GULFISHA FATIMA & ORS. V. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

CASE NAME: Gulfisha Fatima & Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)[1]
Citation: 2026 INSC 2
Decided on: January 5, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Criminal Appeal Nos.: Arising from SLP (Crl.) Nos. 13988/2025, 14030/2025, 14132/2025, 14165/2025, 14859/2025, 15335/2025, and 17055/2025

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case arises from FIR number 59/2020 registered by the crime branch Delhi Police concerning the communal riots that occurred in Northeast Delhi in February 2020 specifically on February 23-25, 2020. The prosecution’s case is founded on allegations of a pre-planned criminal conspiracy orchestrated to protest against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC).

According to the FIR registered on March 6, 2020 the riots were allegedly the outcome of a conspiracy mastermind by JNU student Umar Khalid, and his associates affiliated with various organisations. The prosecution alleged that the conspirators deliberately mobilised women and children to block roads during the visit of them us President Donald Trump on February 24^th to 25, 2020 with the objective of internationalising a narrative that minorities in India were being ill-treated.

The prosecution claimed that in several areas including Maujpur, Kadampuri, Jafarabad Chandbagh, Gokulpuri and Shiv Vihar, weapons and incendiary materials such as firearms petrol bombs, acid bottles, stones, and slingshots were stockpiled in advance. On February 23 2020 ,woman and children allegedly blocked roads under the Zafar Baar Metro Station to create public disruptions.

The riots resulted in catastrophic consequences 54 deaths (including a senior police officer head Constable Ratan Lal and an intelligence bureau official) grievous injuries to several police Personal and civilians and extensive damage to over 1500 public and private properties along with substantial harm to public order and social harmony.

The seven appellants before the Supreme Court were:

1. Gulfisha Fatima (arrested April 11, 2020)
2. Sharjeel Imam (arrested January 28, 2020)
3. Meeran Haider (arrested April 1, 2020)
4. Umar Khalid (arrested October 1, 2020)
5. Shifa-ur-Rehman (arrested April 26, 2020)
6. Saleem Khan (arrested June 25, 2020)
7. Shadab Ahmed (arrested May 20, 2020)

All appellants had been in continuous custody for over 4 to 5 years as under trial prisoners.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. FIR Registration (March 6, 2020):

FIR No. 59/2020 was initially registered under Sections 147[2], 148[3], 149[4], and 120B[5] of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

         2. Charge-sheet Filing:

• Main charge-sheet (September 16, 2020): Filed against 15 accused including Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed
• Offences alleged: Sections 120B read with 109[6], 114[7], 124A[8], 147, 148, 149, 153A[9], 186[10], 201[11], 212[12], 295[13], 302[14], 307[15], 341[16], 353[17], 395[18], 420[19], 427[20], 435[21], 436[22], 452,[23] 454[24], 468[25], 471[26], and 34[27] IPC; Sections 13[28], 16[29], 17[30], and 18[31] of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act[32]; and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984[33]
• First supplementary charge-sheet (November 22, 2020): Added three more accused including Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam
• Further supplementary charge-sheets: Filed on February 23, 2021, March 2, 2022, and June 7, 2023

3. Trial Court Proceedings:

Additional Sessions Judge-03, Shahdara, Karkardooma Court, Delhi took cognizance of the offences. All appellants filed bail applications which were rejected by the Trial Court on March 22, 2022, finding prima facie involvement in a large-scale conspiracy under UAPA.

4. High Court of Delhi:

The High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 184/2022 and connected matters affirmed the Trial Court’s rejection of bail applications, upholding the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) of UAPA and finding that reasonable grounds existed for believing the accusations were prima facie true.

5. Supreme Court:

The appellants filed Special Leave Petitions which were converted to Criminal Appeals. Arguments were heard extensively, with the Supreme Court granting leave and proceeding to examine each appellant’s role individually while also addressing common constitutional questions regarding prolonged incarceration and Article 21.

