Weaponizing the Law: Sanctions, Sovereignty, and Global Inequality

Abstract:

The goal of international sanctions, which are allowed by the UN Charter¹, is to preserve peace.  However, actions like the ones taken against Iraq in the 1990s often result in significant harm to  civilians and are comparable to illegal collective punishment. Furthermore, the boundaries of  international law are being blurred by the widespread unilateral sanctions imposed by nations  such as the US and the EU², which are increasingly being used as instruments of geopolitical  coercion. To ensure that sanctions effectively target regimes without endangering populations  and function within a legitimate multilateral framework, balancing peacekeeping aims with the  protection of human rights and sovereignty, reform is necessary.

Introduction

One of the most significant inconsistencies in international law is represented by sanctions.  Though their legitimacy is constantly questioned, they have evolved into a common tool of  statecraft from being envisioned as a peaceful instrument under the UN Charter. From the  devastating humanitarian consequences in Iraq during the 1990s to the major unilateral steps  against Russia and Iran, the past is worrying. Sanctions often result in extreme hardship for  civilians, which sets off the collective punishment prohibited by international law.

This conflict between theory and practice leads to an unsolvable problem. Even if UN Security  Council-authorized measures have a clear legal foundation under Article 41³, the emergence of  unilateral sanctions makes it difficult to distinguish between lawful diplomacy and overt global  pressure. The ways in which these regimes can turn into tools of economic warfare that harm people more than legislators have been painstakingly documented by academics such as Joy Gordon⁴. To ensure that future actions are both morally and legally sound, the international  community must reform a system that aims for peace, but all too often achieves the opposite.

Legal Framework for Sanctions

In significant cases, the reach and boundaries of this authority have been examined. The  International Court of Justice (ICJ) offered temporary remedies in the Lockerbie cases (1992)⁵,  but in the end, it emphasized the UNSC’s considerable discretion under Chapter VII, showing a  customary deference to its political mandate. In the 2008 case Kadi v. Council of the EU ⁶(Kadi),  the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the imposition of UN sanctions against a  person for lack of due process and adequate judicial protection, proving a more critical judicial  approach. A growing demand that even UNSC resolutions adhere to fundamental rights  standards was brought to light by this historic decision.

Academic analysis further clarifies these tensions. Christine Gray, in International Law and the  Use of Force⁷, recognizes the extensive discretionary powers of the UNSC but warns that these  powers are not boundless. Bardo Fassbender⁸and others have thoroughly examined the  constitutional conflict between the security prerogatives of the UNSC and the necessity of  safeguarding human rights.

In significant cases, the reach of this authority has been examined. ICJ offered temporary  remedies in the Lockerbie cases (1992), but in the end, it emphasized the UNSC’s considerable  discretion under Chapter VII, proving a customary deference to its political mandate. In the 2008  case Kadi, the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the imposition of UN  sanctions against a person for lack of due process and adequate judicial protection, showing a  more critical judicial approach. A growing demand that even UNSC resolutions adhere to  fundamental rights standards was brought to light by this historic decision.

These contradictions are further clarified by academic analysis. In International Law and the Use  of Force, Christine Gray acknowledges the UNSC’s broad discretionary authority but cautions  that it is not unlimited. The constitutional tension between the UNSC’s security authority and the  need to protect human rights has been extensively studied by Bardo Fassbender and others.

The evolution of judicial review, as proven by Kadi, shows that this authority is gradually  coming under legal scrutiny, even while legal doctrine strongly recognizes the legitimacy of  UNSC-mandated sanctions. The validity of a sanction regime is therefore more complex than  checking boxes under Chapter VII. According to its adherence to the spirit of international law,  true legitimacy is earned in practice. This implies that a government must show that it respects  state sovereignty in practical terms and, above all, offer strong protections for the fundamental  rights of common people, who are far too often the unintentional victims of geopolitical  conflicts.

UN Sanctions on Iraq (1990s)

The early 1990s sanctions targeting Iraq proved how legal actions can turn into collective  punishment, undermining the legitimacy of the Security Council. The Council passed Resolution  661 (1990) in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, enacting broad economic penalties intended  to compel withdrawal and adherence to disarmament obligations. These penalties were imposed  by Article 41 of the UN Charter⁹, and their legality was undeniable.

For civilians, the application was disastrous. Widespread starvation resulted from shortages of  food, medication, and clean water brought on by import restrictions. According to UNICEF,  sanctions were a contributing factor in the deaths of more than half a million Iraqi children by  the late 1990s¹⁰. Humanitarian organizations documented persistent shortages of food and  crumbling health systems, which disproportionately affected civilians who were not responsible  for Iraq’s violence.

Analysis from scholars has been critical. Joy Gordon describes the Iraq sanctions system as “the  most severe humanitarian impact in modern history”¹¹ in her 2010 book Invisible War. Others,  like Thomas Weiss¹², contend that by not differentiating between government and civilian  populations, such indiscriminate penalties effectively breached core humanitarian norms.

