Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque and Another vs. Bangladesh and Others

1. Case Title & Citation

Full Name of the Case: Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque and Another vs. Bangladesh and Others

Official Citation: 49 DLR (AD) 1 (1997)

2. Court Name & Bench

Court Name: Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Appellate Division

Bench: A three-judge bench of the Appellate Division presided over this case. The judges were A.T.M. Afzal C.J., Md. Abdur Rouf J., and B.B. Roy Choudhury J.

3. Date of Judgment

The judgment of the Appellate Division was delivered on 25th July 1996.

4. Parties Involved

Petitioner(s) / Appellant(s): Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque, in his capacity as the Secretary-General of the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), a non-governmental organization. BELA was registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. The writ petition was initiated pro bono publico, on behalf of the public.

Respondent(s) / Defendant(s): Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control, and others.

5. Facts of the Case

The case originated from two writ petitions (Writ Petition No. 998 of 1994 and Writ Petition No. 1576 of 1994) filed by Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque and Sekandar Ali Mondol, respectively, in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. The petitions challenged the implementation of the Compartmentalization Pilot Project (FAP-20) in the Tangail District, which was a component of the larger Flood Action Plan (FAP) initiated after the devastating floods of 1987 and 1988.

The petitioners alleged that the FAP-20 project was being implemented in “total disregard of the law and the legal system”. They contended that the project would adversely affect and potentially uproot approximately 300,000 people within the project area, with the adverse effects extending to more than a million human lives and a wide range of natural resources, flora, and fauna. A particularly contentious point was the acquisition of only 210 hectares of land for the project, which the petitioners claimed was done without complying with legal requirements, leaving the vast majority of affected people without legitimate compensation or protection of their rights. Furthermore, they claimed there was a lack of genuine public participation, with public meetings allegedly being “show meetings” managed through manipulation.

The High Court Division initially rejected Dr. Farooque’s writ petition on the preliminary ground of locus standi, a procedural bar that requires a petitioner to demonstrate a direct and personal legal injury to be heard by the court. The court found that neither BELA nor its representative had a direct personal grievance that would qualify them as an “aggrieved person” under Article 102 of the constitution. Dr. Farooque subsequently filed an appeal (Civil Appeal No. 24 of 1995) to the Appellate Division to challenge this restrictive interpretation of locus standi.

6. Issues Raised

The central legal issue before the Appellate Division was a constitutional question that had persisted for 24 years: what is the true meaning of the phrase “any person aggrieved” under Article 102(1) and (2)(a) of the constitution? The court had to determine:

• Whether the expression should be confined to a person who has suffered a direct and personal legal injury.
• Whether it could be interpreted more broadly to include a public-spirited citizen or an indigenous association like BELA seeking to remedy a “public wrong or public injury”.
• Whether the fundamental rights of a large, indeterminate number of people could be protected through a public interest litigation filed by an organization not directly affected.

7. Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner/Appellant’s Arguments: The appellant argued that the traditional, restrictive interpretation of locus standi was an outdated relic of the “police state” concept, which did not align with the modern ideal of a “welfare state”. They contended that the FAP-20 project represented an arbitrary and unlawful scheme that posed an “impending threat” to the fundamental rights to life, property, and profession of millions of people. The petitioners asserted that an organization with a “dedicated and sincere record of activism,” like BELA, had a “sufficient interest” to represent the “voiceless people” who were too socially or economically disadvantaged to approach the court themselves. They also framed their argument from a moral and constitutional perspective, arguing they had a duty to protect “Allah’s creation and environment” which they claimed were in “mortal danger of extinction and degradation”. The petitioners claimed that the FAP-20 activities were contrary to law and violated the fundamental rights in Part-III of the Constitution.

Respondent’s Arguments: The research notes do not detail the specific arguments of the government respondents. However, their position would have been to defend the High Court Division’s initial ruling and the established common law doctrine. This traditional adversarial model of litigation holds that a judge is a neutral umpire who only intervenes when a direct conflict between two parties is presented, with the petitioner having to prove a direct legal injury. The government would have likely argued against expanding the scope of locus standi, which could lead to an influx of petitions from individuals without a direct stake in the matter. It is noteworthy that in a similar, related case, the respondents did not challenge the petitioner’s claim of acting in the public interest.

8. Judgment / Final Decision

The Appellate Division delivered a landmark judgment on 25th July 1996. The court allowed the appeal, reversing the High Court’s decision that had rejected the writ petition on the ground of locus standi. The court paved the way for the original FAP-20 writ petition to be heard on its merits, and the case was remitted back to the High Court Division for a substantive hearing.

9. Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

The court’s reasoning was founded on a progressive and purposive interpretation of the Constitution. The core principles established in the judgment are:

• The “Living Document” Doctrine: The court held that the Constitution is “a living document” designed “for all time to come” and that its expressions must receive a “progressive construction” to meet the “needs of the time and demands of the people”.
• Liberalization of Locus Standi: The court liberated the phrase “any person aggrieved” from its restrictive, traditional meaning. It held that where a “public wrong or public injury” or an “invasion of fundamental rights” affects an “indeterminate number of people,” any citizen, or an indigenous association espousing that cause, is a “person aggrieved” and has the right to file a writ petition under Article 102. This made Public Interest Litigation (PIL) a maintainable form of action in Bangladesh.
• Expansion of the Right to Life: The court made a crucial link between the fundamental right to life, as guaranteed by Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution, and the right to a healthy environment. It reasoned that the right to life not only means the protection of life and limbs but also “includes, amongst others, the protection of health and normal longevity of an ordinary human being”. This judicial interpretation transformed the right to a safe environment from a non-justiciable directive principle into an enforceable fundamental right.
• Judicial Discretion: The court reiterated the principle from its earlier decision in the Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman case, stating that the question of locus standi is a matter of the court’s discretion, to be exercised upon “due consideration of the facts and circumstance of each case”. This provided a safeguard against frivolous petitions while upholding the principle of expanded access to justice.

10. Conclusion & Observations

The judgment in Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, 49 DLR AD 1 (1997) is a monumental decision that marked a “turning point” for Public Interest Litigation in Bangladesh. By liberalizing the doctrine of locus standi, the court created a vital legal channel for citizens and civil society organizations like BELA to represent the interests of marginalized and vulnerable communities. This single ruling provided the legal foundation for a wave of subsequent environmental and public health litigation, enabling challenges to issues such as industrial and vehicular pollution.

The case’s most significant contribution is the recognition of the right to a healthy and safe environment as an integral component of the right to life. This provided a powerful and enforceable tool for environmental protection in a country where such a right is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. However, despite this legal victory and the subsequent proliferation of environmental cases, challenges remain. Issues like the slow pace of legal proceedings and the “lax implementation of court orders” continue to hinder the full realization of the rights established by this landmark judgment. The case, therefore, represents not only a historical triumph of legal interpretation but also an ongoing call for a more robust and responsive justice system.