Authored By: James Dunne
Maynooth University
Adverse possession (AP) law seeks to protect land interests for those who factually occupy land for a substantial period of time, regardless of who has the paper title to the land. Many see this as a flagrant breach of the rights of landowners to quietly possess the land they have title to in whatever way they see fit. However, on appeal from the ECHR decision in Pye v UK which found that AP law was contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR (right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions); the Grand Chamber held that while AP interferenced with Conventions rights, it was a proportionate and permissible interference, upholding the doctrine of adverse possession, finding that AP was compliant with ECHR. This study will illustrate the key policy justifications for this doctrine as well as the necessity for reform, as provided by the Law Reform Commission in a 2002 report.
There are five main justifications for adverse possession’s importance to policy.
- Certainty and Finality of Title
Land disputes can be plagued by ambiguity when titles have been long disregarded or forgotten. Adverse possession promotes legal certainty by resolving long-standing gaps or disputes in ownership by ensuring that once a statutory limitation period has passed (as of the Statute of Limitations 1957, those periods are 12 years in normal circumstances, 30 for state property, and 60 for foreshore land). This policy can be justified as it acts to promote the secure transfer of property to those who have a factual interest in the land. The limitation periods ensure that true owners cannot be blindsided by such a rule, as because if land has not been acted upon in a way that constitutes ownership by the owner themselves for 12 continuous years, it is just that a case is made that the land ownership is sufficiently questionable, especially where someone else’s occupancy factually amounts to ownership. However, expert critisism still sees focus on adverse possession laws ability to affect land rights in a way that hinders ownership (Williams and Brown, 2010). So, we must question whether the societal benefits outweigh the potential harm to landowners.
- Efficient Use and Development of Land:
It is an ideal of the state, dictated through the governing statute, that it is fair to give rights to those putting land to productive use where it has been neglected or abandoned. Idle land like this should be capable of transferring to the owner actually using it. The law also prevents land from remaining idle due to unresolved ownership or defective title that creates perpetual legal uncertainties, as it prioritizes those who have continued actual use of the land in reality rather than allowing disputed titles to render the land useless to anyone. Yet, some argue that the potential negative effects of efficient use can incentivise damage to land by those seeking opportunities to exploit land in ways that do not lead to genuine positive development (Sprakling, 1994).
- Correction of Title Defects and Mapping Errors:
AP law allows for a quick and effective mechanism where land ownership is disputed in cases of accidental encroachment, boundary disputes or incomplete conveyance. By giving effect to people who have used the property for a considerable amount of time, AP law can resolve long technical disputes that may be subject to interpretation of historical records that are prone to error.
- Stabilizing Leasehold Possession (LRC Recommendations):
Changes were recommended by the LRC to increase protection for those in AP of leasehold land, where statutory parliamentary conveyance would be re-introduced to create a legislative framework to protect possessors from landlords who seek to forfeit the lease for breaches of the terms that the adverse possessor was unaware of.
Further changes to AP law through following the recommendations of the LRC could open up the possibility for land held (especially leasehold) to be used in the market, enabling land conveyance, investment and property development by the adverse possessor.
- Social and Moral Reality
Many default to thinking of AP law as a way of protecting “land thieves”, who can take the right to property away from the true owner. However, this is not the case in many circumstances, where the law in reality is used by those who seek to hold on to family land that is unintentionally taken from them through succession law regulation, people who act in good faith but are punished because of inaccuracy in mapping/property lines, people who have occupied land that has been left derelict/abandoned, and people who suffer from inaccurate/defective title documentation.
People should not assume the purposes of these laws so quickly, as the limitation periods and level of proof needed by adverse possessors could be seen as too harsh in many cases (for the adverse possessor), as it allows for an extremely low bar for land owners to prove possession (Dunne v Iarnród Eireann 2016 says that minimal acts of ownership will be sufficient to prove landowner possession) as well as the significant amount of time needed before the adverse possessor can even make a claim.
There remains a moral discomfort with the doctrine, and its mechanistic nature which can be seen as harsh on the landowner or the squatter, depending on what side of the fence you stand on. There are scholars who recognise this and advocate for reforms that allow the judicial bodies to take a more nuanced view of the law that better balances the interests of good-faith possessors and non-negligent owners (Conway and Stannard, 2013).
Conclusion
Adverse possession, though sometimes viewed controversially, serves key legal, social, and economic functions. Through adverse possessions careful application, we can enusre that it supports human rights obligations, ensures efficient land use, and allows for certainty in land markets. To protect these rights while accounting for all other relevant factors by following advice from the Law Reform Commission’s recommendations, a balanced, modernized framework that protects both sqautters’ interests and individual property rights can be developed further. Adverse possession’s ability to protect certainty of title and to promote effective use is not yet complete, as gaps in the law’s ability to prevent damage to good-faith actors is still heavily questioned, so continued assessment of the doctrine is needed to ensure its applicabilty is fair.
Reference(S):
Cases:
Dunne v Iarnród Éireann [2016] IESC 47.
J.A, Pye (Oxford) LTD v. The United Kingdom App No 44302/02 (ECHR 15 November 2005).
Legislation:
European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 1, Article 1.
Statute of Limitations 1957, s 18, s 19 (b)
Secondary Sources:
Carol Necole Brown and Serena M Williams, ‘Rethinking Adverse Possession: An Essay on Ownership and Possession’ (2010) Alabama Law Scholarly Commons, Faculty Scholarship Working Paper 33 https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=fac_working_papers accessed 29 July 2025.
John G Sprankling, ‘An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession’ (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 816 https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=facultyarticles accessed 29 July 2025.
Heather Conway and John Stannard, ‘The emotional paradoxes of adverse possession’ (2013) 64(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 75 https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/article/download/335/238/718 accessed 29 July 2025.
Law Reform Commission, Report on Title by Adverse Possession of Land (LRC 67-2002, December 2002).
