THE LEGALITY OF SILENCE: SHOULD GLOBAL INACTION AND PROFIT IN  MASS ATROCITIES BE CRIMINALISED

Abstract:

The international legal framework governing mass atrocities, from genocide and war crimes to forced  displacement and starvation, to toucher and sexual violence, and crimes against humanity focuses primarily  on direct perpetration while inadequately addressing the culpability of states, corporations, and institutions  that remain silent or profit from such crimes. This article examines the legal and moral imperative to  criminalize global inaction and profiteering in the context of contemporary mass atrocities, including the  ongoing crisis in Gaza, the Rohingya genocide, Uyghur persecution, and conflicts in Sudan, Congo,  Ethiopia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Through doctrinal analysis of international treaties, jurisprudence from  the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC), and examination of  corporate complicity in arms sales and resource extraction, this article argues that current international law  contains critical gaps that enable mass atrocities through systematic silence and profit-driven complicity.  The analysis demonstrates that while the Rome Statute, Geneva Conventions, and customary international  law establish obligations to prevent and punish atrocities, enforcement mechanisms remain inadequate,  particularly regarding state inaction and corporate accountability. This article proposes specific legal  reforms, including amendments to the Rome Statute to establish corporate criminal liability, enhanced  universal jurisdiction mechanisms, and new treaty frameworks criminalizing willful inaction by states and  profit-making entities during mass atrocities.

Introduction

The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed unprecedented codification of international  humanitarian law and human rights protections, yet mass atrocities continue to occur with alarming  frequency and scale. From the ongoing genocide in Gaza¹to the systematic persecution of Uyghurs in  Xinjiang,²the international community’s response has been characterized by legal paralysis, diplomatic  inaction, and in many cases, continued economic and military cooperation with perpetrating states. This  pattern of global silence and profit-driven complicity raises fundamental questions about the adequacy of  international legal frameworks and the moral foundations of state sovereignty.

The legal architecture established through the United Nations Charter,³ Geneva Conventions,⁴and Rome  Statute⁵creates binding obligations for states to prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Article I of the Genocide Convention explicitly requires states not merely to punish genocide, but to  “prevent” it,⁶ while the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine establishes that sovereignty entails  responsibility for protecting populations from mass atrocities.⁷ Similarly, Article 28 of the Rome Statute  establishes command responsibility for failure to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates.⁸ However, these  legal obligations have proven insufficient to address the systematic ways in which global inaction and  profiteering enable and perpetuate mass atrocities. The UN Security Council’s paralysis in addressing crises  in Syria, Myanmar, and currently Gaza demonstrates how institutional structures can become complicit  through inaction. Simultaneously, corporations continue to profit from arms sales, resource extraction, and  financial services that directly enable atrocities, as evidenced by continued weapons exports to Saudi Arabia  during the Yemen conflict⁹and corporate involvement in surveillance technology used against Uyghurs.¹⁰

This article argues that international law must evolve to criminalize not only direct perpetration of mass  atrocities, but also the systematic silence and profit-making that enables their commission and continuation.  Such criminalization is both legally justified under existing principles of complicity and command  responsibility, and morally imperative given the scale of preventable suffering enabled by global inaction  and corporate complicity.

Methodology

This article employs doctrinal legal analysis to examine the adequacy of existing international legal  frameworks in addressing global inaction and profiteering during mass atrocities. The research methodology  is primarily analytical and normative, drawing upon treaty interpretation, international jurisprudence, state  practice, and scholarly commentary to identify gaps in current law and propose reforms.

Primary sources include foundational treaties such as the UN Charter, Geneva Conventions, Genocide  Convention, and Rome Statute, analyzed through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ interpretive  framework.¹¹ Judicial decisions from the International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, and ad  hoc tribunals provide authoritative interpretations of state obligations and individual criminal responsibility.  Key cases examined include Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (ICJ, 2007),¹² Prosecutor v.  Krstić (ICTY, 2001),¹³ and ongoing proceedings in The Gambia v. Myanmar (ICJ)¹⁴ and various ICC  investigations.

Secondary sources encompass UN reports, particularly from Special Rapporteurs and Commissions of  Inquiry, academic scholarship on international criminal law and state responsibility, and civil society  documentation of corporate complicity in mass atrocities. This interdisciplinary approach enables  examination of both legal doctrine and practical implementation challenges in contemporary conflicts.

The Global Landscape of Ongoing Mass Atrocities

1. The global community’s failure to act decisively is evident in the ongoing suffering across multiple crises. In Palestine (Gaza), over 61,200 people have been killed with about 80 % civilian casualties as legal accountability efforts such as ICC arrest warrants continue to face political obstacles.¹⁵
2. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, protracted resource-driven conflict has led to an estimated six million deaths and produced some of the world’s highest displaced populations.¹⁶ 3. In Sudan, the violence in West Darfur has claimed over 15,000 lives, and nearly 11 million people have been displaced since 2023.¹⁷
3. In Ukraine, following the 2022 Russian invasion, more than 30,000 civilians have died and around 14 million people have been uprooted.¹⁸
4. The Rohingya in Myanmar have experienced systematic violence recognised as genocide; more than 24,000 were killed and nearly one million driven into exile.¹⁹
5. In Yemen, nearly a decade of conflict has resulted in over 377,000 deaths, primarily from indirect causes like starvation and disease, and left 17 million people facing food insecurity.²⁰ 7. In Syria, after over 14 years of civil war, UN figures estimate more than 500,000 deaths and 14 million displaced or refugees.²¹
6. Similar atrocities and impunity also grip Mali, Ethiopia, and violations against Uyghurs in China, where mass suffering continues amid deep legal and political voids.²²
7. Legal Framework for Addressing Inaction and Profiteering
8. Treaty-Based Obligations and State Responsibility

