Authored By: Amuyeoluwa Goodwill Adejumo
Kwara State University, Malete, Kwara State.
Abstract
This article critically examines the operation of plea bargaining in Nigeria, questioningwhether it serves as a tool for justice or a shield for the powerful. Although Section270of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and Section 14(2) of the EFCCAct 2004 provide the statutory basis for plea bargaining, its application in high-profilecorruption cases has attracted widespread criticism for producing disproportionatelylenient outcomes. By contrast, the Australian model demonstrates howjudicial oversight and prosecutorial guidelines can ensure fairness and transparency. Usingstatutory provisions, judicial precedents, and scholarly opinions, this article arguesthat while plea bargaining is not inherently unjust, its abuse in Nigeria undermines deterrence and public confidence. Reforms are recommended to restore its legitimacy.
INTRODUCTION
“plea bargaining is a process in criminal justice
According to Olatunbosun administration whereby the accused person agrees to plead guilty to a lesser offenceorto only one of several charges in exchange for some form of concession by theprosecutor, such as a lighter sentence, withdrawal of other charges, or both.” Accordingto Alschuler2, one of the earliest scholars on the subject, “plea bargaining is theprocessby which a criminal defendant and the prosecutor reach a mutually satisfactory disposition of a criminal case, subject to court approval, usually involving the defendant’s plea of guilty to a lesser offence or to only one of several charges inreturn3, defined plea bargainingas for concessions by the prosecutor.”In Australia, Freiberg part of a broader “negotiated justice”, stressing transparency and court supervisionassafeguards against abuse.At its core, plea bargaining is a mechanismintendedtoconserve judicial resources by reducing trial backlogs, lowering costs, and promotingefficiency. However, in Nigeria, the practice has often become a bargaining chipof theelite—protecting billion-naira thieves while petty offenders languish in jail.High-profilecases such as FRN v. Cecilia Ibru and FRN v. Lucky Igbinedion have only deepenedpublic skepticism, portraying plea bargaining as a two-tier systemof justice.. Unlikeother Jurisdictions like Australia where judicial safeguards maintain fairness andtransparency, Nigeria’s framework remains vulnerable to abuse. This article thereforeinterrogates whether plea bargaining in Nigeria serves as a tool for justice or a shieldforthe powerful, and explores reforms necessary to restore public confidence in itsus
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This article adopts a doctrinal research methodology, relying primarily on statutoryprovisions such as the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 and the EFCCAct 2004, as well as judicial precedents including FRN v Igbinedion and Barbaro v Zirilli. Scholarly works and policy reports were also consulted. A comparative approachisemployed, drawing insights from Nigeria and Australia, to evaluate whether pleabargaining functions as a tool of justice or a shield for the powerful.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PLEA BARGAIN IN NIGERIA Statutory basis
The statutory basis for plea bargaining in Nigeria is provided under Section 270of the4. The provision permits the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 prosecutor and the defendant to negotiate a plea, subject to the consent of the victim2014).3 and the approval of the court. Before endorsing such an agreement, the court must ensure that it was entered into voluntarily, that the accused understands its implications, 5 observes, this mechanism and that it serves the interests of justice. As Olatunbosun was intended to “decongest courts and speed up justice.” In addition, Section 14(2) of 6 empowers the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2004 Commission to compound offences where an offender agrees to return the proceedsofcrime or meet other conditions.
Judicial application in Nigeria
Nigerian courts have applied these provisions in several high-profile cases. In FRNv. Tafa Balogun (2005),7the former Inspector-General of Police forfeited large sumsof money and assets but was sentenced to only six months’ imprisonment. Similarly, inFRN v. Lucky Igbinedion (2008),8the former Edo State Governor, though accusedof embezzling billions, was fined a mere ₦3.5 million. In FRN v. Cecilia Ibru (2010),9theformer CEO of Oceanic Bank forfeited assets worth over ₦190 billion but alsoreceivedonly six months’ imprisonment. Finally, in FRN v. John Yusuf (2012),10the defendant, who admitted stealing ₦27.2 billion pension funds, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with an option of a ₦750,000 fine.
