Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C.1 (India)

Abstract 

The case study talks about of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, a landmark judgment that  reinforced the protection of freedom of speech and expression in the digital age. It challenged the  constitutional validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which was criticized for  being vague and overly broad. The case began when two individuals were arrested for expressing  their opinions about a political situation on a social media platform, leading to widespread  protests and a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court struck down  Section 66A for violating Article 19(1)(a), holding that it was not saved by the reasonable  restrictions under Article 19(2). Through the judgment, the court ensured that digital platforms  remain open for everyone to express their views freely, as long as no offence is committed under  any other law. The case highlights the importance of protecting freedom of speech not only offline  but also in the online space, allowing room for diverse opinions and ideas. 

Acknowledgement 

I am writing to express my gratitude to ‘record of law’ for Insightful guidance during the  internship. I’m also thankful to ‘record of law’ for providing me with the opportunity to gain  practical insight into legal research and for creating a conducive environment for learning.  

I hereby acknowledge that this paper is my Original work and has been prepared exclusively for  submission as part of the requirement for this internship.

Case Title: 

Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C.1 (India) 

Citation: AIR 2015 SC 1523; 2015 SCC ONLINE SC 248, 24 March, 2015.

Case Number: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012. 

Court: Supreme Court of India. 

Bench of Judges: Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman.

Bench Type: Division Bench 

Date of Judgment: March 24, 2015 

PARTIES INVOLVED 

Petitioner: Shreya Singhal, a law student at the time, along with other petitioners including NGOs  such as People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Common Cause (a public interest  organization), Internet freedom foundation, Mouthshut.com, filed a writ petition under Article 32  of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutionality of Section 66A of the Information  Technology Act, 2000. 

Respondent: Union of India, represented by the Ministry of Communications and Information  Technology, argued about Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was a valid law and defended its constitutional validityi. 

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 

Two girls, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, were arrested by the Mumbai Police in 2012  for posting comments on Facebook criticizing the bandh (shutdown) called by Shiv Sena members  during the funeral of their leader Bal Thackeray. The comments were considered allegedly  offensive and objectionable, leading to their arrest under Section 66A of the Information 

Technology Act, 2000, which penalized individuals for sending offensive or grossly menacing  messages through computer resources or communication devices. 

Although they were later released and the charges were dropped, the incident attracted nationwide  media attention and public criticism, eventually leading to a petition against the government. 

A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed by Shreya Singhal, contending that Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 violated Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees the  freedom of speech and expression. The petitioner also challenged the constitutional validity of  Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000, as well as Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act. It was  observed that the provision contained vague and undefined terms such as “offensive,” which could  lead to misuse. 

To address public concern, the Central Government, in 2013, issued an advisory stating that no  person should be arrested under Section 66A without prior approval from an officer not below the  rank of Inspector General of Police or any other senior official. 

Provisions of the Case: 

Section 66A of Information Technology Act of 2000ii: 

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act provides punishment for sending offensive  messages through communication devices and computer resources. It states that any person who  sends any information that is grossly offensive or known to be false for the purpose of causing  annoyance or inconvenience through a communication device shall be punishable with  imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine. 

Section 66A was introduced through an amendment in 2008 and came into effect on 27th  October 2009. Originally, the Information Technology Act, 2000 dealt mainly with cybercrimes,  electronic records, and hacking-related offences. However, between 2005 and 2008, there was a  significant rise in the misuse of social media platforms. Since the 2000 Act did not clearly cover  digital communication or online abuse, the Government decided to amend the Act through the  Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, which came into force in 2009. The Ministry  of Communications and Information Technology stated that the amendment was necessary to  address the growing misuse of social media for defamation, threats, and public disorder.

Section 69A of Information Technology Act of 2000iii: 

Section 69A of the Information Technology Act empowers the Central Government to issue  directions for blocking public access to any information through a computer resource. However,  such action can be taken only when the government is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest  of safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations  with foreign States, or for preventing the commission of any cognizable offence related  to these matters. 