The international legal framework establishing state obligations to prevent mass atrocities begins with the  UN Charter’s foundational commitment to protecting human rights and maintaining international peace.²³ Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force, whilst Articles 55 and 56 create binding obligations for states to  promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms’.²⁴ These  provisions establish not merely negative duties to refrain from violations, but positive obligations to actively  protect human rights within and beyond state borders.

The Genocide Convention’s Article I obligation requires states to ‘undertake to prevent and to punish’  genocide,²⁵ creating what the ICJ has characterised as both territorial and extraterritorial duties. In the  Bosnia v Serbia case, the Court emphasised that the duty to prevent genocide applies regardless of whether  the state has ‘clear causal links’ to the genocidal acts, establishing that states must use all means reasonably available to prevent genocide wherever it may occur.²⁶ This interpretation creates potential criminal liability  for officials who knowingly fail to exercise available preventive measures.

The Rome Statute’s framework for individual criminal responsibility extends beyond direct perpetration to  encompass various forms of complicity and omission. Article 25(3)(c) criminalises ‘[f]or the purpose of  facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its  attempted commission’,²⁷ whilst Article 28 establishes command responsibility for superiors who fail to  prevent or punish crimes by subordinates.²⁸ These provisions create potential pathways for prosecuting state  officials and corporate executives whose inaction enables mass atrocities.

The Geneva Conventions establish additional frameworks relevant to corporate and state complicity.  Common Article 1 requires states to ‘respect and to ensure respect’ for the Conventions ‘in all  circumstances’,²⁹ creating obligations that extend beyond a state’s own conduct to encompass ensuring  compliance by other actors, including private entities operating within their jurisdiction. Article 1(1) of  Additional Protocol I explicitly extends this obligation to ensuring respect by ‘other parties to the conflict’,³⁰ establishing clear legal grounds for prosecuting those who enable violations through provision of weapons,  financing, or other material support.

Contemporary examples demonstrate the inadequacy of current enforcement mechanisms. During the  ongoing crisis in Gaza, multiple states have continued arms transfers to Israel despite credible allegations of  genocide and war crimes,³¹ whilst corporate entities maintain business relationships that directly enable  military operations in occupied territories. Similarly, the international response to the Rohingya genocide  was characterised by diplomatic inaction even as evidence of systematic atrocities mounted, with states  prioritising economic relationships with Myanmar over legal obligations to prevent genocide.³²

Corporate Responsibility and Customary International Law

The evolution of customary international law has increasingly recognised corporate entities as subjects of  international legal obligations, particularly regarding human rights and humanitarian law violations. The UN  Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights establish that corporations have independent  responsibilities to respect human rights and avoid complicity in violations,³³ whilst the Alien Tort Statute in  US domestic law has enabled prosecution of corporate entities for violations of international law.³⁴

Corporate complicity in mass atrocities takes multiple forms that current international law inadequately  addresses. Arms manufacturers and exporters directly enable war crimes through weapons sales to  perpetrating states, as evidenced by continued exports to Saudi Arabia during its campaign in Yemen³⁵ and to various parties in the Syrian conflict. Technology companies provide surveillance equipment used in the  systematic persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, with documented evidence of corporate collaboration in  implementing digital apartheid systems.³⁶ Financial institutions facilitate atrocities through money  laundering and sanctions evasion, whilst extractive industries profit from conflict minerals and resources  controlled through mass displacement and violence.

The case of corporate involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates these dynamics clearly.  Multiple international corporations have been documented as purchasing conflict minerals extracted through  forced labour, including child soldiers, yet face no criminal liability under international law.³⁷ Similarly, in  Mali and the Sahel region, extractive industries continue operations that directly benefit from and contribute  to mass displacement and ethnic violence, whilst their home states maintain diplomatic and economic  relationships that prioritise profit over protection of civilian populations.³⁸

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, establishes that  when states fail to protect their populations from mass atrocities, the international community has a  collective responsibility to take action through diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means.³⁹ However, R2P’s implementation has been undermined by Security Council paralysis and selective  application based on geopolitical considerations rather than legal obligations.

• Judicial Interpretation and Precedential Development
• International Court of Justice Jurisprudence on State Obligations

The ICJ’s jurisprudence has progressively expanded understanding of state obligations to prevent mass  atrocities, though significant gaps remain in enforcement mechanisms. The landmark Bosnia v Serbia decision established that the duty to prevent genocide is ‘not territorially limited’ and applies whenever a  state learns of serious risk of genocide, regardless of geographical proximity or political relationships.⁴⁰ The  Court emphasised that states must employ ‘all means reasonably available’ to prevent genocide, including  diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and other non-forcible measures.

