Indra Sarma v. V.K.V.Sarma

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Published On: 8 Sep, 2024

Authored By: Purvi Goyal

Jagran Lakecity University , Bhopal

Case Title and Citation

  • Case Name: Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
  • Court: Supreme Court
  • Date: 26 November, 2013
  • Citation: AIR 2014 SC 309
  1. Introduction
  • The appellant, which is Indra Sarma filed a complaint against the respondent, which is V.K.V. Sarma.
  • In this case we are concerned whether a “live-in relationship” would amount to a “relationship in the nature of marriage” falling under the definition of domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the DV Act and the failing of such a relationship by failing to maintain a women involved amount to “domestic violence” within Section 3 of the DV Act.
  • Reliance was also placed in the Velusamy case had not been satisfied. The Supreme Court therefore decided not to interfere with the judgement of High Court.
  1. Facts
  • Appellant and respondent worked in the same company. The respondent was married with two children and the appellant was 33 years old and unmarried.
  • Regular communication led to a close relationship, and in 1992, the appellant quit her work and moved in with the respondent in a shared home. Both theirs family members including respondent’s wife opposed this live-in relationship.
  • Appellant became pregnant three times although all resulted in abortion. It was alleged that the respondent used to force the appellant to take contraceptive methods to avoid pregnancy.
  • Further, it was also stated that the respondent took a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the appellant stating that he would buy a land in her name, but the same was not done. Additionally, the respondent used the appellant’s money to open a beauty salon for his spouse. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the respondent borrowed Rs. 2,50,000 from her in 2006 and never gave it back.
  • It was further stated that the respondent was harassing the appellant by not exposing her as his wife publicly, or not permitting to suffix his name after the appellant. Appellant also alleged that the respondent did not take her anywhere , either to friends or relatives and he never used to accompany her to the hospital or make joint bank account.
  • The respondent’s family was against their live-in arrangement and eventually made him quit the appellant’s business; it was claimed that he did so without providing for her.
  • The appellant filed a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 claiming maintenance.
  1. Issues

The primary questions in this case concerned whether living together would qualify as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act and whether failing to support a woman in such a relationship would constitute “domestic violence” for the purposes of Section 3 of the Act.

  1. Arguments

Petitioner’s arguments

Shri Anish Kumar Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the relationship between the parties continued from 1992 to 2006 and since then, the respondent started avoiding the appellant without maintaining her. In response, learned counsel argued that their relationship qualified as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act. This provision covers any relationship in which a man and woman share a household, regardless of the respondent’s marital status. Additionally, knowledgeable counsel stated that the requirements set forth in the Velusamy case (above) have also been met.

Section 2(f) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

“(f) domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;”

The respondent’s knowledgeable attorney, Mr. Nikhil Majithia, conducted a thorough investigation into the matter and provided invaluable resources. The learned counsel cited other rulings from the Constitutional Courts of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and other nations, as well as comparable laws from other nations that addressed the same issue. The learned counsel argued that the High Court properly used the approach established in the Velusamy case (above) and that the appellant was unable to prove that their relationship qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the DV Act based on the available evidence.

In addition, the counsel argued that the appellant was aware that the respondent was already married and that the parties lacked the legal capacity to get married. Furthermore, the appellant was in a live-in relationship for mutual benefits and was not the victim of a fraudulent or bigamous marriage; as a result, the High Court correctly concluded that there had not been domestic violence, which would have qualified the appellant for maintenance under Section 3 of the DV Act.

Respondent’s arguments

Expert amicus curiae Ms. Jyotika Kalra walked us through the specifics of the DV Act and the goals and rationale behind its enactment. A knowledgeable amicus curiae argued that the Act’s goal is to safeguard women’s rights when they experience any kind of domestic violence. A learned amicus curiae further stated that the goal of the DV Act’s numerous provisions is to uphold the fundamental ideals outlined in Article 15(3) and further strengthened by Article 39 of the Indian Constitution.

A learned amicus curiae also cited the Malimath Committee report in their submission, which stated that even under Section 125 CrPC, a man who marries a second wife while the first is still alive should still be responsible for supporting her. In order to bolster her argument, the learned amicus curiae further cited a previous ruling from this Court in Deoki Panjhiyara v. Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad and Others (2013) 2 SCC 137.

Reasoning

The Domestic Violence Act was passed in order to stop domestic abuse from occurring in society and to give women a civil law recourse for becoming victims of it. Several terminology, including “aggrieved person,” “domestic relationship,” and “shared household,” are defined in the Act.

The Act also recognizes only a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship like gay or lesbian. The Act also recognizes only a “ relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simplifier. In order to determine whether a live-in relationship qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage” for the purposes of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, the court established several principles.

Decision

The High court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by lower courts. The court held that the appellant was not a victim of any fraudulent marriage and it was a live-in relationship for mutual benefits. As a result, the court determined that the appellant is entitled to maintenance under Section 3 of the DV Act since there hasn’t been any domestic abuse. The Supreme Court made it clear that, under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, a woman who moves in with a married man without realizing he is married will still be considered to be in a “domestic relationship.” As a result, the man’s failure to provide for her will be considered “domestic violence” for the purposes of the Act, and she will be entitled to reliefs like maintenance and compensation.

This case is significant because it established an uncommon exemption and pushed for laws to protect women like Ms. Sarma, whose contributions to a shared household are often overlooked.

Significance

The DV Act’s definition of “relationship in the nature of marriage” is made clearer by this decision. The court held that a live-in relationship can be considered a “relationship in the nature of marriage” if it has some characteristics of a marriage like exclusivity and monogamy. This case also highlights the need for proper legislation or amendment of the Act to regulate such types of live-in relationship upon termination or disruption.

Conclusion

It should be recognized that these partnerships can last a long time and lead to patterns of vulnerability and dependency. As these relationships grow in number, there is a need for appropriate and effective protection, particularly for the woman and any children that may come from the live-in partnership. Of course, the legislature cannot encourage premarital sex, but since these relationships can occasionally be quite intimate, citizens are free to voice their opinions—both in favor and against. Refer to S. Khushboo and others v. Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600.

References

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