This experience reveals a clear conclusion that although the punishments were legally  permissible under the Charter, they violated the standards of proportionality and humanitarian law, undermining the Council’s moral authority. By punishing an entire population instead of  elites, the actions raised the possibility of illegitimacy.

Iraq serves as an example of how legitimacy and legality are not the same thing; sanctions must  be carefully crafted to prevent them from turning into a kind of collective punishment.

Smart Sanctions

The goal of transitioning from broad embargoes to targeted or “smart” sanctions was to reduce  humanitarian suffering, but it has also brought to light current issues with accountability and due  process. Smart sanctions, aimed at political figures, businesses, or terrorism suspects, are  different from broad trade bans. They involve travel restrictions, asset freezes, and arms  embargoes.

This shift is supported by the legal framework, which grants the Security Council significant  authority to impose measures “not involving armed force” under Article 41 of the UN Charter.  However, case law shows that these penalties are liable to be reviewed under fundamental rights.  Due to the insufficiently effective means of challenge, the Court of Justice of the European  Union invalidated the application of UN terrorism sanctions in Kadi v. Council of the EU (2008;  2013). The Court ruled that even when carrying out Security Council resolutions, proper  procedures and judicial protection are crucial.

The use of smart punishments displays both potential and limitations. Resolution 1970 in Libya  (2011) ¹³ limited collateral civilian harm by prohibiting regime leaders from traveling and  freezing their assets. On the other hand, the UN terrorism lists have unfairly categorized  thousands of people and organizations, often using secret intelligence, and have left those  affected with few options.

These issues have been highlighted by academics. While Christina Eckes draws attention to the  “due process deficit” that threatens legitimacy¹⁴, Erika de Wet contends that the Security Council  is constrained by human rights standards and jus cogens¹⁵.

In summary: Smart sanctions exposed major transparency gaps in global governance by diverting  the focus to individual rights violators while reducing collective punishment.

Russia Sanctions (2014–Present)

The tactical importance and risks of using economic measures as a political weapon are both  proved by the sanctions placed on Russia since 2014. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine  and takeover of Crimea, Russia’s veto of the Security Council immobilized the UN Security  Council. Wide-ranging unilateral sanctions were enacted in response by the US, the EU, and  allies.

These actions hindered energy exports, froze the assets of billionaires near the Kremlin, targeted  Russia’s financial system, and frozen central bank reserves. These were imposed unilaterally,  which raises concerns about their legitimacy under international law in contrast to UN authorized sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter. Although the ICJ hasn’t made a formal  ruling on sanctions of this scale, the Nicaragua v. United (1986)¹⁶ States ruling’s principles of  sovereignty and non-intervention point to restrictions on harsh economic measures.

The application has been important. The Russian economy shrank significantly in 2022,  according to IMF reports¹⁷, and sanctions caused supply lines around the world to break down.  European inflation was aggravated by energy constraints, while worldwide food poverty,  especially in underdeveloped nations, was made worse by limitations on grain exports.  Therefore, even if sanctions were successful in limiting Russia, they had unanticipated  humanitarian consequences that extended beyond the targeted state.

That tension is reflected in research. Russia sanctions, according to Anne van Aaken (2022),  highlight the political strength of group action outside the Security Council¹⁸, but she also  highlights their structural potential risks and legal ambiguity.

In conclusion, the efficiency and risk of sanctions on Russia are shown by the fact that, despite  the harm they cause to people around the world and the strained legal framework, their use is  nevertheless motivated by political necessity.

The Legal and Moral Limits of Sanctions

In terms of international law, sanctions fall somewhere in the middle: they are legitimate when  approved by the Security Council but questionable when implemented by a single person. The  conflict between influence, legitimacy, and legality is proved by case studies of Russia and Iraq.

Resolution 661’s sanctions against Iraq were ethically questionable but legally sound. They were  widespread and long-lasting, wreaking havoc on populations and causing malnourishment,  illness, and lethal collective punishment. Despite having multilateral support, the humanitarian  cost damaged the UN’s reputation and highlighted the dangers of direct economic pressure.

A more modern example, however, is provided by Russia, which responded to aggression in  Ukraine with concerted, unilateral sanctions that were not approved by the Security Council.  These actions were economically damaging and politically effective, sending a message of  international contempt. However, they defy recognized legal wisdom and represent an expanding  trend of economic weaponization that is not bound by explicit legal frameworks.

These trends highlight a problem of legitimacy. According to Thomas Franck¹⁹, compliance  declines when legal action is not seen as fair. In a similar vein, Philip Alston²⁰ cautioned that  unilateral sanctions often blur the boundaries between coercion and diplomacy in favor of power  politics rather than legal principles.

An essential dilemma appears sanctions can limit aggressors without resorting to military force,  making them vital. However, their strategic deployment and humanitarian consequences run the  risk of compromising international order, extending the boundaries of legality, and escalating inequality.

In conclusion, sanctions are important but unpredictable tools. Their growing influence in global  leadership highlights unresolved conflicts between morality, legitimacy, and the law, requiring  more precise standards and changes to support their credibility.

