Authored By: Bhavesh tyagi
Chaudhary Charan Singh University
CASE SUMMARY: VELAMMAL v. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Citation: [Year and full citation to be verified]
Court: High Court of Madras
Bench: [Judge names to be verified]
Subject Matter: Preventive Detention – Computation of time period for service of detention order documents – Interpretation of Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Forest Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982
LEGAL PRINCIPLE: LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
The literal rule of interpretation is the primary principle of statutory construction, requiring judges to give words their ordinary, plain, and natural meaning. The purpose of interpretation is to ascertain what the statute stands for, what defect it intends to remedy, and what relief it seeks to provide. Under the literal rule, judges must consider the statute’s simple, plain meaning without introducing ambiguity.
The interpretation process involves courts seeking to ascertain the Legislature’s intent through the authoritative form in which it is expressed. In applying the literal rule, judges cannot go beyond litera legis (the letter of the law). Words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to absurdity or unless the context or object of the statute suggests a contrary interpretation.
The literal rule recognizes Parliament’s supremacy and its right to make laws, even when they may appear harsh or unjust. Under this rule, judges cannot deviate from the statute’s meaning, though the resulting decision may seem unjust. Where there is no contrary meaning within the statute, the words must be given their prima facie ordinary meaning.
FACTS OF THE CASE
On May 15, 2022, at approximately 2:00 p.m., on Kallidaikurichi Sampathimedu Road, the accused persons/detenus allegedly waylaid one Sukumar and jointly committed his murder. Subsequently, the law enforcement authority registered Crime No. 120 of 2022 for offenses under Sections 147, 148, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), later altered to Sections 147, 148, and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
On May 16, 2022, all accused persons were arrested by the law enforcement authority. Considering the gravity of the occurrence and the panic it created in the locality, the detaining authority passed a detention order based on materials furnished by the sponsoring authority through an impugned detention order dated June 8, 2022.
These Habeas Corpus Petitions were filed on behalf of the detenus, who were accused of offenses under Sections 147, 148, and 302 IPC. The detenus had been detained by the second respondent through order dated June 8, 2022, holding them to be “goondas” as contemplated under Section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Forest Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982’). The detention orders were challenged through these petitions.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether the date of detention should be included when calculating the period of five days for serving copies of documents under Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982.
- Whether the detaining authority could pass a detention order based on the likelihood of the detenu being released on bail in the future, even when no bail application was pending at the time of passing the detention order.
- Whether the delay of 12 days in considering the representation submitted by the detenus violated their right to personal liberty.
- Whether the reliance on dissimilar case bail particulars by the detaining authority demonstrated non-application of mind.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS
On the Five-Day Service Requirement:
The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, documents relied upon by the detaining authority must be furnished within five days, and this requirement was not satisfied. The detaining authority passed the detention order on June 8, 2022, but the booklet was furnished only on June 13, 2022. According to the petitioners, counting from June 8, the service was not effected within five days as required by law. They therefore prayed for quashing of the detention orders.
On Subjective Satisfaction Regarding Bail:
The learned counsel further submitted that the detenus had never filed any bail application. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenus would be released on bail was based on speculation and demonstrated non-application of mind. This rendered the detention order liable to be quashed.
On Delay in Considering Representation:
The petitioners contended that there was a delay of 12 days in considering the representation submitted by the detenus, and such delay in considering the representation hampered the personal liberty of the detenus, warranting quashing of the detention orders.
On Dissimilar Case Particulars:
The petitioners argued that the similar case bail particulars relied upon by the detaining authority to arrive at subjective satisfaction were not similar in nature, demonstrating non-application of mind. They relied on the decision in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244, to support their contention that the detention orders should be quashed.
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS
On the Five-Day Service Requirement:
The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that excluding the date of detention, the booklet was served within five days, and therefore there was no violation of Section 8(1) of the Act. The date of passing the detention order (June 8, 2022) should be excluded from the computation, making the service on June 13, 2022 compliant with the statutory requirement.
On Subjective Satisfaction Regarding Bail:
The respondent contended that the material placed before the detaining authority was sufficient to infer the imminent possibility of the detenu being released on bail. There is no legislative mandate requiring that a bail petition must be pending before a detention order can be passed. The detaining authority’s satisfaction that the detenus would likely file bail applications and be released in the near future was based on reasonable grounds and past experience in similar cases.
On Delay in Considering Representation:
The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the delay of 12 days in considering the representation was due to emergency situations arising from natural calamities. The authorities were engaged in emergency work relating to the interest of the public at large. The delay was neither willful nor wanton and should therefore be condoned.
JUDGMENT AND REASONING
The Court examined each contention systematically and delivered the following findings:
On Computation of Five-Day Period:
The Court held that when computing the period of five days as mandated under Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, the date of the detention order must be excluded, and the date of service must be included. This principle is well-established in statutory interpretation—where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day of that date is to be excluded.
