R (on the application of Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey

Introduction: 

The landmark case of R (on the application of Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1040 (Admin) represents a pivotal moment on professional integrity in the age of generative artificial intelligence. The case serves as a powerful reminder that professional duty to the court is paramount. The reliance on non-existent authorities, regardless of the source, violates core duties of honesty, integrity, and competence. The case was brought before the High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division Divisional Court, and was handed down by Mr. Justice Ritchie. 

Parties Involved: 

This case was a judicial review application case between the Claimant (Ayinde) and the Defendant (The London Borough of Haringey as the Local Council). The Claimant, Ayinde, sought a judicial review to challenge the Council’s failure to assess him for emergency housing. The London Borough of Haringey acted as the Local Council. The Council successfully sought compensation for costs. This compensation was requested via a wasted costs application. The application was made against the Claimant’s legal representatives The review challenged a decision by the Local Council. This decision concerned the failure to assess the Claimant for emergency housing. The initial wasted costs application targeted three individuals from the Claimant’s legal team. Ms Sarah Forey: Barrister who settled and signed the grounds for judicial review, Mr Victor Amadigwe: Solicitor and Chief Executive of Haringey Law Centre, and Ms Sunnelah Hussain: Paralegal working under Mr Amadigwe’s supervision.

Facts of the Case:

The facts focus strictly on the misconduct relating to the court documents and the subsequent handling of the issue. The Claimant sought judicial review regarding the Council’s statutory duty under the Housing Act 1996. The Council settled the underlying judicial review, but pursued a wasted costs application against the Claimant’s legal representatives. The grounds for judicial review, drafted and signed by the barrister, Ms Forey, contained severe inaccuracies.

Within that case there were five cited cases were non-existent or “fake” from the claimant’s counsel. One cited case, El Gendi, did not exist; the citation number belonged to an entirely unrelated business rates case. The grounds also contained four other non-existent cases, including one attributed to the Court of Appeal. The pleadings also misstated Section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996, claiming it imposed a mandatory duty when it provides a discretionary power (“may secure”). The Council’s solicitor, Mr Greenberg, alerted the legal team to the five non-existent cases and threatened a wasted costs application. 

The response from the Claimant’s solicitors was deemed “truly remarkable” by Ritchie J. The solicitors claimed the citation errors could be “easily explained,” but offered no explanation. They apologized for the issue, but described the errors as “cosmetic”. They asserted it was “improper to barter our client’s legal position for cosmetic errors”. Ritchie J later called this categorization “grossly unprofessional”. At the costs hearing, Ms Forey claimed the fake citations were “minor citation errors”. She attempted to explain that she had “dragged and dropped” the references from her personal electronic list of cases. Ritchie J rejected this explanation as utterly implausible. He found as a fact that a non-existent case could not be photocopied, listed, or tabulated. He concluded that Ms Forey “intentionally put these cases into her [pleadings], not caring whether they existed or not”. Following the wasted costs order, Ritchie J referred the matter to the Bar Standards Board (BSB) and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). He further referred the case to the Divisional Court under the Hamid jurisdiction to consider broader implications, including potential contempt proceedings.

Issues Raised 

In determining the outcome of this judicial review application, the Divisional Court addressed the serious implications of the professional conduct. The primary legal questions reviewed were as follows: 

• Did the conduct of the legal representatives meet the threshold for a wasted costs order (improper, unreasonable, or negligent conduct causing unnecessary costs)?
• Did the use of fake citations and the subsequent failure to explain them constitute professional misconduct and breaches of fundamental duties to the court?
• Should the court initiate contempt of court proceedings against the legal representatives for deliberately placing false material before the court?
• What regulatory and supervisory actions are necessary regarding the competence of practitioners and the unchecked use of generative artificial intelligence (AI)?

Arguments of the Parties:

The arguments were primarily made during the Hamid hearing before the Divisional Court. One of the key contentions by the London Borough of Haringey was that they  successfully argued that the legal team’s use of non-existent cases caused them to incur wasted costs. They pointed to the severity of the conduct. 

As for Ms Forey, she accepted that she acted negligently and later conceded unreasonableness. She apologised to the court. She maintained her denial that she used generative AI tools.  She later stated she may have used general internet searches (like Google or Safari) that included AI-generated summaries, without realizing it. She argued that the underlying legal principles for which the fake cases were cited were sound. Her counsel submitted that contempt proceedings were inappropriate given her inexperience, difficult working context, and her lack of knowledge that the citations were false.

The same could be said for Mr Amadigwe and Haringey Law Centre. Mr Amadigwe accepted that he should have appreciated the seriousness of the issue after being notified by the Council.  He stressed that the Law Centre, a charitable organization, operated with limited resources and relied heavily on specialist counsel’s expertise. It had not been their practice to verify authorities relied upon by counsel.  They argued the primary responsibility lay with counsel, Ms Forey.

Judgement/Final Decision:

The Divisional Court affirmed the gravity of the misconduct while opting against the most severe immediate sanctions. On the subject of the Wasted Costs Order, Ritchie J found the conduct improper, unreasonable, and negligent. He made a Wasted Costs Order, requiring Ms Forey and the Haringey Law Centre each to pay £2,000 to the Council. 

