Authored By: Manya Jaiswal
City Law College
Name of the Case:
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala
Citation: (2019) 11 SCC 1 (the review judgment is 2020, but the main judgment is 2018)
Bench:
Supreme Court of India, 5-Judge Constitution Bench
Bench: CJI Dipak Misra, Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra (dissenting)
Date of the Case:
28th September, 2018
Fact
The Sabarimala shrine in Kerala, which is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, used to bar entry of women between 10 to 50 years, on the ground that the deity was a celibate. The followers insisted that the ban was not discriminatory, but it was necessary in order to maintain the spiritual nature of the temple.
In 1990, the Kerala High Court affirmed the practise by declaring it not to contravene any of the constitutional provisions and stating that the Kerala Travancore Devaswom Board had the power to control entry to temples. So, the ban remained with a court sanction.
In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association approached the Supreme Court in a writ petition under Article 32 and contested the custom. They claimed that the omission of women amounted to a violation of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25 and that the right to worship in a public temple cannot be refused because of sex, and that the practise was a social phenomenon rather than a necessary religious one.
The Travancore Devaswom Board justified the ban by stating that Ayyappa followers were a separate denomination under Article 26 and that such exclusion was connected with the celibacy of the deity. A five-judge Constitution Bench heard the case and issued its historic judgement on 28 September 2018.
Issue
The petition submitted to the Supreme Court concerning the Sabarimala case posed some issues with constitutional implications. The main problems can be summarised as follows:
1 The question of whether the non-admission of women between ten and fifty years to the Sabarimala Temple is a contravention of the fundamental rights under Articles 14,15,17, 21, 25 of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the practise is discriminatory in nature and deprives women of the right to an equal opportunity to enjoy a public place of worship.
2 Whether the tradition of women exclusion can be defended as an essential religious practise pursuant to Article 25. This necessitates the Court to decide whether the restriction is a fundamental aspect of the Ayyappa faith or it is just a social practise that does not receive constitutional protection.
3 This is whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are an independent religious denomination in the text of Article 26. Having been recognised as such, the denomination would have the authority to control its own religious affairs including the prescription of entry rules.
4 The question of whether exclusion of women on the grounds of menstruation is some form of untouchability which is not allowed under Article 17. The petitioners argue that in this manner menstruating women are treated as impure which is not constitutional and goes beyond caste-based exclusion to include untouchability.
5 The question of whether the rights of a religious denomination as contained in Articles 25 and 26 are liable to the overall concepts of constitutional morality, equality and dignity of the individual.
Argument Advanced
Arguments on behalf of the Petitioners (Indian Young Lawyers Association and Others):
1 Violation of Equality and Non-Discrimination:
The petitioners explained that the exclusion of women on grounds of biological aspects contravened Articles 14 and 15 because the State cannot justify any practise that breeds gender discrimination particularly in depriving women of equal rights to worship in a public place.
2 Right to Worship under Article 25:
It was claimed that the right of worship is given to everyone not to select few devotees. Women as citizens have a right to equal access of the spiritual as men. Based on this, the ban puts an unreasonable limitation on their right to practise their religion freely.
3 Not an Essential Religious Practice:
The petitioners filed that the ban on women is a social practise based on patriarchal ideas of impurity relating to menstruation, and no longer a ritual of the religion. Their point was that the doctrine of necessary religious practises defends only those practises that constitute the very basis of a religion, and not practises that discriminate or exclude.
4 Constitutional Morality over Religious Morality:
By applying the constitutional supremacy principle, the petitioners claimed that constitutional morality should be superior when religious practises are against those fundamental rights. They emphasised that dignity and equality are the leading elements of the constitutional scheme and no tradition could prevail over them.
5 Extension of Article 17:
The tradition, which associates menstruating women with impure creatures, establishes a structural marginalisation that contravene the requirement of Article 17.
Argument on behalf of the respondent:
1 Distinct Religious Denomination under Article 26:
The respondents claimed that the followers of Lord Ayyappa form a different religious group that is marked by its unique rituals and practises such as the celibacy of the deity. In this vein, they argued that Article 26 gives them the freedom to run their affairs without state interference.
2 Essential Religious Practice:
The respondents continued to insist that the restriction has been practised over centuries and it is part of the religion. They cautioned that by striking down the practise, they would have overstepped their judicial authority in the area of religious affairs which is forbidden in the Constitution.
3 Judicial Non-Interference in Matters of Faith:
The respondents underlined that Article 25 protects the rights of individual people and the rights of a certain category of religions as well. They contended that courts were unprepared to rule on practises which were crucial to a religion and ought to leave the decision to the religious faith of believers.
4 Not a Case of Untouchability:
It was strongly argued that Article 17 is limited to caste-based exclusion based on untouchability. The respondents defended the exclusion of women by saying that it was not due to impurity or inferiority but to the fact that this would maintain the special spiritual nature of the shrine.
5 Preservation of the Deity’s Celibacy:
The main reason was that Lord Ayyappa is a Naishtika Brahmachari (perpetual celibate). This restriction was said to be part and parcel of the identity of the temple and its practises, as the presence of women of reproductive age had been inconsistent with this vow of celibacy.
