Matrimony.Com Limited vs Google LlC&Others

PARTIES NAME –

Complainant – A. Matrimony.com Limited

Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS)

Respondent- A. Google LLC

B.Google India Private Limited

Google Ireland Limited

BENCH-

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) issued the ruling in this case. The Benchthat heard the matter comprised the following members:

Mr. Devender Kumar Sikri (Chairperson), Mr. S. L. Bunker (Member), Mr. Sudhir Mital (Member), Mr. Augustine Peter (Member), Mr. U.C. Nahta (Member) Mr. Justice G. P. Mittal (Member).

ADVOCATES NAME-

Advocates Representing Complainant:

Senior Advocate: Harish Salve

Law Firm: Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. 

Advocates Representing Respondents:

Senior Advocate: Abhishek Manu Singhvi

Senior Advocate: K.V. Vishwanathan

Law Firm: AZB & Partners

FACT OF THE CASE-

• The case was initiated by Matrimony.com Limited (previously known as ConsimInfoPrivate Limited) and Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS). These two entities filedcomplaints against: Google LLC (the parent company headquartered in the U.S.), GoogleIndia Private Limited (Google’s Indian subsidiary), and Google Ireland Limited (anothersubsidiary handling advertising operations).
• The complaint was filed under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, whichallows any person, company, or organization to report anti-competitive practices totheCompetition Commission of India (CCI).
• The core allegation was that Google abused its dominant position in the online searchandsearch advertising markets, which led to unfair competition and harmto businessesrelying on Google’s platform.
• Google was accused of manipulating search results to favor its own services andvertical search partners over competing websites. Example: If a user searched for “flights,”Google’s own service (Google Flights) was given priority in search results overindependent travel websites. This meant that competing websites (e.g., MakeMyTrip, Yatra) received less visibility, leading to fewer visitors and potential business losses. Such self-preferring created an unfair advantage for Google’s services andharmedcompetitors.
• Google’s AdWords platform (which controls paid advertisements on searchresults)allegedly favored some advertisers over others.

Google was accused of:

a) Not disclosing Quality Scores to advertisers: The Quality Score determines howanadranks on Google search results. Advertisers claimed Google kept the scoring opaqueandinconsistent.

b) Arbitrary changes in advertising policies: Google allegedly downgraded some advertisers’ rankings unfairly, affecting their ad placements.

• Google was claimed to hold a monopoly in online search services, which allowedit tooperate independently of competitive forces.
• Google controlled both organic search results and paid advertisements, allowingit todictate market terms. Competing businesses had no choice but to comply with Google’srules, even if those rules were unfair. This limited consumer choice by reducingthevisibility of alternative services.

DIRECTOR GENERAL’S INVESTIGATION

• The Competition Commission of India (CCI) ordered an investigation under Section26(1)of the Competition Act. The DG was instructed to examine whether Google’s actionsamounted to an abuse of dominance. During the probe, Google Ireland Limited was addedas a party because of its role in Google’s advertising operations.²
• The investigation found that Google held an overwhelmingly dominant position inOnlinesearch services, with a market share exceeding 90% in India and Online searchadvertising, where Google’s AdWords platform was the primary tool for advertisers. Since businesses and consumers relied heavily on Google, it had significant control overthe digital market.
• After reviewing pertinent data, the DG concluded that Google’s primary serviceinquestion fell under the category of “Online General Web Search Services” andthat ageneral search service could not be substituted for a vertical search service or asite-specific search service. Similar to display advertising, social media advertising, email-based or mobile-based advertising, etc., “online search advertising” was very different because it is connected to user-initiated queries that reflect the user’s particular interestsinrelation to the query’s subject matter. This makes it a very effective way to target potential customers.
• Additionally, the DG concluded that “Online General Web Search Services” and”OnlineSearch Advertising” did not constitute the same relevant product market becausetheywere complimentary rather than interchangeable. Therefore, the “Market for OnlineGeneral Web Search Services in India” and “Market for Online Search AdvertisinginIndia” were the pertinent markets identified by the DG.
• The DG discovered that Google continuously maintained a high market share intherelevant markets from 2009 to 2013 after determining the relevant market usingthepreviously stated rationale. Furthermore, because of its resources, financial clout, andbusiness advantages, Google enjoyed considerable leverage in an environment whereentry hurdles were high due to factors including high cost, technology, andscalerequirements. As a result of the previously listed elements, Google became a dominatingparticipant in the market because of its position of power, which allowed it tooperateindependently of market forces.
• The DG proceeded to conclude that, in addition to Google’s market dominance, therewasstrong evidence of its misuse, as demonstrated by the following actions: a) In order to make its own specialized search services rank better than other vertical searchservices in the Search Engine Results Page (“SERP”), Google first integrated its vertical search services into the general search results in a way that was not applicable tonon-Google vertical search services. Users were impacted because they might not havebeensent to the most pertinent results for their searches. In auxiliary markets that lost out onasizable audience, it also hindered competition. When considered collectively, this wasdetermined to constitute a breach of section 4 of the Act.

