R v Berlinah Wallace (2018)

Case Title & Citation

• Full Name of the Case: R v Berlinah Wallace (2018)
• Citation: [2018] EWCA Crim 690 (Court of Appeal); Crown Court at Bristol (Sentencing Judgment delivered on 23 May 2018)

Court Name & Bench

• Trial Court: Crown Court at Bristol
• Appellate Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
• Judge (Trial Court): The Honourable Mrs Justice Nicola Davie DBE
• Bench Type: Single Judge Bench at the Crown Court; Appellate Bench at the Court of Appeal

Date of Judgment

• Sentencing Date: 23 May (Crown Court)
• Appeal Decision Date: 21 March 2018 [2018] EWCA Crim 690

Parties Involved

• Prosecution / Appellant (on appeal): The Crown
• Respondent / Defendant: Berlinah Wallace

Brief Description

• Berlinah Wallace, the defendant, was tried for the acid attack on her former partner, Mark van Dongen. The Crown later appealed a ruling by the trial court that prevented the murder charge from reaching the jury, based on legal causation.

Introduction

• The case of R v Berlinah Wallace is one of the most disturbing and complex criminal cases in recent years, raising significant issues about causation in homicide, domestic abuse, and the use of corrosive substances as weapons. At the centre of the case was whether Wallace’s deliberate acid attack on her ex-partner, Mark van Dongen, could legally be linked to his subsequent euthanasia. The case went through both the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal, where core legal principles about causation and novus actus interveniens were considered.

Facts of the Case

• On 23 September 2015, Berlinah Wallace threw concentrated sulphuric acid on her ex-boyfriend, Mark van Dongen, while he was asleep in their shared home in Bristol after he left her for another woman. The acid caused extensive and permanent injuries, including burns to over 25% of his body, paralysis from the neck down, amputation of his left leg, and the loss of sight in one eye. Over a period of 15 months, Mark underwent intensive medical treatment, numerous surgeries, and suffered both physically and psychologically. In January 2017, Mark van Dongen elected for lawful euthanasia in Belgium.
• The attack was not spontaneous. Evidence during the trial showed that Wallace had conducted extensive online research about sulphuric acid and its effects. She had removed the warning label from the acid container, indicating deliberate concealment.
• During trial, Wallace claimed that Mark had intended to harm her by placing acid by her bedside – a claim that was rejected by the jury.
• Medical professionals testified that Mark’s suffering was beyond treatment and that his quality of life was irreparably damaged. The attack left him unable to live independently, and his appearance had been permanently altered beyond recognition.
• She had previously exhibited abusive behaviour, including throwing hot water on Mark in 2011 and making threats of self-harm to control and manipulate him emotionally.

Issues Raised

• Whether the victim’s act of euthanasia in Belgium constituted a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) that broke the chain of legal causation.
• Whether the trial judge erred in removing the charge of murder from the jury’s consideration.
• Whether the victim’s decision to end his life was a free and voluntary act sufficient to sever the causal connection to Wallace’s original act.
• Whether the doctors performing euthanasia were acting as independent agents.

Arguments of the Parties

Crown (at appeal):

• The Crown argued that Wallace’s attack was the root cause of Mark van Dongen’s death. They submitted that although euthanasia was a voluntary act, it was not an independent or unforeseeable action that severed the chain of causation. Relying on precedents such as R v Pagett, the prosecution emphasized that actions taken in response to a defendant’s unlawful conduct, even by third parties or the victim, can still be causally connected if they are lawful and foreseeable.
• The Crown emphasized that the Belgian doctors were acting within the bounds of the law, and their actions were not independent enough to break causation. The prosecution also highlighted R v Dear, where a victim reopening his wounds did not sever the causal link, reinforcing the principle that if the defendant’s act remains an operative and substantial cause, liability remains. They insisted that the matter should have gone to the jury to assess causation as a factual issue.

