Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors (1985)

Equivalent Citation: 1985 AIR 945

Court Name: The Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: CJI Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice Misra Rangnath, Justice D.A. Desai, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice Venkataramiah

Bench Type: Constitutional Bench

Date of Judgment: 23 April 1985

Parties Involved:

• Petitioner: Ahmed Khan
• Respondent: Shah Bano Begum And Ors.

Facts of the Case :

The appellant, who works as an advocate, was married to the respondent in 1932. They had three sons and two daughters. In 1975, he expelled her from the matrimonial home. In April 1978, the respondent applied under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[1] To the Court of the Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Indore, for maintenance of Rs. 500 per month, citing the appellant’s professional income of approximately Rs. 60,000 per annum. On November 6, 1978, the appellant divorced the respondent by way of triple talaq and said he was under no obligation to pay her maintenance, because he had paid her Rs. 200/- per month during about two years and had deposited Rs. 3,000/- in court as “dower or Mahr” during her “iddat” period. Then, in August 1979, the Magistrate granted the respondent Rs. 25/- month. The respondent presented a revision application for Special Leave Petition, which resulted in the Madhya Pradesh High Court holding that she was entitled to Rs. 179.20 per month as maintenance. The husband contested the High Court finding through a special leave petition.

Issues Raised :

1. Does Section 125 of the CrPC[2] Apply to divorced Muslim women after the iddat period for maintenance purposes?
2. Should secular laws (such as CrPC) prevail or take precedence over the Muslim personal law on maintenance?
3. Is a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) required to place everyone, irrespective of religion, on equal footing regarding personal laws?
4. Can a secular court be able to interpret the application of Islamic law in justifying the maintenance entitlement of divorced Muslim women?
5. What can be the basis to strike a balance between freedom of religion and gender justice in cases regarding personal laws?
6. Does the restriction of maintenance to only the iddat period under Muslim personal law violate the constitutional rights of divorced Muslim women?
7. Should the state intervene concerning the religious personal laws if it brings about better financial security for women post-breakdown of marriage?

Arguments of the Parties :

Arguments by the Petitioner-

1. Limited Maintenance During Iddat Under Muslim Personal Law:

Mohd. Ahmed Khan argued that under Muslim personal law derived from the Sharia, his duty to provide maintenance for his divorced wife — Shah Bano — was limited to the iddat (approximately three months following divorce). He stated that he had discharged his duty by giving Rs. 3975 during the iddat period, and he was not liable for more maintenance.

2. Payment of Financial Responsibilities with Mehr:

The petitioner stated that he had paid the mehr (dower) that he agreed to at the time of marriage because he had discharged all financial responsibilities toward Shah Bano. He also claimed that the mehr, which is a customary payment made under Muslim marriages, was intended so that the wife would have money to provide financial support in case of divorce. As a result, no further maintenance was required under any law.

3. Irrelevance of Section 125 CrPC[3] To Muslim Women:

Khan’s counsel contended that the CrPC is a secular provision that requires maintenance for destitute wives, which should not apply to Muslim women, because Muslim personal law governs their rights and duties. They argued that applying a secular law of maintenance to Muslims (on matters of divorce and maintenance) has steamrolled Muslim religious freedom and prerogatives to adhere to Muslim personal law under the Indian legal system.

4. Religious sovereignty and non-interference with religious laws by secular courts:

The Petitioner argued that Muslim personal law, originating from Islamic belief systems or texts including the Quran and Hadith, constitutes a significant portion of the Muslim community’s life, particularly in enacting its religious and cultural history. There should also not be any interference with or overriding of the religious laws about marriage and divorce by courts of a secular nature based on the Constitution. This is imperative in consideration of the freedom of religion protection under Article 25 of the Constitution[4].

5. Shah Bano Not Destitute:

The attorney for Khan argued that Shah Bano was not destitute within the parameters of a maintenance obligation under Section 125 CrPC.[5]. He argued that Shah Bano received mehr and maintenance during her iddat period, and that as the mother of five adult children, she could “look to the children or other relatives” for maintenance, which stopped the obligation of ongoing maintenance from her former husband.

6. Precedent and Muslim Personal Law:

The petitioner relied on various historical understandings of Muslim personal law and past legal decisions to argue that maintenance beyond the iddat period was not mandatory, and that this is a widely accepted interpretation of Muslim personal law among the Muslim community, and any attempt like it (the application of Section 125 CrPC)[6] To change it would destroy the personal law consistency as applied to Muslims in India.

Arguments by the Respondent-

The respondent Shah Bano Begum, in the Shah Bano case (Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985), argued:

1. The question of the applicability of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)[7]:

Shah Bano argued that Section 125 of the CrPC.[8], a non-religious or secular provision, allowed any destitute wife (including a divorced Muslim wife) to claim maintenance from her husband regardless of the religion of the wife and/or husband, and even if the wife was a divorced Muslim woman, because she could not maintain herself. Section 125[9] Provides that a person with sufficient means shall maintain his wife (including a divorced wife who has not remarried), to avoid vagrancy and destitution under this section.

