Authored By: Geetesh Sinha
Abstract
This article examines the Aug 11,2025 Supreme Court order directing all stray dogs in the Delhi-NCR region to be captured and housed in shelters within eight weeks, sterilised and vaccinated, and prohibited from being returned to streets. Part I is a defence of the order on a public-safety, constitutional, and administrative grounds. Part II criticises the decision on the bases of its inconsistency with the Prevention of Cruelty to animals Act, 1960[2], the Animal Birth Control (ABC) rules, 2023[3], judicial precedents[4], feasibility and animal welfare ethics. Part III offers a Comparative Jurisprudence and much more balanced, legally and humanely acceptable policy option the powerful combination of enforcement of ABC and community relations. The article argues that while the Court responded to a pressing public health crisis, the judgement suffers from legal and practical flaws, and a sustainable solution must align public safety with statutory animal welfare norms.
Introduction
In Aug 2025, the Supreme Court of India issued a suo motu order and mandating all stray dogs in the Delhi-NCR area to be removed and taken off the streets and placed in shelters within eight weeks, to be sterilised and vaccinated at that time, it expressly forbid re-release to the streets[5]. There was an outburst of suspected rabies deaths and rising cases of dog bites especially among children and the elderly in India. There was also the provision of authorities to establish helplines, receive biting dogs in a span of four hours, checking shelters on CCTV, and obstruction through contempt of court. Although these actions were aimed at serving the purpose of guaranteeing safety in the society, they have raised serious objections within the circles of animal welfare, legal experts, and civic movements.
This conflict between the order and the regulatory mechanism, i.e., the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, or PCA Act, 1960[6], and the Animal Birth Control (ABC), 2023 Rules[7], which requires sterilization and return of animals to their original locality, created a complex legal and ethics debate. The effect of Supreme Court interventions was to put these rules on hold, but not strike them down explicitly, raising the issue of judicial activism or separation of powers, and questions of adhering to established precedent. In the meantime, the critics claimed that it was logistically impossible, astronomically expensive (estimated at 15,000 crore rupees) exceeded the infrastructural capabilities, and posed a risk of creating overcrowded and disease ridden shelters.
This article takes three sections. Part I examines some of the reasons to support the order existential threat to vulnerable populations constitutional support under Articles 19 and 21[8], and the need of the judiciary in executing its duty when failures of the executive remain unaddressed. Part II addresses the legal and operational deficiencies of the order, the inconsistency with statutory initiatives, and ethics on animals. Part III explores how the Supreme Court order of removal of stray dogs form the streets examined through comparative jurisprudence and practical challenges. Finally, this article argues that the order issued by the Court, despite its justification of urgent need, is not the legally correct and human way out in the long run.
Part I: Legitimacy of the Court’s Directive (Support)
Public Safety Imperative and Constitutional Duty
The ruling of the Supreme Court on Aug 11, 2025 was triggered by alarming evidence that the public was in danger. The reports of media showed that in Delhi alone, over 2,000 dog bite cases a day were reported, and a series of rabies related deaths occurred, one of them a six year old girl, giving birth to the suo motu order. The Court noted that, “infants and young children, at all cost, must not be victims of rabies” and took an outspoken stand of: no emotions of any kind should be indulged in” when carrying out the removal of strays. These facts highlight the Wing-tip of Article 21(“Right to Life”) and Article 19(1) (d) (“Right to Freedom of Movement”) keeping in mind that these are the rights which must be guarded against external threats that are life-threatening. Moreover, in Article 47 of the Directive Principles, the state has a duty to advance the population health[9]. In this regard, the Writ jurisdiction of the court to enforce emergency relief can be taken as a legitimate state action to address civic breakdown.
Judicial Activation Against Executive Inertia
The Court held that civic authorities were negligent to the already existing ABC and rabies control plans. There was strict punishment to those officials who did nothing leading to judicial rescue where executive machinery could not be effective. This is in line with the Court in ensuring constitutional rights are enforced, not just abstract interpretation of the law but the exercising of law. In this case, the Supreme Court replaced the executive shortfall with a provision of the reliable time frame to get relief. In a single observation, the bench demanded that when ABC Rules became ineffective, forget the rules at that time and put the public interest before everything. Though controversial, this shows the determination by the court to correct humanitarian dilemma.
Emergency Powers and Preventive Action Doctrine
Removal of the public dangerous animals can be allowed in emergency conditions under PCA Act, 1960. The willingness of the Court to approve violent apprehensions by law enforcers signals the fringe of emergency law authorizing extraordinary actions. Such a course resembles preventive action law which appears in other areas of public health jurisprudence or disaster law in which an order issued to prevent irreparable harm should be under time constraints. Such a type of judicial activism is arguable, but justifiable under the circumstance of non receptive legislative and executive functions particularly in regions of crisis.
