V. Surendra Mohan v. Union of India (2019)

Case Note: V. Surendra Mohan v. Union of India (2019)

Citation: 446.Surendra Mohan v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 14 SCC 446.

Introduction

This case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India raised the crucial issue of rights of persons with disabilities, particularly in the context of their eligibility for judicial service. The petitioner, a visually impaired person, challenged certain provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and rules framed under it, which restricted blind persons from being appointed as judges.  The decision has generated debate regarding the balance between inclusivity and functionality in public office, and the constitutional protection of persons with disabilities under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The central controversy revolved around the Delicate balance between formal equality and substantive equality. While the Constitution guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws under Article 14, along with a mandate against discrimination under Article 15, these guarantees require interpretation in the light of evolving societal realities. The petitioner argued that disqualifying a visually impaired person outright from the judiciary amounted to treating disability as an inherent incapacity, thereby perpetuating stigma and exclusion. Conversely, the Union of India defended the criteria by stressing the functional demands of judicial office, which, according to the State, inherently required full and independent visual capacity, especially for reading lengthy case records, appreciating evidence, and maintaining court efficiency. This dispute was not merely about the eligibility of one individual, but about how the Indian legal system understands disability, competence, and accommodation. The RPwD Act, 2016, modeled on the UNCRPD, envisions a social model of disability which recognizes that barriers are often created by society rather than the impairment itself. The Act emphasizes “reasonable accommodation” and the duty of the State to make public offices accessible. However, the challenge in this case highlighted the gap between statutory ideals and institutional practices.

In adjudicating the matter, the Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether the exclusion of persons with blindness and low vision from judicial service was a legitimate and constitutionally valid classification, or whether it amounted to an unconstitutional denial of equal opportunity. The broader question was whether the judiciary, as the custodian of constitutional values, should set an example of inclusivity by rethinking traditional notions of judicial competence, or whether it should uphold restrictions based on administrative and functional concerns. The significance of this case lies not only in its outcome but also in the jurisprudential tensions it exposed. On the one hand, there is the aspiration of a transformative Constitution that seeks to empower marginalized groups and dismantle systemic discrimination. On the other, there are the practical considerations of institutional efficiency and the perceived limitations of technology and accommodations in the judicial process. The decision thus became a site where law, disability studies, and constitutional morality intersected.  Moreover, the case sheds light on the slow pace of disability rights recognition in India, despite progressive legislation. It also compels critical reflection on whether blanket exclusions are compatible with the principles of individual  assessment of ability, especially in an era when assistive technologies, screen readers, and digital tools have significantly bridged the accessibility gap for visually impaired persons across professions.

This case brought into sharp focus the tension between the constitutional mandate of equal opportunity and the State’s concerns regarding the functional requirements of the judiciary, thus making it a landmark decision in the discourse on inclusivity and accessibility in the justice delivery system. 

Facts of the Case

• The petitioner, V. Surendra Mohan, was a practicing advocate and a person with 100% blindness. 
• He applied for the post of a District Judge in the State of Tamil Nadu.
• However, his candidature was rejected because under the Rules governing appointment of judges, only persons with certain categories of disabilities (up to 40%) were eligible.
• A person with complete blindness was not considered eligible, on the reasoning that judicial work requires constant reading of case files, appreciation of documents, and observation of witnesses.
• Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the exclusion as discriminatory and unconstitutional, claiming violation of his fundamental rights.

 Issues Raised

1. Whether excluding blind persons from eligibility for appointment as judges violates Articles 14 (equality), 19 (freedom of profession), and 21 (right to dignity) of the Constitution?
2. Whether such exclusion is contrary to the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which aims to promote full participation and equality of persons with disabilities?
3. Can administrative efficiency and functional requirements justify restrictions on the scope of employment for persons with disabilities?

