INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION & ORS. V. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. (2018)

ABSTRACT

The Sabarimala Temple dispute in Kerala is an example of a constitutional conflict between traditional religious practices and gender equality. The argument started because women between the ages of ten and fifty have always been prohibited from accessing the temple due to the idea that Lord Ayyappa, the presiding deity, is a Naishtika Brahmachari, or celibate. Under the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965, Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, provided support for this practice. The Kerala High Court upheld the ban in 1991, stating that topics of tradition were solely within the chief priest’s jurisdiction and acknowledging that it was a long-standing custom.

However, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reversed this ruling by a majority of 4:1 in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala. The Court upheld the superiority of constitutional morality over custom and tradition and ruled that the exclusionary practice violated women’s basic rights under Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. The Court additionally decided that, in accordance with Article 26, followers of Lord Ayyappa do not form a distinct religious group. In Indian constitutional doctrine, this ruling is a turning point that upholds equality, individual dignity, and religious freedom from discriminatory religious practices.

1. INTRODUCTION

The ongoing struggle in India between women’s rights and religious traditions is best shown by the Sabarimala Temple debate. The main point of contention is that women between the ages of ten and fifty who are menstruation are not allowed to attend Kerala’s Sabarimala temple. This limitation was based on the idea that menstruation women would compromise the temple’s holiness and that the god, Lord Ayyappa, embodies absolute celibacy, and that the presence of menstruating women would violate the sanctity of the temple.

By allowing the exclusion of women in situations where such exclusion was approved by custom and usage, Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, established the legal foundation for this practice. This ban was maintained by the Kerala High Court, which ruled that it was legally permissible and nondiscriminatory. The Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a challenge against this practice in the Supreme Court in 2006, arguing that it infringed upon basic rights protected by the Constitution. Because of its significant constitutional significance, the case was later submitted to a Constitution Bench..[i]

II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WOMEN’S ENTRY

Religious autonomy and tradition served as the main justifications for arguments against women’s admission to the Sabarimala Temple. It was argued that permitting women to have periods would undermine the celibacy aspect of the god, which is what makes Lord Ayyappa special. The temple administration contended that Article 26(b) of the Constitution grants religious organizations the authority to control their own operations, including access restrictions.

Furthermore, it was argued that Article 25(2) does not include issues deemed vital to religious practice and only allows the State to intervene for social change. The argument that customs protected by Articles 25 and 26 are impervious to challenge under other sections of Part III of the Constitution was based on the case of Riju Prasad Sarma v. State of Assam. The 1965 Rules’ Rule 3(b) was upheld as a legitimate acknowledgement of long-standing tradition.

III. ARGUMENTS FAVOURING WOMEN’S ENTRY

The equality, dignity, and religious freedom guaranteed by the constitution are equally applicable to women, according to proponents of women’s admission. Individual freedom of conscience and religion is guaranteed by Article 25, while discrimination based on sex is prohibited by Articles 14 and 15. It was maintained that patriarchal interpretations of tradition could not restrict religious freedom because it is an individual right.

Given that menstruation is a normal biological process free of moral or religious impurities, the claim that it makes women unclean was hotly debated. It was contended that excluding women based just on their biology amounted to discrimination and a kind of untouchability, which is forbidden under Article 17. Furthermore, because the Sabarimala Temple is supported by the government, it is a public site of worship and ought to be open to all societal groups.

SUPREME COURT VERDICT

The Supreme Court ruled in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala that the exclusion of women was unconstitutional. Because it violated basic rights and went beyond the bounds of the parent Act, the Court invalidated Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. It underlined that, regardless of tradition, all public houses of worship must have free access under Section 3 of the 1965 Act.

The Court decided that the exclusion of women does not qualify as an important religious practice and that Lord Ayyappa’s followers do not form a distinct religious group. According to the majority, discriminatory practices must give way to constitutional morality, which includes liberty, equality, dignity, and fraternity. It was believed that menstruation-related exclusion of women constituted a type of untouchability based on ideas of filth and cleanliness.

HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS

The Indian judiciary started dealing with freedom right after the Constitution became effective. This shows that they knew from the beginning that faith should not be exempt from being examined under the Constitution.