PART II: Critique of the Order
Legal Conflict with PCA Act and ABC Rules, 2023
The ABC Rules are to capture-sterilize-vaccinate and release at original location; relocation is strictly prohibited. At the first level, this allows the Court to overrule delegated legislation where there is no legislative repeal and risks the separation of powers concerns.
Past SC precedents, as in the 2022 bench with Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Maheshwari, had said that “street dogs cannot be detained in captivity” simply out of convenience to people; the PCA framework establishes a humane approach. In comparison, this Aug 2025 order does not conform to established law.
Feasibility, Infrastructure, and Financial Constraints
Delhi is estimated to have half a million to 1 million stray dogs; yet the Court demanded only 5,000 shelters to begin with a logistical impossibility. Analyst opinion sees a need on spending 15,000 crore, which is impossible considering both municipal budgets.
Even the existing sterilisation Centers failed to withstand the pressure, as was recently witnessed at Panchkula and the shelters at Nagpur are incapable to support the flow[10]. It is risking disease, stress, even death, the opposite of welfare goals due to overcrowding.
Ethical and Ecological Concerns
Removing dogs disturbs the local ecological balance: rodents, cats and monkeys can go rampant; in forests areas stray predation already afflicts wild life. The relocation without an ecological development is not advised[11].
Shelters can also institutionalise dog confinement, destroying connections to the community and emotional well being. Article 51A (g) (Fundamental Duties) of Animal welfare ethics requires compassion[12]. The Court’s admonishment that injunction of sentiment must give place to interests of the public safety.
Part III: Comparative Jurisprudence and Broader Implications
The Indian Supreme Court’s decision to mandate the removal of stray dogs from Delhi-NCR must also be examined through the lens of comparative constitutional jurisprudence. Courts worldwide have struggled with balancing public safety, public health, and animal rights.
To give an example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has regularly encountered state rights in terms of the talk on public health crisis in Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 8 (Right to Private and Family Life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In Öneryildiz v. In Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, the state was found to have a positive obligation of safeguarding the citizens against foreseeable risks[13]. Even though the said case involved explosion of methane, the same principle (the state should take precaution to avert the harm) is applied to the reasoning by the Indian court in favour of safeguarding citizens against rabies and dog bites.
Meanwhile, other jurisdictions that are comparative to Brazil and South Africa have recognised animal welfare as an addition of constitutional environmental rights. In ADI 4983 (2016), the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court discarded cruel practices involving animal sacrifice with the belief that animal abuse is an infringement on Article 225 of the Constitution that guarantees protection of the environment and ecology[14]. In the same fashion, the South African Constitutional Court has highlighted in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2016 (1) SA 627 (CC) that prevention of cruelty to animals is not a side issue, but part of the moral responsibility of the state[15]. According to these views, the strategy of removal and segregation of animals without establishing the harmony on the ecological level can be termed as incomplete according to constitutional considerations.
Jurisprudentially speaking, the order by the Supreme Court manifested the spirit of Benthamite utilitarianism which places an emphasis on the greatest good of the greatest number on human safety in this particular case, rather than liberty of animals. Jeremy Bentham, whose contribution to utilitarianism was instrumental, was in a paradoxical way also an early animal rights activist in that he contended that moral consideration should be based not on rationality but rather the capacity to suffer. Accordingly, the judgment poses a conundrum because; in the name of safety it jeopardizes the instrumentalization of animals as parts of administrative utility.
Moreover, because of the view of constitutional morality, as stated by the Court itself in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, the state is required to hold pluralism, dignity and protection of minorities in high regard, of which we may hope this would arguably apply to non human species[16]. Both bottom up and top down interpretations of the concept of public safety are potentially antidemocratic means of privatizing a personal right to safety and abdicating state power on behalf of the majority.
Practical Implications and Policy Concerns
Even assuming the legality of the order, its implementation challenges are formidable. Delhi-NCR alone has an estimated 6–7 lakh stray dog. The creation of shelters with humane conditions, veterinary care, and adequate funding will require not only massive state expenditure but also a coordinated policy involving municipalities, animal welfare boards, and NGOs. The order without proper infrastructure has the risk of either collapsing into mass culling or neglect that can be challenged on the grounds of Article 21 which protects life and liberty which the Court has in the past applied to animals in the case of Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja, (2014) 7 SCC 547.