b) Second, Google violated section 4 of the Act by failing to disclose quality scorestoadvertisers, even for historical data, despite the existence of necessary technology. Thisleft the entire ad placement process opaque and open to discriminatory practices.

c) Thirdly, Google had a significant edge over its rivals because it was exempt frompayingany fees for its internal advertisements. Furthermore, Google was able to rate its adshigher since it had access to the scores of its rivals. According to section 4 of theAct, Google’s checks to stop it were ruled ineffectual and constituted an abuse of its dominant position.

d) Additionally, it was discovered that Google unfairly burdened trademark ownersbypermitting rivals to bid on their trademarks as keywords. This is because, as waspreviously noted, concerned companies paid more bids for results that occupiedhigherplaces on the SERP rather than the most relevant ones. Because of the increasedbiddingfor these terms, this resulted in instances where other entities used the trademarksoftrademark owners.

The DG discovered Google’s use of its market dominance to impose restrictive conditionsonadvertising services, preventing competitors from achieving necessary scale and breakingmarket entry barriers.

Since the conditions for the supply of “Online General Web Search Services” and”OnlineAdvertising Search Services” differed from those in other places and Google held a dominant position in the relevant product market in India, the CCI agreed with the determinationof therelevant product market with the relevant geographical market being delineated as India. Additionally, it concurred with the conclusion that Google does, in fact, hold a dominant position in the pertinent markets listed above.

Prior to delving into the specifics of the abuse of dominance discovered by the DG, theCCIaddressed Google’s main objection, which was that in order for section 4 of the Act tobe applied, there had to be a sale of goods or services. However, since Google’s online searchservices were free, they would not be subject to section 4’s provisions.

The CCI vehemently disagreed with this Google argument. It concluded that by helpingtogather “Big Data” each time they used Google’s search services, customers gave the companyindirect attention, which allowed Google to draw in advertisers. Additionally, the companyreceived ad-based revenue each time customers clicked on links that Google had promoted. As a result, Google’s services were undoubtedly not free and might be subject to section4ofthe Act’s examination.

JUDGEMENT

The CCI discovered that, up until 2010, Google used a system in which the resultsofuniversal searches were fixed at predefined locations and did not accurately represent themost pertinent results for the user’s requests. As a result, the CCI concurred with the DGthat Google’s practices up to 2010 did, in fact, violate its dominant position. Regarding the use of Google’s vertical search services, the CCI also concurred withtheDGthat the prominent placement of Google’s commercial flight units at the top of flight-relatedsearch results was an example of search bias because clicking on these links tookuserstoGoogle’s own vertical sites rather than third-party ones.

