SAROJ RANI Vs. SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA

Case name: SAROJ RANI Vs. SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA 

Citation: 1984 AIR 1562 (SC) 

Court: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

Bench: DIVISION BENCH 

Judges: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI  

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SABYASACHI MUKHERJEE 

Date of Judgement: August 8, 1984 

Appellant: SAROJ RANI 

Respondent: SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA 

Facts of the Case: 

The case of “Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha” reached the Supreme Court of India on  appeal after the High Court of Judicature at Punjab and Haryana dismissed the appeal  challenging the decision of the Trial Court. The parties herein were married on 24 January 1975  at Jullundur City according to Hindu Vedic rites. The last day of cohabitation between the  parties was alleged to be 16 May 1977. The Appellant-wife alleged that on that date, the  respondent-husband turned her out of the matrimonial home and withdrew himself from her  society. 

The wife-appellant filed a petition against her husband-respondent on 17 October 1977 under  Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking restitution of conjugal rights. In the  petition, she alleged I’ll-treatments by the husband and her in-laws and thereafter claimed for  a degree of restitution of conjugal rights. On 21 March 1987, the learned Sub-Judge, 1st Class,  granted Rs.185 per month as maintenance pendente lite and Rs.300 as litigation expense. The husband-respondent filed a written statement denying the allegations made by the wife petitioner but subsequently stated before the court that the petition under Section 9 be allowed.  Accordingly, on 28 March 1978, the learned Sub-Judge, 1st Class, passed a consent degree for  restitution of conjugal rights. 

On 19 April 1979, respondent-husband filed a petition under section 13 of the Act seeking  divorce on the ground that no cohabitation had taken place for more than one year after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife opposed the divorce petition, asserting that  after the decree she was taken to her husband’s house by her parents and that the parties  cohabited for two days, after which she was again turned out. She further stated that she had filed an application under Section 28A of the Act on 22 January 1979 before the Sub-Judge,  1st Class, Jullundur, seeking enforcement of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which  was pending at the time of filing her reply.  

By judgement dated 15 October 1979, the learned District Judge dismissed the petition for  divorce. The Court framed two issues: 

1. “Whether there had been no restitution of conjugal rights after the passing of the decree  for restitution of conjugal rights?” and  
2. “What relief, if any, the husband was entitled to?” 

Upon considering of the evidence, the learned judge held that there had been no resumption of  cohabitation between the parties after the decree, deciding the first issue in favour of the  husband. However, on the question of relief, the Court held that since the earlier decree for  restitution of conjugal rights was a consent degree, and at the relevant time there was no  provision for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B, the husband was not entitled to a  decree of divorce. 

Aggrieved by the dismissal, the husband filed an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High  Court, which reversed the District Court’s decision and granted a decree of divorce. The wife  thereafter approached the Supreme Court by way of appeal, challenging the High Court’s  decision. 

Issues Raised: 

1. Whether the husband was disentitled to divorce under Section 23(1)(a) for allegedly  taking advantage of his own wrong by consenting to a restitution decree and later  seeking divorce?
2. Whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the  Constitution? 
3. What maintenance ought to be granted to the wife and children upon dissolution of  marriage? 

Arguments Raised: 

Arguments Raised by the Appellant (SAROJ RANI): 

1.Husband taking advantage of his own wrong: 

The appellant argued that, in view of the expression “wrong” in Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, the husband was not entitled to a decree of divorce. It was argued that the husband intentionally did not oppose the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights from the outset, as his real  objective was to ultimately obtain a decree of divorce. The husband permitted the passing of a  restitution decree with full knowledge that he would not comply with it, thereby misleading  both the wife and the Court. 

The appellant further submitted that, after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the  husband deliberately refused to cohabit in order to create a ground for divorce under the statue. It was urged that the expression ‘taking advantage of his or her own wrong’ under Section  23(1)(a) should be liberally interpreted to prevent Indian wives from suffering at the hands of  cunning and dishonest husbands. Permitting such conduct, it was argued, would result in grave  injustice to wives, and therefore the Court should deny relief to the husband on equitable  grounds. 

