State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 481

Case Title & Citation

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025 INSC 481.

Court Name & Bench
Supreme Court of India; Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala.

Date of Judgment

Judgment delivered in 2025.

Parties Involved
Petitioner: State of Tamil Nadu, challenging gubernatorial actions on legislative assent, sanction approvals, and appointments.
Respondents: Governor of Tamil Nadu and the Union Government.

Introduction

This landmark case represents a pivotal moment in Indian constitutional jurisprudence, examining the delicate balance of powers between the Governor and the elected State Government. The dispute centered on allegations of the Governor exceeding constitutional authority by indefinitely withholding assent to state legislation, delaying sanctions for prosecution of ministers, and reserving bills for Presidential consideration even after they were re-passed by the State Legislature. The Supreme Court’s judgment is significant for clarifying Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution and reinforcing constitutional morality, federalism, and democratic governance. 

Facts of the Case

The Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed twelve bills from 2020 to 2023 that addressed significant issues, which included the regulation of higher education, welfare schemes, and reform of recruitment procedures. The Governor withheld assent from all twelve bills and reserved two for Presidential assent. After the legislature re-passed the bills with amendments, the Governor reserved all ten of the bills for Presidential assent, saying they were repugnant to central legislation under Entry 66, List I of the Seventh Schedule.

The controversy only escalated further when the Governor delayed or denied assent to several executive decisions, such as sanctions for the prosecution of several corrupt ministers, approval for premature releases of prisoners, and confirmation of several appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission [TNPSC]. The Governor additionally attempted to drop a sitting minister, V. Senthil Balaji, who was being handled by Enforcement Directorate actions, and opposed the reappointment of Dr. K. Ponmudy in light of the Supreme Court’s stay on his conviction. These events led to a writ petition filed by the State Government under Article 32, contending that the Governor’s conduct was inconsistent with his constitutional duties requiring ministerial responsibility and jeopardized democratic governance.

Issues Raised

• Whether Article 200 permits a Governor to withhold or postpone assent indefinitely, in effect exercising a pocket veto.
• Whether the Governor can reserve a bill for presidential consideration after it has been reconsidered and passed by the legislature.
• The limits of the governor’s discretion under Articles 200 and 201, and whether it can override ministerial advice.
• The scope of judicial review of any action by a governor or president in the legislative assent process.
• If the Governor’s actions violated the principles of cooperative federalism and parliamentary democracy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

Arguing on behalf of the petitioner, senior advocates Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Rakesh Dwivedi wrote that the Indian Constitution does not allow a pocket veto. Article 200 provides a constitutional obligation on the Governor to take action as soon as practicable by the phrase shall declare. In the Constituent Assembly Debates, the framers of the Constitution were explicit in opposing the premise that discretionary power be given to Governors similar to colonial administrators. 

They claimed that after the legislature had re-passed a bill, there was a constitutional duty on the part of the Governor to assent to it as provided in the proviso to Article 200. In such a case, reservation of Presidential assent was ultra vires and antithetical to the ethos of parliamentary democracy. The counsel further stressed that the exercise of all executive powers of the State is done on behalf of the Governor, but it must be founded on ministerial advice, referring to a landmark case in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab.

Respondents’ Arguments

The Governor and the Union Government contended that the Governor retained discretion to reserve bills for Presidential consideration at any stage, as supported by the precedent in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary v. Union of India. The reservation was portrayed as a constitutional safeguard to avoid legislative conflicts with central laws, especially in areas of concurrent jurisdiction. They argued that gubernatorial powers under Articles 200 and 201 are part of a broader constitutional mechanism to ensure checks and balances.

Judgment and Final Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously held that an indefinite delay in granting assent amounts to a “pocket veto,” which has no place in India’s constitutional framework. Justice Pardiwala emphasized that “as soon as possible” in Article 200 reflects a constitutional imperative for timely action. The Court ruled that a Governor cannot reserve a bill for Presidential consideration once it has been re-passed by the legislature, citing the mandatory language “shall not withhold assent.” This interpretation reinforces the importance of state-level legislation and safeguards against the misuse of constitutional checks to weaken democratic processes. 

The case also emphasized that any discretionary authority of the Governor is restricted to specific circumstances laid down in writing, and Governors generally are expected to act on ministerial advice. Judicial review was judged to be applicable to decisions of Presidential assent, particularly where it is not accompanied by reasoned orders. The Court decided that transparency and constitutional morality demanded that when a President withholds assent, he reasons why.

Legal Reasoning

In his judgment, the judge conducted a close examination of the Constituent Assembly Debates, observing that Dr. B.R. Ambedkar flatly denied any concept of gubernatorial discretion in a responsible government. The framers were mindful of the colonial past, when Governors tended to be agents of the Crown, and intentionally chose to design a system in which elected governments would be the dominant executive branch of government.

• Interpretation of Article 200

The Court analysed the words of Article 200 and its provisos, and found that the framers wanted a time-limited process. As soon as possible imposes a positive duty on the Governor not to cause needless delay. The Court also found that after re-enactment of a bill, the Governor should give assent, and no process of Presidential reservation can be initiated by the Governor since it will make the legislative override provision meaningless.

• Principle of Cooperative Federalism

The Court once again emphasized the significance of cooperative federalism and said that the role of the Governor is to serve as a constitutional head, not as a power centre. Definite reservation of consent nullifies the federal system and the will of the people represented by their elected leaders.

• Judicial Review of Presidential Assent

The Court exercised judicial review over Presidential assent, emphasizing that non-speaking orders violate constitutional principles of transparency and accountability. This reading is consistent with the basic structure doctrine and provides that executive acts can continue to be subject to judicial review.

• Precedential Analysis

The Court made a distinction between Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary and stated that its observations were obiter dicta and cannot prevail over constitutional provisions. It depended mainly on Shamsher Singh, Nabam Rebia v., and S.R. Bommai v. Deputy Speaker. Union of India to underline the pre-eminence of ministerial advice.  

Significance of the Judgment

The case is a watershed in Indian constitutional law. It also enhances democratic values, restricts discretion on the part of the governor, and enhances judicial checks and balances on the process of legislative assent. The requirement of the Court to be transparent and time-bound in decision-making eliminates loopholes that Governors used in stalling legislation. The ruling also brings much-needed sanity to the constitutional status of Governors, which brings India into a parliamentary democracy with its federal ambitions.

Conclusion

The ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu is a milestone in the constitutional jurisprudence of India, as it confirms the supremacy of democratic governance and the greatness of sound governance. The Court made plain in its rejection of the practice of a pocket veto that constitutional provisions like Article 200 place upon Governors an obligation that is mandatory and which they should follow without hesitation and in compliance with the minister’s advice. This reading supports the spirit of the framers, who conceived Governors as figureheads of the Constitution, as opposed to centers of power, to protect the federal balance of power. Judicial review has also been extended to the Presidential assent process through the judgment, which highlights the need to be transparent and accountable when taking executive action. This will reinforce the fundamental framework of the Constitution since the checks and balances will exist without compromising the legislative power. The use of precedent, constitutional debates, and the principle of cooperative federalism by the Court offers the most holistic approach towards thwarting abuse of discretion by the governors. In the future, this decision will probably become a foundation to ensure the sovereignty of the states and avoid the politicization of constitutional offices. It underlines the Indian tradition of democracy by confirming once again that elected members and not appointed servants are the real custodians of parliamentary and executive authority.