The Court referred to Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which gives statutory recognition to the principle that in computing a prescribed period, the rule is to exclude the first day and include the last day. Section 9 provides that for excluding the first day in a series of days or any period of time, the word “from” is used, and for including the last day, the word “to” is used. When a period is delimited by statute using the word “from,” the opening day is to be excluded, and if the last day is to be included, the word “to” is used.
Applying this principle, the Court held:
“We are of the view that the date of detention order will have to be excluded for the purpose of calculating five days period, which has been mentioned under Section 8(1) of the Act, for communicating documents pertaining to the detention order. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner is liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected.”
In the present case, by excluding June 8, 2022 (the date of the detention order) and counting five days thereafter, the service on June 13, 2022, was within the statutory period.
On Likelihood of Release on Bail:
The Court held that preventive detention is a jurisdiction based on reasonable suspicion, and the detaining authority is required to act on reasonable apprehension. The detaining authority had concluded that the detenus had a chance to file bail applications and would likely be released on bail in the near future. If released on bail, they would act in a manner prejudicial to public order.
The Court emphasized that there is no requirement that a bail application must be pending at the time of passing the detention order. The detaining authority must only be aware that the detenu is in custody and is likely to be released on bail. The Court cited the decision in Senthamilselvi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006), where the Supreme Court held:
“Merely because no bail application was then pending is no premise to hold that there was no likelihood of his being released on bail. The word ‘likely to be released’ connotes chances of being bailed out, in case there be pending bail application or in case if it is moved in future is decided. The word ‘likely’ shows it can be either way.”
The Court further noted that whether a prayer for bail would be accepted depends on the circumstances of each case, and no hard-and-fast rule can be applied. The detaining authority’s conclusion that the detenu may be released on bail cannot be ipse dixit (a bare assertion). In this case, the detaining authority had based his subjective satisfaction on materials before him, including the fact that in similar cases, courts have granted bail. This constituted sufficient grounds for reasonable apprehension.
On Delay in Considering Representation:
The Court accepted the respondent’s explanation that the delay was due to emergency situations arising from natural calamities, which required the authorities’ attention for public welfare. The Court held that the delay was neither willful nor wanton and was therefore excusable.
On Similar Case Particulars:
The Court, after considering the role of the detenus in the murder and the adverse circumstances of the case, found no merit in the petitioners’ submission regarding dissimilar case particulars. The Court held that the principle of parity was not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
Final Order:
The Court found no merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the detenus/petitioners and dismissed all Habeas Corpus Petitions.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
Application of the Literal Rule
This case provides an important illustration of the application of the literal rule of interpretation in computing statutory time periods. Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 requires that documents be communicated to the detenu “as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention.” The Court applied the literal and natural meaning of this provision in conjunction with the principle codified in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
The well-established principle in statutory interpretation is that when computing a period prescribed by statute, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. This principle prevents inconvenience and ensures that parties have reasonable time to comply with statutory requirements. If the date of detention were included in the computation, it might result in the detenu having less than the full five days intended by the Legislature, particularly if the detention order was passed late in the day.
Preventive Detention and Reasonable Apprehension
The judgment reaffirms the principle that preventive detention is a jurisdiction based on reasonable suspicion and apprehension rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The detaining authority need not wait until a bail application is filed or granted; it is sufficient if there is a reasonable likelihood that the detenu will be released on bail and, upon release, will engage in activities prejudicial to public order.
The Court’s reliance on Senthamilselvi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) underscores that the word “likely” in the context of preventive detention connotes possibility rather than certainty. The detaining authority must base its subjective satisfaction on objective materials, including past experience in similar cases, the nature of the offense, and the circumstances surrounding the detention.
Constitutional Balance
While upholding the detention orders, the Court’s judgment reflects the constitutional balance between individual liberty (protected under Article 21 of the Constitution) and public order (a legitimate state interest under Article 22). The Court applied strict scrutiny to procedural compliance while acknowledging the preventive nature of the detention law and the authority’s need to act on reasonable apprehension to maintain public order.
The requirement of serving documents within five days serves as an important procedural safeguard, ensuring that the detenu is promptly informed of the grounds of detention and can make an effective representation. However, the Court’s interpretation—excluding the date of detention from computation—ensures that this safeguard is meaningful while not rendering the detention authority’s actions nugatory due to technical non-compliance.
CONCLUSION
The High Court of Madras dismissed the Habeas Corpus Petitions, holding that:
- The date of detention must be excluded when computing the five-day period under Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 for serving documents on the detenu.
- The detaining authority can pass a detention order based on reasonable apprehension that the detenu is likely to be released on bail in the future, even if no bail application is pending at the time.
- A delay in considering representation, when caused by extraordinary circumstances such as natural calamities requiring attention to public welfare, is excusable and does not vitiate the detention order.
- The detention orders were validly passed and procedurally compliant with the requirements of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982.