It was contended, relying on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Geeta Laxmi v.  G.V.R.K. Sarveswara Rao, that where a husband fails to comply with a decree for restitution  of conjugal rights and his conduct demonstrates a lack of bona fides towards marital  cohabitation, he cannot subsequently be permitted to seek divorce under Section 13(1)(a) of  the Act on the ground of non-resumption of cohabitation. 

2.Section 9 of the Act violates Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution: 

It was contended that section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 is unconstitutional, relying on  the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Sareetha v. Venkata Subbaiah. The  provision was described as a “savage and barbarous remedy” which violates the right to privacy  and human dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. A degree for the restitution of conjugal rights was argued to constitute a serious invasion of privacy, as it denies a woman, the freedom  to decide whether, when, and how to engage in sexual relations, thereby infringing Article 21. It was further submitted that Section 9 serves no legitimate public purpose or social good and  hence fails the test of constitutional reasonableness. 

It was also contended that Section 9 violates Article 14, since although facially neutral, it is  used predominantly by husbands operates arbitrarily against women, and such formal equality does not amount to real constitutional equality. Reliance was placed on the Scarman  Commission Report (England) recommending the abolition of restitution of conjugal rights,  indicating its incompatibility with modern constitutional values. 

3.Maintenance on dissolution: 

The appellant contended that in the social reality of Indian society, a divorced wife will be  placed at a serious material and economic disadvantage. Divorce would adversely affect her  financial security and social position. 

Arguments raised by the respondent (SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA):

1.Rejection of allegation taking advantage of his own wrong: 

The husband contended that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights had been passed after due process of law, and that he had complied with his obligations and offered every opportunity  for the wife to resume cohabitation. Despite the decree, the appellant did not live with him,  indicating that the marital relationship had irretrievably broken down. It was submitted that  under Section 13(1A) of the Act, a party is entitled to seek divorce where cohabitation does not  resume after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and the statutory period  has elapsed. Accordingly, the husband argued that he was legally entitled to seek divorce and  was not taking any advantage of his own wrong, as alleged by the appellant. 

2.Constitutionality of Section 9: 

There was no whisper in the husband’s pleading on regarding the wife’s challenge to the  constitutionality of section 9.

Judgement: 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the wife with the following  directions. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Hindu  Marriage Act, holding that restitution of conjugal rights seeks cohabitation and marital  consortium and does not amount to enforced sexual intercourse or violation of Articles 14 and  21. The Supreme Court held that section 9 merely codifies pre-existing law, and that  enforcement of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC is limited  to attachment of property, thereby excluding any form of physical or personal compulsion. The  Supreme Court noted that the constitutionality of Section 9 had not been raised before the  previous courts, however, it permitted the appellant to argue the issue as a pure question of  law. The Supreme Court held that Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, serves a social purpose  of preserving marriage and enforceable only through limited financial sanctions for wilful  disobedience, does not violate Articles 14 or 21 of the Constitution. 

While considering the plea under Section 23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Supreme  Court ruled in favour of the husband and rejected the appellant’s reliance on Geeta Laxmi v.  G.V.R.K. Sarveswara Rao. The Court held that the said decision was founded on entirely  different facts, where the husband’s misconduct including ill-treatment of the wife and driving  her out of the matrimonial home was clearly pleaded and proved. In contrast, in the present  case, there were neither pleadings nor evidence of any misconduct or wrongful conduct on the  part of the husband. Consequently, the Court held that the husband could not be said to be  taking advantage of his own wrong and was entitled to relief under Section 13(1A) of the Act. 

