S v Baloyi and Others (CCT29/99) [1999] ZACC 19; 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); 2000 (2) SA 425(CC); 2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC)

Case Title and Citations: 

S v Baloyi and Others (CCT29/99) [1999] ZACC 19; 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); 2000 (2) SA 425  (CC); 2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC)  

Court name and branch 

Constitutional Court of South Africa 

Judge 

Sachs J 

Date of judgment 

Heard on : 9 November 1999 

Decided on : 3 December 1999 

Parties involved 

The State (Defendant) Godfrey Baloyi (Appellant) The Minister of Justice (First Intervening Party) The Commission on Gender Equality (Second Intervening Party) 

Facts of the case 

This dispute involved the appellant, an army officer named Godfrey Baloyi and his wife, the  complainant. The complainant laid a charge of assault against the appellant, an interdict was  granted by a magistrate in Pretoria, prohibiting the appellant from assaulting or threatening the  complainant and their child, and preventing them from entering or leaving their joint home.  Along with this interdict a warrant of arrest was simultaneously granted however, it was  suspended in terms of the Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993 (“The Act”).1 

Despite the interdict, the appellant allegedly assaulted the complainant again and threatened to  kill her. The complainant reported the alleged breach to the police and provided an affidavit,  which led to the arrest of the appellant, Mr. Baloyi.2 

The appellant was brought before a magistrate for an enquiry into the alleged violation of the  interdict, during the enquiry the magistrate applied the standard that the onus lay “on a balance  of probabilities”. The appellant was convicted for violating the interdict and sentenced to twelve  months imprisonment, six months of which were suspended.3 

The appellant appealed to the Transvaal High Court, arguing that the imposition of a reverse  onus (Section 3(5) of the Act) which was an onus to prove that he had not willfully violated the  interdict infringed his constitutional right to be presumed innocent and to have his guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt by the state under section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. The High Court  upheld the appellant’s contention declaring section 3(5) of the Act invalid, and referred the order  of invalidity to the Constitutional Court for confirmation.4 

Issues raised 

The main legal questions raised before the Constitutional Court included: 

∙ Whether Section 3(5) of the Prevention of Family Act 133 of 1993, read with Section 170  of the Criminal Procedure Act, was constitutionally valid or invalid. Specifically, whether  these sections place a reverse onus of proving the absence of guilt on a person charged  with breaching a family violence interdict, thereby conflicting with the right to be  presumed innocent. 

∙ Whether a person facing an enquiry into an alleged breach of interdict is an “accused  person” entitled to the full protection of the presumption of innocence under the  Constitution. 

∙ Whether the limitation of the right to be presumed innocent could be justified under  Section 36 of the Constitution. 

Arguments of the parties 

The Constitutional Court heard arguments from the appellant, the Minister of Justice and the  Commission on Gender Equality. 

Appellant: 

The Appellant argued that section 3(5), which imposed an onus on him to prove that he had not  willfully violated the interdict infringed his constitutional right to a fair trial, specifically the  right to be presumed innocent and to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the  state.5 

The Minister of Justice & The Commission on Gender Equality: 

The counsel for the intervening parties, namely the Minister and the Commission for Gender  Equality challenged the High Court’s decision of invalidity by consolidating their arguments into  three main contentions:  

∙ Firstly, they argued that the alleged violators should not be considered “accused person”  entitled to the protection of the presumption of innocence.6 

∙ Secondly, they argued that even if the person is deemed an accused person, the sections  should not be interpreted to impose a reverse onus.7 

∙ And lastly, if the sections did impose a reverse onus, the limitation on the presumption of  innocence could be justified under section 36 of the Constitution8 

Judgment 

The Constitutional Court declined to confirm the order of invalidity made by the Transvaal High  Court. The Court found that the High Court was wrong in declaring section 3(5) of the Act  unconstitutional.9 

The matter was then remitted to the Transvaal High Court to be dealt with in accordance with  this judgement.10 

Legal reasoning/ ratio decidendi 

The Court held that an alleged violator of a family violence interdict facing conviction and  imprisonment (for up to twelve months and a fine) is an ‘accused person” under section 35(3)(h)  of the Constitution. The objective of the enquiry under the Act is not to coerce the will to desist  from on-going defiance, but to punish the body for completed violation.11 

It is important for the Court when interpreting legislation to promote the spirit, purport, and  objects of the Bill of Rights, which requires balancing the state’s duty to deal with domestic  violence effectively with the accused’s right to a fair trial. 

The Court emphasized the fact that the words used in section 3(5) of the Act and section 170 of  the CPA do not lend themselves ready interpretations. The Court made use of interpretations  namely interpretations a, b and c.12 The Court adopted interpretation A which states that section  3(5) imports only the provisions of the CPA relating to the procedure at a section 170 enquiry.  Thus the question of who bears the burden of proof is a matter of substantive law and not  procedural law. 

The Court held that since section 3(5) imports only the procedure of section 170 of the CPA, it  does not import the provision in section 170(2) which places the burden of proof on the accused  (the reverse onus). The Court held that through proper interpretation of section 3(5) read with  section 170 of the CPA the constitutional infringement was avoided, hence it was not necessary  to assess whether such a limitation would have been justifiable under section 36.13 

Conclusion  

This case reflects the importance of interpretations and the fight against domestic violence while  maintaining constitutional safeguards. It showcases an effective way to balance the need for  speedy protection for the victim while maintaining the non-derogable right of the accused to a  fair trial. This case highlights the fact that the core legal ingenuity of judgment lies in the Court’s  interpretation of the obscure statutory language, in the case contained in section 3(5).  

The judgment acknowledges the complex nature of the proceedings, while resolving the issue of  reverse onus and successfully upholding the “golden thread” of criminal law, that guilt must be  proven beyond reasonable doubt the court simultaneously endorsed the necessity of a speedy and inquisitorial proceeding required to effectively deal with domestic abuse, making this case a  landmark example of judicial balancing, safeguarding rights while confirming the legislature’s  latitude to design hybrid processes to tackle profound societal injustice. 

Reference(S): 

S v Baloyi and Others (CCT29/99) [1999] ZACC 19; 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); 2000 (2) SA 425  (CC); 2000 (1) SACR 81 (CC) 

1S v Baloyi and Others (CCT29/99) [1999] ZACC 19; 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); 2000 (2) SA 425 (CC); 2000 (1)  SACR 81 (CC) [3] 

2Ibid. 

3 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [7]

4 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [8] 

5 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [8] 

6 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [10] 

7Ibid.  

8Ibid.

9 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [33] 

10 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , 37 

11 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [22] 

12 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [24] 

13 S v Baloyi and Others [1999] , [33]