However, the Court’s analysis revealed critical limitations in current law. Whilst finding that Serbia violated  its obligation to prevent genocide at Srebrenica, the ICJ imposed no meaningful consequences beyond  declaratory relief, demonstrating the inadequacy of current enforcement mechanisms.⁴¹ The decision also  established restrictive standards for proving state complicity, requiring demonstration of ‘specific intent’ and  direct causal links that are difficult to establish in cases of systematic inaction or indirect support.

The ongoing Gambia v Myanmar case provides another crucial test of international law’s capacity to address  state-sponsored mass atrocities. The ICJ’s provisional measures order requiring Myanmar to prevent  genocidal acts against the Rohingya⁴² demonstrates the potential for legal intervention, yet Myanmar’s  continued violations with impunity illustrate the limits of judicial remedies without robust enforcement  mechanisms. The case also highlights how corporate complicity—including telecommunications companies enabling hate speech dissemination and financial institutions facilitating military operations—remains  beyond the Court’s direct jurisdiction.

In the recent South Africa v Israel case, the ICJ again confronted questions of state obligations during  ongoing mass atrocities. The Court’s provisional measures order requiring Israel to prevent genocidal acts in  Gaza⁴³ represents significant legal development, yet the continued provision of military aid and diplomatic  support by third states demonstrates persistent gaps in implementation of international legal obligations.

International Criminal Court Developments and Individual Responsibility

The ICC’s jurisprudence has gradually expanded concepts of individual criminal responsibility, though  corporate liability remains excluded from the Rome Statute’s framework. The Court’s interpretation of  command responsibility in cases such as Prosecutor v Bemba has established that superiors can be held  criminally liable for failing to prevent or punish crimes by subordinates when they knew or should have  known of the risk.⁴⁴ This precedent creates potential pathways for prosecuting corporate executives and state  officials whose inaction enables mass atrocities.

The Court’s recent arrest warrants demonstrate both the potential and limitations of international criminal  law. The March 2023 warrant for Vladimir Putin regarding the deportation of Ukrainian children⁴⁵ represents unprecedented prosecution of a sitting head of state, yet Russia’s non-cooperation illustrates  enforcement challenges. Similarly, the November 2024 arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant regarding alleged war crimes in Gaza⁴⁶ demonstrate the  Court’s willingness to pursue high-level accountability, whilst highlighting the political constraints on  international justice.

The ICC’s investigation into the situation in Sudan, initiated following the Security Council’s referral,⁴⁷ provides another lens for examining corporate complicity issues. The Court’s focus on crimes committed in  Darfur has documented extensive involvement of private military contractors and extractive industries in  facilitating mass atrocities, yet these corporate actors remain beyond the Court’s jurisdiction due to the  Rome Statute’s limitation to natural persons.

In the Krstić case at the ICTY, the Court established important precedents regarding knowledge and  foreseeability in command responsibility cases. The Court found that commanders can be held liable not  only for crimes they specifically ordered, but also for foreseeable consequences of their orders or  omissions.⁴⁸ This standard could theoretically apply to corporate executives and state officials who authorise  arms transfers or maintain business relationships despite knowledge of ongoing atrocities.

The ICC’s preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine, which evolved into a formal investigation,  has highlighted the complex issues surrounding corporate complicity in settlement activities and military operations in occupied territories. Whilst the Court has not yet pursued corporate executives directly, its  analysis of the legal framework governing business activities in occupied territory demonstrates potential  avenues for future accountability mechanisms.⁴⁹

Regional Courts and Universal Jurisdiction Developments

Regional human rights courts and domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction have pioneered  innovative approaches to addressing complicity in mass atrocities. The European Court of Human Rights  has established that states have positive obligations to prevent and investigate human rights violations,  including extraterritorial obligations in certain circumstances.⁵⁰

German courts, exercising universal jurisdiction under the International Crimes Code  (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), have prosecuted Syrian officials for torture and murder, establishing precedents for  holding state officials accountable regardless of where crimes occurred.⁵¹ These cases demonstrate how  domestic legal systems can fill gaps in international enforcement, though they remain limited by practical  constraints on arresting and prosecuting foreign officials.

French courts have similarly pursued cases against corporate executives for complicity in genocide, most  notably in proceedings against executives of Lafarge SA for allegedly supporting terrorist organisations in  Syria.⁵² Whilst ultimately unsuccessful, these cases illustrate growing recognition that corporate actors can  bear criminal responsibility for enabling mass atrocities through business operations in conflict zones.

Critical Analysis: Gaps and Inadequacies in Current Legal Framework

Institutional Paralysis and Enforcement Deficits

The most significant challenge facing international law’s response to mass atrocities is the systematic  paralysis of enforcement mechanisms, particularly within the UN Security Council. The Council’s  permanent members’ veto powers have repeatedly prevented effective action in response to mass atrocities,  transforming a mechanism designed to maintain peace into an obstacle to accountability. Russia’s vetoes  regarding Syria,⁵³ the United States’ protection of Israel,⁵⁴ and China’s blocking of action on Myanmar⁵⁵ demonstrate how geopolitical considerations override legal obligations.