Reform

To balance the peacekeeping role of sanctions with sovereignty and human rights, they must at  once be reformed. Strengthening Security Council supervision is the first step. To ensure  proportionality and minimize harm to civilians, mandatory humanitarian impact evaluations  before and during sanctions could help avoid a recurrence of the events in Iraq. To prevent  indefinite measures, the Council should also set deadlines and review procedures.

Second, restrictions must be placed on unilateral sanctions. The U.S.’s extraterritorial sanctions  against Iran serve as an example of how national actions can erode sovereignty and cause instability in the global system. More legal clarity would result from codifying more precise  customary standards that distinguish between legitimate countermeasures and coercive excess.

Third, strong due process safeguards are required for targeted punishments. According to the  Kadi jurisprudence, independent review panels could offer listed individuals significant remedies  while striking a balance between fundamental rights and global safety.

Reform is necessary in spite of the challenges. Sanctions could be used as legitimate means for  achieving a balance between justice, sovereignty, and legality, but they will remain politically  charged and discredited in the absence of fundamental changes.

Conclusion

Although sanctions are still vital tools for maintaining world peace, their use as a weapon  compromises their validity and legality. The Security Council has the power to enforce them  under the UN Charter, but Iraq revealed their terrible humanitarian effects. While unilateral  actions against Russia and Iran stretched sovereignty and international stability, targeted  sanctions lessened aggregate harm but created gaps in the due process. Sanctions are essential  alternatives to war, but when they are applied improperly, they turn into instruments of economic  warfare. To refrain from portraying unjustified authority as opposed to lawful order, they must  change to provide proportionality and human rights protections.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Legislation

• Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI

Case Law

• Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14
• Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) EU:C:2008:461
• Lockerbie Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) [1992] ICJ Rep 3

Secondary Sources:

UN Resolutions:

• UN Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661
• UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970

Books:

• Fassbender, Bardo (ed), Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (Oxford University Press 2011)
• Gordon, C. Joy, ‘Smart Sanctions Revisited’ (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 315–35 • Weiss, Thomas G (ed), Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2000)
• Anne Van Aaken and Iulia Motoc, European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law (Oxford University Press 2018)
• Gordon J, Invisible War : The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Harvard University Press 2012) • Gray C, International Law and the Use of Force (OUP Oxford 2008)
• Franck, Thomas M, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) •

Journal Article/ Reports:

• Fassbender, Bardo, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process: The Responsibility of the UN Security Council to Ensure That Fair and Clear Procedures Are Made Available to Individuals and Entities Targeted with Sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’ (Study commissioned by the United Nations Office of  Legal Affairs, 2006
• Court C, ‘Iraq Sanctions Lead to Half a Million Child Deaths’ (1995) 311 BMJ 1523 • Alston, Philip, ‘“A Neo-Colonial Sanctions Regime”: The UN and the Sanctions Against Iraq’ (1999) 13 European Journal of International Law 735
• de Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004) Websites:
• IMF, ‘Russian Federation and the IMF’ (IMF2023) <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/RUS> • Moret E, ‘Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions in Crisis: Implications of Their Rising Use and Misuse in Contemporary World Politics’ (www.elgaronline.com17 August 2021) 19<https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781839107849/9781839107849.00009.xml>

¹ Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.

² Erica Moret, ‘Unilateral and Extraterritorial Sanctions in Crisis: Implications of Their Rising Use and Misuse in  Contemporary World Politics’ (www.elgaronline.com17 August 2021) 19 <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781839107849/9781839107849.00009.xml>.

³ UN Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/661.

⁴ C. Joy Gordon, ‘Smart Sanctions Revisited’ (2011) 25 Ethics and International Affairs 315. ⁵Lockerbie provisional measures (1992) ICJ Rep p 3.

⁶ Kadi I [2008] ECR I‑6351.

⁷ Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (OUP Oxford 2008).

⁸ Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Role for Human Rights in the Decision‑Making Process of the Security Council’, in  Bardo Fassbender (ed), Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (Oxford  University Press 2011) 74.

⁹ UN Charter art 41.

¹⁰ C Court, ‘Iraq Sanctions Lead to Half a Million Child Deaths’ (1995) 311 BMJ 1523.

¹¹ Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Harvard University Press 2012). ¹² Thomas G Weiss (ed), Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Rowman  & Littlefield Publishers 2000).

¹³ UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970.

¹⁴ Christina Eckes, ‘The Due Process Deficit in Targeted Sanctions: Legitimate Expectations of Fair Procedures in  EU and UN Sanctions Regimes’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 487.

¹⁵ Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004) 183–85.

¹⁶ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ  Rep 14.

¹⁷ IMF, ‘Russian Federation and the IMF’ (IMF2023) <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/RUS>.

¹⁸ Anne Van Aaken and Iulia Motoc, European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law (Oxford University Press 2018).

¹⁹ Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990) 19–20.

²⁰ Philip Alston, ‘“A Neo-Colonial Sanctions Regime”: The UN and the Sanctions Against Iraq’ (1999) 13  European Journal of International Law 735, 745.