Section 79 of Information Technology Act of 2000iv: 

Section 79 of the Information Technology Act provides a safe harbour provision that exempts  intermediaries from liability for third-party content, provided they act with due diligence and do  not initiate the transmission or modify the content. However, there are exceptions, the intermediary  loses this protection if it is found guilty of conspiring, abetting, or aiding in an unlawful act, or if  it fails to remove unlawful material after receiving a government or court notice. 

KEY ISSUE RAISED 

1. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act infringed upon the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution?
2. Whether section 66A of the IT Act was unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary?
3. Weather the section be saved under the “reasonable restrictions” allowed by article 19(2)? 

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 

Petitioner’s Submission: 

1. Violation of Fundamental Right: 

Petitioner argued that Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 infringed upon the fundamental right to  freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The  restrictions imposed by this section could not be justified under any of the reasonable  restrictions provided in Article 19(2). It also created a “chilling effect” on free speech. 

2. Vagueness of Terms:

The terms used in Section 66A, such as “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” “offensive,” and  “obstruction,” were not clearly defined and were overly broad, leaving them open to  subjective interpretation by law enforcement authorities. This vagueness allowed arbitrary and  excessive restrictions on free expression. 

3. Reasonable Restrictions: 

The grounds mentioned in Section 66A fall outside the permissible scope of reasonable  restrictions under Article 19(2). Therefore, the petitioners contended that the section could not  be protected under the doctrine of reasonable restrictions. 

4. Violation of Article 14: 

Section 66A also violated Article 14 of the Constitution, as it lacked an intelligible differentia and unreasonably targeted only one means of communication without any rational basis. 

Respondents’ Submission: 

1. Protection of Public Order 

The respondent argued that the use of ‘loose language’ in Section 66A was intended to  safeguard the rights of individuals from those who violate them through communication or  electronic devices. They contended that those languages of the section were necessary to  address various forms of unlawful activities committed over the social media. 

2. Presumption of Constitutionality: 

The State further argued that the legislature is in the best position to assess and address the  needs of the people, and that the Court should not intervene in every statute unless it clearly  violates Part III of the Constitution. It was also emphasized that there exists a presumption in  favor of the constitutionality of a law. 

3. Reasonable Restrictions: 

The government maintained that the freedom of speech and expression is not absolute under  all circumstances and that reasonable restrictions must be observed in the interest of public  order. 

4. Doctrine of Severability: 

The respondent also submitted that mere misuse of a provision does not render the entire law  unconstitutional, and the Court could apply the Doctrine of Severability to preserve the valid  portions of the sectionv.

JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT: 

On March 24, 2015, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justices Jasti  Chelameswar and Rohinton Fali Nariman, delivered a landmark judgment and struck down  Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 in its entirety. The Court held that the  section violated the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of  the Constitution and was not saved by the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). 

The Court observed that the language of Section 66A was extremely broad and vague, which  could mislead its application and failed to distinguish between mere discussion and incitement.  It further held that the discretion vested in law enforcement authorities due to the ambiguous  terms in the section could lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. 

Along with Section 66A, the Court also struck down Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act,  which contained provisions restricting public behaviour. Additionally, the Court upheld the  validity of Section 79 of the IT Act, subject to ‘reading down’ Section 79(3)(b) to ensure that  intermediaries are required to take down content only upon receiving a court order or  notification from the appropriate government authority. 

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI) 

1. Vagueness 

The question before the Court was whether the terms used in Section 66A were vague or not.  The Court held that words such as “offensive” and “annoyance” were vague and overly broad,  making it difficult for individuals to determine what kind of messages would constitute an  offence. Such ambiguity allows arbitrary and subjective interpretation by law enforcement  authorities. Hence, the Court held that the provision excessively and disproportionately  restricted the right to free speech, thereby disturbing the balance between that right and the  reasonable restrictions permissible under the Constitution. 