In a case called Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt in 1954 the Supreme Court came up with an important idea. This idea is known as the ” religious practices” doctrine. The Supreme Court said that the Constitution protects freedom under Articles 25 and 26 but only for religious practices that are really important and essential to the Indian judiciarys understanding of religious freedom and a religion itself like the religious freedom of the people. The Supreme Courts decision on freedom and the essential religious practices doctrine has been significant, in the context of religious freedom. The Court said it has the power to decide on things like this. At the time the Court knows it has to be careful, about the freedom to practice ones faith and the power of the constitution. The Court has to balance the autonomy of faith and the supremacy of the constitution. This is a delicate balance for the Court to maintain, as it deals with the autonomy of faith and the supremacy of the constitution.

The court made some important decisions, like the Durgah Committee and Ajmer case against Syed Hussain Ali in 1961 and the Tilakayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj case against the State of Rajasthan in 1964. These Durgah Committee and Ajmer case against Syed Hussain Ali and the Tilakayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj case against the State of Rajasthan decisions helped to make things clearer by getting rid of things that people thought were part of the religion. Were really just superstitions or things that were not really part of the religion. Some people did not agree with these decisions. The idea of what is essential to a religion is still the main thing that the court uses to decide if someones religious freedom is being taken away. The court still uses the practices doctrine to make decisions, about religious freedom claims.

The Indian Young Lawyers Association versus the State of Kerala also known as the Sabarimala case is very important. In this case the Court said that it is their job to decide what is a part of a religion. The Court looked at what happened in the past and they used the findings from another case S. Mahendran versus the State of Kerala which happened in 1993. They found out that women had been inside the Sabarimala temple at some points in history. This means that the idea that women were never allowed inside the temple is not true. For something to be considered a part of a religion it has to have always been that way. Since this was not the case the rule that kept women out of the Sabarimala temple does not qualify as a religious practice and does not deserve special protection under the constitution. The Sabarimala case is an example of the Indian Young Lawyers Association, versus the State of Kerala.

The decision also got support from Hindu theology itself. Old Hindu scriptures do not show that women are completely banned from entering temples. The Rig Veda talks about women as rishikas and people who discuss things and the Upanishads tell stories about women like Gargi and Maitreyi having philosophical conversations, which shows that women are spiritually equal.

The Manusmriti, which people often quote in a way has contradictions inside it. Some parts show patriarchal norms but other parts say that women should be respected, like the verse that says “where women are respected the gods are happy”. This is what Hindu theology says about women. Women are a part of Hindu theology and Hindu scriptures, like the Rig Veda and the Upanishads show that women have always been a part of spiritual discussions. The Court did not accept the idea that people should only follow parts of the scriptures that are taken literally which can make a religion seem very old fashioned. The Court rejected this way of thinking about religion, which is based on choosing certain scriptures to interpret literally and this can cause the religion to stay in its most backwards state. The Court made it clear that it does not agree with scriptural literalism and this is a big deal, for religion because it means that people should not just pick and choose which parts of the scriptures to follow in a very literal way, which can make the religion seem very rigid and unchanging like it is stuck in its most regressive form.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachuds opinion was really important. It took the judgment to a new level. He compared the way menstruating women are treated to how people from castes are treated. This was a powerful comparison. He used Article 17 to say that the idea of something being impure or polluted cannot be allowed. Justice Chandrachud said that a time ago the constitution helped stop people from being excluded because of their caste. Indias anti-exclusion movements, like the one led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar are important to remember when talking about access, to places of worship.

When you look at Sabarimala as a whole it is not about who can go into the temple. Sabarimala is about something bigger. It is about what our constitution means. We have to see if the old ways of doing things are still good or if we should change them to be more fair.

CONCLUSION

The Sabarimala judgment represents a decisive assertion of constitutional morality over patriarchal tradition. It challenges deeply entrenched notions of impurity associated with menstruation and affirms women’s right to equality, dignity, and religious freedom. The verdict underscores that faith cannot be insulated from constitutional scrutiny when it infringes fundamental rights.

By prioritizing individual liberty over group-based exclusions, the Supreme Court reinforced the transformative vision of the Constitution. The judgment is not merely about temple entry but about reclaiming women’s agency and dismantling social hierarchies rooted in prejudice. As India progresses as a constitutional democracy, the Sabarimala verdict stands as a landmark affirmation that traditions must evolve to align with constitutional values of justice and equality.

REFERENC(S):

• [i] Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (2019) 11 SCC 1, ¶¶ 1–3.
• Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, r. 3(b).
• Mahendran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1993 Ker 42, ¶¶ 32–35.
• Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (2019) 11 SCC 1, ¶¶ 88–91.
• Constitution of India, arts. 14, 15, 17, 21 & 25; Indian Young Lawyers Association, (2019) 11 SCC 1, ¶¶ 52–55 (Chandrachud, J.).
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