Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah Khan etc. (2025)

Case Name

Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah Khan etc. (2025)

Citation

Civil Petition No. 1107-L of 2015 and Civil Appeal No. 247-L of 2017 (Against the judgement dated 28.04.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 29864 / 2014)

Court Name & Bench

The Supreme Court of Pakistan (Appellate Jurisdiction), comprised of a two-member bench: Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Mr. Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi.

Date of Judgement

11th September 2025

Parties Involved

Petitioner: Ambreen Akram

Respondents: Asad Ullah Khan etc. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Ambreen Akram, and the respondent, Asadullah Khan, were married through a nikahnama dated 02.11.2012. Although rukhsati was scheduled for February 2013, the respondent delayed it for over a year. In October 2013, the petitioner approached the Family Court, Faisalabad, seeking maintenance from the date of marriage. The respondent failed to appear during reconciliation proceedings, prompting the Court to proceed ex-parte, awarding Rs. 3,000 per month from the date of marriage (12.03.2014). Both parties appealed to the District Court, Faisalabad, and in the meantime, the respondent divorced the petitioner on 02.05.2014. The District Court partly allowed the petitioner’s appeal, dismissed the respondent’s, and enhanced maintenance to Rs. 5,000 per month until the subsistence of the marriage (27.10.2014). Subsequently, both parties approached the Lahore High Court, which, in its 28.04.2015 judgment, allowed the respondent’s petition on the ground that the marriage had never been consummatedand therefore the petitioner was not entitled to maintenance, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. The petitioner then filed a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal and connected Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised

This case raised two foundational questions at the intersection of Islamic law, constitutional rights, and lived social realities:

1. When does a Muslim woman become entitled to maintenance within a marriage?
2. Under what circumstances, if any, may a husband be excused from his marital obligation to pay maintenance to his wife?

Submissions from Amici Curiae 

Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl, in his amicus brief from UCLA, discussed the classical Islamic juristic foundations of maintenance (nafaqa). He noted that maintenance is traditionally linked to iḥtibās (the wife’s availability for the marital relationship). According to the majority Ḥanafī and early Shāfiʿī view, maintenance is obligatory upon the conclusion of a valid marriage contract, irrespective of consummation, unless the wife is at fault. The Mālikī, Ḥanbalī, and later Shāfiʿī schools tie iḥtibās more narrowly to consummation, but even under this view, a wife is entitled to maintenance if she offers herself for cohabitation and the husband fails to consummate through no fault of hers. Professor El Fadl endorsed the Ḥanafī position, rejecting maintenance as a quid pro quo for conjugal access, describing such a framing as patriarchal. He emphasized that upon a valid contract, the wife “relies to her detriment” on the marital bond, and thus acquires a legitimate right to nafaqa, even without consummation, especially if the husband fails to provide a marital home. He concluded that if a woman does not unreasonably refuse consummation before seeking divorce, she should be entitled to maintenance under Sharīʿah principles.

Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi argued that under Islamic and Pakistani law, a husband’s duty to provide maintenance (nafaqa) arises immediately upon a valid marriage, irrespective of rukhsati or consummation. He criticized colonial-era interpretations for embedding patriarchal assumptions that wrongly condition maintenance on physical cohabitation or obedience. Emphasizing the classical Islamic understanding of marriage as a solemn civil contract (‘aqd) rather than a transactional exchange, he explained that maintenance flows directly from the contract. He relied on Islamic principles, classical jurisprudence, and statutory provisions such as Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, arguing that courts have correctly held that consummation is not a precondition for maintenance. Dr. Abbasi further highlighted that tying maintenance to consummation violates women’s constitutional rights to dignity and equality under Articles 14, 25, and 35 of the Constitution, 1973, and urged the Court to reaffirm that maintenance is a legal and constitutional duty triggered by the marriage itself.

