ARJUN PANDITRAO KHOTKAR VERSUS KAILASH KUSHANRAO GORANTYAL AND ORS

Case Name: ARJUN PANDITRAO KHOTKAR Versus KAILASH KUSHANRAO GORANTYAL AND ORS 

AIR 2020 SC 4908 

Supreme Court of India 

Three-Judge Bench: Justices R.F. Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat, and V.R. Ramasubramanian.

Date: July 14, 2020 

Parties 

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar 

The returned candidate (RC) from Jalna Legislative Assembly constituency, representing  Shiv Sena. 

Appellant 

Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (Congress candidate, election petitioner)

Vijay Chaudhary (elector, election petitioner) 

Respondents

FACTS OF THE CASE 

The case concerns the Maharashtra Assembly election of 2014 from the Jalna constituency  where Arjun Panditrao Khotkar was declared elected by a narrow margin of 296 votes out of  roughly 45,000 votes polled. The defeated candidate Gorantyal and elector Chaudhary filed  election petitions alleging procedural irregularities. 

Specifically, the petitioners claimed that two nomination papers submitted by Khotkar,  numbered 43 and 44, were filed after the prescribed deadline of 3:00 p.m. on September 27,  2014, and thus ought to have been rejected. These allegations hinged substantially on video  recordings from the Election Commission’s office surveillance system, capturing events at the  time of filing. 

The Returning Officer certified that the nomination papers were received before the deadline,  but the petitioners contested this based on the video evidence. The High Court ruled that the  electronic video evidence could not be admitted since the mandatory certificate per Section  65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act (which validates electronic records) was not furnished.  However, the court admitted oral evidence from the Returning Officer and others to establish  the authenticity of the recordings, thereby allowing the evidence. 

The appellant challenged this decision in the Supreme Court, invoking the need for strict  compliance with the certificate requirement and defending the validity of his election. 

ISSUES RAISED 

1. Whether electronic evidence lacking a Section 65B (4) certificate is admissible in court. 
2. Whether oral evidence can substitute the mandatory written certificate under Section 65B (4) to admit electronic records. 
3. Whether acceptance of nomination papers filed after the statutory deadline renders the  election void. 
4. Whether improper acceptance of late nomination papers materially affected the election  result sufficient to invalidate it.

ARGUMENTS BY THE APPELLANT 

The appellant contended that the High Court erred in admitting electronic evidence without  compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 65B (4)1of the Indian Evidence Act,  1872. Relying heavily on the three-judge bench decision in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014)2,  it was argued that electronic records are admissible only when accompanied by a written  certificate under Section 65B (4)3. 

The appellant emphasized that the High Court’s invocation of “substantial compliance” was  contrary to settled law, as the Anvar P.V.4ruling made the certificate a “condition precedent” for admissibility. Oral testimony, however credible, cannot substitute for the written certificate  contemplated by law. The High Court’s relaxation of this requirement, according to the  appellant, undermined the certainty and uniformity of evidentiary standards and therefore  violated the rule of law. 

It was further argued that the Returning Officer, who had accepted the nomination papers,  exercised an administrative function whose certification must be given due primacy unless  shown to be manifestly incorrect. The appellant contended that the respondents had failed to  prove that the acceptance of nomination forms after the 3:00 p.m. deadline had materially  affected the election result, as required under Section 100(1)(d)5of the Representation of the  People Act, 1951. Hence, even assuming any procedural irregularity, the election could not be  invalidated in absence of proof that it altered the outcome. 

ARGUMENTS BY THE RESPONDENTS 

The respondents argued that the CDs/VCDs showing the late filing of nomination papers were  critical to proving that the Returning Officer improperly accepted the appellant’s papers beyond  the prescribed time. Although the Section 65B (4)6certificate was not produced, the  respondents maintained that its absence was due to deliberate and willful refusal by the election  authorities, despite repeated written requests and court directions. 

Invoking the equitable maxim “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” which states that the law does  not compel the performance of impossible acts. The respondents contended that the certificate  requirement should be relaxed in cases where compliance is rendered impossible despite bona  fide efforts. The procedural requirement under Section 65B7, being directory rather than  mandatory in such circumstances, should not bar the truth from being established. 

The respondents further submitted that the oral testimony of the Returning Officer (Smt.  Mutha), who oversaw the video recording process, effectively satisfied the substance of Section  65B (4) 8, since she was a responsible official certifying the authenticity of the electronic record.  Even without the formal certificate, her sworn evidence and the surrounding documentation  provided sufficient assurance of reliability. 