Additionally, because the agreements for Google’s negotiated intermediary search servicesincluded clauses that prohibited publishers from displaying search options fromrival searchengines, the CCI concluded that Google’s actions regarding the terms that allowed publishersto display a Google search option for users on their pages demanded exclusivity. It wasdecided that this violated section 4 of the Act. ³

However, the CCI found no evidence of Google abusing its dominant position by imposingunfair terms and conditions on advertisers, using unfair mechanisms to bid for keywordsforadvertisers based on their trademarks, or imposing unfair terms related to multihoming(usingadvertising campaigns across platforms) and data interoperability across platforms. The CCI then levied a fine of INR 135.86 crores, or 5% of the average total incomethat Google made in India across all business segments between 2013 and 2015, basedontheaforementioned findings.⁴ Additionally, it ordered Google to make it clear that the commercial flight units that are prominently displayed in flight search results only take users to Google’sflight sites, not those of its rivals. Furthermore, Google was ordered to eliminatetheexclusivity-causing elements from its agreements for negotiated search intermediary services.

CONCLUSION

The Competition Commission of India (CCI)’s ruling in Matrimony.comLimited vs. GoogleLLC highlighted the anti-competitive behavior of Google in India’s digital market. Bymanipulating search results to favor its own services and imposing opaque advertisingpolicies, Google created an unfair playing field for competitors while limiting consumer choice. Theinvestigation found that Google’s dominance in search and advertising from2009to2014allowed it to operate independently of market forces, affecting businesses that reliedonfairsearch rankings and transparent advertising mechanisms.

The case set a significant precedent in India’s competition law by holding a techgiant accountable for abuse of dominance. The ₹135.86 crore fine imposed on Google servedasawarning for digital monopolies to adopt fair business practices. It reinforced the needforsearch neutrality, transparent advertising policies, and consumer-centric competition.⁵ Thisdecision also contributed to ongoing global debates on Big Tech regulation, emphasizingtheimportance of ensuring fair competition in the digital economy.

ANALYSIS

Google has recently been under investigation for violating anti-trust laws worldwide, withauthorities harshly criticizing the search engine behemoth for how it handles its searchfeatures. The European Union recently fined Google a record $2.7 billion for engaginginanti-competitive behavior. In that instance, the conclusion was well-known: Google gaveitsvertical search services, which were related to online commerce, a higher ranking insearchresults than its rivals.

Therefore, the CCI’s result is consistent with the worldwide trend. The CCI has concludedinfavor of Google on nearly all grounds, with the exception of three strictly limitedones, therefore its conclusion of anti-trust behavior on Google’s part is limited. Furthermore, giventhe enormous amount of money that the search engine behemoth makes in India, thefine levied against Google is essentially negligible. For a company with Google’s level ofresources and power, the CCI’s directives regarding the unfair display of Google’s commercial flight units and the unfair terms in its agreements for negotiated search intermediate servicesseem like lip service and are unlikely to even be considered a slap on the wrist. This case might have been a turning point in India’s drive for greater digitalization becauseofGoogle’s incredibly dynamic nature, which serves as both a marketplace for advertisers andaservice provider for customers. As more and more daily transactions move online, CCI isprobably going to see a lot more examples like this in the future. It is yet unknown, though, ifthe CCI’s position in this particular case will serve as a benchmark.

Reference(S):

¹ Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC & Others, Case No. 07 & 30 of 2012, Competition Commission of India (Feb. 8, 2018).

² Director General Report in Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC, Case No. 07 & 30 of 2012, Competition Commission of India(2016) (India).

³ Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC, Bench: Devender Kumar Sikri (Chairperson) et al., Case No. 07 & 30 of 2012, Competition Commission of India (2018).

⁴In re Google LLC, Case No. 07 & 30 of 2012, Order under § 27 of the Competition Act, 2002, Competition Commission of India, at ¶ 495 (Feb. 8, 2018) (India)

⁵ Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC, Case No. 07 & 30 of 2012, Competition Commission of India, Fine Imposed: ₹135.86crores under § 27(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 (2018).