R v Field, [2021] EWCA Crim 380, [2021] 1 WLR 3543 

CASE NAME AND CITATION 

R v Field, [2021] EWCA Crim 380, [2021] 1 WLR 3543 

MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE 

On 26 October 2015, Peter Farquhar (PF), an elderly man and retired English teacher, was found unresponsive at his residence by his cleaner. A bottle of 60% proof whisky was discovered on a nearby table, and a glass lay close to his feet. Acute alcohol toxicity was later confirmed to be the cause of death by a post-mortem examination. The defendant, Benjamin Luke Field, later admitted to a series of manipulative actions spanning several years. Between late 2012 and mid 2017, the defendant formed seemingly sincere and affectionate relationships with vulnerable elderly individuals, including PF and Anne Moore-Martin (AMM), both of whom he exploited for personal gain. The defendant manipulated PF into revising his will so that Field would become a major beneficiary upon PF’s death. During this time, the defendant surreptitiously administered sedative medications to PF, and created a false narrative suggesting PF was mentally unwell and suicidal due to alcohol dependence. While the defendant not only manipulated PF and AMM but was also implicated in various acts of fraud and burglaries targeting other elderly residents living in the same neighborhood. 

LEGAL ISSUE(S) 

The issue before the court is: 

• Intent to kill — Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause the death of PF? 
• Causation — Could PF’s voluntary consumption of alcohol and sedatives be seen as breaking the causal chain, especially when that act was based on deception regarding the defendant’s lethal intentions? 

LEGAL REASONING 

The following judgement of the court was handed down by Fulford LJ and there are several cases cited in the judgement. Those includes R v Dalby1, R v Hughes2, and R v Wallace (Berlinah)3.  

As the jury had reached its verdict, the judge provided clear and effective guidance by highlighting the central matter in the case. It was stated that the defendant had given the drink to the deceased with the idea of causing his death. The drink was a more than minimal cause of death, and the deceased’s choice to drink it was not made freely, voluntarily, or with full knowledge — mainly because he did not know the defendant’s actual motive. 

To fully grasp the outcome, the court explored both the mens rea and the actus reus involved,  as well as the evidence raised in trials to get to the bottom of the conviction. The mens rea was reflected in the defendant’s desire to inherit from PF’s estate. This was substantiated by the defendant’s journal entries, in which he explicitly expressed manipulative intentions. The actus reus involved the covert administration of drugs over time, which weakened PF’s health and mental clarity. At trial, the prosecution relied on evidence gathered from multiple sources, including journals kept by the defendant, accounts from his friends and family, and medical reports. A second post-mortem confirmed that the combination of alcohol and Dalmane likely enhanced the sedative effects, reducing PF’s consciousness and posing a risk to his airway. Although smothering could neither be confirmed nor ruled out, no pathological evidence supported it. Based on the evidence in hand, the prosecution argued that the defendant had a definite intention to cause PF’s death, supported by journal entries revealing his intentions and thoughts. However, as the judge emphasised, the prosecution was not based merely on the defendant leaving the bottle to tempt PF into drinking, as this alone was insufficient to prove guilt. On the other hand, summarised by the defence case, it was concluded that the defendant had urged him to consume alcohol, thereby increasing the risk to his life, rather than directly intending to kill him. Plus, it was in dispute that there was a lack of evidence to show the defendant was actually present at the time of the defendant’s death, or establish that there was an act of giving alcohol or drugs that eventually caused the death of PF. 

A pivotal question was whether the deceased’s own actions of consuming alcohol and drugs, breaks the legal chain of causation. It must consider the facts that the defendant has been deceiving him and had an intention to cause harm to the deceased. This case requires an examination of the circumstances in which the victim’s voluntary actions may override the liability of the main offender, thereby positioning the victim as the one who carried out the act and ultimately caused their own death. One common instance of such a voluntary act is submitted to be suicide. Taking into account the case of R v Kennedy (No 2)[2008] AC 269,

the decision handed down by the House of Lords in this specific case stands as the key precedent for addressing the issues raised in this appeal. This landmark case establishes that competent adults who act with full knowledge are responsible for their own decisions. According to that ruling, if the deceased knowingly consumed a dangerous mix of substances, he could be seen as the direct cause of his own death. Similarly, Lord Bingham of Cornhill also stressed this matter, stating that none of the exceptions were considered relevant or applicable to the circumstances of this case. Cited with ‘Finis for Novus Actus?’4, which considers that suggesting, urging, or persuading someone to act may influence their decision, but it does not cause their action in the same way putting a kettle on a stove causes it to boil. In contrast, the Kennedy [2008] AC 269 case was distinguished because the deceased lacked a full and informed understanding of the genuinely dangerous situation they were in. 