Ms. Fatima Yasmin Bokhari  argued that a wife’s right to maintenance (nafaqa) arises directly from the solemnization of a valid marriage and is not dependent on consummation or socio-cultural practices such as rukhsati. She cited constitutional provisions, Islamic principles, and case law, contending that linking maintenance to consummation undermines women’s constitutional rights, allows bad-faith avoidance by husbands, and places an unfair evidentiary burden on wives. Critiquing the so-called “maintenance–obedience complex”, she rejected the idea that financial support is conditional on a wife’s physical submission, emphasizing that such a notion is neither Qur’anic nor consistent with contemporary Islamic values. Ms. Bokhari highlighted that Islam views marriage as a contract (‘aqd) that creates automatic rights and obligations, including maintenance, upon solemnization.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner: The petitioner argued that she was lawfully entitled to maintenance from the date of marriage until the date of divorce because the respondent delayed rukhsati, failed to provide a marital home, and did not fulfill basic marital obligations. There was no allegation or evidence that she refused consummation or cohabitation without reasonable cause.

Respondent: The respondent’s counsel (appointed by the Court since the respondent claimed inability to engage his own lawyer) argued that maintenance only arises once the wife shifts to the husband’s residence. He asserted that because the marriage was never consummated or cohabited, the petitioner was not entitled to maintenance, and therefore the Lahore High Court was justified in setting aside the lower courts’ maintenance awards.

Judgement

The Supreme Court set aside the Lahore High Court’s impugned judgment and affirmed the petitioner’s entitlement to maintenance from the date of the valid marriage. The Court held that the wife could not be penalized for non-consummation caused by the husband’s own failure to provide a marital home or facilitate rukhsati. Maintenance was confirmed at Rs. 5,000 per month, as adjudicated by the District Court, and will continue until the completion of the iddat period following divorce. The Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was accepted, converted into a Civil Appeal, and allowed, and the connected civil appeal was also allowed.

Legal Reasoning 

The Supreme Court examined whether a wife’s right to maintenance arises from the solemnization of marriage or is conditional upon rukhsati or consummation. It noted that the respondent delayed rukhsati, failed to provide a marital home, and did not fulfill basic marital obligations, while the petitioner had not refused cohabitation without valid cause. The Court emphasized that penalizing a wife for non-consummation caused by the husband’s inaction would allow men to evade responsibility and undermine women’s rights. Relying on Islamic jurisprudence (Ḥanafī position), statutory provisions (Section 9 MFLO 1961, Section 17A Family Courts Act 1964), and constitutional guarantees (Articles 14, 25, 35), the Court held that maintenance is a binding legal duty flowing from a valid marriage. The contributions of amici curiae further supported that maintenance is due immediately upon marriage, independent of cohabitation or consummation.

Ratio Decidendi

Entitlement to maintenance: A Muslim wife’s right to maintenance flows unconditionally from the solemnization of a valid marriage, regardless of rukhsati or consummation, and constitutes a binding legal duty.

Husband’s excusal: A husband may be excused from paying maintenance only if he proves, through clear, cogent, and compelling evidence, that the wife wholly and unjustifiably withdrew from the marital relationship, including its emotional, residential, and relational aspects. The burden of proof lies on the husband, and the exception must be narrowly construed to prevent misuse and ensure maintenance protects women’s economic rights.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court not only affirmed the petitioner’s entitlement to maintenance from the date of marriage but also highlighted the importance of gender-sensitive judicial language. The Court stressed that patriarchal terminology in family law judgments reinforces outdated notions of female subordination and undermines women’s constitutional rights to dignity and equality. Judges are urged to adopt rights-based, inclusive language that reflects constitutional values and the lived realities of litigants, thereby promoting substantive justice and shaping societal attitudes toward equality.

Significance of this Case

For the first time, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a woman’s right to maintenance arose immediately upon the solemnization of a valid nikah, and is not conditional on consummation or rukhsati. The Court emphasized that maintenance is not a “reward for obedience” but a binding legal, constitutional, and ethical obligation that safeguards women’s dignity and equality. 

Reference(S):

• Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 
• Section 17A of the Family Courts Act, 1964
• Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arts 14
• Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arts 25
• Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arts 35