Judgement
The majority of the Supreme Court (4:1) ruled that the decision of age exclusion of women in the Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional. This ruling, which was passed on 28 September 2018, has made a historic contribution to the Indian constitutional jurisprudence.
Majority Opinion (CJI Dipak Misra, Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, and D.Y. Chandrachud):
1 Violation of Equality and Non-Discrimination:
Most of them believed that the system of not allowing women between 10 to 50 years old to enter the temple was unconstitutional since it was a breach of Article 14 and 15. The Court noted that simply because of the biological characteristics, a woman must be deprived of the right to worship. Public places of worship should be made equally accessible to everyone irrespective of the gender.
2 Article 25 Right to Worship:
It was pointed out that the freedom of religion contained in Article 25 does not belong to men nor to a certain sect of religious believers. Most of them reasoned that the ban denied the women their primary right to worship and to practise religion in a publicly open temple.
3 No Separate Religious Denomination:
The Court overturned the fact that Ayyappa devotees are a religious sect. Most people came to the conclusion that the followers of Lord Ayyappa lack specific religious beliefs and identity to be termed as a denomination in Article 26. They are therefore unable to assert protective powers to control religious matters in a way that leaves women out.
4 Essential Religious Practices Doctrine:
Most of them reviewed whether the restriction was a central religious practise. It believed that the non-inclusivity of women was not necessary to the Hinduism or the veneration of Lord Ayyappa. Rather, it was treated as a social practise that is based on patriarchal ideas of purity and impurity that are related to menstruation.
Dissenting Opinion: (Justice Indu Malhotra):
The strongest dissent was made by Justice Indu Malhotra who warned that the judiciary should not interfere in religious affairs.
1 Autonomy of Religious Denominations:
She believed that the followers of Lord Ayyappa constitute a separate religious denomination which should be given protection under Article 26. In her view, the exclusionary practise was part of the nature of the deity as a celibate and thus, judicial intervention would be tantamount to a re-writing of religious practises.
2 Non-Interference Principle:
Justice Malhotra pointed out that matters of faith were generally to be left to the people who practised the religion. According to her, the courts should not take a position that a practise is either rational or necessary unless that action is obviously egregious or that it violates the general order, health, or morality.
3 Article 25 as a Qualified Right:
She pointed out that the right to religion under Article 25 is not absolute but it is limited by the rights of religious denominations. Consequently, the right of the women to worship has to be pitted off with the right of the denomination to maintain its custom.
4 Article 17 Not Applicable:
Justice Malhotra did not approve the extension of Article 17 to exclusion on ground of menstruation. She emphasised that untouchability had always been and still is constitutionally limited to caste-based discrimination and expanding beyond it would be a stretch to completely disregard the purpose of the framers.
Ratio Decendi
Sabarimala judgement set a number of binding principles at the crossroads of religious freedom and constitutional guarantees:
1 Primacy of Constitutional Morality:
The Court emphasised the fact that the Constitution is the supreme source of authority. In a situation where one of the religious practises goes against the constitutional values of equality, dignity, and liberty, constitutional morality should take effect. The Constitution imposes the discipline of legitimacy of customs and traditions.
2 Right to Worship to Everybody:
Most of them explained that the freedom of religion in Article 25 applies to everyone and cannot be granted to men or few adherents. It is unconstitutional to exclude women merely on the basis of biological features that does not respect their right to worship.
3 Limits of the Essential Religious Practices Doctrine:
The Court upheld that it was only fundamental practises of the faith that are safeguarded under Article 25. Women had not been excluded at Sabarimala because it was not considered as critical to the Hindu faith as well as worshipping Lord Ayyappa. Traditions based on patriarchal ideas cannot be considered as necessary practises.
4 No Separate Religious Denomination for Ayyappa Devotees:
The Court found that followers of Lord Ayyappa fail to fulfil the requirements of a distinct religious denomination in Article 26. They, therefore, cannot purport to exercise the independence to impose exclusionary practises.
5 Expanded Understanding of Article 17:
The opinion of Justice D.Y.Chandrachud extended the meaning of untouchability in Article 17 to cover exclusionary practises on the basis of menstruation. Even though not universally accepted, this argument expanded the constitutional interpretation of institutionalised discrimination.
Conclusion
The ruling of Sabarimala is a landmark moment in constitutional history in India, because the Supreme Court restated the principle that equality and dignity are the foundations of the Republic. The Court eliminated the exclusion of women in the shrine, thereby emphasising that religious freedom should not be used as an excuse to practise discrimination. The ruling raised constitutional morality over social ideas of purity and impurity, which helped to make it understandable that faith has to develop within the framework of the basic rights. At the same time, the highly vocal opposition of Justice Indu Malhotra made us understand how tricky the meddling of the judges in religious affairs can be, as it is possible to remember that the balance between the religion and the constitutional rights is fragile. The debate and review proceedings in which it takes place show that Sabarimala is not just a case; it is more of a litmus test of how various constitutional values can be used to redefine traditions in the pluralistic, diverse society that India is.