Arguments

Petitioner’s Contentions

• Exclusion of totally blind persons amounts to unjust discrimination.
• Modern technology, such as screen readers and digital case management tools, makes it possible for blind persons to perform judicial duties effectively.
• The spirit of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), ratified by India, obliges the State to ensure equal opportunities.
• Judicial service should not be denied on the stereotypical assumption that blindness renders a person incapable.  

Respondents’ Contentions

• The State argued that the work of a judge requires visual assessment of witnesses, perusal of evidence, and appreciation of demeanor, which are not possible for a totally blind person.
• The classification Is reasonable, as it is based on the functional requirement of the job.
• The Rules under the Disabilities Act are not arbitrary, but framed with the aim of ensuring effective justice delivery.

Judgment

The Supreme Court (Division Bench) dismissed the petition and upheld the exclusion.

Key Reasoning

• The Court recognized the principle of equal opportunity, but held that reasonable restrictions can be imposed if the nature of work demands it.
• Judicial work involves reading and analyzing voluminous documents, assessing oral testimony, and observing witness behavior, which require sight.
• The Court held that it was not feasible for a blind person to discharge the functions of a judge in the traditional setting of Indian courts.
• The classification excluding blind persons from judgeship was therefore held to be rational and not violative of Article 14.

Critical Analysis

• The judgment reflects a conservative approach, prioritizing functionality over inclusivity.
• Critics argue that the Court missed an opportunity to expand the scope of reasonable accommodation by directing the State to adopt technological aids to empower blind persons.
• The reliance on traditional methods of court functioning ignored the evolving digital ecosystem where blind advocates already argue cases effectively.
• The ruling seems inconsistent with the progressive vision of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and India’s international obligations under the UNCRPD. 

Constitutional Provisions Involved

• Article 14 – Equality before law and equal protection of laws.
• Article 19(1)(g) – Freedom to practice any profession.
• Article 21 – Right to life with dignity.
• Article 41 – Directive Principle requiring the State to provide opportunities for securing the right to work, education, and public assistance in cases of disability. 

Conclusion

The Supreme Court in V. Surendra Mohan upheld the exclusion of totally blind persons from judicial service on grounds of practical limitations. While the Court stressed the importance of equal opportunity, it gave primacy to the administrative efficiency of justice delivery. From a rights-based perspective, however, the judgment has drawn criticism for taking a narrow and medicalized view of disability, rather than adopting the social model of disability which the UNCRPD and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 embody. By not adequately exploring the possibility of reasonable accommodation, assistive technology, and support systems that could enable visually impaired persons to perform judicial functions, the Court missed an opportunity to strengthen inclusivity within the justice system. The ruling, while legally justified on grounds of maintaining efficiency and practicality in judicial decision-making, reveals the judiciary’s cautious approach when it comes to restructuring traditional notions of “ability” and “competence.” It underscores the Court’s preference to prioritize institutional convenience and perceived functional limitations over a transformative reading of constitutional equality.

In broader terms, the case highlights the urgent need for progressive reforms in the recruitment and accommodation of persons with disabilities, particularly in high offices. While certain roles may present genuine challenges, blanket exclusions run the risk of reinforcing stereotypes rather than dismantling them. The real challenge lies in striking a balance: ensuring efficiency in institutions while also fulfilling India’s constitutional promise of dignity, equality, and non-discrimination.

 This judgment has been criticized as a step backward in the disability rights movement, as it narrows the scope of inclusivity under the Disabilities Act, 2016. A more progressive interpretation could have directed the government to adopt reasonable accommodations and assistive technology. Thus, the judgment serves both as a reminder of the judicial conservatism that sometimes limits disability rights and as a call for continued advocacy to reimagine accessibility in all sectors of governance. The way forward lies not in exclusion, but in creating systems where persons with disabilities are given fair opportunities, along with the support and accommodations necessary to enable them to contribute meaningfully to society and institutions of justice.

Reference(S):

• V. Surendra Mohan v. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 14 SCC 446.
• The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.
• Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19, 21, 41.
• UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).
• Singh, P. “Judicial Exclusion and Disability Rights in India: A Critical Review,” Indian Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 12, 2019.