making of a care or  placement order, it will be worth watching in the coming years if the tension between speed  and thoroughness necessitates a balancing provision against the avoidance of delay in place  of or conjunction with major changes to the resources of the family justice and child care  systems. 

Reference(S):

Works Cited

Legislation

Adoption and Children Act 2002

Children Act 1989

Children and Families Act 2014

European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8

Case Law

Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911

Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563

Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 431

Re C and B [2001] 1 FLR 611

Re L (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 267, [2013] 2 FLR 999

Re M (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1169, [2016] 2 FLR 153

Re O (Supervision Order) [2001] EWCA Civ 16, [2001] 1 FLR 923

Re P (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 963

Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625

Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 135

Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 804

YC v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 967

Secondary Sources

Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore, ‘The English Children and Families Act 2014’  (2015) 46 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 627

Bainham A and Markham H, ‘Living with Re B-S: Re S and its implications for parents, local  authorities and the courts’ (2014) 44 Fam Law 991

Broadhurst K and Mason C, ‘Birth parents and the collateral consequences of court-ordered  child removal: Towards a comprehensive framework’ (2017) 31(1) International Journal of  Law, Policy and the Family 41

Brown R and Ward H, Decision-making in the Child’s Time Frame (Childhood Well-being  Research Centre, Loughborough University 2012)

Bywaters P, Featherstone B and Morris K, ‘Child Protection and Social Inequality’ (2019)  8(2) Social Sciences 42

Bywaters P and others, ‘The Relationship Between Poverty, Child Abuse and Neglect: An  Evidence Review’ (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2016)

E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report – A Child-Centred System (Cm 8062, 2011)

Featherstone B and others, ‘Rethinking Child Protection Strategy: Learning from Trends’  (2018) 14(1) British Journal of Social Work 15

Harriet Ward, ‘Patterns of Instability: Moves within the Care System, Their Reasons,  Contexts and Consequences’ (2009) 31 Children and Youth Services Review 1113

Holt K and Kelly N, ‘When adoption without parental consent breaches human rights:  implications of Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 on decision making and  permanency planning for children’ (2015) 37(2) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 228

Holt K and Kelly N, ‘Rhetoric and Reality Surrounding Care Proceedings: Family Justice  Under Strain’ (2012) 34(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 155

Joan Hunt, ‘On the Sidelines? Grandparents in Care Proceedings’ (Family Rights Group  2020)

Josh McAlister, 2022, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care: Final Report  https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122449/https://childrenssocialca re.independent-review.uk/final-report/

Judith Harwin and others, Special Guardianship Orders and Supervision Orders (Nuffield  Family Justice Observatory 2019)

Judith Masson, ‘Disruptive Judgments’ (2017) 29(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 401

Judith Masson et al, Child Protection in Court: Outcomes for Children (University of Bristol  2019)

Judith Masson et al, ‘Achieving Positive Change for Children? Reducing the Length of Child  Protection Proceedings: Lessons from England and Wales’ (2017) 41(4) Adoption &  Fostering 401

Justice Committee, Pre-legislative Scrutiny of the Children and Families Bill, 4th Report  (2012–13) HC 739

Lewis J and Erlen N, Evidence Matters in Family Justice (Research in Practice 2012) Ministry of Justice, Family Court Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2023 (2023)  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march 2023

National Adoption Leadership Board, Impact of Court Judgments on Adoption: What the  Judgments Do and Do Not Say (November 2014)

Public Law Working Group, Best Practice Guidance: Support for and Work With Families  Prior to Court Proceedings (2021)

Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, Adoption: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (HL 127,  2012–13)

Winokur M, Holtan A and Batchelder KE, ‘Kinship Care for the Safety, Permanency, and  Well-Being of Children Removed from the Home for Maltreatment: A Systematic Review’  (2014) 47 Children and Youth Services Review 44

¹ Children Act 1989, s 1(2). 

² Practice Direction 36C, 2013.

³ Lewis J and Erlen N (2012) Evidence Matters in Family Justice. Dartington: Research in Practice. ⁴Judith Masson, ‘Capacity to Change and Care Proceedings’ (2022) 34(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 195, 198.

⁵ Family Justice Review, Final Report (2011), [4.23].

⁶ Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 793, [2017] 1 FLR 1257 [36].

⁷ Children and Families Act 2014, s 14.

⁸ Family Justice Review Final Report (November 2011) paras 70–71 (p 72).

⁹Josh McAlister, 2022, The Independent Review of Children’s Social Care: Final Report  https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230308122449/https://childrenssocialcare.independent review.uk/final-report/, 42.

¹⁰ Ministry of Justice, Family Court Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2023 (2023)  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2023.

¹¹ Children Act 1989, s1(3).

¹² Ibid, s31(2).

¹³ E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report – A Child-Centred System (Cm 8062, 2011)  48, para 4.10.

¹⁴ Public Law Working Group, Best Practice Guidance: Support for and Work With Families Prior to Court  Proceedings (2021) 6, para 2.

¹⁵ Goldstein J, Freud A and Solnit A (1973), Beyond the best interests of the child. Publisher: New York, 998.

¹⁶ Brown R and Ward H (2012) Decision-making in the child’s time frame, Childhood Well-being Research Centre, Loughborough University.

¹⁷ Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, [44], [76], [107], [198].

¹⁸ Kim Holt and Nancy Kelly, ‘When adoption without parental consent breaches human rights: implications of  Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 on decision making and permanency planning for children’ (2015)  37(2) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 228.

¹⁹ Children and Families Act 2014, s 14.

