Authored By: Harpreet Kaur
IMS Law College
- CASE TITLE & CITATION
Lillu @ Rajesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013) 14 SCC 643
- COURT NAME & BENCH
Court – Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
Bench – Justice B,S, Chauhan
Justice F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla
(Division Bench)
- DATE OF JUDGEMENT
September 9, 2013
- PARTIES INVOLVED
Appellant : Lillu @ Rajesh and another (accused of committing rape)
Two men from the state of Haryana were charged with the offence of rape on a prosecutrix, a rarely used legal term referring to a female prosecutor. They appeared before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as they challenged their conviction.
Respondent : State of Haryana
As this is a criminal offence, the state represents the prosecution, defending the conviction and supporting the rights of the victim, i.e., the Prosecutrix.
c. Victim : Prosecutrix
Raj Bala, A minor girl aged 13 years and 9 months at the time of the offence. She was subjected to the controversial two-finger test during medical examination.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In the case of Lillu @ Rajesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013), there’s an incident that was reported in the state of Haryana. There was a young prosecutrix who complained to Lillu @ Rajesh and his co-accused(2 men) that they raped her. As the incident occurred in the jurisdiction of Haryana, the police lodged the FIR and started the investigation. As per the procedure, the victim was taken to a government hospital that was in Haryana to conduct a medical examination. This very incident happened during the medical examination, was later became the main issue under this case, as under the medical procedure, the victim was subjected to the disreputable two-finger test in which fingers were inserted into her private parts to outline an opinion about the laxness of her vaginal muscles and whether she was habitual to mating.
In this case, the defence was highly based on the medical opinion, desperately attempting to discredit the prosecutrix, pleading that her testimony is not reliable as she is habituated to sexual relations. Notwithstanding, the trial court found the testimony of the prosecutrix reliable and sentenced both the accused under Section 376 (rape) of the Indian Penal Code, declining the defence argument that her history of sexual mating had no relevance to the issue of consent in the present case. Dissatisfied with the conviction, the accused approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court, but the conviction was upheld, with the Court reiterating that the two-finger test could not be decisive in rape cases.
Eventually, the matter reached the apex court-the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by way of appeal in 2013. Here, other than the criminal liability, the question raised on the two-finger test that whether this practice was consistent with her fundamental rights. The Court examined whether such a test amounted to a violation of a woman’s right to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity under Article 21 of the Constitution, and whether evidence relating to past sexual conduct was legally relevant in determining rape.
ISSUE RAISED
While raising the matter to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, two major issues emerged for consideration. The first and foremost issue is whether the use of the two-finger test in a medical examination of a survivor of rape is constitutional. This question states that subjecting a victim to this test violates her fundamental right to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This issue was of critical importance because the test, by inserting fingers into the private parts of the survivor to check the laxity of vaginal muscles, was degrading and intrusive, raising a very serious question mark about the harmony between the medical investigation and constitutional rights.
And the other question in front of the court is whether the past sexual history of the prosecutrix could be taken into account in determining consent or credibility in a rape case. In this case, the defense relied on the medical report that states the woman (victim) is habituated to sex, thus the rape allegation can be reliable. The Court was therefore called upon to decide if such considerations of a woman’s previous sexual conduct were legally relevant in deciding a charge of rape, or whether they perpetuated stereotypes that unfairly discredit survivors of sexual violence.
Together, these issues required the Court not only to assess the criminal liability of the accused but also to lay down broader principles concerning the treatment of rape survivors, the admissibility of sexual history as evidence, and the constitutional protection of women’s dignity during criminal investigations.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
a) Arguments of the appellant ( accused )
The appeal of the appellants, Lillu @ Rajesh and his co-accused, is highly reliant on the findings of the medical examination. In their defense, according to them, with relating to the medical report, the victim was “habituated to sexual intercourse,” thus the allegations of rape under section 376 IPC were not highly believable and in doubt. They defend that there was an absence of any physical injury on the victim’s body, along with the opinion of the medical examiner, the prosecution’s side becomes weaker and raises a question on the credibility of the accused as a witness. Further, they argued that the prosecutrix’s testimony should not be treated as a sufficient ground to secure a conviction, as there is a lack of a medical report in her favor; they do not support the charge of forcible sexual assault fully.
b) Arguments of the Respondent (State of Haryana)
The prosecution that represents the state of Haryana defended the conviction strongly, emphasizing the very testimony of the survivor that it was clear, constant, and trustworthy. The state replied to the appellant’s ground of argument as the absence of physical injury and the fact that the victim was “habituated to sex” does not affect the allegations of rape, as the main element of consent must be specific to the incident in question. The prosecution highlighted that the so-called “two-finger test” was not only medically unreliable but also unconstitutional, as it violated the dignity and privacy of the survivor. Further, they stated that the past sexual activity history is irrelevant in deciding the rape case, and it can’t affect the credibility of the prosecutrix. The State relied on the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Article 21 and the legislative intent reflected in Section 155(4) of the Indian Evidence Act (as amended), which bars the use of a woman’s character or previous sexual conduct as evidence in rape trials.