2. Chilling Effect on Free Speech

The Court recognised that the existence of Section 66A had a chilling effect on free speech  because the undefined and vague terms used in the provision could discourage individuals from  exercising their right to expression. This vagueness could lead to violations of both Article 19  and Article 14. The provision was overly broad, risking the inclusion of even innocent or  constitutionally protected speech. 

3. Severability 

The Government argued, based on the doctrine of severability, that even if part of a section is  unconstitutional, the remaining part can still be upheld. However, the Court held that in the  case of Section 66A, no portion of it could be separated or saved. The entire provision was  unconstitutional since it did not fall within any of the reasonable restrictions mentioned under  Article 19(2). 

4. Article 14 

Section 66A was also found to violate Article 14 of the Constitution, as it punished online  speech deemed “offensive” without any reasonable classification or intelligible differentia. The  Court observed that although Section 66A infringed Article 14, the main issue lay in its  violation of the freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). The Court clarified that a law must  be judged based on its actual provisions, not on how fairly or unfairly it is administered by the  Governmentvi. 

SIGNIFICANCE 

The Shreya Singhal v. Union of India case was one of the first major judgments recognizing  and enforcing the freedom of expression on social media. It confirmed that, like offline  speech, online speech is also rigidly protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The  Court clarified that any legal provision that is vague or undefined cannot withstand the test of  constitutionality. 

This judgment had significant political and social implications. By striking down Section 66A  of the Information Technology Act, the Court strengthened digital free speech, preventing  arbitrary arrests and the chilling effect on expression. It also reinforced the need for a narrow  and specific legal framework for content restrictions under provisions like Section 69A.

Further, the Court upheld Section 79 of the IT Act, clarifying that online intermediaries  are required to remove content only when they receive a specific order from a  government authority or a court. The decision ensured that individuals cannot be  punished for expressing opinions online under vague or overbroad laws like Section  66A. 

Overall, the judgment empowered the digital community to express opinions freely and  reaffirmed that the judiciary will not tolerate arbitrary enforcement of the law. It also  strengthened procedural safeguards by emphasizing that no police officer can arrest a person  without proper authorization from a higher authority. 

CONCLUSION: 

The judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India is a landmark decision that upholds the  fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in the digital age. The Court struck  down a vague and arbitrary provision, ensuring that online platforms remain open spaces for  diverse opinions and ideas. It emphasized the necessity of clearly defined laws when regulating  one of the most vital fundamental rights — the freedom of speech. As society enters the digital  era, the decision highlights the need to adapt legal frameworks to address unlawful online  activities while simultaneously protecting individual rights in both offline and online spaces. 

The case also underscored the crucial role of the judiciary in upholding constitutional  values and protecting citizens’ rights. The Court’s acknowledgment of the chilling  effect doctrine was particularly significant, as it recognized that vague and uncertain  laws can discourage individuals from expressing their views, thereby undermining  democratic dialogue. 

In conclusion, the judgment reflects a strong commitment to protecting civil liberties and  fundamental rights in the digital sphere. It sets a precedent that safeguards free speech from  arbitrary state action and reinforces the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression  across all platforms. 

Reference(S):

i Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, Writ P. (Crl.) No. 167 of 2012 (Supreme Ct. India Mar. 24, 2015), available at  https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/. 

ii Information Technology Act, 2000, § 66A, India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in.

iii Information Technology Act, 2000, § 69A, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India) iv Information Technology Act, 2000, § 79, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India) v Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1, MANU/SC/0329/2015 (India),  https://share.google/ZdXnVU2OEwhTPJ4mk. 

vi Shukla, Abhinav K., Shreya Singhal v. Union of India: A Critical Analysis, TSCLD, Apr. 10, 2024,  https://www.tscld.com/shreya-singhal-v-union-of-india-a-critical-analysis.