2. Supremacy of Secular Law over Muslim Personal Law:

The respondent’s argument focused on the premise that the secular provisions of Section 125 CrPC[10] should trump any applicable Muslim personal law, which the husband argued provided for a duty of maintenance to last only for the iddat period of three months from talaq. The counsel for Shah Bano contended that there can be no religious personal law that supersedes a lawful provision like Section 125[11], which was meant to promote social justice and prevent any destitution for individuals in all communities.

The argument provided scope for emphasizing the equal application of CrPC provisions for all inhabitants, and that the otherwise equal application for all religions would offer unequal coverage to Muslim women.

3. Breach of Constitutional Rights:

Shah Bano’s lawyers argued that denying her maintenance beyond the iddat violated her fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution, namely, the right to equality under Article 14[12], and the right to life with dignity under Article 21[13]. They also claimed that limiting maintenance for her based on Muslim personal law discriminated against Muslim women compared with cleaning out women from the other communities, who, if they had the same need for maintenance, could claim it under Section 125[14], with no such limit on their rights. They framed the rejection of maintenance as a form of discrimination against her and a barrier to being able to finance her life honorably, as a divorced, needy woman.

4. Inadequacy of Mehr and Iddat Maintenance:

The respondent did not accept her husband’s argument that his payment of mehr (the dower amount payable at the time of marriage) and maintenance during the iddat period had discharged his financial obligations. Shah Bano did not accept the husband’s case that mehr was a customary obligation of the marital relationship rather than a substitute for ongoing maintenance in the event of poverty.

She further argued that the maintenance paid during the iddat period ( little more than a token amount in her situation) was not an adequate answer to her long-term financial obligations, given her age, lack of earning capacity, and the obligations of raising five children. This argument suggested that there is a need for Section 125 CrPC.[15] To deal with economic deprivation occurring after a divorce of any kind, regardless of the legal obligation to pay under personal law.

5. Maintenance Rights Across Communities:

Shah Bano’s lawyer argued that the principle of equality under the law demanded equality in maintenance rights for Muslim women to women from other communities of religion under Section 125 CrPC.[16]. The court should not exclude Muslim women from maintenance rights or permit an exception for them under the law. By allowing personal law to make an exception for Muslim women, this would compromise or compromise the secular character of the CrPC and perpetuate gender inequality or religious inequalities.

This characterization of the case made it an appeal for equality in protection under the law, contending that every woman be afforded the right to maintenance to avoid being economically vulnerable after divorce, irrespective of the religion professed.

6. Recognition of Economic and Social Vulnerability:

The respondent articulated her specific circumstances to emphasize her need for maintenance: at 62 years old, after 40 years of marriage, Shah Bano was divorced, left with no means, and had her children to support. Her legal team asserted that her age, inability to be employed, and her economic dependency on her husband in the marriage made her particularly vulnerable.

They urged the court to understand the social realities of divorced women, particularly older women, with little means, and interpret Section 125 CrPC.[17] In a manner that acknowledges these vulnerabilities and aligns with the purpose of the provision to prevent destitution.

Judgment :

