Authored By: ANIK RAY
Vivekananda Institute Of Professional Studies, New Delhi
Abstract
This article critically examines the principle of cooperative federalism within the Indian constitutional and political framework. It explores whether the idea, though constitutionally enshrined, has translated into political practice or remains a rhetorical aspiration. The article analyzes constitutional provisions, judicial pronouncements, and the evolving Centre-State dynamics in contemporary governance. Drawing upon the Constituent Assembly Debates, legal precedents, and real-world policy conflicts, such as the GST rollout, agricultural reforms, and the pandemic response-it contends that while cooperative federalism was envisioned as a democratic cornerstone, its present-day status is precariously positioned between idealism and illusion. The article concludes with recommendations for institutional and legal reforms to restore genuine federal collaboration in India’s governance model.
Introduction
In a country as vast and diverse as India, federalism is not merely an administrative arrangement-it is a necessity for democratic survival. At the heart of India’s federal structure lies the ideal of cooperative federalism, where the Centre and States, rather than existing in a hierarchy, are expected to operate as partners in governance.
Yet, this principle has increasingly come under stress. From fiscal disputes and central legislative overreach to friction over emergency powers, questions are now being raised about whether cooperative federalism is a lived reality or a constitutional mirage. These tensions are not merely legal; they evoke an emotional anxiety about the erosion of India’s foundational democratic fabric.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, captured this duality when he said, “The Constitution is a federal Constitution in as much as it establishes what may be called a dual polity,” while also acknowledging that India’s model needed a strong Centre to ensure unity in diversity. This delicate balance is now under strain.
Background
India’s federal structure was not born from a compact between sovereign states. Instead, as Article 1 proclaims, India is a “Union of States.” This was a conscious choice to emphasize unity and prevent secessionist tendencies. The federal nature of the Constitution is detailed in Part XI (Articles 245–263) and the Seventh Schedule, which delineates Union, State, and Concurrent Lists.
Constituent Assembly members were acutely aware of the dangers of excessive decentralization. Yet, they also foresaw the dangers of central domination. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru emphasized during the debates: “It is not the division of powers that is important, but the spirit in which these powers are exercised.” The Constitution was thus designed to create interdependence, not friction.
Institutions like the Inter-State Council (Article 263), Finance Commission (Article 280), and mechanisms of fiscal devolution were envisioned to ensure continuous collaboration.
However, historical events like the reorganization of states in 1956, linguistic agitations, and Emergency-era centralization have shaped a federal culture that often leans toward coercion rather than consensus.
Constitutional Framework and Cooperative Mechanisms
The Indian Constitution, though centrally biased, builds room for cooperative engagement. The Inter-State Council, recommended by the Sarkaria Commission and constituted in 1990, was aimed at fostering dialogue on inter-state matters. Yet, it remains underutilized and underfunded.
The replacement of the Planning Commission with NITI Aayog in 2015 was hailed as a move toward cooperative federalism. Its governing council includes all Chief Ministers, and it emphasizes “team India.” However, critics argue it lacks financial powers and thus real influence.
Legislative coordination under Article 246 and administrative coordination under Articles 256 and 257 create opportunities for synergy, but these are often undermined by unilateral central actions.
The misuse of Article 356, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, disrupted this balance. It was only in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) that the Supreme Court declared that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, limiting the arbitrary use of President’s Rule.
The Punchhi Commission (2010) also recommended making the Inter-State Council a constitutional body and restructuring fiscal and legislative consultations. These reforms, however, remain largely ignored.
Judicial Interpretation and Federal Balancing Acts
Judicial intervention has been crucial in defining India’s federal trajectory.
In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), the Supreme Court upheld the Union’s power to acquire property even without State consent. It emphasized the constitutional supremacy of Parliament, unsettling those who hoped for equal state sovereignty.
However, S.R. Bommai reasserted the federal balance by declaring that States are not “mere appendages” of the Centre. It mandated judicial review of President’s Rule, thus restoring federal accountability.
The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) was a milestone in cooperative policy-making, requiring a constitutional amendment (101st Amendment Act). The GST Council includes Union and State representatives, and decisions are made by consensus. Yet, fiscal grievances from States, especially regarding compensation delays have reignited debates about financial federalism.
In Mohit Minerals v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court acknowledged that GST Council’s recommendations are not binding, subtly reinforcing State autonomy. This verdict was a nod to cooperative federalism’s consensual spirit.
Yet, the Centre’s enactment of three farm laws in 2020, without effective state consultation, despite agriculture being a State subject, sparked massive protests. Their eventual repeal in 2021 symbolized the backlash against central overreach and the breakdown of cooperative processes.
Political Practice and the Erosion of Federal Ethos
The disjunction between constitutional ideals and political realities is glaring.