In addition, considerations of the urban ecology could be affected by a possible step in the clearing of streets of dogs. Stray dogs are known to become a territorial repellent to other animals like the rodents. Any attempt to eliminate them would unintentionally enhance other problems such as rat infestations that would have their health risks as well. Such ecological implication implies that the order issued by the Court though well intentioned might not be the perfect outcome of the precautionary principle and sustainable development jurisprudence enshrined within Indian environmental legislation (Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, 1996 (5) SCC 647).
Conclusion
The August 11, 2025 Supreme Court order represents one of the boldest judicial interventions in the sphere of public health and animal law. It was born out of a genuine emergency daily dog bite incidents, rabies related deaths, and an undeniable failure of municipal governance. In that sense, the Court cannot be faulted for recognising its constitutional duty to protect the right to life and secure the conditions for citizen’s freedom of movement.
However, there are two underlying weaknesses of the judgment. To begin with, it is an aberration to the statutory framework of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, which the Court has itself reaffirmed in 2024 with an extraordinary delay after almost sixteen years of consultation. Second, it ignores the ecological, financial, and infrastructural possibilities of mass removal of dogs, thus exposing itself to the danger of sliding down the slope of confinement or culling, which are both morally incompatible with Indian constitutional morality as well as with animal welfare jurisprudence on an international level.
A viable approach to law cannot separate the question of animal dignity with the question of public safety. Rather, it should weave them in a common policy fabric: enhanced sterilisation and vaccination drive, increased accountability at the municipal level, increased NGO collaboration, and civic education to support coexistence. The South African, Brazilian and the European Court of Human Right show that effective governance is possible without sacrificing compassion.
At bottom, constitutionalism is not really about how we defend the powerful, but about how we treat the weakest including non-human species. The Court’s order may deliver short term relief but unless recalibrated, it risks eroding the balance between urgent state action and principled adherence to statutory and ethical norms. The future of India’s animal jurisprudence and even Indian urban health lies in striking a balance of wisdom, consistency and compassion. The true measure of constitutionalism is not only how it safeguards human life, but also how it preserves dignity and compassion for all living beings.
Reference(S):
Cases (India)
- Animal Welfare Bd. of India v. A. Nagaraja, (2014) 7 S.C.C. 547 (India).
- Animal Welfare Bd. of India v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 265 of 2012 (Sup. Ct. India).
- Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
- Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 647 (India).
- Supreme Court Order on Stray Dogs (Aug. 11, 2025) (unreported, India).
Statutes & Rules
- The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, No. 59 of 1960, INDIA CODE (1960).
- Animal Birth Control (Dogs) Rules, Gazette of India, Pt. II, Sec. 3(i) (2023).
III. Constitutional Provisions
- INDIA CONST. art. 19(1) (d).
- INDIA CONST. art. 21.
- INDIA CONST. art. 47.
- INDIA CONST. art. 51A (g).
Comparative / International Authorities
- Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
- ADI 4983, Supremo Tribunal Federal [S.T.F.] [Brazilian Supreme Federal Court] (2016) (Braz.).
- Nat’l Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., 2016 (1) SA 627 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Secondary Sources
- PKL sterilisation centre faces glut of calls after SC ruling, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Aug. 13, 2025). https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/pkl-sterilisation-centre-faces-glut-of-calls-after-sc-ruling/articleshow/123266049.cms.
- Nagpur not equipped enough to implement SC order in Delhi-NCR case, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Aug 13, 2025).
[1] 2nd Year LLB Student at Prof. Rajendra Singh (Rajju Bhaiya) University, Prayagraj.
[2] The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, No. 59 of 1960, INDIA CODE (1960).
[3] Animal Birth Control Rules, Gazette of India, Pt. II, Sec. 3(i) (2023).
[4] Animal Welfare Bd. Of India v. A. Nagaraja, (2014) 7 S.C.C. 547 (India).
[5] Animal Welfare Bd. Of India v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 265 of 2012 (Sup. Ct. India).
[6] The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, No. 59 of 1960, INDIA CODE (1960).
[7] Animal Birth Control Rules, Gazette of India, Pt. II, Sec. 3(i) (2023).
[8] INDIA CONST. arts. 19(1) (d), 21.
[9] INDIA CONST. art. 47.
[10] PKL sterilisation centre faces glut of calls after SC ruling, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Aug. 13, 2025). https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chandigarh/pkl-sterilisation-centre-faces-glut-of-calls-after-sc-ruling/articleshow/123266049.cms.
[11] Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 S.C.C. 647 (India).
[12] INDIA CONST. art. 51A (g).
[13] Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
[14] ADI 4983, Supremo Tribunal Federal [S.T.F.] [Brazilian Supreme Federal Court] (2016) (Braz.).
[15] Nat’l Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., 2016 (1) SA 627 (CC) (S. Afr.).
[16] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India).