ISSUES

The Supreme Court framed and considered the following key issues:

1. Constitutional Issue: Whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration (ranging from 4-5 years), coupled with the absence of early conclusion of trial, renders continued detention constitutionally impermissible under Article 21[34] of the Constitution?
2. Statutory Framework: What is the scope of Section 43D(5) of UAPA[35] and the nature of judicial inquiry permissible at the bail stage under this special statute?
3. Interpretation of “Terrorist Act”: What is the scope and statutory context of “terrorist act” under Section 15 of UAPA[36] as applicable to the present case?
4. Individual Role Assessment: Whether the bail applications should be determined based on individualized assessment of roles rather than treating all accused uniformly, and whether differentiation in treatment between prime conspirators and others is legally warranted?
5. Prima Facie Case: Whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against each appellant is prima facie true within the meaning of Section 43D(5) UAPA?
6. Delay Analysis: Whether delay in trial proceedings can be attributed to prosecutorial or judicial inaction, or whether it resulted from the complexity of the case, conduct of defence, or systemic factors?

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court delivered a partially allowing judgment with differentiated outcomes for individual appellants:

BAIL GRANTED to five appellants:

• Gulfisha Fatima (SLP Crl. 13988/2025)
• Meeran Haider (SLP Crl. 14132/2025)
• Shifa-ur-Rehman (SLP Crl. 14859/2025)
• Saleem Khan (SLP Crl. 15335/2025)
• Shadab Ahmed (SLP Crl. 17055/2025)

BAIL DENIED to two appellants:

• Sharjeel Imam (SLP Crl. 14030/2025)
• Umar Khalid (SLP Crl. 14165/2025)

However, for Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, the Court provided liberty to renew their bail applications after completion of examination of protected witnesses or upon expiry of one year from the judgment date, whichever is earlier.

HOLDING

The Supreme Court held that:

1. Article 21 and Statutory Balance: While Article 21’s guarantee of personal liberty is of foundational importance, it must be balanced with the statutory framework of UAPA, which represents a legislative judgment regarding offences affecting national security. The statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) cannot be automatically displaced merely by passage of time.
2. Contextual Delay Assessment: Prolonged incarceration must be examined contextually, not in isolation. The inquiry must consider the nature of allegations, statutory field, stage of proceedings, realistic trajectory of trial, causes contributing to delay, and risks attendant upon release.
3. Individual Role Differentiation: Courts must differentiate between accused based on their alleged roles. Those attributed with central, strategic, or organizing roles in conspiracy stand on different legal footing from those with peripheral, derivative, or execution-level involvement.
4. Section 43D(5) Threshold: The expression “prima facie true” requires examining whether prosecution material, taken at face value without rebuttal, discloses essential ingredients of offences alleged. This is a threshold inquiry of limited but real content, not a mini-trial.
5. Delay Not Solely Attributable to Prosecution: The record did not establish that delay was attributable solely to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. The complexity of the case, multiplicity of accused, and conduct of defence (including procedural objections and reluctance to proceed) contributed to delay.

RULE OF LAW OR LEGAL PRINCIPLE APPLIED

1. Constitutional Principles:

Article 21 and Speedy Trial: The right to speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration cannot assume the character of punishment by mere passage of time.

Balancing Liberty and Security: Article 21 protects both individual liberty and the State’s obligation to protect community security. Constitutional adjudication requires balancing both dimensions through reasoned analysis.

2. Statutory Principles Under UAPA:

Section 43D(5) Embargo: This provision constitutes a calibrated restriction on bail, requiring courts to be satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true” before granting bail for offences under Chapters IV and VI of UAPA.

Limited Judicial Inquiry at Bail Stage: At the bail stage under Section 43D(5), courts cannot weigh evidence, test defences, or conduct a mini-trial. The inquiry is confined to whether prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses statutory plausibility of the alleged offences.

3. Precedential Framework:

The Court relied on and distinguished several precedents:

• Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021)[37]: Recognized that statutory restrictions cannot render personal liberty guarantee illusory. Where trial is unlikely to commence/conclude within reasonable period, constitutional courts retain jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. However, this does not establish a mechanical rule where mere passage of time becomes determinative.
• NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019)[38]: Established the governing approach to Section 43D(5) regarding prima facie assessment.
• Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025)[39]: Affirmed that delay-based pleas must be adjudicated on accused-specific footing, and prolonged custody does not operate as automatic ground for bail where statutory threshold continues to be attracted.