Arguments by the Defence (Berlinah Wallace) at trial:

• Wallace’s defence centered on the argument that Mark van Dongen’s death resulted not directly from her actions but from his autonomous decision to undergo euthanasia. They asserted that this was a free, deliberate, and informed choice that constituted a novus actus interveniens. Therefore, they contended, Wallace could not be held responsible for the death.
• Additionally, Wallace advanced an alternative narrative, claiming that Mark had set her up by placing acid by her bedside with the intent to harm her. This version was presented during her police interviews and at trial. The defense sought to depict Wallace as emotionally unstable and traumatized, citing her mental health history and previous abuse. However, this version of events was rejected by the jury based on forensic and testimonial evidence.
• Wallace also relied on the distinction between moral and legal responsibility. They argued that regardless of her role in causing the initial injuries, the law should not hold her accountable for the decision Mark made under Belgian law, particularly given that euthanasia involves formal approval by doctors.

Judgment / Final Decision

Trial Court (Crown Court):

• Wallace was acquitted of murder as the judge ruled that euthanasia broke the chain of causation.
• Found guilty under Section 29 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for applying a corrosive fluid with the intent to do grievous bodily harm.
• Sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 12 years.

Court of Appeal:

• Held that the trial judge was wrong to remove the issue of murder from jury consideration.
• Found that it was legally open to a jury to find that Wallace’s act remained a substantial cause of death.
• Emphasised that causation is a matter of fact for the jury, guided by legal principles.
• Reaffirmed that foreseeability and reasonableness of the victim’s response are key in causation assessments.

Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal in R v Wallace clarified the legal framework around causation, particularly in cases involving victim suicide or assisted dying. The court referred to R v Pagett to support the principle that an act done in execution of a legal duty does not constitute a voluntary, independent act capable of breaking the chain of causation. In Pagett, police officers returning fire did not break the chain because their actions were a foreseeable response to the defendant’s conduct.

The court also acknowledged the relevance of R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411, which established that a defendant must take their victim as they find them. In that case, the victim’s refusal of a blood transfusion on religious grounds did not absolve the defendant of liability. This supports the principle that a victim’s personal choices, even if unusual, do not break the chain of causation if they are a direct response to the defendant’s act.

Similarly, the court considered R v Dear, where a victim’s self-inflicted reopening of wounds was not held to break causation, as the original wounds remained operative. The case also drew on R v Girdler, which addressed the issue of remoteness in multiple-vehicle accidents, using foreseeability as a test.

In addition, R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38 clarified that a free, informed, and voluntary act by the victim can break causation, particularly in cases involving drug self-administration.

However, in Wallace, the Court of Appeal distinguished euthanasia from Kennedy’s context, noting that Mark van Dongen’s choice, though voluntary, was a foreseeable and direct reaction to the suffering caused by the acid attack, and therefore did not necessarily break the causal chain.

Wallace’s argument that euthanasia constituted a novus actus interveniens was rejected on the grounds that the Belgian doctors acted lawfully and compassionately under medical and legal oversight, making their actions a direct and foreseeable result of Wallace’s crime.

The judgment underlined that causation is fundamentally a question of fact. While legal guidelines may assist, it is ultimately the jury’s role to determine whether the defendant’s act substantially caused the result. The court held that removing this decision from the jury was inappropriate and a misapplication of the law.

Conclusion / Observations

R v Wallace is a landmark case that expands the legal discourse on causation, particularly in extreme cases involving assisted death. It affirms the principle that the chain of causation may remain intact even when a victim voluntarily ends their life, provided the original act remains a significant cause of death. This case also provides an important precedent in evaluating acid attacks, a crime increasingly common in the UK. However, while euthanasia is illegal in the UK, the fact that it was lawful in Belgium and carried out after medical review added complexity.

The Court of Appeal’s ruling ensures that legal accountability cannot be sidestepped simply because a victim makes a choice under excruciating circumstances caused by the defendant. The case highlights the importance of jury involvement in complex factual assessments and strengthens the prosecution’s ability to secure justice in cases of grievous violence followed by suicide or euthanasia.

Finally, R v Wallace contributes to the legal system’s ongoing adaptation to real-world complexities, particularly in balancing victim autonomy with the need to hold perpetrators accountable for the full extent of harm caused by their actions.