This institutional paralysis creates a culture of impunity that extends beyond direct perpetrators to  encompass enabling actors. When states observe that systematic violations of international law proceed  without consequences as in Syria, where chemical weapons attacks continue despite clear legal  prohibitions⁵⁶ they receive implicit authorisation to prioritise political and economic interests over legal  obligations to prevent atrocities.

The ICC’s limited jurisdiction further exacerbates enforcement deficits. The Court can only prosecute  individuals from states parties or situations referred by the Security Council, creating significant impunity  gaps. The United States, Russia, and China remain outside the Rome Statute system, whilst their citizens and officials face no meaningful risk of prosecution regardless of their role in enabling mass atrocities. This  selective justice undermines the universal character of international humanitarian law and creates perverse  incentives for powerful states to remain outside legal accountability mechanisms.

Corporate Impunity and Profit-Driven Complicity

The exclusion of corporate entities from international criminal law represents perhaps the most significant  gap in addressing contemporary mass atrocities. The Rome Statute’s limitation to natural persons reflects  outdated conceptions of international legal personality that fail to account for corporate power in the modern  global economy. Multinational corporations often possess resources and influence exceeding those of many  states, yet face no meaningful criminal liability for enabling or profiting from mass atrocities.

This impunity gap is particularly evident in arms trade relationships that continue despite clear evidence of  war crimes. European and American weapons manufacturers have continued supplying Saudi Arabia  throughout its campaign in Yemen, despite documented targeting of civilians, starvation tactics, and other  violations of international humanitarian law.⁵⁷ The legal framework governing arms exports relies on state  licensing systems that prioritise commercial interests over human rights obligations, creating systematic  enabling of atrocities through private actors.

Corporate involvement in the persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang demonstrates how technological  capabilities can enable unprecedented scales of oppression. Major technology companies have provided  surveillance systems, biometric identification tools, and artificial intelligence platforms that facilitate the  systematic detention and persecution of over one million people.⁵⁸ Yet these corporations face no criminal  liability under international law, whilst their home states maintain economic relationships that implicitly  endorse continued cooperation with perpetrating regimes.

The extractive industries’ role in conflict minerals and resource extraction further illustrates profit-driven  complicity. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, multinational corporations continue purchasing minerals  extracted through forced labour, including child soldiers, whilst in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, extractive  operations have continued despite mass displacement and ethnic targeting.⁵⁹ These economic relationships  provide direct financial incentives for continued violence whilst generating substantial profits for corporate  actors who remain beyond accountability mechanisms.

Comparative Analysis with Domestic Legal Systems

Domestic legal systems offer instructive models for addressing gaps in international law, particularly  regarding corporate criminal liability and superior responsibility. German criminal law’s concept of  Organisationsdelikte (organisational crimes) enables prosecution of corporate entities for systematic  violations, whilst the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act demonstrates how extraterritorial jurisdiction can  address corporate misconduct with international implications.⁶⁰

The principle of universal jurisdiction, as implemented in jurisdictions such as Belgium, Spain, and  Germany, provides potential mechanisms for addressing impunity gaps in international law. However, political pressure from powerful states has resulted in significant restrictions on universal jurisdiction  legislation, as seen in Belgium’s amendment of its universal jurisdiction law following US pressure  regarding cases involving American officials.⁶¹

Domestic civil litigation mechanisms, such as the Alien Tort Statute in the United States and similar  provisions in other jurisdictions, have enabled some accountability for corporate complicity in mass  atrocities. Cases such as Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum and Nestlé USA, Inc v Doe have established  important precedents whilst also revealing the limitations of civil remedies in addressing criminal conduct.⁶²

The European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive represents an innovative approach  to preventing corporate complicity in human rights violations, requiring companies to identify and address  adverse human rights impacts in their operations and supply chains.⁶³ Whilst falling short of criminal  liability, such regulatory frameworks demonstrate potential pathways for enhanced corporate accountability.

• Recent Developments and Emerging Advocacy
• International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants and Jurisdictional Expansion

The ICC’s recent arrest warrants mark significant developments in international criminal accountability,  though they also highlight persistent limitations. The Court’s warrant for President Putin regarding forced  deportation of Ukrainian children represents the first prosecution of a sitting head of state for mass  atrocities, establishing precedent for accountability at the highest levels of government.⁶⁴ However, Russia’s  non-cooperation and continued violations demonstrate the gap between legal determinations and practical  enforcement.

The November 2024 arrest warrants for Israeli officials Netanyahu and Gallant regarding alleged war crimes  in Gaza constitute another watershed moment, representing the first ICC warrants against officials from a  Western-aligned democracy.⁶⁵ The warrants’ focus on starvation tactics, targeting of civilians, and collective  punishment establish important precedents for prosecuting state-sponsored mass atrocities, whilst also  generating unprecedented political backlash that threatens the Court’s legitimacy and operations.

The ICC’s expanding investigation into the situation in Sudan, following the outbreak of conflict in April  2023, demonstrates the Court’s capacity to respond rapidly to emerging crises.⁶⁶ The investigation’s focus on  ethnic targeting in Darfur and broader violations across Sudan provides opportunities to address both direct  perpetration and enabling conduct by state and non-state actors.