As for the Divisional Court (Hamid Review), they decided not to initiate contempt proceedings against Ms Forey or Mr Amadigwe. The court cited several factors for this decision, including Ms Forey’s junior status, the previous public criticism she received, and concerns that contempt proceedings would not adequately address the potential supervisory failings within her chambers. The court issued a critical correction regarding the solicitor’s team: Ms Sunnelah Hussain (Paralegal) was exonerated, finding her “not at fault in any way,” as she acted entirely under Mr Amadigwe’s instructions. The court issued further referrals to the Bar Standards Board (BSB) regarding Ms Forey and the matter of her supervision during pupillage. It also issued a referral to the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) regarding Mr Amadigwe and the Law Centre’s response to the allegations.

Legal Reasoning/Ratio Decidendi:

The court’s reasoning focused on the non-delegable professional duties owed to the court and the legal standards for handling AI-generated content.

On Professional Misconduct Findings, the conduct, involving placing fake cases in pleadings and then minimizing the error, was explicitly found to be “appalling professional misbehaviour”. Ritchie J found the barrister’s conduct satisfied all three requirements of Practice Direction 46(a): improper, unreasonable, and negligent. The finding that Ms Forey intentionally included the cases, “not caring whether they existed or not,” underpinned the determination of professional misconduct.

As for the responsibility of the Legal Team, Ritchie J emphasized that the responsibility for ensuring the correctness of pleadings rests on the entire legal team, including the solicitors. The solicitors’ letter, dismissing the fake citations as “cosmetic errors,” significantly contributed to the finding of improper behaviour against the Law Centre. The solicitor, Mr Amadigwe, was found to have taken inadequate steps despite being put on clear notice of the severity of the issue.

On AI and Negligence, Although Ritchie J made no finding of fact that AI was used, he provided clear guidance. He stated that, on the balance of probabilities, if the barrister had used AI without verifying its output against reliable sources, this failure would constitute negligence for the purpose of a wasted costs order. This reflects the principle that generative AI tools are unreliable for legal research and can produce confident, untrue assertions or cite sources that do not exist.

As for the Integrity of Court Processes, the Divisional Court stated that the administration of justice depends upon the court being able to rely without question on the integrity and professionalism of those appearing before it. Lawyers must only make submissions that can properly be supported. Citing fake cases is an abuse of process and is tantamount to making a false statement to the court.The court reaffirmed the need to “take decisive action to protect the integrity of its processes against any citation of fake authority”. 

Ultimately, the legal rule derived from this judgment centres on the foundational duty of verification in legal practice. Legal representatives have a non-delegable professional duty to ensure the accuracy and existence of all authorities, quotations, and legal propositions put before the court. This responsibility extends to the instructing solicitor, who is accountable for the work performed on their behalf, even if drafted by counsel or sourced through technology. Failure to verify citations, particularly those potentially arising from generative AI, constitutes conduct that is improper, unreasonable, and negligent, potentially leading to wasted costs orders, referrals to regulators, and severe sanctions.

Obiter Dicta (Persuasive Remarks) 

Asides from its binding statements, the judgement contains strong, non-binding remarks influencing future cases concerning legal technology and supervision.

Most importantly, the court delivered a stark warning that AI is a tool carrying risks, and its use must occur with appropriate oversight within a regulatory framework.  Lawyers who use generative AI tools to conduct legal research have a professional duty to check the accuracy of that research by reference to authoritative sources, such as official law reports or National Archives databases. Guidance from regulatory bodies confirms that unverified AI output, even if inadvertent, is considered incompetent and grossly negligent conduct that brings the profession into disrepute.

The court also placed key importance on the severity of sanctions, the court emphasised the range of powers available when lawyers fail in their duties, including public admonishment wasted costs, referral to a regulator, strike out, and initiation of contempt proceedings.  While contempt proceedings were not initiated in this case, the court stressed that its decision is not a precedent, and lawyers who fail to comply risk “severe sanction”. Placing false material before the court with intent to deceive can amount to the criminal offence of perverting the course of justice, carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

The Divisional Court noted that future Hamid hearings may inquire whether those with individual leadership responsibilities (e.g., heads of chambers) have fulfilled their duties to ensure lawyers understand and comply with ethical obligations when using AI. This suggests potential future liability for inadequate training and supervision.

Conclusion:

The case serves as a powerful reminder that professional duty to the court is paramount. The reliance on non-existent authorities, regardless of the source, violates core duties of honesty, integrity, and competence.

The Divisional Court’s comprehensive review ensures that the regulatory bodies (SRA and BSB) will now investigate the individuals involved, their truthfulness, and the wider issue of supervision and training provided within the legal organizations. The legal profession must immediately implement practical, effective measures to ensure all practitioners comply with their duties when utilizing AI.

The court’s robust stance, reflected concurrently in Bandla v SRA, signals that judicial tolerance for the citation of fake authority is zero. Lawyers are required to verify AI-generated content in all legal submissions. The threat of future contempt proceedings remains very real for any lawyer found to have knowingly or recklessly misled the court. This judgment marks a significant moment in defining the ethical boundaries for technology use in the UK legal system.