Authored By: ANANDAPADMANABHAN R.T.
CASE TITLE & CITATION
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (AIR 2015 SC 1523)
COURT NAME & BENCH
Name of the Court: Supreme Court of India
Name of the Judges: Justice Jasti Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman. Bench type: Division bench
DATE OF JUDGMENT
March 24, 2015
PARTIES INVOLVED
PETITIONER: Shreya Singhal, a petitioner who filed the case to challenge the constitutionality of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
RESPONDENT: Union of India, the governmental body representing the case in opposition to the petition.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2012, the Mumbai Police arrested two young women, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, for posting comments on Facebook criticizing the bandh that followed the death of Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray. Although both women were later released and the charges dropped, the incident sparked nationwide outrage. It was widely believed that the police had misused their authority by invoking Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, thereby violating the women’s fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.
Since offences under Section 66A were cognizable, law enforcement authorities had the power to arrest and investigate without a warrant. This resulted in several high- profile arrests across the country, where individuals were prosecuted for posting views online that the government termed “objectionable,” though in most cases these were merely dissenting political opinions. In response to mounting criticism, the Central Government issued an advisory in January 2013, directing that no person should be arrested under Section 66A without the prior approval of an Inspector General of Police or another senior official.
The present case was filed as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A. The petition contended that the provision violated Article 19(1)(a) by imposing unreasonable restrictions on free expression. The petition was also motivated by the arbitrary arrests that had occurred following the Mumbai incident.
It is noteworthy that Section 66A was not part of the original IT Act, 2000, but was later introduced by an amendment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the amendment explained that the rapid growth of computers and the internet had given rise to new categories of crimes, such as:
∙ publishing sexually explicit material online,
∙ video voyeurism,
∙ breaches of confidentiality and data leakage by intermediaries,
∙ e-commerce frauds like phishing and identity theft, and
∙ offensive messages transmitted through mass communication services.
To address these issues, penal provisions were inserted into the Information Technology Act, 2000, as well as amendments to the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Under Section 66A, punishment was prescribed for three categories of cyber offences: 1. Sending information that is grossly offensive or of a menacing character.
Sending information known to be false, using computer resources persistently with intent to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, hatred, or criminal intimidation.
Sending electronic mail or messages with the intent to annoy, inconvenience, or mislead the recipient regarding the origin of the message.
ISSUES RAISED
Therefore, the primary issue raised by the Petitioners in the instant matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court was that aforementioned section 66A was ultra vires of Article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution as the offence being carved out is not covered under ‘reasonable restriction’ as provided under Article 19 (2).
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
PETITIONER:
∙ Section 66A curtails the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and its restrictions cannot be justified under the grounds enumerated in Article 19(2).
∙ Grounds such as “annoyance” or “inconvenience” fall outside the permissible scope of restrictions under Article 19(2).
∙ Section 66A is vitiated by vagueness, as the expressions it employs are undefined, overly broad, and inherently subjective. This leaves their interpretation to the arbitrary discretion of law enforcement authorities, with no clear limitations provided.
∙ The provision also violates Article 14, since it fails to establish any intelligible differentia for singling out one particular mode of communication (online speech) for penal consequences.
RESPONDENT:
∙ The legislature is best placed to determine the needs of the people, and judicial intervention is warranted only where a law violates the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Every statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.
∙ The Court must strive to interpret a law in a manner that preserves its validity, and for that purpose may read down or read into the provisions to ensure their effective operation.
∙ The mere possibility of misuse or abuse of a provision cannot, by itself, justify declaring it unconstitutional.
∙ The use of broad or flexible language in legislation is intended to protect citizens from those who may misuse the medium of communication to cause harm.
∙ Vagueness alone does not render a statute unconstitutional, so long as the law is otherwise reasonable, specific in its purpose, and non-arbitrary in application.
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment by striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as unconstitutional. A two-judge bench of Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton F. Nariman held that the provision violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The Court observed that the phrases used in Section 66A, such as “grossly offensive,” “annoying,” “inconvenient,” “menacing,” and “ill will,” were vague, undefined, and open-ended, leaving them to the arbitrary discretion of law enforcement authorities. This, the Court reasoned, created a “chilling effect” on free speech, where citizens would refrain from expressing genuine opinions out of fear of prosecution. Further, the Court emphasized that the grounds available under Article 19(2) for restricting free speech are narrow and exhaustive—covering areas like public order, defamation, decency, morality, and incitement to an offence—and that Section 66A could not be justified within these limits, as “annoyance” or “inconvenience” fall far outside the constitutional framework. Rejecting the Union Government’s argument that misuse of a provision cannot be a ground to strike it down, the Court clarified that the problem lay not in abuse but in the inherent unconstitutionality of the law itself, which was too vague and overbroad to be “read down” or saved through judicial interpretation. While striking down Section 66A in its entirety, the Court distinguished it from Section 69A of the IT Act, which empowers the government to block online content. Section 69A was upheld because it was accompanied by clear procedural safeguards, including the requirement of written reasons and an opportunity for affected parties to be heard. Similarly, Section 79 of the Act, concerning the liability of intermediaries such as social media platforms, was upheld with the clarification that intermediaries are obliged to remove content only upon receiving a court order or a lawful directive from the government, not merely on private complaints. Ultimately, the Court declared that Section 66A was unconstitutional for being vague, overbroad, disproportionate, and inconsistent with Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that free speech is the lifeblood of democracy, and any law seeking to restrict it must be narrowly tailored, precise, and fall strictly within the ambit of Article 19(2).