To further explain the legal principle, the defense used a hypothetical situation of a weak swimmer to demonstrate how the level of risk associated with an action can be influenced by the defendant’s underlying intention. If a weak swimmer is persuaded to enter deep water with the assurance of help, but the person who promised aid had no intention of assisting, liability may arise if the swimmer drowns. The concession also recognizes that the victim’s lack of knowledge about the accused’s true intention could greatly influence the nature of the action the victim decides to take. This analogy was accepted by the court as a result. Plus, the judge ought to direct the jury on the issue of causation, especially in relation to whether the victim was aware or unaware of the defendant’s true intentions. 

In conclusion, the defendant’s concealed intent to commit murder fundamentally altered the circumstances that PF found himself in. PF’s belief that he was drinking with a trusted companion, without knowing that he was being led into a dangerous situation. His judgment was compromised by both alcohol and Dalmane. PF’s involvement in the activity did not stem from a free, voluntary, and informed choice. He lacked a full understanding of the serious danger he was facing. Rather, he was manipulated into a hazardous situation by someone who intended to alter the will and cause him harm. Once the substances began to impair PF’s judgment and he deteriorated, the defendant remained passive — or perhaps even complicit. He clearly did not attempt to get medical help, having admitted that he intended to heighten the risk of PF’s death. Incorporated by the judge for the concept of “deception” in  relations to the “nature of the act”, which is a ruling delivered on 4 July 2019 regarding the charge of conspiracy to murder AMM by encouraging suicide, he stated that “a defendant’s conduct may amount to murder if he drives the victim to suicide by force, duress or deception (with the deception being as to the nature of the act encouraged) such that the suicide was not the voluntary act of the victim”. 

RATIO DECIDENDI (LEGAL RULE) 

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the matter of guilt in this type of case was one for the jury to decide the conviction of murder. While voluntary actions usually disrupt the causal chain, this is only true if the actions are informed and autonomous. In this instance, Field’s manipulative behavior and hidden agenda corrupted PF’s decision-making, so the chain of causation remained intact. 

The Kennedy principle was deemed inapplicable under these specific circumstances. The court highlighted that Field had misled PF while pretending to act out of concern, thus guiding him into an unsafe situation that ultimately led to his death. This manipulation was sufficient for upholding the murder conviction. 

OUTCOME OF THE CASE 

The defendant was found guilty of the deceased’s murder and appealed the conviction, arguing that the judge had wrongly directed the jury regarding causation. Nonetheless, the appeal was rejected, as the deceased’s conduct was not seen as breaking the chain of causation. Consequently, the defendant received a life sentence with a minimum term of 36 years, reduced by 346 days. In setting the appropriate minimum term, the court is required to consider section 240ZA of the 2003 Act, which accounts for time spent on remand. However, the judge failed to take into account the 346 days the defendant had spent in custody before sentencing. 

‘Finis for Novus Actus?’ [1989] CLJ 391, 392 

R v Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; 74 Cr App R 348, CA R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56; [2013] 1 WLR 2461; [2013] 4 All ER 613; [2014] 1 Cr App R 6, SC(E)

R v Wallace (Berlinah) [2018] EWCA Crim 690; [2018] 2 Cr App R 22, CA.

Reference(S)

1[1982] 1 WLR 425; [1982] 1 All ER 916; 74 Cr App R 348, CA

2[2013] UKSC 56; [2013] 1 WLR 2461; [2013] 4 All ER 613; [2014] 1 Cr App R 6, SC(E)

3[2018] EWCA Crim 690; [2018] 2 Cr App R 22, CA 

4[1989] CLJ 391, 392