Recent preliminary examinations and investigations have also begun addressing corporate complicity more  systematically. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s policy paper on case selection and prioritisation explicitly  identifies business actors as potential subjects of investigation when their conduct contributes to or enables  crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.⁶⁷

Civil Society Advocacy and Legal Reform Initiatives

International civil society organisations have increasingly focused on developing legal mechanisms to  address corporate complicity and state inaction in mass atrocities. The Coalition for the International  Criminal Court has advocated for amendments to the Rome Statute to include corporate criminal liability,  whilst organisations such as the International Commission of Jurists have developed detailed proposals for  enhanced accountability mechanisms.⁶⁸

The establishment of independent investigative mechanisms, such as the International, Impartial and  Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM) and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar  (IIMM), represents innovative approaches to documentation and accountability that bypass Security Council  paralysis.⁶⁹ These mechanisms have systematically documented corporate complicity in mass atrocities,  creating evidentiary foundations for future prosecutions under expanded legal frameworks.

Regional initiatives have also gained momentum, particularly within the European Union. The proposed  Corporate Accountability Directive would establish mandatory human rights due diligence requirements for  multinational corporations, whilst civil liability mechanisms enable victims to seek remedies in European  courts for overseas violations.⁷⁰ These developments create precedents for more comprehensive international  frameworks.

Academic institutions and legal scholars have contributed through initiatives such as the Draft Convention  on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, which includes provisions addressing state  obligations and potential corporate liability.⁷¹ The International Law Commission’s work on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity similarly explores enhanced accountability mechanisms that could  address current impunity gaps.

Media investigations and journalistic documentation have played crucial roles in exposing corporate  complicity and state inaction, particularly through collaborative efforts such as the Pandora Papers and  Paradise Papers investigations that revealed financial networks enabling mass atrocities.⁷² These  investigations provide evidentiary foundations whilst generating public pressure for legal reform.

UN General Assembly and International Legal Development

The UN General Assembly has increasingly served as an alternative forum for advancing accountability  when the Security Council remains paralysed. The establishment of the International Residual Mechanism  for Criminal Tribunals and various investigative commissions demonstrates institutional innovation within  existing legal frameworks.⁷³

The Assembly’s adoption of Resolution 377A (‘Uniting for Peace’) procedures in response to crises such as  the situation in Gaza represents potential pathways for bypassing Security Council vetoes, though  enforcement mechanisms remain limited.⁷⁴ These developments highlight growing recognition that  institutional paralysis must not preclude legal accountability for mass atrocities.

Recent General Assembly debates on corporate accountability have produced increasingly detailed  recommendations for enhanced legal frameworks, including specific proposals for amending the Rome  Statute and developing new treaty instruments addressing business and human rights violations.⁷⁵ Whilst  non-binding, these recommendations establish political foundations for future legal development.

• Suggestions and Way Forward
• Proposed Legal Reforms and Institutional Mechanisms

The criminalisation of global inaction and profiteering in mass atrocities requires comprehensive legal  reforms addressing both substantive law and institutional mechanisms. The most urgent priority is amending  the Rome Statute to include corporate criminal liability, enabling prosecution of business entities whose  conduct contributes to or enables international crimes. Such amendments should establish clear standards for  corporate mens rea, including wilful blindness and reckless disregard for foreseeable consequences of  business operations in conflict zones.⁷⁶

Enhanced universal jurisdiction mechanisms offer another pathway for addressing impunity gaps. States  should adopt comprehensive universal jurisdiction legislation enabling prosecution of both individual and  corporate actors for complicity in mass atrocities, regardless of territorial connections. The Belgian and  German models provide instructive frameworks, though political safeguards must be strengthened to prevent  interference with legitimate prosecutions.⁷⁷

A new international treaty specifically addressing business complicity in mass atrocities could supplement  existing frameworks whilst avoiding the political difficulties of amending the Rome Statute. Such a treaty  should establish mandatory due diligence obligations for multinational corporations, criminal liability for knowing complicity in international crimes, and extraterritorial jurisdiction for home states over their  corporate nationals’ overseas conduct.

Institutional reforms must address Security Council paralysis through mechanisms such as the ‘Uniting for  Peace’ procedure and automatic referral triggers when the Council fails to act on credible evidence of mass  atrocities. The proposed UN Security Council reform eliminating permanent member vetoes in mass atrocity  situations represents the most comprehensive solution, though political feasibility remains limited.⁷⁸

Enforcement Mechanisms and Deterrence Strategies

Effective enforcement requires coordinated strategies combining criminal prosecution, civil liability,  economic sanctions, and reputational consequences. States should establish specialised prosecutor offices  with expertise in corporate complicity and international crimes, whilst developing victim compensation  mechanisms funded through corporate criminal penalties and asset forfeiture. Financial regulatory frameworks must be enhanced to prevent money laundering and sanctions evasion that  enable mass atrocities. The EU’s proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive provides a model for mandatory supply chain monitoring, whilst the US Treasury’s sanctions programmes demonstrate  potential deterrent effects when systematically applied.⁷⁹

International cooperation mechanisms require strengthening to ensure effective evidence gathering and asset  recovery in transnational cases. Mutual legal assistance treaties should be expanded to cover corporate  criminal liability, whilst international financial intelligence sharing must be enhanced to track illicit financial  flows supporting mass atrocities.