The Supreme Court, while granting a decree of divorce directed the husband to pay  maintenance to the wife until her remarriage and to maintain the daughter. The court fixed the  maintenance at Rs. 200 per month for the wife appellant and Rs. 300 per month for the  daughter, Menka. The wife was held entitled to maintenance only until her remarriage, and the  daughter until her marriage. The parties were granted liberty to seek variations in the amount  by making an appropriate application before Sub Judge, 1st Class, Jullundur. The respondent  was further directed to pay the costs of the appeal, assessed at Rs. 1500. 

Legal Reasoning: 

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s contention that the husband was disentitled to a  decree of divorce under Section 13(1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground that he was taking advantage of his own wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act.  The Court noted that there was no whisper in the pleadings regarding the allegation that the  husband had deliberately allowed the decree for restitution of conjugal rights to be passed with  the intention of later seeking divorce, and that this contention was neither pleaded nor raised  before the courts below. It further observed that the wife’s earlier case was inconsistent with  this argument, as she had asserted that cohabitation had in fact taken place for two days after  the restitution decree. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of pleadings and proof, such  a factual allegation could not be entertained at the appellate stage, nor could the wife be  permitted to amend her case to introduce a contradictory version. The Court relied upon its  earlier decision in Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumari to hold that mere non-compliance with  a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not amount to “wrong” under Section 23(1)(a),  and that something more than a mere disinclination to resume cohabitation is required to deny  statutory relief. The Court declined to apply the decision in Geeta Laxmi v. G.V.R.K.  Sarveswara Rao, holding that the facts of that case were entirely different, as there was no  allegation or proof in the present case of ill-treatment or misconduct by the husband. Accordingly, the Court held that the husband was not taking advantage of his own wrong and  was entitled to a decree of divorce under Section 13(1A) of the Act. 

The Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s challenge to the constitutional validity of Section  9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, holding that it does not violate Articles 14 or 21 of the  Constitution. The Court declined to accept the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T.  Sareetha v. Venkata Subbaiah and instead preferred the reasoning adopted by the Delhi High  Court in Smt. Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry. Adopting the Delhi High Court’s  reasoning, the Court held that the object of Section 9 is the preservation of marriage. Restitution  of conjugal rights aims at cohabitation and consortium, and not at the enforcement of sexual  intercourse. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon authoritative legal sources,  including dictionary meanings of “conjugal rights,” Mulla’s Hindu Law, and the 71st Report  of the Law Commission of India, to emphasize that conjugal rights are inherent in the  institution of marriage and not merely a statutory creation. The Court observed that the essence  of marriage lies in the sharing of a common life, and that restitution of conjugal rights serves  the social purpose of preserving marriage and preventing its breakdown. 

The Court clarified that a decree under Section 9 seeks cohabitation and consortium and does  not compel sexual intercourse and therefore does not amount to an invasion of privacy or human dignity under Article 21. It further noted that enforcement of such a decree is limited  under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure to attachment of property in cases of  willful disobedience, thereby providing sufficient safeguards against coercion. Rejecting the  challenge under Article 14, the Court held that Section 9 is facially neutral and equally available  to both spouses, and that unequal social usage of the remedy does not render the provision  arbitrary or discriminatory. The Court emphasized that mere allegations of misuse cannot  invalidate a law that serves a legitimate social purpose. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld  Section 9 as constitutionally valid. 

Conclusion  

The Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha upheld Section 9 of the Hindu  Marriage Act, 1955 as constitutionally valid, holding that it does not violate Articles 14 or 21.  The Court emphasized that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is designed to promote  cohabitation and companionship between husband and wife, rather than to enforce sexual  relations. By clarifying that cohabitation under Section 9 includes mutual living together and  sharing of marital life, the Court ensured that the law respects personal dignity and autonomy,  while simultaneously serving the social purpose of preserving marriage. Overall, the ruling  reflects a balanced approach between protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals and  promoting marital stability and social harmony. It reinforces the idea that marriage is both a  private relationship and a social institution, and that the law can encourage reconciliation and  cooperation without violating constitutional principles. The judgment, therefore, contributes  positively to family stability, social order, and confidence in the legal system governing  matrimonial relations.