²⁰ K Holt and N Kelly, ‘Rhetoric and Reality Surrounding Care Proceedings: Family Justice Under Strain’  (2012) 34(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 155, 164.

²¹ Children Act 1989, Section 32(5).

²² Ibid, Section 32(7).

²³ Ibid, Section 32(8).

²⁴ Andrew Bainham & Stephen Gilmore, ‘The English Children and Families Act 2014’ (2015) 46 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 627, 627. 

²⁵ Ibid, 648.

²⁶ Harriet Ward, ‘Patterns of Instability: Moves within the Care System, Their Reasons, Contexts and  Consequences’ (2009) 31 Children and Youth Services Review 1113, 1116.

²⁷ Judith Masson et al, Child Protection in Court: Outcomes for Children (University of Bristol 2019) xxii. ²⁸ Adoption and Children Act 2002 s 1(2).

²⁹ Ibid, 1(4).

³⁰ Re L (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 267, [2013] 2 FLR 999 [30].

³¹ Karen Broadhurst and Claire Mason, ‘Recurrent Care Proceedings: Part 4: The Emergence of Child  Protection as a Public Health Problem’ (2017) 47(9) Family Law 1079, 1082.

³² Children Act 1989 s.14A–s.14F.

³³ Re M (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1169, [2016] 2 FLR 153 [28].

³⁴ Justice Committee (2012b), Pre-legislative Scrutiny of the Children and Families Bill, 4th Report 201213 H.C  739, [31].

³⁵ Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, Adoption: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (HL 2012–13, 127) paras 88– 93.

³⁶ Judith Harwin et al, Special Guardianship Orders and Supervision Orders (Nuffield Family Justice  Observatory 2019) 118. 

³⁷ Ibid, 112-113.

³⁸ Judith Masson et al, ‘Achieving Positive Change for Children? Reducing the Length of Child Protection  Proceedings: Lessons from England and Wales’ (2017) 41(4) Adoption & Fostering 401, 402.

³⁹ E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report – A Child-Centred System (Cm 8062, 2011)  15, para 1.10.

⁴⁰ P Bywaters, B Featherstone and K Morris, ‘Child Protection and Social Inequality’ (2019) 8(2) Social  Sciences 42, 48.

⁴¹ Bywaters, P. et al. (2016) ‘The Relationship Between Poverty, Child Abuse and Neglect: An Evidence  Review,’ Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 28.

⁴² House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, Adoption: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (HL 127,  2012–13) para 244, p 59.

⁴³ Joan Hunt, ‘On the Sidelines? Grandparents in Care Proceedings’ (Family Rights Group 2020) 15.

⁴⁴ Elaine Farmer and Sue Moyers, Kinship Care: Fostering Effective Family and Friends Placements (Jessica  Kingsley Publishers 2008), 80. 

⁴⁵ Broadhurst, Karen, and Claire Mason. “Birth parents and the collateral consequences of court-ordered child  removal: Towards a comprehensive framework.” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 31.1  (2017): 41-59.

⁴⁶ Winokur M, Holtan A and Batchelder KE, ‘Kinship Care for the Safety, Permanency, and Well-Being of  Children Removed from the Home for Maltreatment: A Systematic Review’ (2014) 47 Children and Youth  Services Review 44, 47–49.

⁴⁷ Paul Bywaters, Brid Featherstone and Kate Morris, ‘Child Protection and Social Inequality’ (2019) 8(2)  Social Sciences 42, 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Children’s Act 1989, Section 1(3)(g). 

⁵⁰ Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563 [48].

⁵¹ European Convention on Human Rights, art 8.

⁵² Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 431, [30], [34], [46].

⁵³ Re S (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 135, [22], [29], [41].

⁵⁴ Family Justice Review, Final Report (November 2011) para 4.23.

⁵⁵ Re O (Supervision Order) [2001] EWCA Civ 16, [2001] 1 FLR 923, [28].

⁵⁶ Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563 [29].

⁵⁷ E Munro, The Munro Review of Child Protection: Final Report – A Child-Centred System (Cm 8062, 2011)  16, para 2.2.

⁵⁸ Re P (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 963, [107]. 

⁵⁹ Re R (A child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, [2014] All ER (D) 179 (Dec), [44]. 

⁶⁰ Judith Masson, ‘Disruptive Judgments’ (2017) 29(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 401, 401. ⁶¹ Ibid, 412.

⁶² Ibid, 413.

⁶³ National Adoption Leadership Board. (2014). Impact of court judgments on adoption: What the judments do and do not say. (November), p.1, para. 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 414–415.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 416-417.

⁶⁶ Bainham A and Markham H, ‘Living with Re B-S: Re S and its implications for parents, local authorities and  the courts’ (2014) 44 Fam Law 991, 1002.

⁶⁷ Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 804, [27], [35], [49].

⁶⁸ Kim Holt and Nancy Kelly, ‘When adoption without parental consent breaches human rights: implications of  Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 963 on decision making and permanency planning for children’ (2015)  37(2) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law, 234.

⁶⁹ Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 804, [27], [35], [49].

⁷⁰ Ibid, 228.

⁷¹ Ibid., Judith Masson, 417-418.

⁷² Children’s Act 1989, s1(1).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Andrew Bainham & Stephen Gilmore, ‘The English Children and Families Act 2014’ (2015) 46 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 627, 640.

⁷⁵ Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 804, [34]. 

⁷⁶ Re C and B [2001] 1 FLR 611, [34].

⁷⁷ YC v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 967, [134].