Strengthening International Solidarity and Legal Activism

The moral imperative underlying international humanitarian law demands renewed commitment to universal  human dignity transcending narrow state interests. Legal activism must be supported through enhanced  funding for civil society organisations, protection for human rights defenders, and systematic capacity  building in affected regions.

International legal education must emphasise corporate accountability and state responsibility doctrines,  whilst professional organisations should adopt ethical guidelines prohibiting complicity in mass atrocities  through legal or business services. Bar associations and corporate governance bodies bear particular  responsibility for establishing professional standards that prioritise human rights over profit maximisation.

Global coalitions of states committed to accountability must be strengthened through initiatives such as the  Global Alliance for the Future of Food and similar frameworks addressing business and human rights. These  coalitions can implement coordinated sanctions, establish alternative enforcement mechanisms, and generate  political pressure for institutional reform.

Academic institutions should prioritise research on corporate complicity and institutional accountability,  whilst developing practical tools for implementing enhanced legal frameworks. Law clinics and pro bono  programmes should focus on transnational accountability cases that test and develop evolving legal  doctrines.

Conclusion

The international legal framework governing mass atrocities faces a fundamental crisis of legitimacy rooted  in systematic gaps between legal obligations and enforcement mechanisms. Whilst the Rome Statute,  Geneva Conventions, and customary international law establish clear duties to prevent and punish genocide,  war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the persistence of global inaction and profit-driven complicity in  contemporary atrocities from Gaza to Xinjiang demonstrates the inadequacy of current approaches.

This article has argued that international law must evolve to criminalise not only direct perpetration of mass  atrocities, but also the systematic silence and profit-making that enables their commission and continuation.  The legal foundations for such criminalisation exist within current doctrines of complicity, command  responsibility, and state obligations to prevent international crimes. However, realisation of these principles  requires comprehensive reforms addressing corporate criminal liability, institutional paralysis, and  enforcement mechanisms.

The evidence presented—from continued arms sales enabling war crimes in Yemen and Gaza, to corporate  collaboration in the persecution of Uyghurs, to institutional inaction regarding genocide in Myanmar— demonstrates that legal silence regarding enablers and profiteers effectively sanctions mass atrocities through systematic impunity. This pattern transforms international law from a protective framework into a  façade legitimising selective justice based on geopolitical power rather than universal human dignity.

The path forward requires unprecedented political will to prioritise human rights over narrow state and  corporate interests. Legal reforms must be accompanied by institutional changes that eliminate veto powers  in mass atrocity situations, establish corporate criminal liability, and create robust enforcement mechanisms  independent of political interference. Only through such comprehensive transformation can international law  fulfil its foundational promise to protect human dignity and prevent the repetition of mass atrocities that  continue to devastate populations across the globe.

The stakes of this legal evolution extend beyond technical questions of jurisdiction and procedure to  fundamental questions about the kind of international order we seek to construct. An international legal  system that tolerates systematic inaction and profit-driven complicity in mass atrocities ultimately becomes  complicit in those very atrocities, undermining the moral foundations upon which international law’s  legitimacy depends. The choice facing the international community is therefore clear: transform international law to address these realities, or accept responsibility for the preventable suffering that such  inaction inevitably enables.VI

Bibliography

A] Treaties and International Instruments

• Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC § 1350 (1789)
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• UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ‘Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/42/CRP.5 (16 September 2019) • UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) • UN General Assembly, ‘Business and human rights’ UN Doc A/RES/78/162 (19 December 2023) • UN General Assembly, ‘Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’ UN Doc A/RES/78/268 (26 February 2024)
• UN General Assembly, ‘Uniting for peace’ UN Doc A/RES/377(V) (3 November 1950) • UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report’ UN Doc S/2023/990 (15 December 2023)
• UN Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) • UN Human Rights Council, ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/RES/39/2 (27 September 2018)
• UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Mali: Situation of human rights’ UN Doc A/HRC/54/27 (28 August 2023)
• UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1593 (2005)’ UN Doc S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) • UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1966 (2010)’ UN Doc S/RES/1966 (22 December 2010) • UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ‘Opinion No 35/2020 concerning Dolkun Isa (China)’ UN Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2020/35 (28 August 2020)
• UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Visit to China: Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ UN Doc A/HRC/47/39/Add.1 (11 June 2021)

G] UN Security Council Draft Resolutions

• UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2019/756 (vetoed by Russia and China, 19 December 2019)
• UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2022/577 (vetoed by China, 22 July 2022) • UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2023/1028 (vetoed by United States, 8 December 2023)

H] ICC and Prosecutor Documents

• ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation’ (15 September 2016)
• ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Statement of Prosecutor Karim AA Khan KC on the Situation in Sudan’ (4 May 2023)
• ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Statement on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine’ (20 December 2019)
• Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001)

