Authored By: Priyanshu Singh
Amity University, Noida
- Case Title
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors.
- Citation
2024 INSC 562
- Court
Supreme Court of India
- Bench
D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI), B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath, Pankaj Mithal, Manoj Misra, Satish Chandra Sharma, Bela M. Trivedi (dissent).
- Date of Judgment
1 August 2024
- Relevant Statutes/Key Provisions
Articles 15(4), 16(4), and 341 of the Constitution of India
- Brief Facts
The central issue in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Singh (2024) was whether states possess the constitutional authority to sub-classify Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the purpose of distributing reservation benefits more equitably among them. This question was not new. Two decades earlier, in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had ruled that all Scheduled Castes, as notified under Article 341 of the Constitution, form a single, indivisible, and homogeneous class. The Court in Chinnaiah had reasoned that once a caste is included in the Presidential list of SCs, it becomes part of one constitutional category, and no state legislature has the power to further divide or sub-classify that category for reservation purposes. The effect of this ruling was that every caste or community within the Scheduled Castes was entitled to equal access to the benefits of reservation, irrespective of variations in their levels of social and educational backwardness.
In practice, however, it was widely observed that within the Scheduled Castes category, certain communities that were historically somewhat better placed socially or economically had been able to corner a disproportionate share of the reservation benefits. This left behind other communities that remained more disadvantaged and continued to be underrepresented in public employment and education. To address this imbalance, the Punjab government enacted the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006. Section 4(5) of this Act introduced what was known as a “first preference” sub-quota for particular communities within the Scheduled Castes, notably the Valmiki and Mazhabi Sikhs, who were considered among the most disadvantaged groups within the SC category.
The law was challenged before the Punjab and Haryana High Court on the ground that it violated the principle laid down in Chinnaiah. The High Court agreed with this contention, striking down the provision by relying on the precedent that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes was impermissible. The matter then reached the Supreme Court, which had to consider not only the validity of the Punjab law but also whether the earlier ruling in Chinnaiah needed to be revisited.
Thus, the case revolved around a clash of two principles. On one hand, the idea that SCs and STs, once listed under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, constitute a single homogeneous class that cannot be fragmented by state action. On the other, the recognition that equality sometimes requires differential treatment to ensure that the weakest and most marginalised sub-groups within a larger disadvantaged category are not deprived of the benefits of affirmative action by relatively stronger sub-groups.
- Issues Involved
- Can SCs/STs be sub-classified for reservation purposes?
- Do state legislatures have the power to make such classifications despite Article 341?
9.Arguments
Petitioner (State of Punjab):
– Sub-classification is necessary to ensure the most backward among SCs/STs benefit. – Articles 15(4) and 16(4) empower the state to make special provisions.
Respondent (Davinder Singh):
– Only Parliament has authority under Article 341 to modify the SC list. – Sub-classification undermines the constitutional scheme and equality.
- Judgment
The Supreme Court, in a 6–1 majority decision, held that the sub-classification of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the purposes of reservation is constitutionally valid. The Court explicitly overruled its earlier decision in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004), which had declared that SCs constituted a homogeneous class and that no internal division or sub-classification was permissible. In doing so, the Court recognised that the doctrine of formal equality laid down in Chinnaiah did not reflect the social reality of caste hierarchies within the SC and ST categories.
The majority reasoned that the lists of SCs and STs prepared under Articles 341 and 342 are not homogenous but comprise diverse communities with differing levels of social and educational backwardness. Over the years, it has been observed that certain relatively advanced groups within the SC and ST categories have managed to secure a disproportionate share of the reservation benefits, while other groups, often the most marginalised and disadvantaged, remain inadequately represented in public services and educational institutions. Sub-classification, therefore, is a mechanism that allows the State to distribute the benefits of reservation more equitably, ensuring that affirmative action reaches those who need it most.