4. Principles of Differentiation:

Individual Role Assessment: Courts must examine the attributed role of each accused. Those alleged to have conceived, directed, or steered unlawful activity stand on different legal footing from those with facilitative or participatory roles at different levels.

Proportionality: Continued pre-trial detention must serve demonstrable and continuing necessity. Absent such showing, especially where investigative requirements are complete and prosecution has filed charge-sheets, the balance tilts toward conditional release for peripheral actors.

REASONING (RATIO DECENDI)

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeded through several structured analytical steps:

On Prolonged Incarceration and Article 21:

The court acknowledged that all appellants had been in custody for 4-5 years, which is substantial. However, it rejected the submission that delay alone mandates bail. The court reasoned:-

1. Contextual Assessment Required: Delay must be examined in context of case complexity, number of accused (multiple), voluminous, documentary and electronic evidence, and structured conspiracy allegations.
2. Delay Attribution: After examining Trial Court order sheets and the High Court’s findings in co-accused Tasleem Ahmed’s case (2023), the court found that delay could not be attributed solely to prosecution or judiciary. Defence conduct, including:

• Objections to Section 207 CrPc compliance procedures
• Refusal to receive charge sheet copies in directed manner
• Successive applications causing procedural delays
• Reluctance to commence arguments on charge despite day to day hearing directions contributed significantly to the delay.

Constitutional Safeguard, not automatic rule: Following Najeeb, the court held that while prolonged detention engages Article 21, it does not create a mechanism formula. The proper constitutional question is not whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5), but how Article 21 applies where Parliament has expressly conditioned bail for national security offences.

On Section 43D(5) and Statutory Framework:-

The court reasoned that Section 43D (5) reflects Parliament’s legislative judgement that offences under UAPA, which implicate sovereignty, integrity and security of the state , warrant a distinct bail regime. The provision:

• Does not exclude judicial scrutiny but defines its contours at pre-trial stage
• Requires “prima facie true” assessment, examining whether prosecution material at face value discloses essential statutory ingredients
• Contemplates threshold inquiry of statutory plausibility, not evidentiary sufficiency
• Does not permit weighing evidence, assessing admissibility, or determining whether prosecution will withstand trial

On Individual Role Assessment:

The court undertook detailed examination of each appellant’s attributed role:

Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khaild (Bail Denied):

The Court found prosecution material disclosed prima facie attribution of central and formative roles in the conspiracy:

• Sharjeel Imam: Alleged to have delivered provocative speeches at multiple locations (Shaheeen Bagh JMI, AMU), called for “chakka jam” (road blockages), made inflammatory statements regarding “cutting off Assam from India”, participated in strategic planning meetings, and played ideological leadership role.
• Umar Khalid: Alleged to be primary architect and strategist, delivered speeches calling for disruption during Trump’s visit to “internationalize” minority persecution narrative, attended multiple conspiratorial meetings, coordinated with various protest groups through WhatsApp groups, and provided strategic direction for escalation from peaceful protests to violent confrontation.

For both, the court reasoned that the material suggested involvement at planning, mobilization, and strategic direction level, extending beyond episodic acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) stood attracted.

Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed (Bail Granted):

The Court found their attributed roles were derivative, peripheral, or execution- level:-

• Gulfisha Fatima: Alleged participation in site-level organization, attendance at meetings, but not strategic planning. Prosecution Categorised her in 3^rd tier of accused. Court noted gender consideration under article 21 which says incarceration burden on women when role is non central and investigation complete.
• Meera Haider: Alleged financial contributor (₹2.33-2.86 lakhs out of alleged Rs 1.60 crores which is less than 2%), attended some meetings, but prosecution’s own categorization placed him in lesser role tier. No material showing independent command capacity.
• Shifa-ur-Rehman: Similar financial contribution allegations, site-level participation, but material did not establish strategic centrality or organizing authority.
• Saleem Khan: Alleged local operative for Chand Bagh protest site, task execution (CCTV camera destruction), but attribution was “largely derivative” reflecting execution of tasks discussed by others, limited to coordination within specific cluster, without autonomous authority over larger conspiracy.
• Shadab Ahmed: Similar execution-level participation without strategic decision-making role

For these five, the Court reasoned that:

1. Their roles were structurally distinct from alleged masterminds
2. Continued incarceration not proportionate given their peripheral involvement
3. Investigation complete; no ongoing custodial interrogation needs
4. Legitimate state concerns can be addressed through stringent bail conditions
5. Prolonged detention approaching punitive character for non-central actors

Structured Multi-Factor Test:

The Court applied a proportional and contextual balancing test considering:

1. Gravity and statutory character of offence
2. Individual role within alleged conspiracy
3. Prima facie strength at limited threshold
4. Whether continued detention demonstrably disproportionate under Article 21
5. Availability of conditions to safeguard trial integrity
6. Realistic prospect of trial progression

On Trial Expedition:

The Court directed that Trial Court must proceed with utmost expedition, particularly examination of protected witnesses, and imposed reporting requirements to ensure trial doesn’t stagnate further.

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS

This was a unanimous judgment by the two-judge bench (Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice N.V. Anjaria). There were no separate concurring or dissenting opinions. Both judges agreed on:

1. The legal framework for balancing Article 21 and Section 43D(5)
2. The differentiated approach based on individual roles
3. The grant of bail to five appellants
4. The denial of bail to Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid with liberty to renew
5. The stringent conditions imposed on those granted bail

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS/PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS (OBITER- DICTA)

1. Jurisprudential Significance:

This judgment represents a landmark contribution to Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence on several fronts:

a) Articulation of Structured Balancing Test:The Court has for the first time provided such detailed and structured guidance on how Article 21 interacts with special statutory restrictions under UAPA. Previous judgments like Najeebprovided the principle but not the methodology. This judgment fills that gap with a multi-factor proportionality framework that will guide lower courts in future UAPA bail matters.

b) Individual Role Differentiation Doctrine:The emphatic insistence on differentiated treatment based on attributed roles is constitutionally sound and practically significant. It prevents the injustice of treating peripheral participants identically to alleged masterminds, while maintaining fidelity to the serious nature of the offences.

c) Nuanced Reading of Najeeb:The Court rescues Najeebfrom mechanical application while preserving its constitutional essence. The clarification that prolonged detention is a “trigger for heightened scrutiny” rather than an “automatic trump card” is jurisprudentially important.

2. Process Observations:

a) Delay Analysis:The Court’s examination of trial court order sheets and finding that delay was partly attributable to defense conduct is significant. This prevents manipulation where accused might deliberately protract proceedings and then claim bail on delay grounds—a concern the Court rightly addressed.

b) Protected Witnesses:The Court’s direction that Sharjeel and Umar can renew bail applications after examination of protected witnesses is pragmatic. Protected witness testimony is often the prosecution’s strongest evidence in conspiracy cases, and examining it first addresses evidentiary strength concerns.

          3.UAPA and Civil Liberties Debate:

This judgment will feature prominently in ongoing debates about UAPA’s constitutional validity:

Supporters will argue: The Court has shown that even under UAPA’s stringent provisions, bail is possible where roles are peripheral, thus UAPA doesn’t completely negate liberty.

Critics will counter: The denial of bail to Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid despite 5+ years of incarceration, with trial yet to commence meaningfully, demonstrates UAPA’s excessive severity. The fact that investigation is complete yet bail is denied based on “prima facie” material shows the law enables punishment before trial.

4. Practical Implications:

a) For Future UAPA Cases:Lower courts now have clear guidance: they must conduct individualized assessment, examine attributed roles carefully, and cannot deny bail mechanically to all accused in conspiracy cases.

b) Stringent Conditions:The 10 conditions imposed (travel restrictions, passport surrender, biweekly reporting, no witness contact, no media statements, no public gatherings, full trial cooperation) show that bail under UAPA comes with extraordinary restrictions that substantially curtail liberty even post-release.

c) Gender Consideration:The Court’s explicit recognition that gender forms a legitimate factor in proportionality assessment (para 425 regarding Gulfisha Fatima) is progressive and acknowledges differential impact of incarceration.

          5.Constitutional Tension:

The judgment reflects inherent tension in constitutional democracies: security versus liberty. The Court’s approach is neither libertarian (automatically favouring release) nor authoritarian (automatically favouring detention). Instead, it adopts a calibrated, context-sensitive methodology.