I] Organisation Reports and Documentation

• Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Uyghurs for Sale: “Re-education,” Forced Labour and Surveillance Beyond Xinjiang (March 2020)https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale
• Campaign Against Arms Trade, UK Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia (12 April 2022) https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/uk-arms-to-saudi-arabia/
• Human Rights Watch, China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region (26 February 2018) https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region
• Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art (June 2006) https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/06/27/universal-jurisdiction-europe/state-art
• Human Rights Watch, Yemen: Events of 2023 in World Report 2024 (Human Rights Watch, 2024) https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/yemen
• International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability (2021) https://www.icj.org/corporate-complicity-and-legal-accountability-vol-1/
• International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Panama Papers (2016) https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/ accessed 15 January 2025
• International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Pandora Papers (2021) https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/ accessed 15 January 2025
• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Report of the Investigation and Identification Team Regarding the Incident in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018 (DOC S/1867/2020) (1 March 2020)https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/s-1867-2020%28e%29.pdf
• Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers Database (2024) https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers accessed 15 January 2025
• Syrian Network for Human Rights, Annual Reports and Chemical Weapons Reports (2025) https://snhr.org/blog/category/report/thematic-reports/weapons/chemical-weapons/
• U.S. Department of Justice, Corporate Enforcement Policy (Criminal Division) (June 2025 update) https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-fraud/corporate-enforcement-policy
• Amnesty International, Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity (1 February 2022)https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/
• B’Tselem, A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid (12 January 2021)https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid
• Campaign Against Arms Trade, UK Arms Exports to Saudi Arabiahttps://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/uk-arms-to-saudi-arabia/.
• Corporate Accountability Lab, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (19 July 2021) https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2021/7/19/corporate-complicity-in-international-crimes
• Human Rights Watch, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution (27 April 2021)https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid and-persecution
• Human Rights Watch, Yemen: Events of 2021 (13 January 2022)https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/yemen
• International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability: Report Volume 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path (2008)https://www.icj.org/corporate-complicity-legal-accountability-volume-1/
• International Crisis Group, The Economic Drivers of the Gaza Conflict (25 October 2023) https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/easternmediterranean/israelpalestine/economic-drivers-gaza-conflict
• UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Yemen: UN Experts Point to Possible War Crimes by Coalition and Houthis (3 September 2019)https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/09/yemen-un-experts-point-possible-war-crimes coalition-and-houthis
• United Nations News, Gaza: 70% of Civilian Infrastructure Destroyed or Damaged, Says UN (5 July 2024)https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1151446

J] Academic Sources

Ratner SR, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law  Journal 443

¹ South Africa v Israel (Application of the Genocide Convention in the Gaza Strip) (Order on Provisional Measures) [2024]  ICJ Rep 86. South Africa v Israel, Order of 26 January 2024, para 86 <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf> accessed 25 July 2025.

² UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ‘Opinion No 35/2020 concerning Dolkun Isa (China)’ UN Doc  A/HRC/WGAD/2020/35 (28 August 2020).

³ Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 2(4).

⁴ Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered  into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287.

⁵ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90.

⁶ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force  12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277, art I.

⁷ UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) paras 138-139.

⁸ Rome Statute (n 5) art 28.

⁹ Campaign Against Arms Trade, UK Arms to Saudi Arabia, CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE (Apr. 12, 2022),  https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/uk-arms-to-saudi-arabia/.

¹⁰ Australian Strategic Policy Institute, ‘Uyghurs for Sale: “Re-education,” forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang’  (March 2020).

¹¹ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331,  article 31.

¹² Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v  Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43.

¹³ Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Judgment) IT-98-33-T, ICTY Trial Chamber (2 August 2001).

¹⁴ Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia  v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ Rep 3.

¹⁵ UN OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, Flash Update #170 (24 May 2024) https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-170 accessed 24 July 2025.

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Conflict and Human Rights’ (2023) https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country chapters/democratic-republic-congo accessed 24 July 2025.

¹⁷ UNHCR, Sudan Emergency – Situation Report (May 2025) https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/sudan-emergency accessed 24 July 2025.

¹⁸ UNHCR, Ukraine Refugee Situation (2023) https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine accessed 24 July 2025.

¹⁹ Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: Crimes Against Humanity’ (2018) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/myanmar-army-crimes-against-humanity-rohingya/ accessed  24 July 2025.

²⁰ UNDP/Pardee Centre, Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen: Pathways for Recovery (November 2021)  https://www.undp.org/yemen/publications/assessing-impact-war-yemen-pathways-recovery accessed 24 July 2025.

²¹ Associated Press, ‘Displaced Syrians who have returned home face a fragile future’ (20 June 2025)  https://apnews.com/article/0f3ba6e3045fa01d94f1c8ccc5ec124f accessed 24 July 2025; UNHCR, Syria Refugee Crisis  Explained (2025) https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/ accessed 24 July 2025.

²² UN OHCHR, ‘Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang’ (10 August 2022) https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-4.pdf accessed 24 July 2025.

²³ UN Charter (n 3) Preamble and arts 1(3), 55.

²⁴ ibid arts 55-56.

²⁵ Genocide Convention (n 6) art I.

²⁶ Bosnia v Serbia (n 12) paras 427-438.

²⁷ Rome Statute (n 5) art 25(3)(c).

²⁸ ibid art 28.

²⁹ Geneva Convention I art 1; Geneva Convention II art 1; Geneva Convention III art 1; Geneva Convention IV (n 4) art 1.

³⁰ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of  International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3, art  1(1).