Policy v. Practice
These cases demonstrate that, although Section 270 ACJA was designed to promoteefficiency and reduce delays, plea bargaining in practice has been disproportionatelyapplied in corruption cases involving elites, producing lenient outcomes that erodedeterrence. While politically exposed persons enjoy minimal sentences, petty offendersface the full weight of the law, creating a two-tier justice system and fuelling publicdistrust. Consequently, plea bargaining in Nigeria is increasingly perceived as ashieldfor the powerful rather than a genuine tool of justice.11
The Australian Approach to Plea Bargaining
In contrast to Nigeria, plea bargain in Australia has no statutory basis but it’s solelydependent on common law and prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutor may acquitted or drop charges based on guilty plea the court takes strict measure toensurethat they are voluntary, fair, and consistent with public intrest. In Maxwell v. TheQueen(1996),12the High Court affirmed the legitimacy of plea bargains but underscoredthat judicial oversight was essential to protect fairness. Similarly, in Barbaro v. Zirilli (2014),13the Court ruled that prosecutors could not propose specific sentencing outcomes, thereby safeguarding judicial independence. Although the two countries purposewastodecongest court and reduce workload, Australia framework shows that they ensurefairness and public confidence.
Comparative Analysis: Tool of Justice or Shield for the Powerful?
The contrast between Nigeria and Australia undermines the dilemma as to whether pleabargain serves as a tool for justice or a shield for the powerful. In Nigeria, althoughSection 270 ACJA enacts that plea bargain for efficiency in court system, it’s applicationin high profile corruption cases like FRN v. Igbinedion and FRN v. John Yusuf showsthatefficiency has been secured in place of justice. This selective leniency undermines deterrence and entrenches inequality before the law, contrary to the constitutional guarantee of equal rights under Section 17(2)(a)14 and the prohibition of discriminatorytreatment in Section 42.15 By contrast, Australia demonstrates that plea bargaincanbalance efficiency with fairness provided that there are strong safeguards. Judicial oversight, as seen in Maxwell v. The Queen and Barbaro v. Zirilli, ensures that bargainsremain transparent, voluntary, and consistent with the public interest. The lessonfor Nigeria is clear: plea bargaining is not inherently unjust, but without meaningful judicial control, it risks becoming a tool of impunity for the elite rather than a genuine instrument of justice.
Recent Developments
Since the enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, plea bargaininghas continued to play a controversial role in Nigeria’s anti-corruption framework. TheEconomic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) still relies on it in high-profileprosecutions, particularly corruption and financial crimes. However, civil society groupssuch as the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP)16 and AmnestyInternational17 have repeatedly criticised the practice as encouraging impunity, arguingthat it reduces accountability for politically exposed persons. The Nigerian Bar 18that plea bargains in corruption cases erode Association has also raised concerns deterrence and undermine constitutional principles of equality before the law.
Recent legislative debates have also highlighted the issue. For instance, some membersof the National Assembly have proposed stricter conditions for plea agreementsincorruption cases, such as mandatory forfeiture of assets and custodial sentences without the option of fines.
Internationally, Australia has refined prosecutorial guidelines following the decisioninBarbaro v Zirilli (2014), prohibiting prosecutors from suggesting sentencing outcomesand thereby strengthening judicial independence. More recently, state jurisdictionsinAustralia have reviewed sentencing guidelines to improve transparency. These developments highlight the ongoing debate: whether Nigeria should reformits pleabargaining system to reflect international best practices or risk further erodingpublicconfidence in its criminal justice system.
Recommendations
To restore public confidence in plea bargain, Nigeria must ensure to take meaningful reforms.Firstly, by ensuring that the court adopt stricter squinty in handling pleacases,judges must by their actions and sentences ensure that bargain really servespublic intrest. Secondly, Nigeria should publish clear prosecutorial guidelines for pleabargain to ensure transparency, also terms of plea bargain as to corruption casesmust be handled in an open court. Thirdly,to prevent abuse, bargains inlarge scale corruptionmust be subject to stricter conditions. Finally, plea bargaining opportunities shouldbeextended beyond the political and economic elite to ordinary offenders, thereby reducing prison congestion and reinforcing the constitutional guarantee of equalitybefore the law under Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution.By adopting these reforms, Nigeria can learn from Australia’s experience and reposition plea bargaining as agenuine tool of justice rather than a shield for the elite.19 The judiciary, too, has begun to take a more cautiousstance, with some judges emphasising that plea bargains must be transparent andconsistent with public interest.20
Conclusion
Plea bargaining, though introduced in Nigeria to promote efficiency and decongest thecourts, has largely served the interests of the powerful, undermining deterrenceandpublic confidence. High-profile cases reveal a two-tier justice systemwhere elitesescape with lenient sentences while ordinary offenders bear the full weight of thelaw. Incontrast, Australia’s model demonstrates that judicial oversight and transparency canpreserve both efficiency and fairness. Nigeria must therefore strengthen safeguardsand adopt reforms that ensure plea bargaining functions as a tool of justice rather thana shield for impunity.