However, one might question: If someone has been detained for 5 years pre-trial, investigation is complete, and they’re still not released, has the “process become the punishment”? The Court addresses this by:

• Granting bail to 5 out of 7 appellants
• Providing review mechanism for the other 2
• Directing trial expedition

6. Evidentiary Concerns:

The heavy reliance on protected witnesses (codenames like VENUS, GOLD, BRAVO, JOHNY, KILO, PLUTO, RADIUM, HECTOR) raises questions:

• Accused cannot cross-examine these witnesses until trial
• Their identities remain unknown
• Yet their statements form basis for continued detention
• This creates information asymmetry favoring prosecution

The Court addresses this by making their examination a milestone for bail reconsideration for Sharjeel and Umar.

7. Technical Excellence:

The judgment demonstrates remarkable judicial craftsmanship:

• Comprehensiveness: 444 paragraphs addressing every submission
• Structure: Clear table of contents, systematic issue-wise analysis
• Precedential Survey: Extensive engagement with prior jurisprudence
• Individualized Treatment: Separate analysis for each appellant spanning 30-40 pages each

8. Broader Context:

This case must be understood in context of:

• Political polarization around CAA/NRC
• Communal violence in Delhi with 54 deaths
• Sedition law debates (Section 124A IPC, though Supreme Court has since stayed it)
• Free speech concerns regarding criminalizing protest mobilization
• International scrutiny of India’s civil liberties record

The Court has navigated these sensitive political waters by focusing strictly on legal doctrine, statutory interpretation, and constitutional principles, without engaging with the underlying political controversy.

9. Open Questions:

Several questions remain:

• Will trial actually proceed expeditiously as directed?
• Will the protected witnesses’ testimony prove as incriminating as prosecution claims?
• Will Sharjeel and Umar get bail after protected witness examination?
• How will lower courts apply the individual role differentiation doctrine in practice?

CONCLUSION

The judgment concludes that Article 21’s protection of personal liberty must be harmonised with the special bail restriction in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, so courts cannot either automatically grant bail on the ground of delay or automatically deny it by mechanically invoking the statutory embargo; instead, they must undertake a structured, accused‑specific, proportional assessment of whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, makes the accusations “prima facie true.”

On applying this framework, the Court holds that Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam appear, at this stage, to occupy a central and formative role in the alleged conspiracy, so the statutory bar is attracted and their bail is refused for now, with liberty to renew their bail applications after the protected witnesses have been examined or after one year, whichever is earlier.

In contrast, for Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa‑ur‑Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, the Court finds that their alleged roles are derivative, peripheral, or execution‑level, investigation is complete, no further custodial interrogation is needed, and any risk to the trial or public order can be managed by strict conditions; therefore, continued pre‑trial incarceration in their case would be disproportionate, and they are directed to be released on bail subject to detailed safeguards (including territorial limits, periodic reporting, surrender of passport, no contact with witnesses, and no public commentary on the case).

The Court emphasises that all these observations are confined to the question of bail and do not amount to any finding on guilt or innocence, and it directs the trial court to proceed with “utmost expedition,” especially in recording the evidence of protected witnesses, so that the trial advances meaningfully and pre‑trial detention does not, in substance, become a form of punishment.

REFERENCE(S):

[1] Gulfisha Fatima & Ors. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2026 INSC 2

[2] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 147, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[3] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 148, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[4] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 149, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[5] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 120B, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[6] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 109, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[7] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 114, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[8] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 124, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[9] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 153A, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[10] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 186, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[11] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 201, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[12] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 212, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[13] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 295, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[14] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 302,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[15] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 307,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[16] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 341,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[17] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 353,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[18] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 395,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[19] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 420,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[20] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 427,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[21] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 435,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[22] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 436,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[23] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 452,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[24] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 454,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[25] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 468,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[26] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 471,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[27] The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 34,, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[28] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 13 (India).

[29] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 16 (India).

[30] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 17 (India).

[31] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 18 (India).

[32] Arms Act, No. 54 of 1959, §§ 25, 27 (India).

[33] Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, No. 3 of 1984, §§ 3–4 (India).

[34] INDIA CONST. art. 21.

[35] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 43D(5) (India).

[36] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, § 15 (India).

[37] Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 (India).

[38] National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 (India).

[39] National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 (India).