RATIO DECIDENDI
The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the Court’s categorical ruling that any restriction on free speech and expression must fall strictly within the boundaries of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, and that Parliament cannot create new, undefined categories of restrictions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the grounds under Article 19(2)—such as public order, decency, morality, defamation, sovereignty and integrity of India, and incitement to an offence—are exhaustive in nature. Section 66A of the IT Act, however, criminalized speech on grounds such as “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” or “grossly offensive” communication, none of which have any constitutional backing. By doing so, the legislature exceeded its power and imposed restrictions that were not contemplated under the Constitution.
The Court further held that laws restricting speech must be clear, precise, and narrowly tailored, so that individuals are aware of what conduct is prohibited. Section 66A failed this test as the phrases used in it—“menacing,” “grossly offensive,” “ill will”—were vague, undefined, and subjective, allowing police and enforcement authorities unbridled discretion to decide what constituted an offence. Such vagueness, the Court noted, inevitably produces arbitrary and inconsistent application, violating both Articles 14 and 19(1)(a). This lack of clarity also produced a “chilling effect” on free speech, as citizens, fearing prosecution, would refrain from expressing even legitimate criticism or dissent, which is vital in a democracy.
Another important element of the ratio was the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument that only the misuse of Section 66A was problematic. The Court clarified that the defect was not in its misuse, but in its very substance: the section itself was unconstitutional. Unlike situations where a provision may be “read down” to align with constitutional limits, Section 66A was so overbroad and fundamentally flawed that no interpretative exercise could salvage it. Finally, the Court highlighted that the section singled out online speech for harsher punishment without establishing any reasonable classification or intelligible differentia, thereby violating Article 14’s guarantee of equality.
In essence, the ratio decidendi is that a law curbing free expression will be struck down if it (i) travels beyond the permissible limits of Article 19(2), (ii) employs vague or overbroad terminology, (iii) produces a disproportionate chilling effect on free expression, or (iv) arbitrarily discriminates against a particular medium of speech. Since Section 66A failed on all these grounds, it was declared unconstitutional in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
The judgment stands as a watershed moment in the constitutional history of India, particularly in the context of free speech and the digital age. By striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Supreme Court not only reaffirmed the centrality of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) but also clarified that this freedom cannot be curtailed on vague, subjective, or extra constitutional grounds. The Court underscored that while freedom of speech is not absolute and may be reasonably restricted under Article 19(2), such restrictions must be precise, narrowly tailored, and directly connected to the specific grounds enumerated in the Constitution.
The decision also highlighted the dangers of vague and overbroad legislation, which can easily become a tool for arbitrary state action. Section 66A, by criminalizing undefined acts such as causing “annoyance” or being “grossly offensive,” had created a climate of uncertainty and fear, where citizens could be punished for exercising their democratic right to dissent. The Court’s recognition of the “chilling effect” doctrine was especially significant, as it acknowledged that unclear laws discourage citizens from speaking freely, thereby weakening democratic discourse.
Furthermore, the ruling clarified that the medium of communication—whether online or offline—cannot be subjected to arbitrary classification without a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. By singling out electronic communication for disproportionately harsh treatment, Section 66A had also violated the equality guarantee under Article 14. The Court’s insistence that laws must treat different forms of speech fairly, unless justified by intelligible differentia, strengthens the principle of equality in digital spaces.
In conclusion, the judgment reflects a strong judicial commitment to protecting civil liberties in the face of technological change and state overreach. It set a precedent that legislative intent cannot override constitutional guarantees, and that any law curbing fundamental freedoms will be carefully scrutinized for its proportionality, clarity, and constitutionality. In doing so, the Supreme Court not only safeguarded the rights of individuals against arbitrary state action but also reinforced the idea that free speech—especially dissenting and critical voices—is the lifeblood of a vibrant democracy. The decision continues to serve as a guiding light in debates on internet regulation, privacy, and freedom of expression in India.