The Court clarified that the authority for such sub-classification stems from Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution, which empower states to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and to ensure adequate representation of such groups in public employment. However, it stressed that this power is not unbridled. Any sub-classification must be based on objective, empirical, and quantifiable data that demonstrates both the relative backwardness of a sub-group and its inadequate representation. Mere political considerations or blanket assumptions will not suffice. The classification must also satisfy the test of proportionality, meaning that the measures adopted should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the constitutional goal of substantive equality.
By endorsing sub-classification, the Court advanced the principle of substantive equality over formal equality. Equality, the majority held, does not mean treating all communities within the SC and ST categories identically, but rather requires acknowledging internal disparities and tailoring affirmative action to ensure that the weakest sub-groups are not left behind. The decision thus marked a significant shift in reservation jurisprudence, moving away from a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach towards a more flexible and justice oriented framework.
In contrast, Justice Bela M. Trivedi dissented. She held that Chinnaiah had been correctly decided and that permitting sub-classification within the SC and ST lists would undermine the constitutional scheme. According to her, once a caste or community is included in the Presidential list under Articles 341 and 342, the entire group forms a single constitutional class, and states cannot fragment it further. She warned that allowing sub-classification could lead to endless divisions and political manipulation, weakening the constitutional identity of SCs and STs.
Nonetheless, the majority view now stands as binding precedent. It establishes that sub classification within SCs and STs is constitutionally permissible, provided it is carefully designed, backed by data, and proportionate in its scope and application. This ruling empowers states to target reservation benefits towards the most marginalised sub-groups, thereby strengthening the constitutional commitment to real equality and social justice.
- Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024) held that states have the constitutional authority to sub-classify Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) for the purpose of reservation in public employment and education. This power flows from Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution, which empower the state to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and to ensure adequate representation of disadvantaged groups in state services. The Court reasoned that SCs and STs, though recognised as categories under Articles 341 and 342, are not internally homogeneous. Within these constitutional lists, there exist significant variations in the degree of backwardness and levels of representation. As a result, certain comparatively advanced communities within the SC and ST fold often secure a disproportionate share of the reservation benefits, leaving the more marginalised groups even further behind.
To address this imbalance, the Court held that the principle of equality does not demand identical treatment for all communities within the SC or ST categories but rather permits differential treatment based on demonstrable need. Therefore, states are not barred from creating sub-classifications or sub-quotas among SCs and STs in order to channel reservation benefits more effectively towards the most disadvantaged sections. However, the Court emphasised that such sub-classification cannot be arbitrary or politically motivated. It must be justified by quantifiable and objective data that establishes both the relative backwardness of the sub-group and its inadequate representation in public employment or education. This ensures that the exercise of state power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is evidence-based and directed towards the genuine advancement of those who are most in need of affirmative action.
In essence, the Court overruled the earlier decision in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004), which had treated SCs as a single homogeneous block incapable of sub classification. By contrast, the Court in Davinder Singh affirmed that the constitutional mandate of substantive equality requires recognising internal differences and tailoring reservation policies accordingly. The ratio, therefore, is that the state’s power to design and implement affirmative action is flexible enough to allow sub-classification within SCs and STs, provided it rests on demonstrable evidence of backwardness and inadequate representation, and thereby promotes the larger constitutional goal of achieving real equality and social justice.
- Obiter Dicta
In addition to its binding ruling on the permissibility of sub-classification, the Supreme Court made significant observations in the nature of obiter dicta that are likely to influence the future course of reservation jurisprudence. One of the most important of these observations concerned the application of the “creamy layer” principle to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The Court noted that while the concept of creamy layer had traditionally been applied to Other Backward Classes (OBCs), there is no constitutional bar to extending the principle to SCs and STs as well.
