Authored By: Marysowjanya Bandi
INDIRAPRIYADARSINI LAW COLLEGE ANDRAKESARY UNIVERSITY
Case title
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India)
Citation
AIR 2015 SC 1523; Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 OF 2012
Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice R.F. Nariman
Date of Judgment
24 March 2015
Provision Challenged
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000
Parties involved
Petitioner:
A law student and the main petitioner who filed a writ petition under article 32 of the constitution of India challenging the constitutionality of section 66A of the information technology Act, 2000.
Other petitioners joined later, including:
People’s union for civil liberties(PUCL)
Common cause(a public interest organization)
Center for internet and society
Internet freedom foundation.
Respondent:
Union of India(UOI) Represented by the ministry of communicational and information technology defended the constitutional validity of section 66A,section 69A,related provisions
Facts of case
This case arose after the arrest of two women in Maharashtra over a Face book post that criticized a political leader. They were booked under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, The provisions were challenged in the Supreme Court, in a series of writ petitions by individuals (Shreya Singhal), NGOs (People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Common Cause), and companies(Mouthshut.com). The various petitions were clubbed together and heard by a two-judge bench of Justices Chelameswar and Nariman. 2000. The incident led to a national debate about free speech and the misuse of vague legal provisions in the digital space.
Issues
- Does Section 66A violate the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution?
- Is the provision unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary?
- Can the section be saved under the “reasonable restrictions” allowed by Article 19(2)?
Arguments of parties
Petitioner’s Submissions
Section 66A is vague, overbroad, and prone to misuse due to undefined terms like “grossly offensive” or “annoying.”
It creates a chilling effect on free speech.
It does not fall under any of the permissible grounds under Article 19(2). Respondent’s Contentions
The provision was essential to prevent cyber abuse, hate speech, and online defamation. Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions.
Misuse by authorities can be prevented through executive guidelines rather than judicial invalidation.
Judgment
The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional. It held that the provision was vague, subjective, and allowed for arbitrary application, failing the tests under Article 19(2). The Court reaffirmed that vague laws regulating speech violate constitutional principles.
In a 52-page judgement, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66-A of the Information Technology Act, read down Section 79 of the Information Technology Act and the related rules, and affirmed the constitutionality of Section 69A of the Act.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Nariman discussed the various standards which are applicable to adjudge when restrictions on speech can be deemed reasonable, under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that Section 66-A was vague and over-broad, and therefore fell foul of Article 19(1)(a), since the statute was not narrowly tailored to specific instances of speech which it sought to curb. Importantly, the Court also considered the ‘chilling effect’ on speech caused by vague and over-broad statutory language as a rationale for striking down the provision. Further, the Court held that the ‘public order’ restriction under Article 19(2) of the Constitution would not apply to cases of ‘advocacy’, but only to ‘incitement’, specifically incitement which has a proximate relation to public disorder.
On the equal protection challenge Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Court held that “we are unable to agree with counsel for the petitioners that there is no intelligible differentia between the medium of print, broadcast and real live speech as opposed to speech on the internet. The intelligible differentia is clear – the internet gives any individual a platform which requires very little or no payment through which to air his views.”
The Supreme Court further read down Section 79 and Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines, under the Act, which deals with the liability of intermediaries, mostly those which host content and provide online services. Whereas the Section itself uses the term ‘receiving
actual knowledge’, of the illegal material as the standard at which the intermediary is liable for removing content, the Court held that it must be read to mean knowledge received that a Court order has been passed asking it to take down the infringing material.
Finally, the Court also upheld the secret blocking process under Section 69A of the Act, by which the Government can choose to take down content from the Internet, holding that it did not suffer from the infirmities in Section 66A or Section 79, and is a narrowly drawn provision with adequate safeguards.
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
- This batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India raises very important and far-reaching questions relatable primarily to the fundamental right of free speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The immediate cause for concern in these petitions is Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. This Section was not in the Act as originally enacted, but came into force by virtue of an Amendment Act of 2009 with effect from 27.10.2009. Since all the arguments raised by several counsel for the petitioners deal with the unconstitutionality of this Section it is set out hereinbelow:
“66-A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.-Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.
Legal resoning/ratio decidendi
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 made it a punishable offence for any person to send ‘grossly offensive’ or ‘menacing’ information using a computer resource or communication device. The provision also made it punishable to persistently send information which the sender knows to be false for annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will. Additionally, Section 66A made it punishable to send an ‘electronic mail message’ for the purpose of causing annoyance, or inconvenience, or to deceive or to mislead the recipient about the origin of the message.
The vague and arbitrary terms used in the Section led to much misuse of both personal and political nature, with several criminal cases being instituted against innocuous instances of online speech, including political commentary and humour. Section 66A and 79 of the IT Act, as well as rules made under the Act created an onerous liability regime for internet intermediaries.
Key Observations
Doctrine of Vagueness: Penal laws must be clear and unambiguous.
Chilling Effect: The threat of prosecution for undefined offenses suppresses free expression.
Mere “annoyance” or “inconvenience” is not a valid ground to criminalize speech. ∙ Possibility of misuse is not a ground to uphold a bad law.
Post-Judgment Developments
Despite the judgment, Section 66A continued to be invoked.
In 2021, PUCL and Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) filed applications showing hundreds of ongoing cases under the repealed provision.
The Supreme Court reiterated that all such prosecutions must cease.
Notable Related Case
X Corp v. Union of India (Karnataka HC, 2025): Challenged content blocking under Section 79(3)(b), citing Shreya Singhal for due process principles.
Conclusion
This is a landmark judgment in Indian constitutional law.
It set strong safeguards for freedom of expression online.
Reaffirmed the importance of precision in penal statutes.
Frequently cited in cases involving intermediary liability and internet regulation.
Shreya Singhal is a milestone in upholding digital rights in India. It underscores that any restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored, precise, and constitutionally valid. The case continues to serve as a foundational precedent in the age of online discourse.
India has powerful constitution. It gave great freedom to individual through fundamental rights. It is every one’s right. No Act or section can violet the fundamental rights. These case one’s again prove that. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which cause the violation of the fundamental right the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1) (a) that is unconstitutional. The courts always show their efforts in protect and implementation of constitutional laws. The chance of violation the immediate action will be procced.
The technology and innovations leading the current generation. It is essential that the fundamental rights and the constitutional acts are implemented in techno world. With maintaining some strict precautionary measures. Otherwise technology leads to cyber crimes. There must be take strict guidelines in usage of technology. This avoid the rate of cybercrimes.
The atmost care essential for safeguard the misuse of the fundamental rights.Implimentation of the limitations towards usage of rights.
This case is the one of the evidence that the judiciary system always protect the constitution and rights.The constitution is the basic foundation for India maintain peace and prosperity