³¹ South Africa v Israel (n 1) Application, paras 132-142.

³² UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, ‘Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding  Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/42/CRP.5 (16 September 2019).

³³ UN Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations  “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).

³⁴ Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC § 1350 (1789).

³⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI) ‘Arms Transfers Database’ (2024)  https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers accessed 15 January 2025.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region’ (26 February 2018).

³⁷ UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ‘Final Report’ UN Doc S/2023/990 (15 December 2023).

³⁸ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Mali: Situation of human rights’ UN Doc A/HRC/54/27 (28  August 2023).

³⁹ UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (n 7) paras 138-139.

⁴⁰ Bosnia v Serbia (n 12) para 430.

⁴¹ ibid paras 450-463.

⁴² The Gambia v Myanmar (n 14) para 86.

⁴³ South Africa v Israel (n 1) para 86. South Africa v Israel, Order of 26 January 2024, para 86 <https://www.icj cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf> accessed 25 July 2025.

⁴⁴Prosecutor v Bemba (Judgment on the appeals of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Mr Jean Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Mr Fidèle Babala Wandu and Mr Narcisse Arido against the decision of Trial Chamber VII  entitled ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’) ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Appeals Chamber (8 June 2018).

⁴⁵ Prosecutor v Putin and Lvova-Belova (Warrant of Arrest for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin) ICC-02/17-138, Pre-Trial  Chamber II (17 March 2023).

⁴⁶ Prosecutor v Netanyahu and Gallant (Warrant of Arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu) ICC-01/18-199, Pre-Trial Chamber I (21  November 2024). Prosecutor v Netanyahu and Gallant, ICC-01/18-199, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 21 November 2024  <https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Q_As/ECCHR_QA_arrest_warrant_ICC_Netanjahu_Gallant_042025.pdf> accessed 25  July 2025

⁴⁷ UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1593 (2005)’ UN Doc S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005).

⁴⁸ Prosecutor v Krstić (Appeals Judgment) IT-98-33-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber (19 April 2004).

⁴⁹ ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Statement on the conclusion of the preliminary examination of the Situation in Palestine’  (20 December 2019).

⁵⁰ Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011).

⁵¹ Prosecutor v Raslan (Judgment) Higher Regional Court of Koblenz (13 January 2022).

⁵² Prosecutor v Lafarge SA (Cour d’appel de Paris, 31 May 2023).

⁵³ UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2019/756 (vetoed by Russia and China, 19 December 2019).

⁵⁴ UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2023/1028 (vetoed by United States, 8 December 2023).

⁵⁵ UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2022/577 (vetoed by China, 22 July 2022).

⁵⁶ Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Report of the Investigation and Identification Team Regarding the  Incident in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018’ Doc S/1867/2020 (1 March 2020).

⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, ‘Yemen: Events of 2023’ in World Report 2024 (Human Rights Watch 2024). <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/yemen> accessed 25 July 2025.

⁵⁸ UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Visit to China: Report of the Working Group on the issue of human  rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ UN Doc A/HRC/47/39/Add.1 (11 June 2021).

⁵⁹ UN Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, ‘Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts  on Ethiopia’ UN Doc A/HRC/54/55 (18 September 2023).

⁶⁰ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 et seq. (2023), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78dd-1 accessed 25 July 2025.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art’ (June 2006).

⁶² Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 569 US 108 (2013); Nestlé USA, Inc v Doe, 593 US 628 (2021) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/593/19-416/ accessed 25 July 2025.

⁶³ Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (n 55).

⁶⁴ Prosecutor v Putin and Lvova-Belova (n 37).

⁶⁵ Prosecutor v Netanyahu and Gallant (n 38).

⁶⁶ ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Statement of Prosecutor Karim AA Khan KC on the Situation in Sudan’ (4 May 2023).

⁶⁷ ICC Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation’ (15 September 2016) para 42.

⁶⁸ International Commission of Jurists, ‘Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability’ (2021).

⁶⁹ UN General Assembly, ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria’ UN Doc A/RES/71/248 (21  December 2016); UN Human Rights Council, ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Myanmar’ UN Doc  A/HRC/RES/39/2 (27 September 2018).

⁷⁰ Directive (EU) 2024/1760 on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (n 55).

⁷¹ International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity’ in Report of  the International Law Commission, Seventy-first session, UN Doc A/74/10 (2019).

⁷² International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Pandora Papers (2021) <https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/> accessed 15 January 2025.

⁷³ UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1966 (2010)’ UN Doc S/RES/1966 (22 December 2010).

⁷⁴ N General Assembly, ‘Uniting for peace’ UN Doc A/RES/377(V) (3 November 1950).

⁷⁵ UN General Assembly, ‘Business and human rights’ UN Doc A/RES/78/162 (19 December 2023).

⁷⁶ See generally Steven R Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law  Journal 443.

⁷⁷ Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [International Crimes Code] (Germany, 2002); Act concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches  of International Humanitarian Law (Belgium, 1993, as amended).

⁷⁸ UN General Assembly, ‘Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’  UN Doc A/RES/78/268 (26 February 2024).

⁷⁹ Council Regulation (EU) 2024/386 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Gaza [2024] OJ L 2024/386  <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/386/oj/eng> accessed 25 July 2025.