Declaration
I, Amuyeoluwa Adejumo Goodwill, hereby declare that this articleismyoriginal work submitted as part of the Record of Law International Special 2-Week Legal Internship (August 2025). All authorities, statutes, andacademic works referred to have been duly acknowledged in accordancewith the OSCOLA referencing style.
Bibliography
Table of Statutes
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (Nigeria).
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Nigeria). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
Table of Cases
Barbaro v Zirilli [2014] HCA 2, 253 CLR 58.
FRN v Cecilia Ibru (FHC, Lagos, 2010).
FRN v John Yusuf (FCT High Court, Abuja, 2012).
FRN v Lucky Igbinedion (FHC, Enugu, 2008).
FRN v Tafa Balogun (FHC, Abuja, 2005).
FRN v Mohammed Abacha (Unreported, FHC Abuja, 2019).
Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46, 184 CLR 501.
R v GAS; R v SJK [2004] HCA 22, 217 CLR 198.
Books and Articles
Albert W Alschuler, ‘The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining’ (1979) 36(1) UniversityofChicago Law Review 50.
Arie Freiberg, Fox and Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (3rdedn, OUP 2014).
Kayode Olatunbosun, ‘Plea Bargaining and the Nigerian Criminal Justice System: ACritical Appraisal’ (2015) 6(2) Journal of Sustainable Development Lawand Policy120.
Kayode Olatunbosun, ‘The Dynamics of Plea Bargaining in Nigeria: Challenges andProspects’ (2017) Journal of Law and Social Sciences 8(1).
Reports and NGO Publications
Amnesty International, Nigeria: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses (Report 2019). Nigerian Bar Association, Position Paper on Plea Bargaining in Nigeria (2019).
National Assembly of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates on the Administrationof Criminal Justice Act Reform Bill (2019).
Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), Plea Bargaining andtheRule of Law in Nigeria (Policy Brief 2018).
1 Kayode Olatunbosun, ‘Plea Bargaining and the Nigerian Criminal Justice System: ACritical Appraisal’ (2015) 6(2) Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 120.
2 Albert W Alschuler, ‘The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining’ (1979) 36(1) University of Chicago Law Review 50.
3 Arie Freiberg, Fox and Freiberg’s Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (3rd edn, OUP
4 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 270.
5 Kayode Olatunbosun, ‘The Challenges of Plea Bargaining in Nigeria’ (2017) 8(1) Journal of LawandSocial Sciences 65.
6 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004, s 14(2). 7 FRN v Tafa Balogun (2005) (Federal High Court, Abuja).
8 FRN v Lucky Igbinedion (2008) (Federal High Court, Enugu).
9 FRN v Cecilia Ibru (2010) (Federal High Court, Lagos).
10FRN v John Yusuf (2012) (FCT High Court, Abuja).
11 Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), Plea Bargaining and the Rule of LawinNigeria (Policy Brief, 2018).
12Maxwell v The Queen [1996] HCA 46, 184 CLR 501.
13Barbaro v Zirilli [2014] HCA 2, 253 CLR 58.
14Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 17(2)(a).
15Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 42
16 SERAP (n 11).
17. Amnesty International, Nigeria: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses (Report, 2019).
18 Nigerian Bar Association, Position Paper on Plea Bargaining in Nigeria (2019).
19 National Assembly of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates on the Administration of Criminal Justice Act Reform Bill (2019).
20 FRN v Mohammed Abacha (Unreported, FHC Abuja, 2019).