Lastly, the respondents argued that the election was materially affected, as the acceptance of  nomination papers filed after the deadline allowed an ineligible candidate to contest and win  by a margin of only 296 votes. Therefore, the High Court rightly held the election void under  Section 100(1)(d) 9of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 

The Supreme Court, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)10, reaffirmed the ratio laid down in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014)11, holding that electronic  records are admissible in evidence only when accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B (4)12 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This certificate authenticates the electronic record and  ensures its reliability, preventing potential misuse. The Court expressly overruled Shafhi  Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018), clarifying that the latter had incorrectly  diluted this mandatory requirement. It observed: “We may reiterate, therefore, that the  certificate required under Section 65B (4)13 is a condition precedent to the admissibility of  evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly  ‘clarified’ in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot  possibly suffice as Section 65B (4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed  principle in Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D. 426, which has been followed in a number of the  judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B (4)14 of the Evidence Act clearly  states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise.  To hold otherwise would render Section 65B (4)15 otiose” The Court emphasised that when a  statute prescribes a specific manner of performing an act, it must be done in that manner or not  at all. Accordingly, compliance with Section 65B (4)16 is not optional but compulsory. 

Nevertheless, the Court recognized a narrow exception: where a party, despite bona fide and  repeated efforts, is unable to obtain the required certificate due to willful obstruction by the  person in control of the device or record, the court may admit alternative evidence, such as oral  testimony from responsible officials, to prevent injustice. This exception, the Court reasoned,  is rooted in the equitable maxims “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” & “impotentia excusat  legem”. However, the Court cautioned that such departure must be subjected to rigorous  judicial scrutiny to safeguard against fabrication or abuse. 

On the question of election validity, the Court upheld the High Court’s findings that the  appellant’s nomination papers were filed after the prescribed deadline, in violation of election  law. Given the narrow margin of victory, the improper acceptance of the nomination was held  to have materially affected the election result. Relying on established precedent, the Court  observed that when a returned candidate’s nomination is invalidly accepted, the election is  rendered void ipso jure under Section 10017 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,  without requiring further proof of prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside Arjun  Panditrao Khotkar’s election and declared it null and void. 

LEGAL REASONING 

The Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)18 reaffirmed the principle laid down in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014)19, holding that Section  65B(4)20 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 imposes a mandatory procedural condition for the  admissibility of electronic records when relied upon as secondary evidence. The Court  categorically stated that compliance with Section 65B (4)21 is a condition precedent to  admissibility, ensuring the authenticity and reliability of electronic records and preventing their  misuse. 

However, the Court carved out a limited and practical exception, acknowledging that where  the requisite certificate is impossible to obtain due to persistent refusal or obstruction by the  authority in control of the device or data source, oral or other reliable evidence may be admitted  to establish authenticity. This exception, the Court observed, is rooted in the equitable maxims  “lex non cogit ad impossibilia” and “impotentia excusat legem”. Such flexibility, the Court  reasoned, is essential to ensure that procedural requirements do not become instruments of  injustice or impede the discovery of truth. 

The Court further underscored the inherent powers vested in courts under Section 16522 of the  Evidence Act, and the procedural provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal  Procedure Code, enabling them to summon witnesses and compel production of documents  and certificates. Where authorities refuse or neglect to comply, adverse consequences must  follow against the party obstructing production. 

On the issue of election validity, the Court clarified that improper acceptance of a nomination  paper of a returned candidate renders the election void “ipso jure” under Section 10023 of the  Representation of the People Act, 1951, without the need to prove further material effect, as a  candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted could not have legally contested the  election. The Court observed that in this case, where the margin of victory was only 296 votes out of approximately 45,000, the irregularity had a direct and material impact on the result,  thereby justifying the election’s annulment. 

In conclusion, this judgment stands as a landmark ruling harmonizing the strict procedural rigor of electronic evidence admissibility with the broader demands of justice. By recognizing that  bureaucratic or institutional obstruction should not defeat substantive rights, the Court struck a  balance between procedural formality and equitable fairness. It also reinforced the sanctity of  electoral processes, affirming that adherence to statutory timelines and procedures is crucial to  preserve transparency, integrity, and democratic legitimacy. Finally, the decision signifies the  judiciary’s progressive approach in adapting legal standards to the realities of the digital era,  ensuring that while technology enhances justice delivery, its evidentiary use remains grounded  in authenticity, accountability, and the rule of law. 

Reference(S):

1Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 65(B). 

2 Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer AIR 2015 SC 180. 

3Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 65(B). 

4 Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer AIR 2015 SC 180. 

5 Representation of the People Act 1951, s 100(1)(d).

6Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 65(B). 

7Ibid. 

8Ibid. 

9 Representation of the People Act 1951, s 100(1)(d).

10 Arjun Pandit Rao Hotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal AIR 2020 SC 4908. 

11 Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer AIR 2015 SC 180. 

12 Ibid. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Ibid.

17 Representation of the People Act 1951, s 100(1)(d). 

18 Arjun Pandit Rao Hotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal AIR 2020 SC 4908. 

19 Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer AIR 2015 SC 180. 

20 Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 65(B). 

21 Ibid. 

22 Indian Evidence Act 1872, s 165(B).

23 Representation of the People Act 1951, s 100(1)(d).