Authored By: Mihlali Mpahla
University of Fort Hare
Facts and background:
The case of S v Chretien involved the accused, who had consumed a substantial amount of alcohol at a social gathering. While driving home from the party in a state of extreme voluntary intoxication, he collided with another vehicle, resulting in the death of one person and injuries to several others. He was subsequently charged with murder and attempted murder. The core factual dispute revolved around the degree of his intoxication and its effect on his mental state and ability to form the necessary criminal intent or act voluntarily. Witnesses testified to his highly inebriated state, leading to questions regarding his criminal responsibility at the time of the incident.
Issues:
The primary legal issue was the extent to which voluntary intoxication could serve as a complete defence in South African criminal law. Specifically, the Appellate Division had to determine whether:
- Extreme voluntary intoxication, which leads to a complete absence of criminal capacity, which is the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions or to act in accordance with that appreciation, could result in a full acquittal.
- If such intoxication could negate the voluntariness of the accused’s actions, leading to a finding of automatism.
- If intoxication, even if not leading to automatism or total lack of capacity, could nonetheless negate the specific intent (dolus) required for crimes like murder and attempted murder. This challenged the then-prevailing “specific intent” rule, which often only allowed for a reduction of the charge, for example, from murder to culpable homicide rather than an outright acquittal.
Jurisdiction:
The case was heard by the Appellate Division, now the Supreme Court of Appeal, which is the highest court of appeal in South Africa for non-constitutional matters. It had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on questions of law and fact related to the interpretation and application of criminal law principles regarding intoxication.
Arguments by parties:
The applicant contended that due to his extreme voluntary intoxication, he lacked the necessary criminal capacity or intention to commit murder and attempted murder. He argued that his state of mind was such that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or act with the required intention, and therefore, he should not be held criminally liable for those specific charges.
Key contentions by the Respondent/Defendant (The State): The State likely contended that Chretien was criminally liable for his actions, potentially arguing for the application of the “specific intent” rule, which would allow for a conviction on a lesser charge like culpable homicide, or that his intoxication was not so severe as to negate all criminal elements.
Legal reasoning:
The Appellate Division, in its judgment delivered by Rumpff CJ, undertook a comprehensive review of the law regarding voluntary intoxication. The court critically examined the traditional “specific intent” rule and effectively abandoned it in favour of a more logical and principled approach based on the elements of criminal liability. The judgement examined the following:
Voluntariness: The court confirmed that if intoxication renders an act involuntary, for example automatism, there is no criminal act (actus reus), and thus no liability.
Criminal Capacity: Crucially, the court held that if intoxication is so severe as to totally deprive an accused of criminal capacity, meaning the ability to appreciate wrongfulness or to act in accordance with that appreciation, then there can be no criminal liability for any crime requiring such capacity.
Intention (Dolus): The court ruled that if intoxication prevents the formation of the specific intention required for a crime, then the accused cannot be convicted of that crime. For crimes requiring dolus, if dolus is absent due to intoxication, then liability for that crime is excluded.
In Chretien’s specific case, the court found that his level of intoxication was so severe that it precluded him from forming the intention to commit murder and attempted murder. Consequently, he could not be convicted of these charges. However, the judgment did not mean that intoxicated persons would always escape liability, it simply clarified that if the essential elements of a crime were genuinely absent due to intoxication, then a conviction for that specific crime was not possible. The court emphasized that the state would still need to prove the elements of a lesser crime if appropriate, for example culpable homicide, which requires negligence rather than intention.
Final decision:
The Appellate Division upheld the appeal of Chretien, finding that due to his extreme voluntary intoxication, he lacked the necessary intention (dolus) for the charges of murder and attempted murder. He was therefore acquitted on those specific counts.
Conclusion/Observations:
This landmark decision clarified that if intoxication was so severe as to negate voluntariness, criminal capacity, or the required form of intention, it could lead to a full acquittal. However, it is vital to note that this judgment led to significant public and parliamentary concern about the potential for individuals to escape responsibility for their actions due to self-induced intoxication. This ultimately prompted legislative intervention in the form of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988.
S v Chretien is a pivotal case in South African criminal law. Its primary significance lies in its departure from the “specific intent” rule and its establishment of the principle that extreme voluntary intoxication, if it genuinely negates voluntariness, criminal capacity, or the specific intent required for a crime, can lead to a complete acquittal on that charge. This brought the law on intoxication into closer alignment with general principles of criminal liability.
However, the case also highlighted a perceived gap in the law, where individuals who acted dangerously while severely intoxicated might escape all criminal liability for their actions, even if their intoxication was self-induced. This public and legislative reaction directly led to the enactment of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988.
If you look at section 1(1), you will see that this act created a specific statutory offence for individuals who commit an act prohibited by law while in a state of criminal incapacity induced by voluntary intoxication, thus ensuring that such individuals can still be held accountable. Therefore, Chretien is significant not only for its legal reasoning but also for its direct impact on legislative reform in South African criminal law.
Purpose:
The aim of this summary is to explain the legal principles established in S v Chretien regarding the defence of voluntary intoxication, its impact on the elements of criminal liability such as voluntariness, capacity, intention, and its role as a catalyst for subsequent legislative reform in South African criminal law.
Reference(S):
S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A)
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988
C R L de Chermont, A Critical Discussion of Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988 (LLM dissertation, University of South Africa 1998)
CR Snyman, Criminal Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2020) 194-204
South African Law Commission, Report on Offences Committed Under the Influence of Liquor or Drugs (Project 49, January 1986)
M Watney, ‘Voluntary intoxication as a criminal defence: legal principle or public policy?’ (2017) 3 TSAR 486
C H J Badenhorst, ‘S v Chretien 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A): vrywillige dronkenskap en strafregtelike aanspreeplikheid’ (1981) TSAR 185
J Burchell, ‘Criminal Law Amendment Act No 1 of 1988: Intoxication of the Chretien: parliament intervenes’ (1988) 1 SACJ 274
J M Burchell, ‘Intoxication and the criminal law’ (1981) 98 SALJ 177
J Burchell and J Milton, Principles of Criminal Law (4th edn, Juta 2014) 303-315
S Jordaan, ‘Intoxication as a multiple defence in the South African criminal law’ (2009) Aug DR 24
N Steven, ‘A critical legal perspective on statutory intoxication – time to sober up?’ (2023) OBITER 584