The Court explained that the very purpose of reservation is to level the playing field by providing opportunities to communities that are structurally and historically disadvantaged. However, within the SC and ST categories, there are some families or groups that have, over time, attained relatively higher social and economic status and have managed to repeatedly benefit from reservations. If such comparatively advanced groups continue to access the lion’s share of reservation benefits, the intended purpose of affirmative action- upliftment of the most marginalized- remains unfulfilled. To prevent this inequitable outcome, the Court observed that the creamy layer doctrine can serve as an instrument to exclude those individuals or families within SCs and STs who no longer suffer from the same degree of social and educational deprivation as others in the category.
The Court was careful to stress that this observation was not part of the core ratio decidendi of the case but an important guiding principle for future policy. By suggesting the applicability of the creamy layer to SCs and STs, the Court sought to reinforce the broader idea that equality in the constitutional sense is not merely formal but substantive. Substantive equality demands that the benefits of affirmative action be distributed in a manner that prioritises the weakest and most disadvantaged within any reserved category. Applying the creamy layer principle, therefore, ensures that reservation does not become a tool for perpetuating privilege within disadvantaged groups, but continues to serve as a means of correcting structural inequalities.
The Court also indicated that applying the creamy layer filter would not amount to a dilution of the rights of SCs and STs under the Constitution. Instead, it would enhance the effectiveness of reservations by directing state resources and opportunities towards those who are truly in need of support. In this way, the observation complements the majority’s endorsement of sub-classification. Both sub-classification and the creamy layer principle operate on the same logic: recognition of internal disparities within a broad disadvantaged category and the tailoring of state action to achieve genuine equality of outcomes.
Though these remarks were not binding in the same way as the ratio decidendi, they carry persuasive weight. They signal the Court’s openness to a more nuanced and evidence based approach to affirmative action in India, where social realities are complex and not reducible to rigid categories. Going forward, policymakers and courts alike may draw on these observations to refine reservation schemes in a manner that balances constitutional guarantees with practical justice.
- Final Decision
The Supreme Court, by a decisive 6–1 majority, upheld the constitutional validity of sub classification within the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The Court ruled that state governments are empowered to create sub-quotas within the broader framework of SC/ST reservations in order to ensure that the most disadvantaged communities are not overshadowed by relatively better-off groups within the same category. By doing so, the Court shifted the understanding of equality under the Constitution from a narrow, formal approach to a more substantive and justice-oriented framework.
The majority held that Articles 15(4) and 16(4) provide states with the necessary constitutional mandate to adopt special measures for ensuring adequate representation and advancement of disadvantaged classes. This includes the authority to design sub quotas within SC and ST reservations, provided such measures are based on reliable
empirical data and are proportionate to the degree of disadvantage faced by particular sub-groups. The decision thus empowers states to tailor affirmative action policies with greater precision, so that the benefits of reservation reach those who continue to remain at the margins despite decades of constitutional protection.
At the same time, the Court made it clear that this power is not without limits. Sub classification must be backed by quantifiable data on backwardness and underrepresentation, and must withstand the constitutional test of reasonableness and proportionality. Arbitrary or politically motivated divisions would not pass muster. The ruling therefore strikes a balance between flexibility for the states and safeguards against misuse.
Justice Bela M. Trivedi delivered the lone dissenting opinion. She held that the majority’s approach undermines the constitutional scheme under Article 341, which vests the power of identifying Scheduled Castes exclusively in the President, subject to Parliamentary control. In her view, once a community is placed in the Presidential list of Scheduled Castes, the entire group becomes a single constitutional unit, and no state has the authority to fragment it further by way of sub-classification. According to her, only Parliament can revisit or alter the framework of reservations for SCs, and allowing states to create internal divisions would lead to uncertainty and weaken the constitutional identity of Scheduled Castes.
Despite this dissent, the majority decision now stands as binding precedent. It confirms that sub-classification within SCs and STs is permissible, enabling states to design more targeted and effective reservation policies that prioritise the upliftment of the weakest among the weak. The judgment therefore marks a turning point in India’s reservation jurisprudence, recognising diversity within disadvantaged groups and aligning constitutional guarantees with social realities.