In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (AIR 1985 SC 945), delivered on April 23, 1985, the Supreme Court of India delivered a critical judgment in favor of Shah Bano and dismissed the appeal of Mohd. Ahmed Khan was against the respective orders of the lower courts, which were granting maintenance to his divorced wife under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)[18]. The five-judge bench, with Chief Justice Y. V. Chandrachud presiding, examined the critical issues of the right of divorced Muslim women to maintenance from their divorced husbands, the application of secular law, and its relationship with Muslim law. On the issue of whether Section 125 of the CrPC[19] applies to all persons, including Muslim women, the court found that Section 125[20] applies to all persons, entitling Shah Bano to maintenance from her former husband, if she could not support herself. The court rejected the argument advanced by Khan that Muslim personal law limits maintenance until the iddat (which is three months from the date of talaq), which limits his obligation for maintenance to three months. The court stressed that Section 125 is a secular provision of law that has been designed specifically to prevent destitution and will make an order irrespective of sect or religion. The judges relied on the authority in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia (1979 AIR 362)[21], where the court found that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC[22], in the event she is still destitute, as the personal law does not restrict her right to maintenance. In a similar case, Fazlunbi v. K. Khader Vali (1980 AIR 1730)[23], the court held that the payment of mehr does not exhaust a wife’s right to ask for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC[24], provided there are economic consequences for the wife. These cases supported the court’s finding that Shah Bano, a 62-year-old woman with no other source of income, was entitled to maintenance beyond the iddat time frame because she was not in a position to support herself. The Court considered Khan’s argument that his payment of Rs. 3,000 during the iddat period and the mehr had satisfied his financial responsibilities under Muslim personal law. The judges concluded that mehr is a contractual obligation related to the marriage—it is not a defence to maintenance under Section 125[25], which deals with continuing destitution. The judges found that the factual circumstances surrounding Shah Bano’s financial deprivation, the age at which she had approached the court, her lack of employment, and her responsibility for five children established a legitimate basis for continued maintenance. The judges enforced the order from the Madhya Pradesh High Court that went order that ordered Khan to pay Rs. 179.20 per month under the view that Shah Bano’s financial deprivation continued after the end of the iddat period, and under Section 125, the husband must relieve financial deprivation. The Supreme Court went on to look at Islamic law in an attempt to refute Khan’s claims based on Muslim personal law, determining that Section 125 was not in conflict with Islamic tenets. The judges referred to Surah Al-Baqarah (2:241-242)[26] of the Quran, which establishes a reasonable provision for a divorced woman, asserting that this constituted a maintenance requirement for a destitute ex-wife. The Court held that this was consistent with the purpose of Section 125 of the Crimes Procedure Code (CrPC)[27], to enable the ability of a woman to take care of a family while determining that Khan’s obligations did not cease with the iddat period. The Court’s interpretation of Surah Al-Baqarah reinforced the availability of the CrPC to Shah Bano’s case, allowing her the right to maintenance under secular law. The Court also refuted Khan’s argument that applying Section 125 to Muslim women infringed upon religious freedoms protected under Article 25 of the Constitution[28]. The judges were clear that Section 125 is secular and has a purpose of social welfare applicable to all communities. They cited Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal (1970 AIR 446)[29], where the Supreme Court stated that the CrPC was applicable across the board. The Court found that to deny Muslim women access to section 125 was to violate equality guarantees in Article 14[30], as it would amount to unequal treatment based on religion. Accordingly, Shah Bano’s right to maintenance was affirmed as a matter of legal equality and justice. The Court also dismissed Khan’s argument that Shah Bano was not destitute since she could turn to her adult children or family for support. The judges pointed out that Section 125[31] is concerned with the obligation of the husband to maintain a destitute wife, and simply because she was a married woman does not take away the obligation (until she remarries or has enough income). Given the circumstances of Shah Bano’s case, whereby she was divorced from Khan after 40 years of marriage, there was no evidence to suggest she had any income and she had dependents, there was a need for maintenance. The Court upheld the lower court’s orders dismissing the appeal and directing Khan to pay Rs. 179.20 per month, and the cost relies on this application of Section 125[32] towards Muslim women in similar situations.

Ratio Decidendi :

The Supreme Court’s ratio decidendi was that the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 125) applies to all citizens, including Muslim women. Thus, a divorced woman like Shah Bano cannot be denied maintenance if she cannot maintain herself, even though the Muslim personal law limits maintenance to the iddat period. The Court gave a clear indication that married women as autonomous agents have a right to maintenance during and after divorce, and payment of mehr or maintenance during the iddat period does not extinguish the husband’s liability under section 125 if the divorced wife is unable to support herself. The Court said that the optional provisions of section 125 override the Muslim personal law, and the purpose of the law was to provide social justice and preserve life and therefore, the Islamic law in section 125 overrides Muslim personal law in terms of the right to maintenance. The Court also found that Islamic law is consistent with providing for the divorced woman based on the Quranic verses noted in its decision, consistent with the purpose of section 125. The application of section 125[33] to Muslim women does not interfere with the right to religion under Article 25 of the Constitution[34], as there has not been a breach of religious freedom, and also it promotes equality under Article 14. As a result, the Court recognised Shah Bano had a right to Rs. 179.20 maintenance and dismissed Mohd. Ahmed Khan’s appeal.

Conclusion :

In this case, the Supreme Court, in its ruling, stated that Section 125 of the CrPC.[35] Applied to Muslim women, and that Bano was entitled to maintenance beyond the iddat period, if thus destitute, in contravention of Muslim Law. The Court noted that the husband’s obligation to pay mehr, or iddat payments, did not relieve him of liability under Section 125, which itself accords with the Islamic tenet of making provisions for women who are divorced. This provision was secular, it promotes equality under the Constitution, it prevents persons from being destitute, it rejected Khan’s appeal, and it upheld Bano’s right to Rs. 179.20 monthly maintenance, thereby achieving justice, despite the subsequent legislation reversing the decision.

Reference(S):

[1] Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (India), s 125

[2] Ibid

[3] s 125

[4] Constitution of India 1950, art 25

[5] Sec 125

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] Sec 125

[11] Ibid

[12] Constitution of India 1950, art 14

[13] Ibid, art 21

[14] S 125, n 12

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid

[21] Bai Tahira v Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia [1979] AIR SC 362

[22] n 21

[23] Fazlunbi v K Khader Vali [1980] AIR SC 1730

[24] n 23

[25] Ibid

[26] Qur’an 2:241–242

[27] n 26

[28] Art 25

[29] Nanak Chand v Chandra Kishore Aggarwal [1970] AIR SC 446

[30] Art 14

[31] n 28

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] n 29

[35] n 34