Governors, meant to be constitutional bridges, often act as political agents of the Centre. In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Supreme Court restrained gubernatorial overreach in Arunachal Pradesh but similar issues persist in states like West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra.
The selective use of federal agencies like the CBI and ED in opposition-ruled states raises concerns of political vendetta, weakening intergovernmental trust.
Moreover, the 14th and 15th Finance Commissions have restructured fiscal federalism by increasing States’ share of tax revenues. However, conditional grants and centrally sponsored schemes continue to curtail States’ spending autonomy.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of Indian federalism. Health being a State subject, initial responses were local. Yet, the Centre’s unilateral decisions, like vaccine procurement strategy and lockdown implementation, left States scrambling for resources and clarity.
Former Chief Justice R.M. Lodha aptly stated, “Cooperative federalism is not a slogan. It is the soul of Indian democracy. Strip it, and what remains is a hollow shell.”
Analysis
The Indian federal system stands at a crossroads. While cooperative federalism is structurally embedded, its functional reality is weakened by political centralization, economic disparities, and institutional neglect.
The judiciary has at times acted as a sentinel, but its deference to Parliament and political sensitivities often curtails deeper structural reforms.
To bridge the constitutional ideal and political practice, several steps are imperative: Institutional revival of the Inter-State Council and zonal councils with clear mandates. Statutory limitations on the misuse of Article 356 and gubernatorial overreach.
Strengthening the fiscal independence of States by revisiting the role and design of the GST Council.
Institutionalizing consultative mechanisms for subjects in the Concurrent List.
Cooperative federalism must be reimagined not just as a constitutional doctrine but as a democratic culture—where dialogue replaces directives and mutual respect substitutes micromanagement.
Conclusion
The promise of cooperative federalism in Indian governance remains largely unfulfilled. While the Constitution envisioned a dynamic and balanced relationship between the Centre and States, political practices have often reduced it to tokenism. Judicial intervention has offered corrections, but systemic reforms are urgently needed.
As India prepares for deeper decentralization and participatory development, it must return to its constitutional roots. The framers offered a federal vision not out of convenience, but conviction.
Let us heed the words of Jawaharlal Nehru: “It is only when the spirit of cooperation is made real that we can survive as one nation.”
The choice is now ours—to relegate cooperative federalism to a political illusion, or to resurrect it as a living constitutional ideal.
Reference(S):
∙ India Const. art. 1.
∙ India Const. pt. XI, arts. 245–263.
∙ India Const. art. 246.
∙ India Const. arts. 256–257.
∙ India Const. art. 263.
∙ India Const. art. 280.
∙ India Const. art. 356.
∙ The Constitution of India, 1950.
∙ S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918 (India).
∙ State of W.B. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241 (India).
∙ Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, (2016) 8 S.C.C. 1 (India).
∙ Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 S.C.C. 1 (India).
∙ Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 657 (India).
∙ Constituent Assembly Debates (1946–1950), https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution assembly-debates/.
∙ Sarkaria Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations, Govt. of India (1988). ∙ Punchhi Commission, Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations, Govt. of India (2010).
∙ R.M. Lodha, Speech at National Judicial Academy Conference (2015) (transcript on file with author).
∙ NITI Aayog, Cooperative Federalism: Toolkit for Stakeholders (2017), https://niti.gov.in.
∙ Planning Commission of India, Evolution and Role, Govt. of India (Archived), http://planningcommission.nic.in.
∙ Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, 15th Finance Commission Report 2021–26 (2021).
∙ The Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 (India).
∙ Amit Kumar, Cooperative Federalism vis-à-vis Government Policies in India, 3 Int’l J. Hum. Sci. 1 (2022)
∙ B.S. Rao, India’s Emerging Co-operative Federalism, 18 Indian J. Pol. Sci. 1 (1957)
∙ K.K. Kautilya, The Working of Cooperative and Collaborative Federalism in India, 56 Indian J. Pub. Admin. 1 (2021)
∙ M. Zahiruddin, India’s Cooperative Federalism During Covid-19 Pandemic, 56 Indian J. Pub. Admin. 1 (2021)
∙ Ayushi Gupta & Aayushi Sharma, Cooperative Federalism under the Indian Constitution, Int’l J. Early Child. Spec. Educ. 14(3): 9609–9614 (2022)
∙ Nidhi Yadav, Cooperative Federalism in India, Int’l J. Innovative Res. Law (Nov. 2022) ∙ Aryan Goel, India’s Cooperative Federalism, Int’l J. Res. Pub. Rev. 5(4): 1089–1095 (Apr. 2023)
∙ S. Pal, Operative Federalism in India and Its Implications, Int’l J. Creative Res. Thoughts 6(3): 18–25 (2018)
∙ Dr. Himanshi Bhardwaj, Model of Cooperative and Competitive Federalism in India, Soc. Sci. Res. Network (SSRN) Paper No. 4201328 (2022),