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the accused and upheld the conviction under Section 376 IPC, delivering a non-orthodox and significant judgment. The court soundly declared the two-finger test subject to the survivors of rape unconstitutional, stating that such practice violates the right to privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity of women guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The apex court observed that the test is only Pseudoscientific, as well as chastening and insulting to the victim, as it points to shift the blame onto the survivor rather than focusing on the crime committed by the accused with a typical stereotype.
The Court clarified that the past sexual history of the prosecutrix, including whether she was habituated to sexual intercourse, is wholly irrelevant for determining consent in the incident under trial. Consent must be judged with reference to the specific occurrence, and not based on a woman’s character or prior conduct. It further held that introducing evidence about a survivor’s sexual history is impermissible in view of Section 155(4) of the Indian Evidence Act (as amended), which clearly prohibits using a woman’s character to challenge her credibility in cases of sexual offences.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed that the two-finger test should not be conducted in rape cases by medical professionals and called upon the State to ensure that proper guidelines and sensitization measures are implemented to prevent its future use. The judgment thus not only affirmed the guilt of the accused but also established a constitutional prohibition on invasive and degrading medical procedures that compromise the dignity of women.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case rested upon the constitutional mandate of protecting the dignity, privacy, and bodily integrity of women as an essential part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that the “two-finger test,” by its very nature, subjects a woman to an intrusive and degrading procedure, which has no scientific basis for determining whether rape has occurred. The test merely attempts to ascertain whether the survivor is “habituated to sexual intercourse,” which has no connection with the issue of consent in the incident under trial.
The Court made it clear that past sexual history of a woman is immaterial in cases of rape, as consent must be specific to the particular act in question. A woman’s previous sexual conduct cannot be used to draw adverse inferences against her character or credibility. In support of this reasoning, the Court referred to Section 155(4) of the Indian Evidence Act (as amended in 2003), which expressly prohibits impeaching the credit of a prosecutrix by showing that she was of “generally immoral character.” Thus, the Court harmonized statutory law with constitutional guarantees to affirm that reliance on sexual history violates both legal principles and fundamental rights.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that rape is not merely a crime under the penal code but a violation of a woman’s fundamental right to live with dignity. It stressed that treating survivors with respect is as important as punishing offenders. By denouncing the two-finger test, the Court aligned Indian rape jurisprudence with international human rights standards, particularly the principle of protecting women from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
The ratio decidendi of this case, therefore, is that medical procedures which compromise the dignity and privacy of women—such as the two-finger test—are unconstitutional under Article 21, and past sexual history is legally irrelevant to determining consent in rape cases.
OBSERVATION
The decision in Lillu @ Rajesh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013), popularly known as the Two-Finger Test Case, is a milestone in Indian rape jurisprudence. The Supreme Court not only upheld the conviction of the accused but also issued a pathbreaking ruling that medical practices which degrade and humiliate rape survivors are unconstitutional. By striking down the use of the two-finger test, the Court reaffirmed that a woman’s right to dignity, privacy, and bodily autonomy is non-negotiable and protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The judgment also firmly established that the past sexual history of a woman has no bearing on the question of consent in a rape case, thereby dismantling long-standing stereotypes that placed women on trial instead of their perpetrators. This case has had a transformative impact on the treatment of survivors within the criminal justice system, compelling medical institutions, investigating officers, and courts to adopt more sensitive and rights-based approaches.
From a critical perspective, the ruling marked a progressive step towards aligning Indian law with international human rights principles, but its true effectiveness lies in its implementation. Despite the ban, reports suggest that the two-finger test has occasionally continued in practice due to lack of awareness and sensitization among medical professionals. Hence, the case serves not only as a constitutional safeguard but also as a reminder of the need for continuous judicial vigilance, administrative training, and social awareness to ensure that survivors of sexual violence are treated with respect and compassion.
In conclusion, this judgment represents a turning point in the fight against secondary victimization of rape survivors, and its legacy is one of restoring dignity to women within the justice system.
